National Security Archive, 8 July 2004
Indonesia's 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by "Free Choice"
Document Release Marks 35th Anniversary
of Controversial Vote and Annexation
Secret Files Show U.S. Support for Indonesia,
Human Rights Abuses by Indonesian Military
Edited by Brad Simpson simpbrad@isu.edu / 208-282-3870
Posted July 9, 2004
Washington, D.C. - July 8, 2004 - "You should tell [Suharto] that we understand the
problems they face in West Irian," national security adviser Henry Kissinger wrote
President Nixon on the eve of Nixon's July 1969 visit to Indonesia. On the 35th
anniversary of West Papua's so-called "Act of Free Choice" and Indonesia's first direct
presidential elections, the National Security Archive posted recently declassified
documents on U.S. policy deliberations leading to Indonesia's controversial 1969
annexation of the territory. The documents detail United States support for Indonesia's
heavy-handed takeover of West Papua despite overwhelming Papuan opposition and
United Nation's requirements for genuine self-determination.
Background
When Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the Dutch
government retained control over the territory of West New Guinea. From 1949 until
1961 the Indonesian government sought to "recover" West New Guinea (later known
as West Irian or West Papua), arguing that the territory, a part of the former
Netherlands East Indies, rightfully belonged with Indonesia.
In late 1961, after repeated and unsuccessful attempts to secure its goals through the
United Nations, Indonesia's President Sukarno declared a military mobilization and
threatened to invade West New Guinea and annex it by force. The Kennedy
administration, fearing that U.S. opposition to Indonesian demands might push the
country toward Communism, sponsored talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia
in the spring of 1962. Negotiations took place under the shadow of ongoing Indonesian
military incursions into West New Guinea and the threat of an Indonesian invasion.
The U.S.-sponsored talks led to the August 1962 New York Agreements, which
awarded Indonesia control of West New Guinea (which it promptly renamed West
Irian) after a brief transitional period overseen by the UN. (Note 1) The agreement
obligated Jakarta to conduct an election on self-determination with UN assistance no
later than 1969. Once in control, however, Indonesia quickly moved to repress political
dissent by groups demanding outright independence for the territory.
U.S. officials understood at the outset that Indonesia would never allow West Irian to
become independent and that it was unlikely to ever allow a meaningful act of
self-determination to take place. The Johnson and Nixon Administrations were equally
reluctant to challenge Indonesian control over West Irian, especially after the
conservative anti-Communist regime of General Suharto took over in 1966 following an
abortive coup attempt which led to the slaughter of an estimated 500,000 alleged
Communists. Suharto quickly moved to liberalize the Indonesian economy and open it
to the West, passing a new foreign investment law in late 1967. The first company to
take advantage of the law was the American mining company Freeport Sulphur, which
gained concessions to vast tracts of land in West Irian containing gold and copper
reserves. (Note 2)
Over six weeks from July to August 1969, U.N. officials conducted the so-called "Act
of Free Choice." Under the articles of the New York Agreement (Article 18) all adult
Papuans had the right to participate in an act of self-determination to be carried out in
accordance with international practice. Instead, Indonesian authorities selected 1022
West Papuans to vote publicly and unanimously in favor of integration with Indonesia.
Despite significant evidence that Indonesia had failed to meet its international
obligations, in November 1969 the United Nations "took note" of the "Act of Free
Choice" and its results, thereby lending support of the world body to Indonesia's
annexation.
Thirty-five years later, as Indonesia holds its first-ever direct Presidential elections, the
international community has come to question the validity of Jakarta's takeover of
West Papua and ongoing human rights abuses there. In March, 88 members of the
Irish Parliament urged Kofi Annan to review the United Nations' role in the 1969 Act of
Free Choice, joining South African Archibishop Desmond Tutu and scores of
non-governmental organizations and European Parliamentarians. On June 28, 2004,
nineteen U.S. Senators sent a letter to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan
urging the appointment of a Special Representative to Indonesia to monitor the human
rights situation in West Papua and the territory of Aceh.
The Documents
The Archives postings include a confidential February 1968 cable from U.S.
Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green. Following a conversation with Indonesian
Foreign Minister Adam Malik about the situation in West Irian, Green concluded that
conditions in the territory are "far from satisfactory and deteriorating." A subsequent
cable reported that Indonesia is "belatedly and almost desperately seeking to develop
support among the peoples of West Irian" for the "Act of Free Choice."
A consular trip to West Irian in early 1968 observed that "the Indonesian government
directs its main efforts" in the territory to "maintaining existing political facilities and
suppressing political dissent." Because of neglect, corruption and repression at the
hands of Indonesian authorities, Western observers agreed almost unanimously that
"Indonesia could not win an open election" and that the vast majority of West Irian's
inhabitants favored independence.
In July of 1968 the UN-appointed Ambassador Fernando Ortiz Sanz arrived in Jakarta
as the Secretary General's Special Representative for assisting Indonesia with the
West Irian plebiscite, as called for by the 1962 New York Agreements.
A confidential cable from the US Embassy to the State Department outlined the
stakes in the upcoming "Act of Free Choice." While cautioning that the U.S.
government "should not become directly involved in this issue," Ambassador Green
worried that Ortiz Sanz or other UN members might "hold out for free and direct
elections" in West Irian, frustrating Indonesia's intention to retain the territory at all
costs. Consequently, U.S. and other Western officials worried about the need to meet
with Ortiz Sanz to "make him aware of political realities." In a confidential October
1968 Airgram the U.S. Embassy reported with relief that Ortiz now "concedes that it
would be inconceivable from the point of view of the interest of the U.N., as well as the
GOI, that a result other than the continuance of West Irian within Indonesian
sovereignty should emerge."
The Indonesian government firmly rejected the possibility of a one-person, one-vote
plebiscite in West Irian, insisting instead on a series of local 'consultations' with just
over 1,000 hand selected tribal leaders (out of an estimated population of 800,000),
conducted in July 1969 with between 6,000-10,000 Indonesian troops spread
throughout the territory. As the U.S. Embassy put it in a July 1969 telegram:
The Act of Free Choice (AFC) in West Irian is unfolding like a Greek tragedy, the
conclusion preordained. The main protagonist, the GOI, cannot and will not permit any
resolution other than the continued inclusion of West Irian in Indonesia. Dissident
activity is likely to increase but the Indonesian armed forces will be able to contain
and, if necessary, suppress it.
Ambassador Frank Galbraith noted on July 9, 1969 that past abuses had stimulated
intense anti-Indonesian and pro-independence sentiment at all levels of Irian society,
suggesting that "possibly 85 to 90%" of the population "are in sympathy with the Free
Papua cause." Moreover, Galbraith observed, recent Indonesian military operations,
which resulted in the deaths of hundreds, possibly thousands of civilians, "had
stimulated fears and rumours of intended genocide among the Irianese."
President Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta in July
1969 while the "Act of Free Choice" was underway. Improving relations with
Indonesia's authoritarian regime was clearly uppermost in the mind of Kissinger, who
characterized Suharto as a "moderate military man ... committed to progress and
reform." In Nixon's secret briefing papers (Document 9 and Document 10) for the visit
Kissinger flatly told the President "you should not raise this issue" of West Irian and
argued "we should avoid any U.S. identification with that act." The White House
generally held to this position throughout the period preceding and following the "Act
of Free Choice."
Although they recognized the deep flaws in the Act and in Indonesia's intentions, U.S.
officials were not interested in creating any problems for a Suharto regime they saw
as nonaligned but pro-Washington. While the U.S. was unwilling to actively intervene
on Indonesia's behalf (an action they thought unnecessary and counterproductive) at
the UN to insure quick General Assembly acceptance of Indonesia's formal takeover
of West Papua, the U.S. quietly signaled that it was uninterested in a lengthy debate
over an issue it viewed as a foregone conclusion and marginal to U.S. interests. In a
secret briefing memo for a meeting with Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States
Soedjakmoto, a State Department official expressed confidence that international
criticism of the "Act of Free Choice" would quickly fade, allowing the Nixon
Administration to move forward with its plans for forging closer military and economic
ties with the authoritarian regime in Jakarta.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Documents
NOTE: The documents featured below were selected for inclusion in this Electronic
Briefing Book. Click here to download the complete set of documents on this issue
(PDF - 7.6 MB).
Document 1
February 29, 1968
Subject: West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
The U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, reports on a conversation with
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik on West Irian. Malik suggests the possibility
of reducing the more than 10,000 Indonesian troops serving in Irian. He also hints
Indonesia will insist on indirect means for ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of
the territory in 1969, perhaps relying on tribal leaders who can be induced with "favors
for them and their tribes." Green expresses concern about the "deteriorating"
situation.
Document 2
May 2, 1968
Subject: West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green, reports on a conversation with
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik in which Malik outlines some of the
measures Jakarta is undertaking in an attempt to build support among the people of
West Irian for merger with Indonesia.
Document 3
May 10, 1968
Subject: Consular Trip to West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Airgram
In January, 1968 Embassy Political Consul Thomas Reynders visits West Irian for one
month. Renyders observes the relatively low level of economic development in the
territory since Indonesia assumed control in 1962, noting that "The Indonesian
government's presence in West Irian is expressed primarily in the form of the Army."
Reynders concludes, as have nearly all Western observers, that "Indonesia will not
accept Independence for West Irian and will not permit a plebiscite that would reach
such an outcome" and notes the "antipathy or outright hatred believed to be harbored
toward Indonesia and Indonesians by West Irians in the relatively developed and
sophisticated areas."
Document 4
August 20, 1968
Subject: The Stakes in West Irian's "Act of Free Choice"
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
US Ambassador Marshall Green suggests "Act of Free Choice" in West Irian "May
well be the most important political issue in Indonesia during the coming year." Notes
Indonesian "dilemma" in seeking "to devise some meaningful way to conduct
ascertainment which will not involve real risks of loss of West Irian." Green reminds
the State Department, in urging a hands-off approach by the U.S., that "we are
dealing here essentially with stone age, illiterate tribal groups" and that "free elections
among groups such as this would be more of a farce than any rigged mechanism
Indonesia could devise."
Document 5
August 4, 1968
Subject: "Act of Free Choice" in West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
Marshall Green writes to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific G. McMurtry Godley expressing concern over the views of U.N. Special
Representative for West Irian Ortiz Sanz. Green recommends that "in view of high
stakes ... we should do anything we can indirectly to make him aware of political
realities" regarding Indonesian intentions toward West Irian.
Document 6
October 4, 1968
Subject: West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Airgram
Embassy Political Consul Jack Lydman describes the results of Ortiz Sanz's recent
orientation visit to West Irian and asserts that Sanz is now "attempting to devise a
formula for an "act of free choice" in West Irian which will result in an affirmation of
Indonesian sovereignty" yet "stand the test of international opinion."
Document 7
June 9, 1969
Subject: Assessment of Irian situation
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
On the eve of the "Act of Free Choice," the U.S. embassy offers a highly critical
appraisal of Indonesia's determination to insure West Irian's integration, concluding
that from Jakarta's standpoint "separation is unthinkable." After detailing Indonesian
efforts to repress "increasingly desperate" supporters of independence for West Irian,
Embassy concludes with concern for "future Indonesian relations with Irianese," many
of whom display a "festering antagonism and distrust of Indonesians."
Document 8
June 9, 1969
Subject: West Irian: The Nature of the Opposition
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Airgram
Galbraith offers a detailed assessment of the views of various Irian groups opposed to
integration with Indonesia and advocating independence, including the Free Papua
Movement (OPM). He observes that "opposition to the GOI stems from economic
deprivation over the years, military repression and capriciousness, and
maladministration," and suggests that anti-Indonesian groups will be unable to alter
the final outcome of the "Act of Free Choice."
Documents 9 and 10
June 10 and July 18, 1969
Subject: Djakarta Visit: Your Meetings with President Suharto
Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the President
National security adviser Henry Kissinger briefs President Nixon on his visit to
Indonesia and likely conversations with Indonesian President Suharto. Kissinger
argues that there is no U.S. interest in getting involved in the issue of West Irain and
that it is certain its people will choose integration with Indonesia. In Nixon's talking
points, Kissinger urges that the President refrain from raising the issue except to note
U.S. sympathy with Indonesia's concerns.
Document 11
August 25, 1969
Subject: Call by Indonesian Ambassador Soedjakmoto
U.S. State Department, Secret Memorandum
Paul Gardner briefs Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green on his visit with
Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S. Soedjakmoto, who is expected to ask for help
from the U.S. in "preparing smooth U.N. handling" of the "Act of Free Choice" in the
General Assembly.
Notes
1. For an excellent overview of the events leading up to the New York Agreement, see
Jones, Matthew. Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the
United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge Press,
2002): 31-62; C.L.M. Penders. The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Colonization
and Indonesia, 1945-1962 (Hawaii, 2002); John Saltford. The United Nations and the
Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969 (Routledge, 2003).
2. Denise Leith. The Politics of Power: Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia (Hawaii, 2003).
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