by Jen Caspari
The traumatic fact of Vietnam has hypnotized the United States; policy makers and public alike have been affected. Not only is it a matter of whether national policy is right or wrong, withdrawal too fast or too slow, and the costs extravagant or reasonable. It raises the question of whether the nation should get involved again under similar circumstances, and if so on what scale. Thus Vietnam not only colors current policy, it affects future policy as well. Vietnam has been a significant event in the history of American foreign policy; it has generated a reassessment both of conceptual foundations of past foreign policy and of America’s image of the world in which that policy has been based. It has forced the United States to reevaluate its national priorities and to probe the probable consequences, which any redefinition of the national interest would engender. (Gregg and Kegley, p. 2 &3.)
Perhaps the most immediate response to Vietnam - discernible at all levels of American society- was that never again should the United States government embark upon interventionist policies that might run the risk of rupturing the very fabric of American society. The cry of “No More Vietnams!” was one that would echo down the years, sounding in the ears of all of those politicians, strategists, and propagandists, with an interest in protecting United States power around the world to safeguard perceived American interests. “Vietnam was a terrible shock to the American culture. The resulting loss of confidence had led to a years-long reluctance in the United States to intervene in the developing world to protect its allies against Communist “subversion”, “threat”, and “aggression”. (Simons, p. 12.) This lack of confidence was signaled by the journal Business Week in 1979: “This perception of paralysis was confirmed when the United States stood by helplessly as Russian-backed insurgents, aided by Cuban troops, took over Angola. And it was enhanced when the Soviet-aligned Ethiopian government crushed separatist movements in Eritrea and Ogden. In such circumstances the Vietnam Syndrome is not merely a misguided policy approach, but evidence of a far more profound psychological disorder.” (Simons, p.12.)
Vietnam left American “crippled psychologically” to the point in Richard Nixon’s perception, “that the United States was unable to defend its interests in the developing world.” The psychological impairment was such that the United States retreated, like a traumatized individual, “into a five-year, self-imposed exile…critics of American involvement abroad brandished “another Vietnam” like a scepter, an all-purpose argument-stopper for any situation where it was being asserted that the United States should do something rather than nothing." (Simons, p.10.) Nixon believed that the American ineptness in Vietnam had even encouraged many to wonder if there would ever be circumstances in which it would be wise for Washington to order an armed intervention. Nixon stated, “Thus did our Vietnam defeat tarnish our ideals, weaken our spirit, cripple our will, and turn us into a military giant and a diplomatic dwarf in the world in which the steadfast exercise of American power was needed more than ever before.” (Simons, p.13.) At the end of the war millions of people across the United States were emotionally exhausted, bewildered by the years-long struggle that was at once incomprehensible and deeply disturbing. Then there began a long healing process, and the painful learning of lessons that might guide future policies around the world. After Vietnam American policy was constructed in the full consciousness of the inadequacies of military might in molding behavior. America’s military superiority no longer guaranteed that Americans would be safe from conflicts abroad. It is one of the great paradoxes of the nuclear age that our development of such vast destructive potential has rendered useless, rather than more secure. (Gregg and Kegley, p.7.)
Indeed the Vietnam War was by far the most convulsive and traumatic of America’s foreign policy. The war discredited the postwar policy of containment and undermined the consensus that supported it. The destroying of the consensus left Americans confused and deeply divided on the goals to be pursued and the methods used. From the Angolan crisis in the mid 1970s to Central America in the 1980s to the Persian Gulf in 1990, foreign policy issues were viewed through the prism of Vietnam and debated in its context. Popular divisions on the gulf crisis derived to a large extent for the Vietnam experience, and the Gulf War was fought on the basis of its perceived lessons. (Herring, p. 1 &9.)
“The Vietnam Syndrome” had both institutional and subjective manifestations. Institutionally, the “syndrome” assumed a number of specific forms: (1) The War Powers Act and other legislative restrictions on presidential war-making abroad; (2) the abolition of conscription and the establishment of an all-volunteer service; (3) restrictions on covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies; and (4) military alliances with "surrogate gendarmes" like Iran and Egypt. (Klare, p.2) These developments had profound consequences for the entire national security establishment. The Armed Services lost nearly one-half of their uniformed personnel, thus eliminating future openings for thousands of generals, admirals, and other top career officers. The Pentagon budget was reduced causing a significant drop in business for the nation’s bloated arms industry. The CIA was forced to undergo an unprecedented public probe of its secret operations and lost many veteran workers through a massive layoff of senior personnel. (Klare, p.2.)
The United States also paid a high political cost for the Vietnam War. It weakened public faith in government, and in the honesty and competence of its leaders. Indeed, skepticism, if not cynicism, and a high degree of suspicion and distrust toward authority of all kind characterized the views of an increasing number of Americans in the wake of the war. The military, especially, was discredited for years. Americans after the war neither respected not trusted public institutions. They were wary of official calls to intervene abroad in the cause of democracy and freedom. Thus, a new consensus rose among foreign policy makers, reflecting the lessons learned from the war: the United states should use military force only as a last resort; only where the national interest is clearly involved; only when there is strong public support, and only when in the likelihood of a relatively quick, inexpensive victory. (Sitikoff, p.1&2.)
As the 1970s drew to a close, however, more and more policymakers viewed the non-interventionist stance as an intolerable constraint on United States power at a time of growing challenges to American interests abroad. These leaders-representing powerful segments of the military, intelligence, and business communities-argued that America’s unwillingness to use force in responding to minor threats abroad would only invite more serious and intractable challenges later. “The Vietnam Syndrome”, in this view, actually fosters instability because it encourages hostile powers to exploit the emerging gaps in the West’s global security system. “Worldwide stability is being eroded through the retrenchment of American policy and power,” James R. Schlesinger wrote in Fortune after his dismissal as Secretary of Defense in 1976. (Klare, p.3.)
Yet, the biggest lesson learned in Vietnam is that not everything can be accomplished by the knee-jerk reliance on military force. The United States was blind to history, naively confident about its role as the primer power on earth, conditioned by national pride and national propaganda to behave in unreasonable and inappropriate ways. (Simons, p.10) The memories of United States paralysis and despair in Vietnam remain potent due to the efforts of many Vietnam War veterans and former antiwar activists, very much in the public eye. So long as these memories remain alive, and the public remains skeptical about official explanations for government conduct, the United States will continue to discourage indiscriminate military intervention abroad. (Klare, p.14.) If Vietnam is to teach us anything, it should be the diminishing capacity of military means to shape the behavior of others. Vietnam has demonstrated in a vivid and deeply disturbing manner that superior firepower will no longer necessarily enable us to “get the other fellow to do what he would not otherwise do.” (Gregg and Kegley, p.6.)
