Shapers of the Modern Mind

Final Exam Study Guide

 

By: Adam C. Parker

Class: Shapers of the Modern Mind

Instructor: Dr. David Reiter

 

Philosophers Covered:

John Locke (Chapters 4 – )

George Berkley

David Hume

      Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason segment)

 

Explain Locke’s “three degrees” of knowledge and how they differ:

Intuitive Knowledge: “The view that the mind has of its own ideas”

 

Demonstrative Knowledge: “Wherever the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately.”  Each step in demonstrative knowledge must be based (or be evidenced) in intuitive knowledge

 

Sensitive Knowledge: “There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds.”  In addition to this, Locke points out that external objects must exist because many things happen that occur against our will.  “Being in the fire is far different from dreaming of being in the fire.”

 

Summarize Locke’s argument for God’s existence.  (663)

1.     Man knows that he exists.

2.     Nothing cannot produce a Being.

3.     Therefore, something must have existed from Eternity.

4.     That being must be all-powerful and all-knowing.

5.     Therefore, an all-powerful, all-knowing, and Eternal being exists.

 

In a paragraph, summarize Berkley’s philosophy as expressed in the 3 Dialogues.

Berkley’s character Philonous holds forth the extravagant claim that there is no immaterial substance; he is an immaterialist.  For Berkley, all of existence is real but not in a material/physical sense.  All objects exist only as perceived in the mind.  If, at any time, something is unperceived by man or God, then it does not exist.  For Berkley, all people truly exist as spirits, all of whom are connected together by God in what is a non-physical reality where God mediates their co-existence, perceived to the spirits as “the real world.”  In reality, there is no matter or physical existence.

 

Explain how Philonous argues that heat does not exist outside the mind. (688-9).

1.  Heat and coldness are only sensations existing in our minds.  It is not possible for pain to exist apart from the mind.

2.  It is impossible for pain and pleasure, cold or heat to exist in an object, since by definition, those things require a perceiving mind.

3.  Therefore, heat, when unperceived, does not exist.

4.  Only a mind perceives.

5.  Therefore, heat does not exist except in the mind.

 

Explain and evaluate the “reductio ad absurdum” argument L690 that cold and warmth both exist in the body itself.

1.     It is absurd that the same material object is both cold and warm.

2.     If cold and warmth exist in material objects, then the same material object can be both cold and warm.

3.     Therefore, cold and warmth cannot exist in material objects.

 

EATE the argument 700 to show that there cannot exist an object which has existence independent of a conceiving mind.

1.     If the concept of a material object is coherent, then we can conceive of unconceived material objects.

2.     We cannot conceive of an unconceived material object.

3.     Therefore, the concept of a material object is not coherent.

 

Explain the argument suggested by Philonous on 702 for the conclusion that there is no reason to believe in the existence of material objects.

1.     Anything perceived is perceived either immediately or mediately.

2.     We immediately perceive nothing but our own sensations (or ideas).

3.     Therefore, material objects, if perceived, must be perceived mediately.

4.     There is no good argument for the existence of material objects.

5.     Therefore, material objects are not perceived.

6.     Therefore, there is no reason to believe in the existence of material objects.

 

Know the “two notions” which make up the substance of Philonous’ case for immaterialism (730).

1.     Real things are the things immediately perceived.

2.     The things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind.

 

According to Hume, what is the relationship between ideas and impressions?  (740).

“By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions.  And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned…All our ideas (or more feeble impressions) are copies of our impressions (or more lively impressions).”

 

What is Hume’s “criterion for meaningfulness.”  (741).

“When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.”

 

EATE Hume’s position concerning the question: What is the justifying evidence for making an inference beyond the present testimony of sense and memory? (743).

“All reasoning concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect.”  Hume gives two examples.  (a) We believe our friend is in France because we have a letter from him that says he is in France.  (b) We believe men have been on a particular island at some time when we find a watch lying on the beach.”  For Hume, “the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience.”

 

What is Hume’s skeptical argument against the idea of necessary connections in nature?(757).

(From Reiter’s notes)

“External” impressions do not provide the idea of a necessary connection; could it possibly be derived from internal impressions?  Yes, it does seem that we get the idea of power from the power of the will, which results in bodily action.  There are 3 puzzles in connection with this, however:

1.           The mystery of the union of body and soul

2.           The mystery of why we have “power” over some bodily parts but not others.

3.           We don’t “directly” cause the movement of the bodily limb.  Rather, we cause something else to happen, but we don’t know what that is.

 

What is Hume’s “analysis” of causation?  (757-65).

We can observe that one event follows another, but “we can never observe any tie between them.”  As Hume says on page 760, “The power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable.”  Conclusion: “The phrase necessary connection is meaningless!” (Quote from Reiter notes).

 

Summarize and thoughtfully evaluate Hume’s argument against belief in miracles (777-88).

1.     Beliefs ought to be held proportionally to the evidence.

2.     This evidence is gathered by humans through experience.

3.     There is uniform experience against any miracle.

4.     Therefore, miracles are matters of faith, not of reason.

 

What is Hume’s criticism of the Pyrrhonism (skeptical) position? (799).

For Hume, the great subverter of Pyrrhonism is action: one cannot live consistently with the Pyrrhonian philosophy, and humans in general cannot live consistently with this philosophy.

 

Explain what Kant means by saying that space (this also goes for time) is “empirically real but transcendentally ideal” (B44, B52):

“Space is real (objectively valid) in regard to everything that we can encounter externally as object, but at the same time space is ideal in regard to things when reason considers them in themselves.”

“Space is empirically real but transcendentally ideal.”  In other words, space “is nothing as soon as we omit that space is the condition of the possibility of all experience and suppose space to be something underlying things in themselves.”

 

Explain and evaluate Kant’s argument for the claim that mathematical judgments are one and all synthetic (B14):

In all judgments in which we think of the relation of a subject to the predicate, a judgment is synthetic if, it is connected with a concept, yet also lies quite outside of it.

Synthetic judgments: those judgments in which this connection is thought without thinking identity.  They could be called expansive for they do add to the concept of the subject a predicate that had not been thought in that concept at all and could not have been extracted from it by any dissection.

“Experiential judgments are one and all synthetic.  For to base an analytic judgment on experience would be absurd, because in its case I can formulate my judgment without going outside my concept, and hence do not need for it any testimony of experience.”

“Arithmetic propositions are always synthetic.  We become aware of this all the more distinctly if we take larger numbers.  For then it is very evident that, no matter how much we twist and turn our concepts, we can never find the number of the sum by merely dissecting our concepts.”  Therefore, mathematics is synthetic, rather than analytic.

 

Terms and Concepts:

Pure Reason:         

The mind’s ability to have concepts that are absolutely independent of experience.

 

Critique of Pure Reason:

“Carefully understanding in what ways the mind is really suited for doing metaphysics.”

 

Analytic vs. Synthetic Judgments (B11):

All experimental judgments are synthetic.  Mathematical judgments are synthetic.  Principles of pure geometry are synthetic

 

“The Problem of Pure Reason” (B19):

How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?

 

Transcendental Aesthetic (B36, see also B76):

“A science of all principles of a priori sensibility.”

 

Pure Form of Sensible Intuition (B35):

“All presentations in which nothing is found that belongs to sensation, I call pure.  Accordingly, the pure form of sensible intuitions generally, in which everything manifold in experience is intuited in certain relations, will be found in the mind a priori.  This pure form of sensibility will also itself be called pure intuition.”

 

Sensibility:

“The capacity to acquire presentations as a result of the way in which we are affected by objects.”

 

Understanding:

“Our ability to think the object of sensible intuition.”

 

Receptivity:

“Our mind’s ability to receive presentations.”

 

Spontaneity:

“Our ability to produce presentations ourselves.”

 

“Sensation and “reflection” in Locke (603).

Sensation: “This great source of most of most of the ideas we have, I call our senses, and derive by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.”

Reflection: “I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.”

 

“Sensible thing” in the Berkleyan sense.  (688).

Sensible quality or combination thereof. (Reiter’s notes)

“Sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense” (Berkley, pg. 688).

 

Direct realism (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy).

We have direct access to reality.

 

Representative Realism (Locke):

Perception does not involve ideas until we have received the perception.  We perceive a book without engaging the idea of the book, for example.

 

 “idea” and “impression” in Hume (739).

“By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions.  And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned…All our ideas (or more feeble impressions) are copies of our impressions (or more lively impressions).”

 

Demonstrative Reasoning (742-3).

The type of reasoning by which a truth can be argued from rationality and then shown to be true by applying it to experience.

 

Experiential reasoning (743ff).

Arises from an event or experience.  It is a truth which is deduced from an experience.

 

Hume’s “proportional belief” principle.  (778).

“A wise man…proportions his belief to the evidence.”

 

Hume’s “proportional principle” applied to cause/effect reasoning (790).

Cause/effect reasoning must also be “proportional.”  Thus, the degree of the gods’ (or God’s) intelligence is proportional to that found in their workmanship.  For Hume, it is not permissible to “add something” to the hypothesis which is not in some way indicated by the evidence to be explained.

 

Pyrrhonism vs. mitigated skepticism (academic philosophy) (799-800).

Pyrrhonism = “Excessive skepticism”

 

“The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals. “

 

Vs.

 

Mitigated Skepticism = “a result of excessive skepticism when its undistinguished doubts are in some measure corrected by common sense and reflection.”

 

Know Hume’s criterion for burning books (802):

1.     If it does not contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or numbers.

2.     If it does not contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence.

 

 

 

Adam C. Parker is a philosophy student at Grand Canyon University, in Phoenix, AZ.  He can be contacted at: adamc.parker@gmail.com