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This paper provides an introduction to some of the classic writers on military theory and a guide as to where to look for further information.
 By tradition, Sun Tzu was a general in
ancient China, living at about 500BC. In reality, there is no certainty whether there was
a Sun Tzu, who was author of the The Art of War or exactly when it was written.
What is known is that it dates back into antiquity. The Art of War is the earliest known manual of strategy. Unlike other ancient treatises, it does not focus on specific tactics or techniques which can become dated with changing technology.
In the modern context, Sun Tzu writes extensively about issues that are now embraced by the term "information warfare". To Sun Tzu, "all warfare is based on deception"; and equally good intelligence is an essential precursor to victory. |
Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com Sun Tzu, The Art of War (trans Samuel Griffiths, 1963) Other useful linksBuy from Amazon.com Sun Tzu, The Art of War (trans James Clavell) |
| The French revolution and the rise of Napoleon heralded the
largest change in warfare since gunpowder. The old formalised warfare of the past had been
banished. Accompanying Napoleon's armies for many of their key battles was the Swiss-born
Jomini, who eventually rose to be a brigadier-general and chief of staff of Ney's corps.
After falling out with a superior, Jomini defected to the Russians, and served as an
adviser to successive tsars. Throughout his career, Jomini punctuated his career with
writing, mostly historical studies. Thus, by the time he wrote his best known work, Summary
of the Art of War (Précis de l'art de la guerre), he was already a well
known and respected thinker. Jomini treated war as a field of scientific study. He sought general principles that could be applied universally. Today, many seem trite but at the time were revolutionary. Thus, Jomini condensed the Napoleonic method of mass and manoeuvre into a principle that the bulk of the army should be employed against the enemy's decisive points. Today, Clausewitz is far better known and respected, but Jomini's thought dominated the 19th century, and is still with us today in much military doctrine which finds its roots in sets of principles. |
Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com Jomini, The Art of War
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| Clausewitz enjoys the reputation of being the greatest of the
military theorists. Like Jomini he too learnt from the experiences of Napoleon, but
serving with the Prussian army (and briefly for the 1812 campaign the Russian army)
fighting the French.
His On War is not an easy work to digest. Its bulk is formidable enough, but work was not complete on his death and was published by his widow. Clausewitz's use of dialectic arguments also promote confusion. Some, like Liddell Hart see him as an advocate of total war and called him the "Mahdi of mass and mutual massacre"; other scholars point to his description of real war (limited war). Clausewitz simply described both phenomena and what could give rise to them, and made few moral or judgements or prescriptive formulas. |
Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com Clausewitz, On War (ed and trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret) Other useful linksBuy from Amazon.com Clausewitz, On War (Penguin edition) |
 Mahan stands as the best known of the
naval strategists. He served as a professional officer in the United States Navy, serving
in the US Civil War. He was an early faculty member at the US Naval War College and his
lectures were converted into a series of books and articles.An Anglophile, Mahan saw merit in the British Royal Navy and urged America to follow what he saw as a successful formula - a strong navy for security combined with colonies and merchant shipping for economic strength. He developed the concept of "seapower" to embrace those aspects of national power associated with the sea. In Mahan's view, seapower could influence the course of history - a fact he reflected in the titles of his most famous works. However, Mahan's ideas are scattered through his works and he tends to settle on simple formulas without looking for exceptions. Campaigns where seapower proved irrelevant are neglected. |
Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 Other useful linksBuy from Amazon.com A.T. Mahan, The influence of sea power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 |
| Corbett, unique amongst the strategists, was a civilian with
no direct experience of war. Rather, as a lawyer with an interest in naval history, he
came to the attention of the British naval authorities, and he was invited to lecture to
the Royal Navy War College. His lectures became the basis of Some Principles of
Maritime Strategy - a thorough analysis of the naval art. While respected, Corbett's views often proved controversial in the naval establishment. For example, he dismissed out of hand the dogma that naval wars should be decided by seeking out the enemy fleet. |
Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com J.S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy Other useful linksBuy from Amazon.com James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (eds), Mahan Is Not Enough : The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond |
| Douhet headed Italy's first aviation unit at the start of the
First World War. He was court-martialled for his criticisms of his superiors, but later
rehabilitated and eventually placed in command of Italy's air force. Douhet carries the reputation of being the father of air power theory. Douhet argued that war could quickly decided by offensive action. Aircraft could avoid the frontline and strike directly at the enemy cities, rapidly resolving the conflict. As war would be resolved in the air, armies and navies were correspondingly less important to nation. To many, Douhet's views were too extreme, and that what he proposed was beyond the technology of aircraft of his day and even later. His supporters counter by arguing that Douhet's prescription was never tested - a mix of high explosives, incendiaries and poison gas on the enemy population centres. |
Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com G. Douhet, Command of the Air Other useful links |
 Liddell Hart served on the Western Front during the
First World War, where he was gassed. Despite staying with the British Army for some years
after the end of hostilities, he was eventually invalided out of the service as a captain.
He continued write as journalist, commentator and at times government adviser. While he
wrote many works, his Strategy - republished several times throughout his life
with additional chapters and new titles - contained his major views.
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Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy Other useful linksBuy from Amazon.com B.H. Liddell Hart, Great Captains Unveiled Buy from Amazon.com B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918 Buy from Amazon.com B.H. Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk Buy from Amazon.com B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers |
 Mao is well known as a Chinese political leader, but his
military contributions are also significant. He wrote a series of essays on the military
conduct of the civil war and the war against Japan which continue to carry influence
today.Mao was the author of the concept of the agrarian-based revolution, distancing him from other Communist theorists. Importantly, he saw that China's vast size but relative backwardness, and the weakness of his forces demanded a different approach. He wrote about the use of mobile regular forces in combination with guerrilla, all drawing on a supportive population. He also differed with many theorists by his advocacy of "protracted war". |
Virtual War College recommendsBuy from Amazon.com Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare Other useful linksMao, On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism, 1935 Mao, Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, 1936 Mao, Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, 1938 Mao, Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting the Japanese Invasion, 1937 |
Prepared by and copyright © Martin Dunn, 1998-2000
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