There was a man in Germany who, although not a German, knew how to shape the German political scene better than many German leaders; that man was Eugenio Pacelli, the Papal Representative.
Pacelli had been in Germany since 1920, first in Munich and then in Berlin. On behalf of the Pope, in 1917, he had taken part in the negotiations for a compromised peace between Germany and the Allies---an attempt which ended in failure. He had been constantly in Germany ever since and followed German politics very closely, especially the politics of the Catholic parties: the Bavarian People's Party and the Centre Party. No Catholic leader of either party took a single step of importance without first consulting the Vatican through Cardinal Pacelli. And as Cardinal Pacelli was the right arm of the Pope, many important decisions rested with him.
When Pacelli first arrived in Germany as Papal Nuncio, he created a mild sensation when, contrary to expectation, he began to cooperate with Erzberger. There were different opinions about this, as the views of the Cardinal were fairly well known. Some held that he was in sympathy with the Left wing of Catholicism; other, that he tried to curb and restrain as much as possible the Socialist tendency of the Catholic leader. The latter view seemed to have been confirmed when, after the assassination of Erzberger, he treated his successor, Dr. Wirth, with great coolness. But when Dr. Marx took the leadership of the Party, Pacelli sided openly with the Right wing Catholic group.
The Cardinal and the new leader of the Centre Party became intimate, and Dr. Marx never made a move without consulting Pacelli, who, in fact, practically directed the policy of the Catholic Party for several years during that period. It was he who first conceived, and then inspired and promoted, the coalition of the Centre Party with the German National Party, which move was so full of most serious consequences for the whole of Germany.
What were the reasons which caused the Cardinal to steer a powerful political party in one certain direction instead of another; and what induced him to make an alliance with the most nationalist, authoritarian, anti-democratic, and would-be creator of a German dictatorship, the German National Party?
The answer lies in what has prompted all Catholic politicians; the interests of the Catholic Church as a religious institution. Setting aside the dislike of the Vatican for Socialism, etc., there was an immediate goal which the Vatican aimed at: it wanted to introduce the formal establishment of the confessional school into the German educational system. That they wanted above all; and it would have been possible if Germany and the Vatican had reached a mutual agreement for a favorable Concordat.
But the Concordat was never signed; nor was the School Bill ever to come into effect. Nevertheless, Cardinal Pacelli did well for the Catholic Church, as the Republic opened her coffers to the Church, and the subsidies of the German State to the Catholic Church increased from 148,000,000 marks, in 1925, to 163,000,000 marks, in 1928.
Cardinal Pacelli's opinion on how to deal with the great set-back at the election of 1928 grew in weight at the Vatican, where he was known to be as keen as the Pope in his plan to sacrifice the old-fashioned political Catholicism. The Vatican had already started on that road, although after the war there had been much hesitation over the fate of the German Catholic parties, as they had proved an invaluable weapon even during the years immediately following the First World War, and it seemed as if they might still be of great service to the Church. But actually this was not borne out. The Catholic Party was no longer able to exert the great influence it had exerted in the past without allying itself with some other party---at times, even with its enemies. This was largely due to the framework of the Republic. It allowed too much liberty to the political groups, which increased the economic deterioration of Germany as the masses were radically inclined on social matters. Also, the loss of thousands of Catholic members of the Centre Party, who had left political Catholicism for other movements and in the main had joined the ranks of the Social Democrats, caused the Vatican great concern.
All this had been considered for several years, but the shock came when the loss suffered by political Catholicism in the spring of 1928 was known. Almost half a million voters had turned their backs on political Catholicism. It was the worst electoral defeat ever suffered in the history of the Centre Party. Although the loss was proportionally enormous, the seriousness of the matter was even more alarming to the Vatican, as that loss was the culmination of a persistent decline in the strength of political Catholicism in Germany. Had this continued to decline at such a pace it would have been a matter of but a few years before the Party would have become a nonentity in the political life of the nation, and the "red, secular enemies of the Church would have prevailed."
The Vatican had kept a close watch on this decline, and after the defeat of 1928 the statistician of the Centre Party was asked to draw up a table showing the losses of the Party since its foundation. The report was sent to Rome by Pacelli. Its publication was forbidden, and only the high officials of the Party, and the Vatican, had knowledge of it. According to this report the percentage of all male Catholic voters who cast their vote for the Catholic Centre Party was the following:
Percentage
1875.............................................85
1907.............................................65
1912.............................................55
1919.............................................48
1928.............................................39
This tendency of a persistent decline was the more serious as there was a prospect of the losses continuing to increase disproportionately, and with increasing speed, as the Catholic workers were more and more accepting Socialist doctrines, especially after the alliance of the Centre Party with the reactionary German National Party; whereas the Catholic Youth and the Catholic intelligentsia were going over to the German Nationalists.
The Party which had served German Catholicism for more than two generations was ceasing to become an effective political instrument. Something more drastic and effective had to replace it. A new path had to be followed; new policy adopted; new methods encouraged; new men had to be helped to power.
After the defeat of 1928 the most reactionary elements of the Catholic Party became all-powerful. The Left wing ceased to count so far as the direction of the Party was concerned; and that was explained by the fact that the Party became an instrument of the Nuncio Pacelli. The clerical elements were supreme. The mouthpiece of the Right wing of the Centre Party was Dr. Ludwig Kaas, Professor of Ecclesiastical Law at the University of Bonn, and Papal Prelate. He had specialized in foreign politics; he was the speaker of the Centre Party groups in the Reichstag on foreign politics; he was the speaker of the Centre Party groups in the Reichstag on foreign affairs and went with the German delegation to Geneva.
Dr. Kaas's chief demands were for "a more active foreign policy." He was highly critical of Stresemann's foreign policy, and was against the attempts to carry out German aims by patient negotiations. This is noteworthy, for, at a time he was advocating this more active policy, two other men, the leaders of two parties, were advocating exactly the same thing: Hindenburg, the leader of the German National Party, and Hitler, the leader of the Nazi Party, were in agreement with Prelate Kaas.
It is of interest to note, further, that Dr. Kaas, after the First World War, was a fervent leader of a separatist movement, which was largely sponsored by Catholics, in the Rhineland. On March 10, 1919, he was so certain he would succeed in creating a Catholic State that he telegraphed to Cologne: "Greetings to the Rhenish Republic." It should not be forgotten that he was a close friend of Dr. Seipel, the man who was planning the creation of a Catholic Empire in Central Europe.
It is of interest to note, further, that Dr. Kaas, after the First World War, was a fervent leader of a separatist movement, which was largely sponsored by Catholics, in the Rhineland. On March 10, 1919, he was so certain he would succeed in creating a Catholic State that he telegraphed to Cologne: "Greetings to the Rhenish Republic." It should not be forgotten that he was a close friend of Dr. Seipel, the man who was planning the creation of a Catholic Empire in Central Europe.
Dr. Kaas's influence in the Party was much strengthened by the fact that he was an intimate friend of the Papal Nuncio in Berlin, Cardinal Pacelli. Pacelli and Dr. Kaas, on several occasions, spent holidays together in Switzerland; and the opinions of Dr. Kaas were regarded as the reflection of the views of the Papal Nuncio. The friendship with Dr. Kaas was one of the greatest incentives for the steady strides to the Right of the Centre Party, as Pacelli greatly encouraged Catholicism in Germany to adopt national activism wholeheartedly. This is the more noteworthy, as, upon various occasions immediately after the First World War, the Vatican had refused to grant its support for similar demands from the Centre Party. The Vatican began to give its support to the Nationalist Party from the year 1924 until 1928, and, from 1928, all its support until 1933.
This should not be overlooked, as during that period the Vatican was shaping and giving concrete form to its new policy in the world. Its various activities were all aimed at curbing democracy and Socialism in the various countries; and these activities took shape and were carried out by the different instruments of political Catholicism in Europe. It is worth noting a few of these forms, which, although varying in character, were all aiming at the same goal. In Bavaria and Hungary, political Catholicism was legitimist; in Belgium and Austria, reactionary; in Portugal, Spain, and Poland, militarist and Fascist. But all had one international framework, which was anti-Communism as sponsored by the Vatican.
In Germany, political Catholicism had to play no mean part in this international framework; but it was necessary to wait and create favorable circumstances in which to bring about the necessary alterations in German policy. The Vatican steered the Centre Party to the Right between the years 1924 and 1928; and steered it to dictatorship between 1928 and 1933.
The German Catholics came more and more under the influence of the clergy, often in conflict with the Centre Party, and that was done through the creation of Catholic Action. At the same time the Catholic intelligentsia, which was already very antagonistic to Soviet Russia, was made more so by the direct encouragement of the Vatican. At the Vatican, and amidst the German Catholics, it became clear that, besides their common enmity against Communist Russia, there was another great goal before them, and that was the restoration of the Russian Church into the bosom of the Catholic Church (see Chapter on Russia and the Vatican).
This odium and this aggressive attitude toward Soviet Russia met and mingled with all those other elements in Germany which entertained the same hostility toward that country: Prussian Junkers, Pan-Germans, Nazis, and the like. On this particular subject these groups were on common ground with the various leaders of political Catholicism, like Dr. Kaas, Chancellor Bruening, von Papen, etc.
But not all Catholic elements were in favor of this crusade. There were several which, for purely political reasons, were against it. After the defeat of the Centre Party there was violent controversy inside the Party itself concerning the future line to be adopted in social matters and in foreign policy; but, with Dr. Kaas and the Papal Nuncio in continual close touch, the clerical element won, and in December 1928 Dr. Kaas became the leader of the Centre Party.
That was the turning point. The Centre Party from now on was completely in the hands of the Vatican. The rank and file continued in the belief that things were as before except that the Party was pursuing a more reactionary and nationalist policy; but in reality the Centre Party was being used for one purpose, and that was to destroy German democracy, German Socialism, and to create a dictatorship which should fight Communism and guarantee the interest of the Church in that country.
Events began to take concrete form; the Vatican plan began to work in the realm of German politics. Exactly a year had passed after Dr. Kaas's election when Dr. Bruening, the fervent Catholic Deputy, was elected chairman of the parliamentary group of the Centre Party, and the plot spun by the Nationalist and Centre Parties began to unfold itself.
At the New Year's reception in the palace of the Reich President, in 1930, HIndenburg was to see, for the first time, the man who had been recommended to him by the plotters---the most devout Dr. Bruening. They said he would be the man who would rid them of democracy, who would render Parliament obsolete, and who would rule as a dictator with Article 48.
Hindenburg and Dr. Bruening discussed plans, Bruening raising several objections to getting rid of democracy too hastily. In the end he accepted. Hindenburg repeated another of his acts---a replica of that enacted with Erzberger several years previously. "Suddenly Hindenburg began to weep, those facile tears of old age; and with that historic gesture which began and ended so many of his relationships, he clasped Bruening's hand in both his own. 'So many have forsaken me; give me your word that now, at the end of my life, you will not desert me'" (Wheeler-Bennet).
Bruening accepted. On March 27, 1930, the Social Democrat Mueller resigned from the Reich Chancellorship. The following day Bruening was charged with the formation of the new Cabinet. On March 31 Hindenburg appointed Bruening Reich Chancellor, by the grace of the old General and backed by the German Army.
April 1, 1930, was an historical date for Germany. The new Chancellor made his first appearance in the Reichstag. The parliamentary regime in Germany had ended and the authoritarian regime had begun. "My Cabinet has been formed with a view to concluding in the shortest possible time the tasks generally considered necessary in the interest of the Reich. It will be the final attempt to carry them on with the assistance of the Reichstag," said Bruening. This meant that the new Chancellor did not appeal for support, but threatened Parliament with dissolution if that support was not forthcoming. The Reichstag had not heard such words since the days of Bismarck. The new Cabinet presented itself as "The Government of front-line soldiers," and from then it was very important, in the political field in Germany, whether a man had served in the front-line trench or not; and when, where, and for how long.
The Hindenburg-Groener-Schleicher plan was at last actively at work. Bruening had begun to carry on its mission. He presented the Reichstag with a finance program which was to be an excuse for him to deal with Parliament summarily. Knowledge of this in detail is unimportant; but it provided for increased military expenditure, notwithstanding the fact that the State was in a bad financial condition, and it advocated a poll tax which became known as the "Niger Tax."
The Reichstag, after having attempted to come to some agreement with Bruening, rejected several points to the program. This is what Bruening and his companions had counted on. That same evening Bruening decided to put the rejected points into force by an "Emergency Decree" issued by the Reich President. The Emergency Decree was made possible by Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. This Article permitted the Reich President, "in the event of considerable disturbance to public order and security, or danger to public order or security," to invest himself with certain dictatorial powers, including the right to issue laws by the so-called "Emergency Decree." The text of Article 48 made it very clear that the Emergency Decree was to be used only in the case of grave internal unrest and tumult on a dangerous scale, factors which at that time, with Bruening, did not exist.
Two days after Bruening had issued his first "Emergency Decree," Parliament asked for its withdrawal. Bruening's answer was to dissolve the Reichstag. New elections were held during the following autumn. And in the elections of September 1930 the shadow of Hitler appeared menacingly on the New Reichstag. One hundred and seven Nazi Deputies entered the House.
Men and events played into the hands of the parliamentary disaster. The Social Democrats, who had 142 seats in Parliament and who were now the strongest group in the Reichstag, began a policy of "toleration" toward Bruening, "lest worse befall." They were afraid of Hitler. It was a suicidal policy. The economic crisis did the rest. Bruening's economic policy, in the opinion of many, was disastrous. Wages were reduced between 25 and 30 per cent, whereas reduction in cost of living, which had been promised, was only 10 per cent; and while all servants of the State had their wages cut, it is significant that one section, the officers of the Reichswehr, was not touched.
When Bruening was made Chancellor there were 2,000,000 unemployed in Germany; when he left, there were 6,000,000, and a financial collapse was made worse by a self-imposed economic blockade! Had it not been for this political and economic chaos there were many Germans who would not have been influenced by Hitler, who was one of those who welcomed these conditions joyfully. As the debacle gathered impetus the rank and file of his Party increased, and there is no doubt but that Hitler's promise of recovery, and the prospects he held out of a brighter future, brought him many unsuspecting adherents.
Bruening had several plans of an economic and political nature, by which he hoped to avoid paying reparations and at the same time arm the German Army.
In the spring of 1932 Bruening declared that, as Germany had completely disarmed, "she had the legal and moral right" to demand the disarmament of all other countries. While he was speaking to the world in this way the Catholic Bruening went on with the secret arming of Germany. During his Chancellorship there were several incidents bearing on this, one of the most outstanding being that connected with Carl von Ossietzky, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, who was tried and convicted for revealing the military activities behind the facade of civil aviation in Germany. He was sentenced to a number of years' imprisonment, charged with "the betrayal of military secrets."
Bruening and his Defense Minister worked hand in hand on Germany's secret armaments, which, under Bruening, began to develop at full speed. He and his military friends gave particular attention to the air arm. Germany's illegal fighter and bomber formations were amplified and strengthened, and substantial subsidies were paid to aeroplane manufacturing firms, such as Junkers and Heinkels. Already there were in existence no fewer than forty-four illegal training schools for military flying. Plans, studied to the minutest details, were ready for the bombardment of the Maginot LIne, as well as for Paris and London. The leader of the "Air Department," under Bruening, was Captain Brandeburg---the man who later led the Luftwaffe when London was bombed.
Meanwhile, Bruening, "the Hunger Chancellor," as the German masses called him, was busy in the political field in connection with the rising Nazi Leader. He did not see in Hitler an enemy; on the contrary, he saw in him an ally who, in his lust for power and as a rival dictator, would help to get rid of democracy, to arm Germany, and to fight Bolshevism.
Almost immediately after the election of 1930 Goering had long and secret negotiations with Minister Treviranus; and, at the same time, Roehm, the chief of Hitler's S.A., was received by General von Schleicher. They discussed the Army, regular and irregular, and agreed, as was later disclosed, to alter certain features of the Nazi civil Army.
After these preliminaries the two leaders met again in October 1930. What was discussed has never been known in its entirety, but information leaked out which gave rise to the report that Bruening and Hitler had reached an agreement to share the government, and that Bruening would take Nazi Ministers into his Cabinet. However, the agreement broke down over the number of such Ministers to be given office.
Both Hitler and Bruening denied that they had ever made such arrangements; but upon one occasion, when Bruening was holding a meeting of Catholics, he was interrupted by a gang of Nazis. He threatened to make disagreeable revelations about what Hitler had confided to him of his plans if they continued to interfere with the Catholic meetings. The Nazis replied that they, too, could make sensational disclosures about what Bruening had told Hitler. Both, knowing themselves to be compromised, saw to it that there was no more friction to cause disclosures about the famous first meeting.
A year passed before the two leaders restarted their negotiations, in September 1931. This time Bruening publicly thanked Hitler and his supporters for "the courtesy with which, despite all criticism, they treated my person."
Hindenburg's term of office was expiring, and Bruening needed assistance for Hindenburg's re-election as Reich President, which he wished to secure through the Reichstag, and not through public election---a plan that was wholly unconstitutional. This plan gave Hitler a key position, as, without his Party, such a plan could not be carried out, Hitler having 105 seats in the Reichstag. Bruening knew what Hitler's program would be if he came into power. Also he knew his secret plans: apart from which there came to light the notorious Boxheim document, which contained details for a policy of terror once the Nazis were in power.
That the Bruening Cabinet was behind Hitler was evident at the end of 1931, when a high Prussian official, a Democrat, saw the Minister of the Interior, Groener, and asked for support in a revolt led by a Berlin leader of the Nazi S.A. against Hitler. The opinion of Hitler held by the Government was shown plainly in Groener's answer: "Hitler is a man in favor of legality, who has promised to respect the Constitution. We must support him against the others, who are all firebrands." Then to the astonishment of the interviewer, the Minister added: "Hitler will certainly keep his word." In order to lend additional weight, he said that this was not only his personal opinion, but the opinion of Bruening, the Chancellor, who entirely shared his view on the subject.
But before trying to come to an agreement with Hitler, Bruening made several preliminary moves. He not only held Hitler in favor, but he spoke well of him and refused to take any steps against him, and in every way tried to smooth the path for him. He arranged that Hitler should at last meet Hindenburg, as others had arranged for his own first meeting with the Old Field-Marshal; and, in addition, he asked the great Catholic industrialist Thyssen, one of the most generous financial friends of Hitler, to urge him to make a good impression on the President; for, should Hindenburg take a personal dislike to him, Hitler's chances of office would be lessened. He asked Thyssen to tell Hitler to be very moderate in speaking of his plans with the Reich President.
The meeting with the Field-Marshal took place, and Bruening and Hitler at last reached an agreement. Bruening offered to resign within the space of twelve months in order to give way to a Cabinet where the key positions would be in the hands of the Nazis, and in return Hitler was to support the election of Hindenburg as Reich President, and open negotiations with the Vatican for a Concordat.
Bruening's reason for postponing his resignation for a year satisfied Hitler, who accepted the offer. Bruening's argument was that if the Nazis were in the Government the Powers at Geneva would not make concessions to Germany; and Bruening hoped at least to obtain from them the complete abolition of reparation payments. With this he persuaded Hitler to be patient.
After the meeting, Hitler declared that he had been "deeply impressed" by Bruening. But, in addition to having been impressed by Bruening's plan to deceive the Allies, there were the military plans put forward and the enormous armament program as conceived by Catholic Bruening. This was testified to later by the Nazi General von Epp, who declared that it was the "Reich Chancellor's rearmament plans which had really decided Hitler."
Bruening kept Dr. Kaas minutely informed of all his moves with Hitler, Dr. Kaas's task being that of faithfully reporting to the Pope the progress of the transactions. The Vatican asked Bruening to make sure that, if Hitler was to be part of the new Government, the Nazis would not be hostile to "the true religion." But, for the second time, nothing came of all these negotiations. At the most important interview with Hitler, in January 1932, and to which Bruening took with him von Groener and von Schleicher, Hitler appeared, accompanied by his S.A. chief Roehm, who was the leader of the most intransigent Nazis. Bruening's offer, to his consternation, was rejected; also by the National German Party.
Seeing that collaboration with the Right-wing party of the extreme Right had failed, Bruening turned to the parties of the Left without any hesitation. He succeeded in convicting the Social Democrats, who elected Hindenburg by forming a Republican block against the parties of the Right. He put forward a slogan which would appeal to the Left: "Elect Hindenburg and defeat Hitler!" The Social Democrats once more gave their millions of votes for the election of Hindenburg and defeated the plan of the National Party and of Hitler.
But the election that took place during the same year gave such a shock to the Vatican that the Pope and Cardinal Pacelli definitely decided to support the new political force which alone could prevent Germany from going Left. The old Catholic Party had definitely had its day. Only drastic measures could stem the Red tide; that is, only Nazism. The poll cause Pacelli and the Pope to decide to put in their weight with Hitler. Out of total vote of 35,148,470, the Nazi Party polled 11,737,391, the Catholic Party 5,326,583, and the Socialists and Communists 13,232,292.
The arch-enemies of the Catholic Church were making tremendous progress in Germany. If they were allowed to go on unchecked, and unless an iron hand assumed power and stopped them, it would be too late. And who could do that better than Hitler? From that moment, and behind the scenes, the Vatican worked with one main goal of influencing the issue so that Hitler would go into power. Ungrateful for the support of the Left, Hindenburg was no sooner elected than he turned sharply against it and pursued the most reactionary policy of an extreme Right-wing character, until, in the end, he offered Hitler power.
Meanwhile, Bruening was trying to destroy the Republic and restore the German Monarchy. He was always in complete accord with the Church's hostility to any form of popular government or republican regime, and with it in support of monarchies and authoritarian government. This spirit, with which he was so thoroughly imbued, was heightened by his nationalistic outlook. While Reich Chancellor of a Republic, he was working for its overthrow. He had taken the Constitutional oath, and the Republican Constitution began solemnly: "The German Reich is a Republic. Political power proceeds from the people." Bruening had sworn that he would uphold and defend such principles. But Bruening did not think himself bound to the Republic. He was influenced by three great motives: his conscience as a Catholic, which bade him restore the authority of the Monarchy, for "authority does not derive from the people," as the Catholic Church has expressed repeatedly (see Chapter 6); and to this was added his strong nationalistic feelings and fear of the Reds, whose power he wanted to check.
Bruening had long conversations with Hindenburg, with the leaders of the National and Nazi Parties, and with the Crown Prince. Hindenburg was to be elected Reich Regent for life by a two-thirds majority of the Reichstag, which would have been obtained within a coalition of the Right-wing parties; and after his death, the second son of the former Crown Prince was to be proclaimed Kaiser.
The Vatican was kept well informed even before Bruening had taken active steps to put this plan into execution. Cardinal Pacelli had left Germany---in 1930 he had been appointed Secretary of State by Pope Pius XI---but he was still the main authority on German political affairs. He had given the plans his blessing, and the Vatican was in favor of it. The one condition that the Vatican imposed upon Bruening and his companions was that it should not be compromised or involved openly in the plot in view of the international complications to which it would give rise. Once the Monarchy was restored, the Catholic Church would give all her support through its clergy, Catholics, and Centre Party. Bruening and the other conspirators agreed. Outwardly, the procedure for the execution of the plan was not to come either from Bruening or the Catholic Party, or from anybody connected with the Vatican.
Once more the whole scheme was abortive. This time owing to the opposition of Hindenburg himself, who could not harmonize his still existing loyalty to his old Kaiser with the plan. But one result was achieved by Bruening while in power. Under his deliberate guidance, generals, big industrialists, Junkers, and extreme Nationalists were put into key positions. The military machine had reconquered Germany and become dominant---chiefly due to the moves of the Centre Party, and, above all, to those of Bruening.
It has often been said that Bruening envisaged the restoration of the Monarchy in order to prevent Hitler from coming into power, but the facts do not bear out this contention. Bruening's original plan, to which Hitler and Hugenberg, the leader of the Nationalist Party, subscribed, and were ready to give their support, was: first, to destroy the Republic; secondly, to restore the Monarchy; and thirdly, to form a Government entirely composed of Fascists and semi-Fascist parties, which were the Nationalist, the Nazis, and the Centre Party. In order to achieve this last part of their program Bruening promised Hindenburg, as well as Hitler and Hugenberg, that, once the first two goals were reached, he, Bruening, would resign and make way for Hugenberg and Hitler.
The Pope and Cardinal Paceclli were not only kept informed, but, for the ultimate plan which was to follow the restoration of the Monarchy, they wanted an assurance that a really strong Government which "would not leave room for the Social Democrats" should rule the new Germany, always under the conditions that enough guarantees should be given for the safeguarding of the Church's interests. These pourparlers were carried out at this stage, chiefly through Dr. Kaas and the Papal Chamberlain, von Papen.
Here are the textual words of Bruening regarding his plans, spoken to Hindenburg:
"I give my word that as soon as it has reached the point when the transition from the Republic to the Monarchy is assured, I will resign, and then you can form a Cabinet entirely from the parties of the Right" (Nationalist, Nazis, etc).
In addition to this, Bruening had another project in mind. This was, to turn the Social Democrats out of office in Prussia. Such a project had already taken shape before he asked their Party to support his plan to re-elect Hindenburg, who was nominated on April 10, 1932, and elected chiefly by the votes of the Social Democrats.
For several weeks the detailed plans were in the desk of Hindenburg. After the overthrow of Social Democracy in Prussia the attempt was made to form a strong Government of Catholics and Nazis. Mgr. Kaas was in continual touch with the Catholic leader, Gregor Strasser, trying to come to a final agreement with Hitler. But Hitler changed his mind at the last moment and the plan miscarried: he did not co-operate with Bruening because he knew that the Catholic Chancellor was politically dead. In fact, on May 30, 1932, Bruening fell.
Hindenburg dismissed Bruening on the advice of the generals and other forces which were working behind the scenes. They were plotting for the destruction of the Democratic German Parliament and for the creation of a dictatorship. The first phase had been reached. The time was ripe for the second phase.
The new Cabinet was formed by General von Schleicher, even before Bruening's dismissal. But at this point the plotters once more were divided among themselves. The generals wanted a man who should leave the door open to them at the first opportunity. That man had been chosen and had accepted. It was another Catholic, von Papen. But Mgr. Kaas, and through him the Vatican, wanted Hitler and Hugenberg to come into power.
For a long time the Vatican had been negotiating with the intrigues, and when it was known that the Chancellorship had been offered to von Papen, and that it had been accepted, it instructed Mgr. Kaas, who was the leader of the Centre Party, to ask him to refuse it. This von Papen promised to do, and actually swore to Kaas that he would reject the offer. When, however, HIndenburg pressed him once more and von Papen accepted, Mgr. Kaas and the Vatican reproached him for having broken his promise, to which he gave a typical Jesuitical answer. The first time, he said, the President offered him the Chancellorship as a member of the Catholic Party, and in accordance with his promise he refused; the second time the offer was made to him as a private individual, and he accepted.
Franz von Papen belonged to a Westphalian Catholic family; he was rich, and in spite of the disreputable character for which he was notorious, he had great influence in the inner councils of the Catholic Party and at the Vatican. He was the owner of the main organ of German Catholicism.
The new Chancellor was heartily supported by the great Catholic industrialists, the aristocracy, and high State officials, all of whom knew that his nomination was but a last step to that at which they had been aiming for so long. In spite of the set-back suffered by Prelate Kaas and Cardinal Pacelli in Rome, matters would have taken the right turn for them at the right time but for the rank and file of the Catholic Party, which was composed of workers. They turned against the leading figures of the Party, its policy, and the new Chancellor, with as much strong feeling as the Social Democrats, and, for a time, the leadership of the Party fell into their hands. This was allowed, as the fate of the Party was already sealed.
This significance of the rise to power of von Papen was not realized except for the few intriguers in Berlin, and the still fewer in the Vatican. It was the conflict of the two tendencies in the German Catholic Party which gave the coup de grace to Bruening. Those who had sponsored the second course, headed by von Papen, had persuaded the various generals and their colleagues to "work" on Hindenburg to dismiss Bruening from the Chancellorship. The two hostile camps within the high ranks of the leading German Catholics were divided on the issue whether definitely to abandon the Centre Party and allow its extinction, as decided by the Pope, or whether to allow it to continue and take its share in an administration headed by Hitler. In such an administration, the Nazi, the Nationalist German Party, and the Centre Party were to be full partners. The alternative was to subscribe to the death of the Centre Party and come to an agreement with Hitler about the interests of Catholicism and of the Church in Germany.
The first group was headed by Bruening himself. He had upon more than one occasion let the Vatican know of his objection to the plan of the Pope to get rid of the Catholic Party which, for two generations, had served Catholicism well, as the oldest, most powerful, and steady Catholic Party in Europe. On several occasions he had promised to resign in order to give way to Hitler, provided the Centre Party should be allowed to play its role. Even after his dismissal, Bruening informed Kaas, and through him the Vatican, that he would be ready to accept a post in the new Cabinet if Hitler were made Chancellor. Like Hugenberg, the leader of the Nationalists, Bruening was under the illusion that Hitler would work with them as equals. This policy, which had been condemned ever since the great defeat of 1928, was not accepted. Kaas and the other Catholics who had accepted the Vatican's decision were made to understand by Cardinal Pacelli that something had to be done before "unforeseen events could interfere with our plans." Kaas and his accomplices set in motion the necessary political machinery behind Hindenburg, and Bruening, who was already in disfavor with the German masses and with the clique which had put him into power, was dismissed.
Von Papen was soon replaced by another Catholic, General von Schleicher. But the General found himself in sympathy with the Socialists and threatened to expose transactions which would have embarrassed high Catholics and the Vatican; and, last but not least, the corruption of certain dealings in which Hindenburg and von Papen themselves were involved. It was then that von Papen persuaded the old President to make Hitler President.
Later von Papen, during a lecture to a Catholic audience in Cologne, declared that: "Providence destined me to render an essential service to the birth of the Government of the national regeneration" (November 12). At the beginning of January 1933 von Papen met Hitler in the house of a Cologne banker and told him that the time had arrived when they should work together; and men and machinery that would put him into power were ready, and the Vatican would support him. In return it was expected that, once in power, he, Hitler, would destroy the Communist and Socialist Parties as a preliminary and discuss a Concordat with the Catholic Church. Hitler promised. The two reached an agreement. Hitler would become Chancellor, and von Papen Deputy Chancellor. Von Papen then persuaded Hindenburg to ask Hitler to become Chancellor. On January 30, 1933, Hitler, a Catholic by birth, was made Chancellor of Germany. Chapter 11