Laksamana.Net, January 30, 2002 01:34 PM
Australia's Worst Nightmare
January 30, 2002 01:34 PM, By Scott Burchill
Laksamana.Net - When US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz announced
recently that “going after al-Qaeda in Indonesia is not something that should wait
until after al-Qaeda has been uprooted from Afghanistan”, a shiver must have gone up
the collective spine of Australia's foreign policy elite.
At a time when the Howard government is trying to rebuild bridges with Jakarta after
three tense and unproductive years, the last thing Canberra wants is the so-called war
against terrorism – to which it is a party – extended to the Indonesian archipelago.
It seems clear that al-Qaeda has active cells in Indonesia, with reports of training
camps in Sulawesi and links between al-Qaeda and local Islamic militias such as
Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiah. As one senior US official conceded, “Indonesia
offers practical jihad experience you can't get in too many other places.” It is also
possible that senior al-Qaeda officials – perhaps Osama bin Laden himself – have
fled to Indonesia from Afghanistan.
With long-standing military ties between Washington and Manila, the US may find
that destroying anti-Western terrorist groups such as Abu Sayyaf is comparatively
straightforward in its former, predominantly Christian, colony.
But Indonesia will be a very different challenge to The Philippines, and one that would
present Canberra with a series of invidious choices.
Will the Bush Doctrine, which states that Washington makes no distinction between
terrorists and states that harbor terrorists, be applied to Indonesia?
Although President Megawati Sukarnoputri may want to cooperate with the US in
shutting down her most troublesome Islamic militants, can she afford to antagonize
their supporters both inside and outside the Indonesian parliament?
And can she promise the cooperation of Indonesia's armed forces (TNI), which her two
predecessors could not guarantee? Indonesia's intelligence chief Lt-General A.M.
Hendropriyono has already warned Washington that the presence of terrorists in his
country "does not mean the US can make the area of Indonesia part of its war".
Until recently, the West paid scant attention to Indonesia as a base for international
terrorism. Groups such as Laskar Jihad were associated with communal violence and
viewed in the context of ongoing secessionist struggles.
Because its in-country intelligence is comparatively weak, the Pentagon would find
the task of destroying al-Qaeda facilities and cadres very difficult without the
assistance of the TNI. But as things stand, laws passed by the US Congress after the
East Timor crisis in 1999 prohibit Washington from providing most forms of military
assistance to Jakarta – much to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's ire.
In its present mood Washington has little patience for such legal niceties, despite
warnings by former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft that Indonesia is “still
barely a country” and should be able to declare itself neutral in the war against
terrorism. If it believes senior al-Qaeda leaders are hiding out on one of Indonesia's
17,000 islands, the Bush administration won't hesitate to pursue them. But the
consequences for Megawati's government, the cohesion of Indonesian society and the
country's relationship with the West would be enormous, especially for Australia.
Having invoked ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, US defense alliance) in fulsome
support of the Bush administration's war in Afghanistan, the Howard government
would find it impossible to back away if the war against terrorism came to Southeast
Asia. An extension of the war to this region would, after all, make it relevant to
Australia's national interests for the first time. Neutrality isn't an option.
Canberra, however, would pay a significant diplomatic price for supporting US-led
military assaults on the Indonesian archipelago, even if Australian SAS forces weren't
directly involved. It would almost certainly bring an end to any nascent rapprochement
between Canberra and Jakarta. Cooperation on people smuggling, piracy, regional
security and a range of other issues would cease.
And anti-Australian groups within the Indonesian polity, who are still angry about
Canberra's leading role in East Timor's liberation, would be handed yet another stick
with which to club the relationship back to square one.
In New York this week to address the World Economic Forum and the UN, John
Howard will be hoping that no one in the Bush administration asks him for help in this
new chapter of the war. At the very least he will expect Washington to take Australia's
regional interests into account before launching any military strikes against al-Qaeda
in this hemisphere. The prime minister is likely to be asked about Australia's position
when he visits Megawati on his way home.
All of this must be keeping Australia's diplomats and strategic planners up late into
the night. Every possible scenario looks bleak. It's their worst nightmare, and it may
come true – very soon.
Scott Burchill is a lecturer in international relations at Deakin University in Melbourne.
This article originally featured on ZNet website and appears on Laksamana.net with
the author's permission.
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