Asian Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2002
Commentary
Beware the Jihad in Southeast Asia
By Dana Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan. Mr. Dillon is a senior policy analyst, and Mr.
Pasicolan a research assistant, at the Heritage Foundation.
Imagine an Afghanistan-by-the-South-China-Sea, a radical Muslim state carved out
from renegade regions of Southeast Asia, led by fundamentalist clerics calling for the
destruction of the West.
That's the vision that animates Jemaah Islamia, a group aiming to establish "Daulah
Islamiah," a state that would include parts of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Fortunately, the group's timetable for paradise on earth has suffered a setback, with
the recent arrest of a 13-member unit in Malaysia and a squad of 15 in Singapore.
Forget about the stereotype of indigent freedom fighters trying to rid themselves of
oppression. Like the al Qaeda hijackers of Sept. 11, the Jemaah terrorists arrested
were mostly educated, productive members of society -- bank officers, businessmen,
a school headmaster. But apparent respectability is not the only thing these thugs
share with their al Qaeda brethren. Some received jihad training in Afghanistan. One
is known to have met Khalid al-Mindar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, both members of the al
Qaeda team that crashed into the Pentagon. And there is strong suspicion that
Zacarias Moussaoui, the French national indicted on Sept. 11-related charges, may
have made contact with the Jemaah Islamia organization when he visited Malaysia in
late 2000.
These and other signs of international coordination and cooperation involving local,
radical Islamic groups should trigger alarm bells throughout Southeast Asia. Yet so
far, most governments have down-played the threat posed by these groups, regarding
them as little more than for-profit criminal organizations, Islamic versions of La Cosa
Nostra that deploy Muslim fundamentalism primarily for public relations purposes.
That may have been the case a few years back. But evidence is mounting that these
groups are much more sinister than some governments are willing to admit.
Consider the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, the organization that oversees the Jamaah
Islamiah. Their members train in Indonesia and raise money in Singapore. Or consider
the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf, which captured the international spotlight in April
2000 by taking 20 Asians and Europeans hostage at a Malaysian resort. The
international range and organization of these activities would appear to be beyond the
means of simple, homegrown mobsters. While criminal organizations tend to try to
hunker down and control their "turf" by working out arrangements with local law
enforcement authorities, terrorist organizations diversify operations into several
countries to take advantage of each country's reluctance to share intelligence with
others.
In Southeast Asia, the next logical step for terrorist groups is to work in concert. Al
Qaeda would be their ideal umbrella organization. It has the resources and the
experience to unite disparate groups of Muslim extremists. Al Qaeda operatives can
help create an organizational structure, train locals in bomb-making and in how to
circumvent existing intelligence safety nets. Al Qaeda reaps benefits from these
arrangements as well. Ramzi Yousef, architect of the first World Trade Center
bombing in 1993, got logistical support from the Abu Sayyaf to test his bombs in the
Philippines. And with the "welcome mat" no longer on Afghanistan's doorstep, al
Qaeda operatives could use the haven in Southeast Asia for a while.
That is why governments in the region must recognize that the terrorist organizations
they combat are not merely local or domestic. Today's terrorism leapfrogs borders. In
fact, groups like Jemaah Islamia plan to obliterate those borders. To keep up with
these terrorist cells, governments must cooperate, share intelligence, and forgo the
traditional limits of territorial jurisdiction. It's a lesson the U.S. learned the hard way.
Had the Federal Aviation Administration had access to CIA intelligence on Sept. 11,
particularly its terrorist watch-list, the hijackers might not have been able to board
their planes.
Singapore already has set up a new national security secretariat within its defense
ministry to coordinate anti-terrorism initiatives. Others should do the same. Moreover,
Southeast Asian governments should set up offices that deal exclusively with
coordinating efforts across national borders to combat terrorism. It is far easier to
track down Malaysian terrorists training in Indonesia if the counter-terrorist unit tasked
with finding them has both knowledge of Indonesian territory and Malaysian criminal
organizations. The Philippine president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, has offered an even
better idea. Following the Sept. 11 attacks, she suggested the formation of a regional
anti-terrorism coalition. Alas, several months later it remains just another good idea.
U.S. involvement should continue to be significant, but nuanced -- one that
encourages Southeast Asian governments to seek local solutions first, with the
assurance that the U.S. will provide help to plug security holes. This strategy can be
seen in U.S. support for the Philippine effort to destroy Abu Sayyaf. After its first
kidnappings, the group pocketed a $20 million ransom, which it plowed back into the
business, buying high-tech communications equipment and speedboats. These were
used to launch a second kidnapping in May 2001, this time involving three Americans.
The kidnappers have eluded the Philippine army ever since, on an island just seven
miles long and nine miles wide.
The post-Sept. 11 urgency has convinced the U.S. to help end this embarrassing
impasse. It sent a team of military officers to assess the needs of the Philippine
troops. Shortly thereafter, a delegation led by President Arroyo came to Washington
and requested additional equipment, training and resources. A 650-man U.S. force is
to arrive in the Philippines shortly to provide local troops with military training and
logistical support.
Although American soldiers will not battle the Abu Sayyaf, they will observe the
performance of Philippine troops and modify future training and assistance according
to their needs. This will permit maximum participation by the local government, yet
still accomplish America's goal of eliminating another cell of terrorists.
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