On April 17 1939, the Soviet Ambassador to Germany discussed the possibility of better relations between the two countries. It was the first time Alexei Merekalov had called on the German Foreign Office.
To show that he was serious about improving relations, Stalin sacked his Foreign Minister, Maksim Litvinov on May 3 and replaced him with Vyacheslav Molotov. It was announced with great fanfare on the Soviet newspapers. Molotov was a ‘close collaborator with Stalin’ as the US intelligence noted and this would ensure that the dictator’s ideas would be followed.
Later that month, the German ambassador in Moscow, under orders from Berlin to speak as cautiously to Molotov as possible, urged that quick action be taken before the USSR concluded a pact with England and France. Schulenburg clearly did not understand the situation. Stalin had dropped all hopes of an alliance with Britain and France and was now pursuing a pact with Germany.
In June, Molotov gradually abandoned his reserve and now openly told the Germans about his aim. He complained about the lack of German interest and the attitude of the Germans.
On July 22, the Soviet press announced the opening of economic negotiations with Germany. Talks proceeded slowly for the rest of the month and for the first week of August.
On August 14, Schulenburg told Molotov that ideological differences did not exclude friendly cooperation; that all questions from the Baltic to the Balkans could be settled; that the western democracies were the natural enemies of both Germany and the U.S.S.R.; that, since war might come soon, immediate clarification of relations is desirable; that Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister is prepared to come to Moscow to negotiate.
The next day, Molotov said that he was now fully convinced of German sincerity in pursuing the agreement, but requested that adequate preparation should precede Ribbentrop's visit.
On August 16, Ribbentrop told Molotov that Germany was ready to conclude a non-aggression pact. The need for haste is to be stressed; Ribbentrop is ready to come to Moscow at any time after August 18 with full powers (to be granted) from Hitler.
On August 19, Schulenburg submitted the terms and conditions of the Nazi—Soviet non-aggression pact to the Soviet government. That same day, permission was granted for Ribbentrop to come to Moscow on the 26th.
Three days later, Hitler granted full powers to Ribbentrop as his foreign minister to sign the pact. That day, the Japanese expressed their concern over repercussions of the pact, which were later played down by the Germans.
On August 23, Ribbentrop landed in Moscow and signed the pact for the Germans. (see the Appendix) A conversation between Stalin, Ribbentrop, and Molotov was held.
*****
Extracts from a Memorandum
of a Conversation Held on the Night of August 23rd to 24th, Between the Reich
Foreign Minister, on the One Hand, and Herr Stalin and the Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars Molotov, on the Other Hand
VERY SECRET!
STATE SECRET
The following problems were discussed:
1) Japan:
Ribbentrop stated
that the German-Japanese friendship was in no wise directed against the Soviet
Union.
Stalin replied
that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with
Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese
provocations. If Japan desired war, it could have it. The Soviet Union was not
afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace-so much the
better! Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an
improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the
Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been
taken by the Soviet Union.
2) Italy:
Stalin inquired
of the Reich Foreign Minister as to Italian aims. Did not Italy have
aspirations beyond the annexation of Albania-perhaps for Greek territory?
Small, mountainous, and thinly populated Albania was, in his estimation, of no
particular use to Italy.
Ribbentrop
replied that Albania was important to Italy for strategic reasons. Moreover,
Mussolini was a strong man who could not be intimidated.
This he had
demonstrated in the Abyssinian conflict, in which Italy had asserted its aims
by its own strength against a hostile coalition. Even Germany was not yet in a
position at that time to give Italy appreciable support.
Mussolini
welcomed warmly the restoration of friendly relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union. He had expressed himself as gratified with the conclusion of the
Non-aggression Pact.
3) Turkey:
Stalin asked the
Reich Foreign Minister what Germany thought about Turkey.
Ribbentrop
expressed himself as follows in this matter: he had months ago declared to the
Turkish Government that Germany desired friendly relations with Turkey.
4) England:
Stalin and
Molotov commented adversely on the British Military Mission in Moscow, which
had never told the Soviet Government what it really wanted.
Ribbentrop stated
in this connection that England had always been trying and was still trying to
disrupt the development of good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.
England was weak and wanted to let others fight for its presumptuous claim to
world domination.
Stalin eagerly
concurred and observed as follows: the British Army was weak; the British Navy
no longer deserved its previous reputation. England's air arm was being
increased, to be sure, but there was a lack of pilots….
Stalin remarked
that the feeler was evidently Chamberlain's letter to the Führer, which
Ambassador Henderson delivered on August 23 at the Obersalzberg. Stalin further
expressed the opinion that England, despite its weakness, would wage war
craftily and stubbornly.
5) France:
Stalin expressed
the opinion that France, nevertheless, had an army worthy of consideration, but
this was downplayed by the Germans.
6) Anti-Comintern
Pact:
Ribbentrop
observed that the Anti-Comintern Pact was basically directed not against the
Soviet Union but against the Western democracies. He knew, and was able to
infer from the tone of the Russian press, that the Soviet Government fully
recognized this fact…
7) Attitude
of the German people to the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact:
Ribbentrop stated
that he had been able to determine that all strata of the German people, and
especially the simple people, most warmly welcomed the understanding with the
Soviet Union. The people felt instinctively that between Germany and the Soviet
Union no natural conflicts of interests existed, and that the development of
good relations had hitherto been disturbed only by foreign intrigue, in
particular on the part of England.
Stalin replied
that he readily believed this. The Germans desired peace and therefore welcomed
friendly relations between the Reich and the Soviet Union.
Ribbentrop
interrupted here to say that it was certainly true that the German people
desired peace, but, on the other hand, indignation against Poland was so great
that every single man was ready to fight. The German people would no longer put
up with Polish provocation.
8) Toasts:
In the course of
the conversation, Stalin spontaneously proposed a toast to the Führer, as
follows:
"I know how
much the German nation loves its Führer; I should therefore like to drink to
his health."
Molotov drank to the health of the Reich
Foreign Minister and of the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg.
Molotov raised his glass to Stalin, remarking
that it had been Stalin who-through his speech of March of this year, which had
been well understood in Germany-had brought about the reversal in political
relations.
Molotov and
Stalin drank repeatedly to the Non-aggression Pact, the new era of
German-Russian relations, and to the German nation.
Ribbentrop in
turn proposed a toast to Herr Stalin, toasts to the Soviet Government, and to a
favourable development of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.
9) When they took their leave, Stalin
addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister words to this effect:
The Soviet Government takes the new Pact very
seriously. He could guarantee on his word of honour that the Soviet Union would
not betray its partner.
On August 25, Mussolini sent a letter to Hitler, ‘approving completely of the agreement with Russia’.
On September 1, Hitler invaded Poland. In the secret protocol to the Russo—German pact, Stalin would get Poland east of the Vistula River. On September 3, Ribbentrop communicated with Moscow, that in view of the Soviet inaction, and to hasten the destruction of the Polish army, if it would mind if operations were to be conducted in the Soviet sphere of influence. The Russians replied that ‘one or both parties might be forced to cross the line temporarily’ and thus agreed.
On September 17, the Soviets invaded on the east. This was a terrible blow to the Poles, who were planning to make a final stand on the Pripet Marshes.
The two armies eventually met amicably at Brest—Litovsk and the border was redrawn there.
On September 28, an additional protocol was added, providing for the exchange of nationals. Ethnic Germans living in the Russian spheres of influences will be transferred and made German nationals, with the same going for the Russians.
On November 30, the Soviets attacked Finland after it refused to yield territory. By doing so, it renegade on the friendship treaty of 1932. Hitler refused to allow German volunteers to fight on the Finnish side even though there were substantial German interests in Finland, and there were Italians fighting for the Finns. He instructed German press to report favourably for the Soviets, even though the Finns’ dogged resistance cost them many lives.
Nevertheless, the Finns succumbed under heavy Soviet weight thrown at them. On March 14 they sued for peace.
On March 28, 1940, Ribbentrop suggested that Molotov and Stalin visit Berlin. But this was quickly turned down.
The German invasion of Norway in April was met with a wish of complete success from Moscow.
Soon, friction began to occur between Russia and Germany.
On June 23, Russia turned on Romania, demanding the return on Bessarabia and Bucovina. Bessarabia had been put under the Soviet sphere of influence in the German—Soviet pact, but nothing had been mentioned about Bucovina, which happened to be densely populated by ethnic Germans. The Soviets then limited their claim to Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia. The Romanians, in consultation with Germany, had agreed reluctantly to cede both territories. Nevertheless, to sweeten the bitter pill that had been given to Romania, Hitler guaranteed what remained of the small unhappy country.
In August that year, the Germans renounced their claims on a portion of Lithuania in exchange for billions of dollars.
On September 26, the German Embassy warned that deliveries to the USSR were lagging and as a result the Soviets might suspend their deliveries with terrible effect.
On October 13, Ribbentrop wrote to Stalin, pointing out the gains which both sides had made from the non aggression pact. He also invited Molotov over to Berlin.
The Soviet Foreign Minister finally came over on November 12. A meeting between him, Hitler, and Ribbentrop was disrupted by an air raid, so they took refuge in a shelter. When the Germans then pointed out that they were winning the war, Molotov pointed out, “If you are winning this war, why are we in an air raid shelter?” This statement angered the Germans.
With no easy way across the English Channel, Hitler started looking East. On December 18 1940, he came up with the preliminary plan, code-named ‘Operation Barbarossa’.
On the last day of the year, the Finns indicated that they would like German assistance should the Soviets attack them. (Doing so would violate the pact)
In late March, Ribbentrop reviewed the world military situation and concluded that the Axis had already won the war; he also stated that German relations with the U.S.S.R. were correct, but that Germany regarded Soviet policy with suspicion; he suggested that a Japanese attack on Singapore would break British morale and keep the United States out of the war.
On April 16, the Japanese signed a neutrality treaty with the Russians. This ensured that the USSR had good relations with the Axis.
On April 22, the Soviets complained that the Germans had violated their airspace. This was answered quickly by another complaint that the Germans had violated Soviet airspace the very next day. Clear cracks had begun in the marriage between Germany and Russia.
On April 24, the British Ambassador to the USSR predicted the invasion of Russia to be on June 22. This was ignored by Stalin. More rumours were coming from all sorts of people: travellers, professors… Stalin therefore gave the order that rumours be quashed.
This continued until mid-May, when the Soviets protested to the German Embassy that airspace violations were still continuing. The matter remained unsolved.
On June 22, 1941, the Germans attacked.
Sources:
1. http://russianculture.about.com/library/weekly/aa040698.htm
2. Department of State (1948) “Analytical List of Documents”, Nazi—Soviet Relations 1939-1941, Washington
D.C. pp. 1-359