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Gulf War Syndrome - The Burlington Free Press, 06/15/2002:

Sanders to address British Parliament

Gulf War Syndrome - The report to Congress 11/07/97

[contents]:

Union Calendar No. 228

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Primal Scream: Beyond the Box

Essays: Gulf War Syndrome and The News

Links:

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Pages 27 - 33 of the printed ver-sion are shown at right. A complete copy of this re-port is available from your Con-gressional Rep-resentative, or from:

U.S. Printing Office

A pdf version is available from the Federal Government at:

Library of
Congress

 Depleted Uranium
Depleted uranium [DU] is a highly, toxic, radioactive by-product of the uranium enrichment process.96 DU is used in munitions as armor-piercing rounds fired at enemy tanks, and as protective armor on U.S. tanks. When a DU penetrator impacts a hard target, most of the round burns up, scattering uranium dust and shrapnel in and around the target. In the Gulf War, DU is credited with destroying over 1,400 Iraqi tanks, as well as other equipment and weapons storage facilities.97
"Exposure to DU armor and/or penetrators is dangerous, but DU poses the greatest risk to those who: breathe smoke or dust from a burning vehicle hit by DU rounds; climb on or enter a vehicle hit by DU rounds; or were in a friendly fire incident involving DU rounds."98
One of the more severe DU exposure events occurred in July 1991 in Doha, Kuwait when a major U.S. Army ammunition depot and motor pool exploded and burned for 2 days. DU armor on vehicles and 9,000 pounds of DU rounds were oxidized to powder exposing 3,500 soldiers in the vicinity to radiation and DU aerosol particles that were widely distributed by high winds. Soldiers involved in the cleanup several days after the fire were not warned of DU contamination and, therefore, wore no protective gear.99
According to the booklet "DU: The Stone Unturned," published by Swords to Plowshares: "Even after the [Doha] fire, soldiers were never told about the presence of DU contamination. Soldiers swept the compound with brooms, picked up debris with their bare hands, and were never issued respiratory masks or other protective clothing."100
"Like most soldiers," the DU publication continues, "S/Sgt. Chris Kornkven was unaware of the use of DU munitions during the war. Due to his exposure to DU dust on destroyed Iraqi vehicles, he has since tested positive for internalized depleted uranium." [S/Sgt. Kornkven testified before the Human Resources Subcommittee on January 21, 1997.]101
Radiation exposure expert Dr. Asaf Durakovic, a medical unit commander in the gulf War and most recently the chief of nuclear medicine at the VA Medical Center in Wilmington, DE was a witness at the Human Resources Subcommittee hearing on June 26, 1997. Dr. Durakovic reported that his expertise was never used because he and his staff were never informed of the intended use of DU before the war or during the war.102
In late 1991, following the war, 24 soldiers from the 144th Transportation & Supply Company in New Jersey were referred to Dr. Durakovic at the VA Medical Center in Wilmington for diagnosis and treatment. These soldiers had worked on battle damaged tanks and vehicles in the Gulf from January to March 1991 without protective equipment or clothing. In March, a Battle Damage Assessment Team arrived in full radioprotective clothing, inspected the vehicles, declared them "hot" and off-limits.103
Preliminary testing showed 14 of 24 veterans "contained decay products of radioactive uranium." According {to} Dr. Durakovic, urine samples sent to the Army Radiochemistry Lab in Aberdeen, MD, disappeared. Dr. Durakovic recommended additional, more comprehensive testing -- including tests to determine if the 24 veterans had also inhaled DU particles -- but further tests and treatments were denied by the VA. Of the 14 veterans, 2 have since died, and the remaining members of the 144th Company have scattered around the country making medical follow-up unlikely.104
"None of my recommendations was ever followed. Every conceivable road block was put in my line of management of those patients. I was ridiculed. There were obstacles throughout my attempt to properly analyze the problems of those patients. My plan failed because of total lack of interest on the part of the VA to do anything for those unfortunate patients. I [even] received phone calls from DOD suggesting that this work is not going to yield meaningful information and should be discontinued."105
Dr. Durakovic was later terminated by the Wilmington VA hospital, he alleges for his outspoken views of the VA concerning the diagnosis and treatment of sick Gulf War veterans.
Physicist and DU expert Leonard Dietz, who testified before the Human Resources Subcommittee, writes and speaks frequently on the dangers of depleted uranium. In a recent abstract he stated, "A large number of unprotected Gulf War veterans could easily have acquired dangerous quantities of DU in their bodies. We refer to scientific measurements that have been made of the atmospheric wind-borne transport of uranium aerosols up to 25 miles from their sources. Micrometer particles of DU can spread over a large region and poison many people both radiologically and chemically."106
"A comprehensive epidemiological study should be made of all Gulf War veterans and their families," Dietz said, "searching for evidence of residual DU in their bodies and for causes of genetic defects in their children. The health issues associated with DU munitions should be investigated and evaluated by independent medical and scientific experts separated completely for the DOD, VA, National Laboratories, U.S. military services and their contractors."107
Dr. Michio Kaku, nuclear physics professor at City University of New York, stated, "Ultimately, the Gulf War Syndrome will be traced to a variety of factors, simply because the Pentagon released so much firepower on the Iraqis during that war that large quantities of materials were sent into the atmosphere, including DU and chemicals stored in warehouses. Ultimately, when the final chapter is written, DU will have a large portion of the blame."108
"The Pentagon should release all its classified information concerning the Gulf War Syndrome and depleted uranium," Dr. Kaku said. "It is a national embarrassment that the Pentagon, even at this late date, is still withholding vital information about precisely what happened during the Gulf War."109
A 1993 report by the GAO concluded, "Although the Army's stated policy is to minimize personnel's exposure to radiation, it has not effectively educated its personnel in the hazards of DU contamination and in proper safety measures appropriate to the degrees of hazard. What little information is available is not widely disseminated and training on DU is basically limited . . ."110
The DOD did not properly train Gulf troops to the dangers of DU before and during the war, according to Dr. Bernard Rostker, DOD's Special Assistant for Gulf War Illness. He made this statement in a July 1997 meeting on depleted uranium with Human Resources Subcommittee staff. Dr. Rostker advised the Human Resources staff that steps were being taken to educate troops, who may fight future wars, on the toxic effects of DU exposure.

Oil Well Fires and Petroleum Contamination
Iraqi troops, in a deliberate act of sabotage and revenge, ignited hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells during the Gulf War. According to a Defense Science Board Report, "On February 23, 1991, Iraqi forces began to destroy and set fire more than 700 oil wells throughout Kuwait."111 The date is challenged by the University of Arizona's Environmental Research Laboratory, concluding that, "Solar radiation data indicate that the first oil well fires were most likely set on or around January 17, 1991"112 [an important date because it suggests an additional month of troop contamination]. The last of the 749 oil well fires, including storage tanks and refineries, were extinguished 10 months later, in November 1991.113
Oil well fires and petroleum related exposures are another possible cause of the Gulf War Syndrome. In testimony submitted to the Presidential Advisory Committee [PAC], chemical engineer and expert on health effects of petroleum exposure, Craig Stead stated: "Petroleum was a major Gulf War environmental exposure. American troops were exposed to petroleum from oil well fires, oil contaminated drinking and shower water, oil soaked clothing, and use of petroleum for dust suppression, pesticide application, and fuel. Petroleum inhalation, ingestion and skin absorption causes illness. The symptoms of petroleum illness are consistent with symptoms reported by Gulf War veterans."
"Clinical techniques exist to diagnose petroleum illness," Mr. Stead said. "These techniques include broncho alveolar lavage [BAL], computed tomography, and magnetic resonance imaging. Known treatments for petroleum include the use of anti-inflammatory steroids, expectoration of oil in the lungs, and diet. Left untreated, petroleum illness is a progressive disease which can lead to emphysema and cancer as endpoints."114
Sick Gulf War veterans testified about their experiences before the Presidential Advisory Committee and a National Institutes of Health Gulf War workshop. Testimony included:
"When they blew the oil well fires, it was unlike anything I ever seen in my life. It was like being in a locked closet in the dark. We are in the middle of 500 oil well fires. And the only thing that they [U.S. military] gave us was a white T-shirt and [said] 'Put it over your face.' When they brought in the civilian contractors to put out these oil well fires, they had self-contained breathing apparatus, They had chemical suits, They had everything. Members of my team did [get ill]."115
"[I] was in the center of the oil fires in Kuwait City with no capability of distinguishing the sun from the moon for the first 6 weeks after the liberation of Kuwait. [My] body was so oil and soot covered that a black watch band was camouflaged on [my] wrist. The scarf [I] wore around [my] face did not filter out the air borne debris. [My] spit looked like oil and when [I] sneezed [my] mucus looked like axle grease."116
"We were by the oil well fires for 2 weeks and we camped right next to them."117
"I developed severe nasal problems from the oil smoke. I got breathing problems."118
"I lived six city blocks from the fires for almost 2 weeks, I flew in the stuff every day."119
"For 7 months, my husband's ship chartered through burning oil derricks in the water. They were on the oil spill. They ingested oil-infested water. They cooked with it. They showered in it. He has chemical sensitivity. He has asthma. He got it in the service."120
"We suffered chemical ingestion when our drinking, cooking, washing, and bathing water became heavily contaminated with some sort of chemical that burned our mouth, throat, esophagus, and stomach, When we took our showers, we smelled of petrochemicals as well as the freshly washed clothes we put on. The food tasted of kerosene. We were in a 100 percent contaminated environment. I became very sick with digestive problems that same day that the contamination came aboard ship in our drinking water. The Navy ships' distilling plants . . . cannot filter out chemicals."121
Gulf War veteran Debbie Judd, an Air Force nurse, testified before the PAC on a survey completed in 1995 by the Operation Desert Storm Association on 10,051 sick Gulf veterans. she reported the following results: "Specific to the oil in the environment there, those breathing or enveloped in oil fire smoke was 96 percent; within clear visual area of the oil fires was 90 percent; worked in, lived in, or make travel through the burning oil fields was 72 percent; washed in water with an oily sheen was 68 percent, and those with oily taste to their food was 66 percent, and those with oily taste to the drinking water was 65 percent."122
A study, "Kuwait Oil Fire Health Risk Assessment," by the U.S. Army's Environmental Health Agency concluded: "Results of this [report] indicate the potential for significant long-term adverse health effects for the exposed troop or civilian employee populations is minimal . . ."123
Craig Stead provided a statement tot he Human Resources Subcommittee in which he said the Army study was flawed: "In 1994, the Army issued the final Kuwait Oil Fire Health Risk assessment. The Assessment used Gulf air pollution data gathered in May through November 1991. Air pollution from the oil field fires during this time was much less than during the Gulf War for the following reasons: The months of May through November [when the study was done] have the Shamal winds blowing from the northwest causing the smoke plume from the oil field fires to disperse widely and ascend to great heights. During the Gulf War (February and March) low wind speeds and air inversions were common. Under these conditions the smoke plume was on the ground, creating high localized levels of air pollution to which the troops were exposed."124
An Institute of Medicine [IOM] document confirms Mr. Stead's statement: "The Army Health Risk Assessment could not launch a successful air-sampling effort until the beginning of May, after the more stagnant air conditions of the winter months had passed. Those who undertook the sampling efforts did so with this knowledge."125 Principal author of the Army report, Dr. Jack Heller, also confirmed the Stead statement: "What we measured at the time we were there starting in May when the Shamal winds were strongly blowing and there was a lot of thermal lofting of the pollution. We didn't have those ground level impacts [present during the war]. In fact the whole time I was there I had [only] one ground level impact."126
Mr. Stead stated: "Dr. Heller did not factor into the Assessment study the high levels of wartime air pollution to which the troops were actually exposed. The Assessment is seriously flawed . . . [and] . . . is a primary document relied upon by DOD, PAC, VA and IOM in concluding the oil field fires presented no health hazard to the troops."127 Mr. Stead also said the study was additionally flawed because it neglected to include troop exposures to contaminated rain during the fires, oil contamination in water for drinking, cooking and showering.128
Also, a January 1991 study by the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, issued on the eve of the invasion, forewarns of the treat of the oil well fires and tends to refute the U.S. Army Environmental Health Agency's Risk Assessment. The army Intelligence report stated: "Owing to Iraq's defensive 'scorched earth' plan for Kuwait, the overall Kuwaiti oil infrastructure presents a serious hazard to advancing ally ground forces. There is overwhelming evidence that once ordered, the Iraqi forces will initiate demolition of oil wells, oil-gathering centers, oil-storage depots, pumping stations, large tank farms, refineries, and oil/product loading terminals. Demolition of these facilities and complexes will result in massive fires -- 'Burning Kuwait.' "
"The danger of oil fires, toxic gas, and smoke in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations [KTO] is very serious [emphasis added]. These dangers . . . are as follows: 1) associated toxic and highly flammable gas from spilled raw sour crude oil from nonburning oil wells; 2) Intense heat of oil-well fires, possible natural-gas wells, and fire trenches; 3) Dense smoke and superheated gases from these fires. By far the greatest danger is from dissociated hydrogen sulfide gas and highly volatile light ends [gases] released from wellhead blowouts. In the KTO, the prevailing winds generally blow from the north-northwest southward toward Saudi Arabia [emphasis added]. Smoke and gases from Kuwaiti fires and blowouts most likely will be blown in the face of northerly advancing [United States] forces along the southern front of the KTO."129

Experimental Drugs and Vaccines

[NOTES]

96. U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal With Depleted Uranium Contamination, GAO/NSIAD-93-90, p. 1.
97. Report by the National Gulf War Resource Center, Inc., Washington, DC. "Gulf War Syndrome," Fall 1996, p. 5 (in subcommittee files).
98. Ibid.
99. International Action Center, Metal of Dishonor (Depleted Uranium Action Project, International Action Center, New York, NY, 1997), pp. 33-35.
100. Report by Dan Fahey, "DU: The Stone Unturned," Swords to Plowshares, March 28, 1997, p. 10 (in subcommittee files).
101. Ibid., p. 11.
102. Prepared statement of Asaf Durakovic, Human Resources Subcommittee hearing of June 26, 1997, p. 2 (in subcommittee files).
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
105. Testimony of Asaf Durakovic, Human Resources Subcommittee hearing of June 26, 1997, original transcript, pp. 135-136 (in subcommittee files).
106. See supra note 98, p. 135.
107. Ibid., p. 149.
108. Ibid., p. 114.
109. Ibid., p. 115.
110. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal With Depleted Uranium Contamination," GAO/NSIAD-93-90, January 1993, p. 2.
111. Final Report of the Defense Science Board, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 50.
112. Riley, et al., "Effect of Kuwait Oil Field Fires on Human Comfort and Environment in Saudi Arabia," International Journal of BioMeteorology, 1992, pp. 36-38.
113. Report prepared by Craig Stead, "Oil Fires, Petroleum and Gulf War Illnesses," June 1997, at tab J, citing testimony of Gary Friedman, Texas Lung Institute to the PAC (in subcommittee files).
114. Statement of Craig Stead to the PAC, March 26, 1996, p. 2 (excerpt in subcommittee files).
115. Statement of Scott Russell to the PAC, August 6, 1996 (excerpt in subcommittee files).
116. Statement of Herb Smith to the National Institutes of Health Gulf War Workshop, April 27-29, 1994, (excerpt in subcommittee files).
117. Statement of Kevin Jenson to the PAC, August 6, 1997 (excerpt in subcommittee files).
118. Statement of Michael Lanning to the PAC, August 6, 1997 (excerpt in subcommittee files).
119. Statement of Ronald Matthews to the PAC, February 27, 1996 (excerpt in subcommittee files).
120. Statement of Betty Zuspan to the PAC, February 7, 1996 (excerpt in subcommittee files).
121. Statement of Antonio Melchor to the PAC, February 7, 1996 (excerpt in subcommittee files).
122. Statement of Debbie Judd to the PAC hearing, November 7, 1995, (excerpt in subcommittee files).
123. Final Report, Kuwait Oil Fire Health Assessment, Department of the Army, U.S. Environmental Hygiene Agency, Report No. 39-26-L192-91, February 1994, p. 1.
124. Prepared statement of Craig Stead, Human Resources Subcommittee hearing of June 26, 1997, p. 3 (in subcommittee files).
125. National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Health Consequences of Service During the Gulf War, ["IOM Report"] (National Academy Press, 1996) p. 45.
126. See supra note 113, statement of Jack Heller to the NIH Workshop: "Persian Gulf Experience and Health, April 27-29, 1994, tab I (in subcommittee files).
127. See supra note 124, p. 4.
128. Ibid.
129. Report of the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Foreign Science Center, "Kuwait: Serious Oilfire, Gas and Smoke Dangers," AST-2660Z-148-90, January 9, 1991, pp. iii, 1 (in subcommittee files).