THE DEBACLE:
MILITARY FACTORS IN THE DEFEAT OF FRANCE, 1940
At 5:30, on the morning of 10 May 1940, German forces attacked Holland and Belgium.(1) The Luftwaffe suppressed aerial opposition while parachute and glider forces landed far inside the frontiers of the Low Countries. German ground forces followed hard on the heels of the aerial assault. According to established Anglo-French doctrine which anticipated a German attempt to implement the Schlieffen Plan, major elements of the French army and the entire British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) moved from their positions in northern France into Belgium to meet the enemy. Along the coast, the French Seventh Army continued north into Holland in an effort to join forces with the Dutch army. This wrinkle was a late addition to Allied strategy, added at the insistence of the French Commander-in-Chief, General Maurice Gamelin, over the strenuous objections of many of his subordinate commanders.
The German forces quickly overwhelmed the heavily fortified border positions of the Low Countries. The capture of the supposedly impregnable Belgian fortress of Eban Emael was accomplished by a mere seventy-seven Germans whose gliders landed atop the fortress in a spectacular display of military innovation.(2)
By the night of 12 May it became apparent that the main German effort emanated from the Ardennes Forest where masses of German armor had reached the Meuse River. On the 13th, General Heinz Guderian's panzer forces smashed through Sedan and began a mad dash for the English Channel. Despite valiant counterattacks around Laon by Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle's newly activated armored division (17-19 May), Guderian's forces took Abbeville on the 20th, cutting the Allied positions in two. Trapped, the B.E.F. and numerous French troops were withdrawn by sea in the "miracle" of Dunkirk, between 27 May and 4 June.(3)
The Germans then crossed over the Somme, entering Paris on 14 June. The remnants of the French army were pinned against the Maginot Line and the new government of Marshal P�tain asked for an armistice.(4) The Battle of France was over.
Since 1940, a vast literature has appeared to explain the stunning defeat of the Allies in Western Europe.(5) Although a large percentage deals with social and political factors, a huge number of works concentrate solely on the military factors. Numerous theories have been argued--some quite convincingly. It is doubtful that a consensus will ever be reached as to the single most important factor. Any monocausal explanation is inappropriate since many errors and short-comings are evident when the campaign is analyzed. At best, historians may agree that a series of factors contributed to the debacle, most notably strategy and leadership. In addition, arguments have concerned troop strength, force composition, morale, and weaponry.
In the autumn of 1939, Great Britain and France agreed to a defensive strategy in the West. The British proposed to concentrate on building a strategic bombing force that, in concert with naval blockade, would strangle the German economy and cripple her war-making capability. Consequently, the British Expeditionary Force sent to aid France did not exceed 400,000 troops.
France sought to protect her border with Germany by means of the Maginot Line.(6) This feat of military engineering ran from the Swiss border to the Ardennes forest. Numerous critics have derided the vast expenditures necessary to create the Maginot Line, arguing that France would have been better served in producing tanks and airplanes. But had the money been spent for such purposes, the machines would have been obsolete by 1940. It is worth noting that Germany invested heavily in defensive fortifications--the Atlantic Wall and the Siegfried Line (the West Wall) proved to be significant obstacles in 1944 and early 1945. The Maginot Line served its purpose; the Germans did not launch a major attack anywhere along its length. The reliance on fortifications allowed France to establish a concentration of force in the much more vulnerable North. Unfortunately, the flawed strategy pursued by Gamelin failed to correctly position available forces to stem the German attack through the Ardennes.
Anglo-French strategy was based on the assumption that Germany would attack through the Low Countries, as in the First World War. To meet this challenge, the bulk of the French army and the B.E.F. planned to move into Belgium and link up with the Belgian army as soon as the neutrality of the Low Countries was violated. Concerned that the Belgians could not hold the Albert Canal Line, plans called for meeting the Belgians along the Dyle River. This sound strategy would shorten the defensive line (allowing greater concentration of force) and protect the industrial areas of northern France. Two main flaws are evident in the Allied strategy: the Ardennes, assumed to be impenetrable, was defended in the main by low quality reserve units of the French army;(7) the commitment of the best and most mobile forces for the move into Belgium severely limited Allied options in the event that the main German attack did not come as expected.
Much has been made of the role of leadership in the debacle. Typically the argument runs that, in particular, France's military leaders were too old and unable to comprehend modern mobile warfare. While all the senior commanders were veterans of the first war, so were the German commanders. Although Germany did lead the way in implementing new techniques of armored warfare--the blitzkrieg--these concepts were first expounded by de Gaulle in 1934. The main German proponent of de Gaulle's tactics, Heinz Guderian, struggled for years to win acceptance. Had Germany not been a totalitarian state, it is doubtful that his ideas would have been implemented. Hitler, however, was impressed by the potential of armored warfare. Yet, even in the Polish campaign, the techniques championed by de Gaulle and Guderian were not fully implemented. In the campaign against the West, Guderian's superiors, all the way up to Hitler, grew increasingly concerned at the magnitude of their success. Thus, after the breakthrough at Sedan, Guderian was ordered to halt until sufficient infantry forces could be advanced. After strenuous argument, Guderian received permission for a "reconnaissance in force" and hurled his armored corps onward to the channel coast.
A careful analysis of French tank doctrines reveals a clear understanding of armored warfare.(8) Given the basic French strategy of defense, the tactical employment of armor as set forth in French field manuals fully utilized forces available. The field officers in the French armored units were fully versed in current French doctrines which higher commanders often failed to grasp. A prime example is the withdrawal ordered by General Corap, in command of the French Ninth Army, which guarded the Ardennes. This allowed the Germans to secure their bridgeheads across the Meuse River. A strong counterattack by Corap's armored units might have allowed time for reinforcements to arrive.
Undoubtedly the most questionable aspect of French leadership was General Gamelin's distribution of forces and his insistence on moving into Holland--a strategic decision know as the Breda Variant. Gamelin placed half the French army immediately behind the Maginot Line. Perhaps Gamelin had no faith in this formidable series of interconnected fortresses. In the event, no major attack was launched against the Line. From the start, half of France's military might was in no position to meet the German attack. Most seriously, Gamelin had stripped the French army of reserves. This vital role was to have been played by the Seventh Army. Instead, Gamelin placed this reserve force against the channel and assigned it a liaison role--to move to Breda, Holland, and link up the Dutch and Belgian armies. Since the Low Countries refused even informal staff conversations, this was a highly risky gambit. When the onslaught came, the Dutch army withdrew to the North into "Fortress Holland." This made the Seventh Army's mission a fool's errand. The lack of reserves would have fatal consequences for France.
As to troop strength, for the invasion in the West, the Germans fielded one hundred thirty-four infantry divisions, ten armored divisions, and four motorized divisions. The Allies possessed almost equal numbers: the Dutch army had eight infantry divisions; the Belgians, eighteen;(9) the B.E.F. consisted of ten infantry divisions, a brigade of heavy tanks and five independent regiments of light tanks; the French army fielded ninety infantry divisions, three divisions of heavy tanks, three divisions of light tanks, and twenty-seven independent tank battalions.(10)
German armor was organized in thirty-five battalions in ten divisions for a total of 2,574 tanks. Of these, more than 1,400 were the lightly armored, under-gunned Panzer I and Panzer II models.(11) Allied armor totaled approximately 2,400 machines. The French B and D tank models and the Somua tank were superior to the German light tanks and at least equal to the Panzer III and IV models.(12) Commanders unfamiliar or distrustful of armored doctrine often dispersed tank units when concentration of force was required.
Since 1940, the morale of the French army has received severe criticism. This charge, however, seems unfair in light of German reports of French tenacity. Morale was certainly not a problem for French forces in the Alps. There, six divisions withstood the efforts of thirty-two Italian divisions to advance across the border. Casualty figures for the campaign also suggest that the French put up a vigorous fight--120,000 killed in action.(13)
Air forces have received considerable attention as a major factor in the Allied defeat. While the Luftwaffe did have an advantage, especially in ground attack aircraft, the disparity in fighters was minimal. The Luftwaffe had about 3,700 aircraft of all types available for action while the French air force numbered about 1,500. The Royal Air Force had 474 aircraft based in France; the air forces of Holland and Belgium were negligible. Many authors have suggested that a full commitment of the R.A.F. to the battle would have balanced the scales. But without air cover for the Royal Navy, Britain would have been completely vulnerable to invasion.
No single military factor adequately explains the sudden collapse of the Western Front. Arguments about troop strength, morale, force composition, and weaponry as primary causes of the debacle seem unconvincing. Two reasons appear most significant: Gamelin's flawed strategy, and the lack of coordination with the military commands of Holland and Belgium. Had Gamelin retained the French Seventh Army as a reserve force as originally intended, the basic French doctrine of containment and counterattack may have successfully stemmed the tide. If Dutch and Belgian forces had closely coordinated their strategies with the British and French, disaster for all would have been less likely. Instead, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, these nations vainly hoped to remain neutral. Hitler's racial agenda, revealed in Mein Kampf and countless speeches, made it clear that no country in Europe was safe from attack. Only the close cooperation of many nations finally ensured victory in the greatest conflagration in world history.
1. This summation of the campaign against the Low Countries and France is based on two standard references in military history. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), chap. XX; Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars, vol. 2 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959), sec. 2. Back
2. T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1977), 259.Back
3. About 340,000 were evacuated, including about 120,000 French troops. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 130. Other sources give the figure as 366,162 evacuated with nearly 142,000 being non-British. J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 3, From the Seven Days Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 1944 (N.P.: Minerva Press, 1967), 404. Churchill puts the total at 338,226, without a breakdown by country. French morale may be judged in part by Churchill's note that many ships returned empty on the last day of the evacuation (4 June), many French troops refused to leave. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 114-115.Back
4. Oddly enough, there is confusion as to the exact date of the armistice. Some sources give 21 June, others 22 June. According to B.H. Liddell Hart, Hitler's terms were delivered to the French on 20 June, accepted on 22 June, with the armistice taking effect at 1:35 a.m. on 25 June, after the arrangement of an armistice with Italy (which had declared war on 10 June). B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), 85-86.Back
5. Early analyses tend to credit German superiority in manpower, tanks, and airplanes to explain the Allied defeat. More perceptive reports also credited German initiative and organization. See, for example, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Chronology of Failure: The Last Days of the French Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), Chap. 10.Back
6. For an excellent discussion of the Maginot Line's technical achievements, see Keith Mallory and Arvid Ottar, The Architecture of War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), chap. 5.Back
7. French forces consisted of active units maintained in peace time: Series A units, first line reserve; Series B second line reserve; fortress units, defensive in nature and without transport. Fuller, 385, n. 2.Back
8. See particularly Don W. Alexander, "Repercussions of the Breda Variant," French Historical Studies 8 (Spring 1974).Back
9. Some authorities put Belgian strength at twenty-two divisions. The Belgian army never reached full mobilization.Back
11. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967), 75, n.1. The total includes 334 Czech tanks and 135 armored command vehicles.Back