ASSIGNMENT: ALASKA
When one examines a globe, the Aleutian Islands, sweeping from the Alaska Peninsula like a scimitar, appear to be a strategically important region for warfare in the northern Pacific. Japanese and American military planners recognized the significance of the Aleutians, but also recognized the inherent problems posed by operations in the Aleutian archipelago. Even though the Aleutians appeared exceedingly difficult to use as an invasion route, the United States could not afford to assume that Japan and other potential foes would refrain from exploiting the islands as bases for striking the North American mainland.(343)
The Aleutian Islands are a partially submerged continuation of Alaska's Aleutian Range. The presence of active and dormant volcanoes readily indicates the origin of the islands. The islands are characterized by "bold peaks and rugged highlands, with narrow dividing passes at sea and deep valleys on land." There are numerous hot springs which nurture a profusion of moss, grasses, and shrubs.(344) An archipelago of 279 small islands, the Aleutians stretch for about 1,100 miles from the Alaska Peninsula toward Japan and northern Asia.(345) The chain separates the Bering Sea from the Pacific Ocean. The Aleutian archipelago is composed of five island groups. From east to west: the Fox Islands, the Islands of the Four Mountains, the Andreanof Islands, the Rat Islands, and the Near Islands.(346) The Kommandorski Islands, geographically a part of the Aleutians, were retained by Russia after the Alaska Purchase.
The easternmost group, the Fox Islands, includes the three largest islands in the Aleutian archipelago: Unimak, Unalaska, and Umnak. The highest point in the Aleutians is the 9,387-foot volcanic peak, Mount Shishaldin, on the largest island, Unimak.
Unalaska, the second largest island, is dominated by two features--the volcanic Mount Makushin
at 6,680 feet
high, and Dutch Harbor, the best port in the archipelago.(347) The harbor is located on a bay backed by hills which slope gently down from the mountains. The island's fjords and valleys have been described as "picturesque to the eye."(348)
The Russian expedition of 1741, under Vitus Bering, made the first Old World contact with the Aleutians. The abundant wildlife resources of the area promised great wealth, and the Russians quickly occupied the islands. Unalaska Island was settled between 1760 and 1775, and the famed British explorer, Captain James Cook, called at Dutch Harbor in 1778.(349) During the Russian occupation, Unalaska was the center of activity for the Russian Orthodox Church, and the fur trade.(350)
Exploitation and disease took a heavy toll on the native Aleut population. Estimates of the Aleut population, at the time of contact with the Russians, range from about 12,000 to 30,000.(351) By the 1940's, there were only about 1,000 Aleuts.
The largest community in the Aleutians during the war years was on Unalaska Island. The town is also known as Unalaska, but is referred to as Iliuliuk by the Aleut population.
One observer, writing in the early years of this century, noted that "about one day of seven or
eight is clear at Unalaska, while the island temperatures rarely exceed 65 in the warmest month
(usually July), and fall to as low as from 10 to 22 in March."(352) Another early observer noted
that while the average January temperature on Unalaska was 30 above zero, the island had
about 250 days of precipitation each year.(353) Current weather data agrees with these early
assessments.(354) Constantly wet, and certainly not warm, Unalaska's weather is further
complicated by ever-present fog. In addition, there is a phenomenon in Aleutian weather known
as the williwaw. Williwaws are incredibly violent windstorms that blow up unpredictably.
Winds, often exceeding 100 miles per hour, can last for minutes or days. Ocean-going vessels
have been beached by the force of williwaws. Williwaws were responsible for the deaths of four
members of the 206th. When the winds howled, sensible men took fright.
The Defense of Alaska
The only military establishments in the Aleutians, prior to the start of the European war, were a naval radio station and a small Coast Guard base on Unalaska Island.(355) The only active military establishment, and the only tactical force, was on the Alaskan mainland at Chilkoot Barracks, near Haines in southeastern Alaska. This lone detachment, for many years the entire garrison of Alaska Territory, was composed of eleven officers and 286 enlisted men.(356) This token force was obviously unable to carry out the mission of defending the Alaskan mainland, and the Aleutians as far westward as Unalaska.(357)
Defending the extreme north Pacific was not a pressing concern of the War Department in 1939. In late November, General Marshall concluded that major operations by an enemy in the Alaska-Aleutian area were highly unlikely. But Marshall knew that Alaska's undefended harbors had to be provided with both air and ground defense to guard against seizure by minor enemy forces. Specifically, the naval stations at Kodiak and Sitka, and the radio station and fuel reserves at Unalaska needed protection.(358) If an enemy gained a foothold in the Far North, it would provide a springboard for nuisance raids, and could disrupt West Coast shipping. But the most damaging aspect of an enemy lodgment on American territory would be psychological. The United States needed the assurance that the West Coast was safe from enemy operations.
On 21 April 1939, the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Army and Navy Board issued a report that stressed the need to swiftly complete the defenses most vital to United States interests--Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, and Alaska.(359) Defense of this strategic triangle would secure the West Coast from enemy assault.
The War Department recognized the necessity of stationing troops in Alaska before the outbreak of hostilities. The key to Alaska's defense, it was reasoned, hinged on denying to an enemy actual or potential bases from which air or naval operations could be conducted. The United States faced the strategic problem of establishing a system that could cope with Alaska's logistical difficulties, without unduly dispersing available forces.(360)
The strategic plan for Alaska, adopted by the Army in 1940, called for maintaining virtually autonomous garrisons of air and ground forces at strategic positions along the southern coast, and in the Aleutians. These forces were to be sufficiently strong to defend the immediate area.(361) Securing the requisite appropriations proved difficult, however.
On 4 April 1940, Congress approved only $4 million for the construction of a cold-weather research station at Fairbanks.(362) Despite the pleas of Anthony J. Dimond, Alaska Territory's non-voting delegate, Congress failed to increase appropriations for the defense of Alaska according to War Department plans.
Later in April, the first contingent of Alaska's fledgling defense force, 774 enlisted men and thirty officers of the 4th Infantry Regiment, arrived in Anchorage. They encamped at the tent site of what would become Fort Richardson.(363)
In May, General DeWitt, the Fourth Army commander, recommended to General Marshall the creation of a special Alaska command. Marshall agreed, and, on 9 July, appointed a commander for the Alaska forces, Colonel Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr.(364) Buckner arrived in Anchorage on 22 July, and immediately began working on Alaska's defenses.
To accomplish his mission, Buckner needed to create garrisons, airfields, communications systems, and supply lines. His efforts were hampered by Alaska's wilderness, and by the fact that most supplies, including food, had to be shipped in from Seattle.(365) The next day, 23 July, Buckner's forces were redesignated the Alaska Defense Force.(366)
During July, a civilian construction contract was issued to develop Dutch Harbor's naval air station, and the Army's defense facilities.(367) Eventually, all Army construction at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor was performed under Navy Department contracts. A Navy officer was assigned to supervise each project, but General DeWitt exercised final authority.(368)
On 15 August 1940, the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Army and Navy Board issued a directive for defense of naval bases in Alaska, based on the assumption that "surprise aggression against Alaska by either Japan or Russia" was possible. The directive further assumed that major land operations in the Alaskan area were unlikely. The committee also proposed that the Army garrisons for Kodiak, Sitka, and Unalaska be composed of one infantry battalion plus artillery attachments at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor and one infantry company plus artillery attachments at Sitka. Details "were to be worked out by the Commanding Officer, Alaska Defense Force, in direct collaboration with the Commander, Alaskan Sector, Thirteenth Naval District."(369)
During the summer of 1940, the Signal Corps and Corps of Engineers proposed installing an aircraft warning system to protect the naval bases at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor. This radar network would also provide coverage for Anchorage. The planners felt that protection of Fairbanks and other sites should be considered only after completion of this system.(370)
In September, the War Department reached a preliminary decision about the size of Alaska's garrisons. In addition to the 153 officers and 3,388 enlisted men contemplated for the Anchorage garrison, a composite air group made up of one pursuit squadron and two bomber squadrons was scheduled to move in as soon as the base was ready. Another 1,489 men were to be sent to Unalaska on 1 July 1941, and 2,300 more to Sitka and Kodiak when facilities became available.(371) Not only was Buckner's command scheduled to grow, but he was promoted to brigadier general on 1 September.(372)
In October, the Fourth Army assumed the IX Corps Area's tactical responsibility for Alaska.(373) During that month, Buckner proposed establishing an Army air base in the vicinity of Dutch Harbor. Buckner recognized the major role that air power would play during an attack on Alaska. His suggestion was the first step toward the extension of Army air power into the Aleutians.(374) Airfield sites were ultimately chosen at Cold Bay on the Alaska Peninsula, and at Otter Point on Umnak Island. General Buckner, lacking appropriations for the projects, diverted funds from other military construction projects in Alaska to expedite the completion of these important airfields.(375)
1941
The Navy began construction of a combined air and submarine station at Dutch Harbor in 1940. The original plans left no room for an Army post on Amaknak Island where naval construction was concentrated. The Navy agreed in November to modifications that placed the Army garrison on Amaknak, near Margaret Bay.(376) On 25 January 1941, the construction of Fort Mears began there.(377) At Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor, the Army facilities were placed as close to the Navy station as possible, but remained separate from the naval facility. (378)
On 17 March 1941, four Defense Commands were established in the continental United States, each under one of the four field army commanders. The four commands were the Northeast (later Eastern), Central, Southern, and Western. The Western Defense Command included all of Alaska.(379)
In February 1941, the War Department created the Alaska Defense Command, subordinate to the Fourth Army.(380) At that time, Fort Richardson, Buckner's Anchorage headquarters, consisted of one permanent building, a log hut, and a tent camp.(381)
When it became necessary to dispatch antiaircraft units to Hawaii and the Philippines, and engineers to Alaska, Regular Army units (some with ninety percent recruits) were not ready for overseas duty. National Guard units were instead sent overseas. The Army's official history noted that those Guard units were demonstrably more fit for such duty at the time.(382)
In March, General DeWitt ordered the piecemeal deployment of garrison units to Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor. By June, elements of the garrisons were at all three posts.(383)
In a letter to General DeWitt, dated 18 May, General Marshall officially authorized the dispatch of garrison troops to Alaska. Marshall vigorously urged sending, "without delay," a reinforced regiment to Anchorage. This regiment could be split into combat teams, if necessary, to defend Dutch Harbor and Kodiak.(384)
The General Staff's G-2 division informed the War Plans Division on 26 June, that Japan might take advantage of the German invasion of the Soviet Union to move against Alaska. The G-2 report urged that Alaska's defenses be brought to full strength as soon as possible.(385) The report also urged WPD to increase air patrols north of the Bering Strait, and seek arrangements with the Soviets for joint use of bases at Petropavlovsk, the Kommandorski Islands, and Anadyr Bay.(386)
Buckner urged DeWitt for help in securing funds to correct the serious defects in Alaska's communications system. DeWitt, on the pretext of Japan's 2 July call-up of one million conscripts, ordered an alert of the Western Defense Command. While Panama and California responded to the alert in minutes, Alaska took four days to come to the ready. Radio communications were totally inadequate--some posts were notified of the alert by dog sled.(387) A Signal Corps report of 25 April, concerning Alaskan radio facilities, noted that Dutch Harbor was "on the list" to complete the planned expansion of the Alaska Communication System.(388) The Fourth of July alert revealed that much work needed to be done.
The Fourth of July alert also exposed the weakness of Alaska's air defenses, and three months later General DeWitt found them in no better shape.(389) The Army air force in Alaska, some thirty-eight planes, was mostly obsolescent or obsolete.(390) The army's official history admitted that the Alaska Defense Command was "notably weak" in air strength in the fall of 1941, but argued that "to a certain extent the lack of aircraft controlled Washington's policy toward Alaska."(391) Although Alaska was part of the strategic defense triangle, more pressing problems were absorbing resources earmarked for its defense.
The Alaska Defense Command suffered from a chronic lack of strategic materials and construction equipment. The priorities system established by the War Department early in 1941 proved very little benefit to the Alaska Defense Command, since it held a very low priority until September 1941.(392)
Establishing a radar net in Alaska also presented unique problems, not easily solved. On 28 January 1941, the Secretary of War approved the establishment of twelve radar sites in Alaska.(393) By October, Buckner had secured permission to increase the number of radar sites to twenty. None of these sites were, however, in operation before the outbreak of war. Equipment shortages and construction difficulties hindered completion.(394) No one had foreseen the enormous effort that would be required to install and maintain radar sets in the rugged, isolated locations selected.(395)
The danger of a Soviet collapse spurred an increase of the Alaska garrison to a total of 1,154 officers and 22,892 enlisted men. Only one-third of this force was scheduled to be sent to Alaska before 1942.(396) The original authorization of May 1940, established an emergency garrison of 3,100 in Alaska. By July 1941, the Alaska garrison had grown to 24,000. The movement of the authorized emergency garrisons for Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor was nearing completion by the end of that month. These garrisons included approximately seventy officers and 1,950 enlisted men for Sitka, 235 officers and 5,600 enlisted men for Kodiak, and 225 officers and 5,200 enlisted men for Dutch Harbor.(397) By September, the actual strength in Alaska approached the total number contemplated for as long as the United States remained at peace in the Pacific. The combat forces sent to Alaska included four infantry regiments, three and one-half antiaircraft artillery regiments, one mobile coast artillery regiment (155-mm. gun), and a tank company. The Arkansas National Guard's 153rd Infantry and 206th Coast Artillery formed a large and important part of this force. The Army's official history of World War II noted that by September 1941, "Alaska was no longer the exposed and undefended continental salient that it had been in 1939."(398)
Upon arriving at Dutch Harbor, the 206th began the long and arduous task of preparing defensive installations. Gun positions needed to be located and prepared, as did searchlight and radar positions. In addition to these pressing matters, the troops served as stevedores, unloading the vital cargo which was Dutch Harbor's lifeblood.(399) Army troops also assisted the civilian construction workers, who were carving an airfield from the southern end of Mount Balleyhoo, on Amaknak Island overlooking Dutch Harbor.(400)
In an October letter to the Arka-Tech, Sergeant John W. Weese, Battery F, affirmed the difficulties encountered in construction. The former Arkansas Polytechnic College football player noted that "Amaknak Island [was] just one big mountain and the only level places [were] hand-made." Weese also reported that it had rained every day since the 206th's arrival at Dutch Harbor. On a personal note, Weese related that mail arrived by boat only twice a month, and the men had not been paid in two months.(401)
Another of Tech's "Wonder Boys," Sergeant Raymond R. Tull, wrote, shortly thereafter, that mail would be forwarded from Seward to Dutch Harbor by plane. Tull, listed in the 1940 edition of Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities, reported that some of the men had been "digging in old Indian grave yards for ivory, beads, skulls, and arrow heads (quite interesting)." It is not clear whether he meant that the arrowheads were "quite interesting," or the entire business of ransacking graves.(402)
Tull described the village of Unalaska as having "four stores, one red truck, one car, three bicycles, five horses, fifteen sheep, and around seventy-five houses." In a forlorn wish, Tull expressed his desire to eat Christmas dinner at home, in Arkansas.(403) For many of the men, the coming holidays would be their first ones away from home.
Shortly before Thanksgiving, the 206th received its first complement of new recruits since arriving in Alaska.(404) Sergeant Conway recalled that Thanksgiving Day was the first time he saw the sun since arriving at Dutch Harbor. "It came out for a few minutes," he said. He remembers the event because of its effect. The cover on one of the searchlights was torn, and this allowed sunlight to strike the highly-polished, mirrored surface of the searchlight's reflector. Like a giant magnifying glass, the 60-inch searchlight focused the sunlight, causing the covering to catch fire.(405)
Meanwhile, the elements of the 206th still in Washington were enjoying a favorite autumn pastime, football. The regimental team, the Arkansas Travelers, beat the 163rd Infantry's team by a point per minute, 60-0.(406) The Travelers won against a team from Fort Stevens on Armistice Day, 13-6. On 22 November, the team scored its sixth straight win against the 41st Division's team from Fort Lewis, 14-0.(407) The Travelers were slated to play the Moffett Field Flyers for the championship of the Pacific Northwest Army League on 13 December, at the University of Washington's stadium in Seattle. The Arkansas Travelers had scored 279 points to their opponents' 6 points in the course of their 7-0 season.(408) Unfortunately, war canceled the big game.(409)
On 27 November, the War Department issued a "war warning," that Japan was likely to begin hostilities at any moment. General DeWitt ordered Buckner to place the Alaska Defense Command on full alert.(410) DeWitt and Buckner believed it was possible that Japan might attack Alaska, although not probable. By all indications, the Japanese blow was expected to fall in the Far East.
There was cause to worry. Buckner's air force consisted of twelve B-18 medium bombers, and twenty P-36 fighters. Both aircraft types were obsolescent, and only six of the thirty-eight were ready for combat.(411)
The Alaska Defense Command had but 143 Signal Corps personnel. These were the members of a signal aviation construction company, a signal service company, and an aircraft warning company. The aircraft warning company had waited in Alaska for months, but had no radar when the war began.(412) The communication problems revealed by the July alert were still present. Indeed, Alaska's administrative radio network would not be ready until mid-1942.(413) This state of affairs would have serious consequences during the beginning of the Aleutian Campaign.
The War Department realized that Alaska was vulnerable. But with so many other pressing
problems, the War Department found it impossible to hasten more aid to Alaska.(414) Too many
other places were also vulnerable.
A Date Which Will Live in Infamy
Alaska reacted sensibly to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In Anchorage, "street lights and commercial signs were darkened . . . to make attack more difficult and to conserve power for military use." Mayor William Stolt instituted the partial blackout on General Buckner's suggestion.(415)
On Unalaska, many people got the Pearl Harbor news by radio. Pfc William Maxwell, a Battery
A "cat-skinner," recalled that, although he spent most of his time away from the base preparing
searchlight positions, he was at Fort Mears at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. He continued:
I was walking guard duty. . . . I'll never forget it. I had a little radio that I was carrying with me, that's how I heard it. I guess I said a few choice words, because I knew I would be there for the duration plus, and that might be one to ten years. So there went my chance of coming home and getting a good job.(416)
Others, hearing the news, thought it was a hoax. One group heard the Pearl Harbor announcement during a radio broadcast of a Los Angeles football game. The sounding of the post's siren convinced the men it was terribly true.(417)
Sergeant Leo New was stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, with the 206th Headquarters Battery. On 7 December, he was in Canada, on a three-day pass with four others members of the battery. "Sunday morning we laid in because we were out Saturday night, all night," he said. About eleven o'clock, they went to a restaurant for breakfast. The restaurant owner told the five Americans about the attack on Pearl Harbor, which none of the men had ever heard of before. When New and his friends returned to Fort Lewis, Batteries D and G were in the process of moving to Boeing airfield to establish a perimeter of defense. The Headquarters Battery remained at Fort Lewis. "Being transportation sergeant," New explained, "I got all the truck drivers I could to start hauling ammunition from the Fort Lewis ammo dump to Boeing airfield." Eventually, barrage balloons were placed around the Boeing factory, and .50-caliber machine guns were set up on top of the Boeing plant.(418)
As that fateful Sunday wore on, blackout panels were constructed at Fort Mears.(419) That night, the wartime blackout began, and a strengthened guard was posted.(420)
On 18 December, Battery A's 2nd Platoon, one officer and eighty-one enlisted men, boarded the
transport Chirikof to begin a near month-long voyage to Dutch Harbor.(421) Due to the threat
posed by enemy submarines, vessels were routed via the Inside Passage, formed by the islands of
southeast Alaska, to Cape Spencer. Convoys were formed at Cape Spencer for movement across
the open sea to stations in central and southwest Alaska, and the Aleutians.(422)
1942
President Roosevelt was keenly interested in the defense of Alaska, more so than General Marshall and the President's other military advisors. In February, Roosevelt indicated that he wanted a striking force established in the Aleutians as soon as possible, perhaps by mid-summer.(423) This appeared to be a good idea when, on 19 March, the War Department's G-2 division, warned that an attempt to seize the Aleutians or raid the mainland of Alaska could be expected at any time.(424)
Alaska's ability to meet such an enemy challenge had improved markedly, but many problems remained. The radar situation had worsened. The number of sites was reduced from twenty to ten, and then to five. On 24 March, Brigadier General William C. Butler, commander of Alaska's Eleventh Air Force, suggested placing radar sets at Lazy Bay on Kodiak Island, at Sitka, and at Cape Winslow on Unalaska Island. A mobile set (SCR-270) was in operation at Anchorage, and a fixed set (SCR-271) was operating at Cape Chiniak on Kodiak Island.(425)
When the 206th arrived at Dutch Harbor, Battery A possessed three radar units (SCR-268). Two units were defective, apparently corroded by seawater. The third unit was set up on Hill 200, overlooking Dutch Harbor.(426)
After the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April, Washington expected that the Japanese would retaliate with an attack on the West Coast or Alaska.(427) By the end of the month, the Alaska Defense Command was more prepared to meet the threat. Buckner's forces had grown to 40,424.(428) Among their number were reinforcements sent to Dutch Harbor.
Battery A's 2nd Platoon arrived at Dutch Harbor on 13 January. The Chirikof had made stops at Ketchican, Seward and Kodiak during the twenty-seven day journey.(429) On 16 January 1942, twenty-six enlisted men arrived from the Alaskan Overseas Discharge and Replacement Center at Fort Lawson.(430) Twenty-six more enlisted men arrived a week later.(431) The remainder of the regiment boarded the transport Northcoast on 26 February for the trip to Dutch Harbor. During the rough crossing, waves often lifted the ship's screw clear of the water, causing a tremendous vibration. The ship's seasick passengers gratefully went ashore at Dutch Harbor on 8 March.(432)
As many more troops arrived, a few went elsewhere. Pfc Paul Beasley was ordered back to the United States on 24 April, when it was discovered that he was underage. Beasley was then sixteen, almost certainly the youngest member of the 206th.(433)
The surrender of the Philippine garrison, on 5 May, came as sad news to the 206th. Many
friendships had been formed with men of New Mexico's 200th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment
during training. Sergeant Conway of Battery A recalled hearing news about a friend from Tokyo
Rose. He listened to her broadcasts because she played the Lucky Strike Hit Parade, the top ten
tunes. Sergeant Conway recounted:
One night I heard her tell about one of my friends. She said he was a prisoner, and wanted to tell his folks that he was in good hands and receiving good treatment. In fact, he was in the salt mines and nearly died. He did die about five years after he came home. He was in the Death March.(434)
The sad reminders of war's brutality added to the psychological stresses which were part of the men's daily existence in the gloomy Aleutians. Beyond the sheer misery caused by the terrible climate, the sense of isolation inflicted further pain. Pfc Garland Jackson of Battery G felt that morale was bad in Alaska. There was "nothing going on, and some of the boys couldn't take it," he said, adding that "some of them cracked up and took their own lives."(435) Sergeant Conway agreed that depression was a major problem. He remembered two instances of suicide, and one case of murder-suicide. "I also knew a guy who killed an officer because he wouldn't try to get the soldier a furlough when his father died," Sergeant Conway recalled. The officer, however, took a furlough. When he returned, the soldier went into his office and shot him dead. The soldier then turned the gun on himself.(436) Some men suffered emotional breakdowns and were sent home.(437) "We had several go completely nuts," said Sergeant Conway, "and we had to send them back."(438) Elective surgery, especially circumcision, was a popular way to break the monotony. One doctor, attached to the 250th Coast Artillery at Dutch Harbor, found himself performing three or four circumcisions a day for a time. He was glad for the surgical practice because it relieved his boredom also.(439)
The Battle of Dutch Harbor
Japanese interest in the Aleutians can be traced back to the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operational Order Number One, dated 5 November 1941. That order listed Midway and the Aleutians "as points to be invaded or destroyed at the earliest opportune moment."(440) The military curiosity of the Japanese must have been piqued by the fact that Kiska's harbor was closed. The United States government had closed the harbor to foreign use a number of years before the war. In addition, Adak, to the nearest degree, is on the same meridian as Midway.(441) An offensive to seize both islands would provide the Japanese with an advanced line across the middle of the central and northern Pacific. Aircraft and submarine patrols from these bases would give Japan advance warning of movements by the United States fleet.
Until 1939, Japanese submarines and surface vessels operated openly in Aleutian waters. They compiled a wealth of data on virtually every island in the archipelago.(442) But the Japanese were completely unaware of the actual military situation in Alaska. The Japanese map of Dutch Harbor, for example, was based on a thirty-year old chart. The single photograph available dated from the same era.(443) Japanese planners thought that Dutch Harbor was garrisoned by an entire division.(444) The handful of Japanese spies in Alaska had been sent to internment camps, along with hundreds of innocent Nisei, and were unable to correct such intelligence mistakes.(445) Japanese intelligence had confirmed, however, that four garrison units were stationed at Dutch Harbor, under the command of a major general.(446)
On 29 May, the Japanese submarine, I-19, conducted a periscope reconnaissance of Dutch Harbor. The presence of two destroyers, one transport or mine-layer, and several patrol boats was reported. In addition, the report stated that it "was probable that two or three destroyers were in the immediate area."(447) The report also indicated that only about 5,000 troops occupied Dutch Harbor. The commander of the strike group, Rear Admiral Kakuta Kakuji, radioed the Combined Fleet commander, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, and requested permission to divert the invasion force to Dutch Harbor. Yamamoto rejected the proposal because Dutch Harbor was too far from Japan, and too difficult to supply.(448)
Strategically, Japan's move into the Aleutians was conceived as a flanking movement to protect the forces at Midway from a possible attack from the north.(449) Samuel Eliot Morison, the official historian of the United States Navy in World War II, concluded that the Aleutian phase of the Midway attack was a defensive move by Japan. The Japanese were worried that an American invasion force was being assembled on the West Coast. Thus, the Aleutian Campaign was designed to forestall an invasion of Japan, in addition to any diversionary value it might afford the attack on Midway.(450)
In addition, the 18 April raid on Tokyo by Doolittle's forces unnerved Japanese commanders. They realized that the Aleutians afforded one possible launching point for air raids on Japan. Thus, the Doolittle raid was "one of the reasons for fostering the operational idea to invade Midway and the Aleutians at that time." Although the operational directive was written two days prior to the Doolittle raid, the bombing did argue persuasively against postponement of the planned operation.(451) John Toland, World War II historian, agreed, noting that the Doolittle raid "finally brought an end to opposition within the Navy to the Midway campaign."(452) Walter Lord pointed out that the Japanese Naval General Staff was worried about the possibility of bombing attacks from the Aleutians. He concluded that Admiral Yamamoto added the Aleutian attack to the Midway plan to ease their minds. Yamamoto believed his fleet was mighty enough to engage the United States in both areas simultaneously. In addition, he hoped to confuse the Americans.(453)
The United States Navy's code-breaking effort, known as ULTRA, intercepted Japanese communications in early March that revealed the enemy's intention for a major assault, probably at Midway and in the Aleutians.(454) In May, it became clear from the intercepts that the Japanese objectives were specifically Midway and Dutch Harbor.(455) By 21 May, the United States knew with fair accuracy the strength of the Japanese Northern Area Force, designated to attack the Aleutians, and approximately when it would strike. The best estimate forecast that battle would be joined about 1 June or soon thereafter.(456)
The Navy provided some protection for Alaska, although the bulk of the fleet was retained for the main battle at Midway. A force of nine ships, under Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, left Pearl Harbor on 21 May for Alaska. (See Table IV for Theobald's order of battle). The coming battle would be conducted on the basis of "fleet-opposed invasion" which would place the Army Air Force under Theobald's command, rather than Buckner's.(457)
A Japanese monograph, prepared from official sources at the end of the war, stated the tactical
objectives of the Aleutian operation as follows:
(1) Destroy the enemy forces and military installations at Dutch Harbor and Adak;
(2) Attack and occupy Kiska and Attu so as to restrict and prevent enemy offensive sea and air operations in the North Pacific; and
(3) To maintain our offensive policy.(458)
The tactical objectives included the air raid on Dutch Harbor, three days prior to the Kiska landings, to "prevent the enemy from using Dutch Harbor as a base."(459) This tactical goal was never achieved.
According to the Army's official history, the only radar operating on 2-3 June was the set at Cape Chiniak on Kodiak Island.(460) However, there were four radar-equipped heavy bombers available for offshore patrols.(461) Every effort was being made to locate the Japanese fleet in the dense fog. All the available Navy PBY's--twenty from Patrol Wing 4--searched for the Japanese fleet, but did not sight it.(462)
At 2:45 A.M. on 3 June, the Japanese fleet was less than 170 miles from Dutch Harbor. The aircraft carriers Ryujo and Junyo turned into the wind, and launched a strike on Dutch Harbor. This attack would mark the first time enemy bombs fell on North America.
The Ryujo carried twelve fighters and eighteen bombers, the Junyo had eighteen fighters and eighteen bombers. In addition to its own aircraft, the Junyo also carried twelve fighters scheduled for the Midway occupation.(463) The Ryujo launched eleven torpedo bombers and six Zeros, while the Junyo launched twelve dive bombers and six Zeros.(464) The aircraft from the Junyo encountered a PBY, which was shot down. That delay, and the weather, forced the Japanese to return to their carrier.(465)
Radar aboard the seaplane tender Gillis detected the Ryujo's planes at 5:40 A.M.(466) Six other ships were in Dutch Harbor, in addition to the Gillis. They were the submarine S-27, the United States Coast Guard Cutter Onondaga, the Army transports President Fillmore and Morlen, and two World War I destroyers, Talbot and King.(467)
Since the Sunday morning debacle at Pearl Harbor, the garrison at Dutch Harbor had changed its typical routine. Reasoning that the Japanese would likely attack again on the "day of rest," Sunday was moved to Wednesday. Wednesday became the "day of rest" while Sunday became a work day. Unfortunately, 3 June was a Wednesday.(468)
The Japanese planes came in over Eider Point, where a contingent of the 206th was preparing a searchlight position. "We could hear the planes coming," Pfc Maxwell recalled, "so we all hit the foxholes we had dug." As the planes came over, one broke formation and flew right over their position. He noticed a flash from the plane, as if the pilot were taking pictures. "The plane that took the picture was so close to me," Maxwell continued, "that I could see the pilot smoking a cigarette, and he didn't have the chin strap on his helmet fastened."(469)
During the raid, which lasted about twenty minutes, one Japanese plane was shot down by what the Japanese described as "powerful" anti-aircraft fire.(470) The Gillis claimed credit for the downed plane. However, the other ships and the shore installations were also firing. The President Fillmore fired a battery of 37-mm. guns from its deck. The President Fillmore had arrived at Dutch Harbor the day before with a full cargo of antiaircraft ordnance and ammunition. During the journey to Dutch Harbor, the ship's captain had ordered artillery from the cargo set up on deck. The Naval Air Station's post-action report stated that the President Fillmore's improvised defense fired so quickly, producing so much flame and smoke that the ship was reported to be on fire.(471) The Japanese, however, credited ground fire with downing the plane.(472)
Most of the American casualties suffered in the first attack came from a single bomb blast. Twenty-five men of the National Guard's 151st Engineer Regiment from Alabama were killed at Fort Mears. "A lieutenant fell them out in the street, in ranks," Sergeant Charles Laubach of the 206th's Battery A recalled. A bomb hit the barracks, killing and injuring many of the men in the street.(473) (See Table V, page 157, for the 206th's battle casualties) In all, the first attack caused fifty-two American casualties, about one percent of the Dutch Harbor garrison.(474) Material damage was not significant. Sergeant Nash's morning report simply noted, "Early morning attack by Japanese aircraft."(475)
The scheduled air raid on Adak was canceled when the weather worsened. The Japanese force was slowed to nine knots, and could not get into position for the attack. Therefore, the Japanese decided to hit Dutch Harbor again. About 4:00 P.M. on 4 June, the carriers launched eleven dive bombers, six high-level bombers, and fifteen Zeros.(476)
During the thirty-six hours between attacks, the Dutch Harbor garrison was busily preparing for another onslaught. The 206th moved its guns to new positions. Two reasons necessitated the move. First, the original gun positions did not have the best possible fields of fire. During the first attack, the enemy planes had come in too low for many of the guns on the mountains. Secondly, new positions would confuse the enemy. Undoubtedly, the Japanese would thoroughly study the photographs taken during the first attack, and return to hit the undamaged targets.(477) In addition, all the ships in the harbor departed.(478)
The attackers appeared shortly before 6:00 P.M. coming in over Dutch Harbor from two directions.(479) Private Garland Jackson of Battery G recalled that waiting for the second attack was difficult. "We had one nineteen year-old boy," he continued, "that got so scared he threw up." When the attack came, Jackson was in his gun position, feeding ammunition to the gun. "Then it got hot and jammed," he said, "and we all ran for the sandbags."
One bomb struck a 20-mm. gun position, instantly killing its three Marine crewmen and their officer.(480) Another struck the chief petty officers' barracks at the naval station.(481) The village of Unalaska, across the bay from Dutch Harbor, also sustained damage. The village's hospital was badly damaged by a direct hit.(482)
The four new 6,666-barrel fuel tanks, filled to capacity, were destroyed.(483) The sound of the explosion carried to Umnak Island, forty miles away.(484) The loss of the tanks, and their contents, was the most significant damage done in either raid.
An old Alaska Steamship Company vessel, the Northwestern, was being used as a barracks for the civilian construction workers of the Seims Drake Puget Sound Company. It had been beached by the ferocious winds of a williwaw. In thirty-one years of service, the vessel ran aground sixteen times in the treacherous waters of the Inside Passage.(485) Since it was the only ship visible, it drew the attention of the attackers. They made repeated passes at the ship, setting it, and the Seims Drake warehouse, on fire. Although spectacular, the attack on the ancient ship accomplished nothing. She would be repaired and continue to serve as a barracks. The old ship also would continue to supply electrical power and steam heat to Dutch Harbor.(486)
Although antiaircraft fire failed to knock down any of the planes, the attackers did not emerge unscathed. When the Junyo's aircraft reassembled over western Unalaska, they saw the secret fighter base on Umnak. Eight of the P-40's based there rose to do battle. Under the command of Major John Chennault, son of General Claire Chennault of "Flying Tigers" fame, the Umnak fighters destroyed three of the aircraft.(487) The discovery of the secret airfield at Otter Point on Umnak caused Yamamoto to order the abandonment of the occupation of Adak, in favor of Attu.(488)
The report on the second raid, filed by the Navy's VP-42 Squadron (V-heavier than air, P-patrol)
noted:
Half-hour attack of dive and glide bombing with about 20 or more airplanes. Direct hit was made on Northwestern, starting fire and burning Seims Drake Warehouse. Two tanks not buried were fired. Direct hit on hanger wrecked PBY inside and twisted hangar beams."(489)
But Dutch Harbor's functional ability was not severely hampered by the two attacks.(490) Casualties for the two attacks came to forty-three killed, including thirty-three Army men, and about fifty wounded. The Army's official history stated that "both Dutch Harbor attacks were opposed by intense antiaircraft fire from land artillery supported by the naval guns fired from ships in the harbor."(491)
In one important way, the Battle of Dutch Harbor altered the course of World War II. The air operations officer of the Ryujo put it succinctly:
Even as we reeled from the debacle at Midway, another event occurred far to the north which, although lacking the drama of open conflict, was no less serious. In the Aleutians, one of our Zero fighters made a forced landing and was captured almost intact by the Americans. The subsequent detailed study of the airplane revealed fully to the Americans the Zero's advantages and faults. With the plane's every characteristic an open book to the enemy engineers, they could quickly assure their own qualitative superiority.(492)
And, indeed, that is what came to pass. Within eighteen months, the Navy's new F6F Hellcat would drive the vaunted Zero from the skies.(493)
"Tokyo Rose came on that night," reported Sergeant Conway, "and said that they had hit a big aircraft carrier, that fighting was going on in the streets, and that the Royal Forces had it all under control." "If people back home had heard that," he quipped, "it would have scared them to death.(494)
To be sure, censor-approved reports of the Dutch Harbor raids did cause consternation in the United States. The New York Times reported that the "entire Pacific Coast" was on alert. The report added that radio stations from San Diego to Santa Barbara went off the air at nine o'clock on the night of 3 June.(495) In a sidebar to its lead story, the Arkansas Gazette reported that comedian Joe E. Brown, who had entertained at Dutch Harbor in April, said the men "figured on such a bombing with the coming of good weather."(496)
Magazines also reported the Dutch Harbor raids, with mixed reactions. Time was critical of American performance, citing "little if any air defense at Dutch Harbor."(497) Newsweek reported the eyewitness testimony of "100 grim men and women" who fled to Seattle. They reported that the attack had been expected, and that liquor stores on Unalaska had been closed three days before the raid. Most of the civilians had sought safety in a ravine, but one group of about 250 was caught in the open and strafed.(498) Life was most harsh in its criticism, comparing Dutch Harbor to Pearl Harbor, "perhaps not so costly or so deadly but just as inexcusable."(499)
The 17 June premier issue of Yank, a weekly magazine published by servicemen, reported:
On June 3, at Dutch Harbor, in the Aleutians, the soldiers who had been performing such duties as K.P. with no more excitement than their comrades in the States, or at other quiet outposts, got their first taste of war. The fog that enfolds the islands most of the year parted. Out of the sky came planes with the Rising Sun insignia. They dropped bombs and flashed away, leaving a few warehouses burning beneath them. . . .. . . Exactly what the Japs hoped to accomplish in their blows at Dutch Harbor and Midway was uncertain. Generally, however, it was believed that their plan was to divert American naval forces toward Alaska, then strike south and seize Midway as a preliminary to invasion of Hawaii."(500)
The Yank article made no mention of the second attack on Dutch Harbor.
On 7 June, an article in the Chicago Tribune reported that the United States knew of the planned
Japanese attack well in advance. The article further stated that Dutch Harbor and Midway were
the known targets, and even included the names of the Japanese aircraft carriers and heavy
cruisers that attacked Midway. It was feared that the disclosure of such accurate information
would reveal the ULTRA secret.(501) But the Japanese Navy was convinced that its fleet code
was unbreakable.(502) Even after the United States ambushed the aircraft carrying Admiral
Yamamoto, the Japanese failed to realize that their coded communications were
compromised.(503)
The Threat Passes
The 206th was not, as a unit, involved in the Aleutian Campaign after the opening attacks. The rest of the campaign to retake Attu and Kiska was a miserable fifteen-month affair. Samuel Eliot Morison aptly dubbed the Aleutians as the "Theater of Military Frustration."(504) He concluded that "it would have been wiser in the long run to have left the Japanese in Kiska and Attu alone to get frostbite on the muskeg--the Arctic counterpart of that 'withering on the vine' so often spoken of elsewhere."(505)
Following the Dutch Harbor raids, new equipment arrived, the radar and communications problems were solved, and the 206th was expanded. On 18 August 1942, under a new Table of Organization for antiaircraft regiments, a third battalion was created. Battery A was divided into two new batteries, Batteries I and K.(506) Battery A became a radar battery. Battery I was created as a 90-mm. gun battery, and armed with that newest antiaircraft weapon.(507) Battery K retained the regiment's searchlights.(508)
A number of men from the 206th volunteered for the Attu operation, and some went to Kiska.(509) The Arkansas National Guard's 153rd Infantry Regiment was a part of the Kiska invasion force.(510) Although the Japanese had withdrawn from Kiska, the landing went ahead. American commanders thought the amphibious landing would be good practice for the future. Morison noted that friendly fire resulted in twenty-five killed and thirty-one wounded during the Kiska operation.(511)
With the Aleutian Campaign concluded successfully, the War Department turned to the question of future operations in the Aleutians. The idea of using the Aleutians as a shortcut invasion route was quickly dismissed. A plan to use the Aleutians for an invasion of the northernmost Japanese bastion, Paramushiro, was also considered. The plan was rejected on 18 September 1943.(512)
Lend-Lease shipment of aircraft to the U.S.S.R. began in September 1942. Almost 8,000 aircraft of various types were delivered by the Air Transport Command to the Soviets at Ladd Field in Fairbanks. The Soviets then ferried the planes to Siberia via Nome.(513)
In November 1942, the Alaska Highway was opened for traffic. It was the only direct land connection between the continental United States and Alaska.(514) According to Brigadier General James A. O'Conner, a commander of the construction project, the Alaska Highway was built for insurance. The United States wanted to be sure the line of communication would always be open.(515)
In late February 1944, the 206th was ordered back to the United States.(516) William Maxwell
(then a corporal in Battery K) recalled that when the order came, he was installing another radar
about twenty-five miles from Dutch Harbor. "The [battery] commander told me to bring only
what we could carry of our personal stuff," he said, "and leave the rest behind." They left trucks,
bulldozers, quonset huts, searchlights, food, fuel, and ammunition behind. For Corporal
Maxwell, the good news almost had a tragic outcome. He recalled:
That was the day I nearly died. We had a freshwater stream from the mountains that we had to ford, we had done it before. I walked ahead of the men, and I got about halfway across when the current carried me out into the ocean. The water was so cold that my body felt like it was as big as my arm. I finally gained my composure and could see what was happening. I was dressed in many layers of heavy clothing and carrying a big pack. I started dog paddling and made it to shore. I motioned the men to come across about thirty feet upstream. They carried me to the trucks and when we got to camp I couldn't walk. They put me by the fire, undressed me and wrapped me in blankets. About thirty minutes later I came around. Then I thanked everyone who had helped me.(517)
On 20 February 1944, the Arkansans of the 206th bid farewell to Alaska, and began shipping out for Seattle.(518)
343. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions: May 1942 - August 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 162-163.
344. Greely, 232. Background material on the Aleutian Islands is taken, in part, from The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropaedia Volume 1 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990), 239; and Academic American Encyclopedia, Volume 1 (Princeton: Arete Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), 272.
345. Stan Cohen, The Forgotten War, vol. 1 (Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 1981), 110. The islands range in size from Unimak at 70 miles by 20 miles to tiny islets.
346. Cohen noted six distinct island regions, the five mentioned above and the Delarofs. Ibid.
347. Mount Makushin remained dormant during the war years, but did rumble menacingly on occasion. Maxwell Interview. Dutch Harbor is across Iliuliuk Bay from Unalaska on Amaknak Island. A ferry covered the short distance between the islands.
348. Greely, 233.
349. Frank G. Carpenter, Alaska: Our Northern Wonderland, Carpenter's World Travels (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1923), 242.
350. Greely, 233. The Russians referred to Dutch Harbor as Udokta. In the 1890's, Americans called it Lincoln Harbor. Cohen, vol. 1, 126.
351. 30,000 in Carpenter, 243; 30,000 in Greely, 231; 12,000 to 25,000 in Academic American Encyclopedia, 1:272.
352. Greely, 232.
353. Carpenter, 243.
354. E.A. Pearce and C.G. Smith, The Times Books World Weather Guide (New York: Times Books, 1984), 159.
355. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 223.
356. Mills, 54. The Army's official history states that the Chilkoot Barracks garrison was 400 men--two rifle companies. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 223.
357. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 223.
358. Watson, 454-455.
359. Conn and Fairchild, 9.
360. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 227.
361. Ibid., 228.
362. Mills, 41.
363. Ibid.
364. Watson, 456; Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 231.
365. Mills, 41-42.
366. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 231.
367. Ibid., 224.
368. Ibid., 234.
369. Ibid., 233-234.
370. Ibid., 245.
371. Watson, 456.
372. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 231.
373. Ibid.
374. Ibid., 241.
375. Mills, 42.
376. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 236.
377. Stan Cohen, The Forgotten War: A Pictorial History of World War II in Alaska and Northwestern Canada, Volume 2 (Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 1988), 130. The fort was named for Colonel Frederick J. Mears. Colonel Mears was "instrumental in surveying and building the Alaska Railroad earlier in the century."
378. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 236.
379. Kreidberg, 584, 586.
380. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 231.
381. Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To December 1941), United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services, gen. ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956), 275.
382. Watson, 186-187.
383. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 237.
384. Watson, 455 note 6.
385. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 237.
386. Ibid., 242-243.
387. Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), 54. Garfield's is the most thoroughly and carefully researched history of the Aleutian Campaign.
388. Terrett, 275.
389. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 244.
390. Ibid., 248.
391. Ibid., 239.
392. Ibid., 246.
393. Ibid.
394. Ibid.
395. Ibid., 251.
396. Watson, 457.
397. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 237.
398. Ibid., 238.
399. Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services, gen. ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), 36, 47-48. The first troops trained to load and unload ships, an Army Transportation Service port company, did not arrive at Dutch Harbor until December 1942.
400. Maxwell Interview. Garfield notes that Mount Balleyhoo was named by Jack London during a visit to Unalaska, the setting for The Sea Wolf. Garfield, 21.
401. "Johnny Weese, Former Tech Football Star, Now in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, Writes 'Hamburgers Over 30c Here'," Arkansas Polytechnic College, Russellville (Arkansas) Arka-Tech, 22 October 1941, 3.
402. "Raymond Tull, Former Outstanding Tech Student, Writes About His Unusual Experiences at Dutch Harbor, Alaska," Arkansas Polytechnic College, Russellville (Arkansas) Arka-Tech, 5 November 1941, 1. The Arkansas Polytechnic football team is named "Wonder Boys."
403. Ibid., 4.
404. Nash, 22 November 1941 .
405. Conway Interview.
406. "News From Camp Murray," Marianna (Arkansas) Courier-Index, 6 November 1941, 8.
407. "Arkansas Army Ace Travels," [photo caption], Arkansas Polytechnic College, Russellville (Arkansas) Arka-Tech, 26 November 1941, 1.
408. "206th Grid Team Contender for Army West Coast Crown," Arkansas Polytechnic College, Russellville (Arkansas) Arka-Tech, 3 December 1941, 4; "206th Included Among Southern Units on Pacific," Arkansas Polytechnic College, Russellville (Arkansas) Arka-Tech, 10 December 1941, 4.
409. Conway Interview.
410. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 250.
411. Ibid., 251.
412. Terrett, 277.
413. Ibid., 278.
414. Watson, 458.
415. "206th Coast Artillery in 'Hot Spot' on Dutch Harbor Since Japs Started War," Arkansas Polytechnic College, Russellville (Arkansas) Arka-Tech, 10 December 1941, 2.
416. Maxwell Interview.
417. Drake, 13.
418. New Interview.
419. Drake, 14.
420. Nash, 7 December 1941.
421. Ibid., 18 December 1941.
422. Bykofsky, 32. The average 1943 turnaround time for Alaska shipping was 55.8 days for transports and 42.1 days for cargo ships. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943, United States Army in World War II, The War Department, gen. ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), Appendix A-6, 725.
423. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 253.
424. Ibid., 259.
425. Ibid., 257.
426. Drake, 11.
427. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 259.
428. Ibid., 255.
429. Nash, 13 January 1942.
430. Ibid., 16 January 1942.
431. Ibid., 23 January 1942.
432. James M. Massey, "The Aleutian Campaign," Phillips County Historical Quarterly 8 (June 1970): 17.
433. Nash, 24 April 1942.
434. Conway Interview.
435. Garland Jackson, interview with author, Tape recording, Morrilton, Arkansas, 14 November 1991.
436. Conway Interview.
437. Maxwell Interview.
438. Conway Interview.
439. Cohen, vol. 1, 130.
440. Mikami Jakuo, "Aleutian Naval Operation, March 1942 - February 1943," Japanese Monograph No. 88, in War in Asia and the Pacific: 1937-1949, Volume 5, The Naval Armament Program and Naval Operations (Part II), ed. Donald S. Detwiler and Charles B. Burdick (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1980), 7.
441. Mills, 42.
442. Ibid., 59.
443. Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, Miracle at Midway (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 152.
444. Morison, vol. 4, 168. Morison states that Dutch Harbor was garrisoned by 4748 army troops and 639 marines.
445. Garfield, 7.
446. Mikami, 5.
447. Ibid., 30-31.
448. Garfield, 8.
449. Mikami, 3.
450. Morison, vol. 4, 169.
451. Mikami, 7-8.
452. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945, Volume 1 (New York: Random House, 1970), 387.
453. Walter Lord, Incredible Victory (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), 5.
454. Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982), 18, 100.
455. Edward Van Der Rhoer, Deadly Magic: A Personal Account of Communications Intelligence in World War II in the Pacific (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), 87.
456. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 259-260.
457. Ibid., 260.
458. Mikami, 32.
459. Ibid., 32.
460. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 257.
461. Ibid.
462. William Ward Smith, Midway: Turning Point of the Pacific (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), 75.
463. Mikami, 43 note 3. Prange stated that the Ryujo was carrying sixteen Zeros and twenty-one torpedo bombers, while the Junyo had twenty-four Zeros and twenty-one dive-bombers. Prange, 152.
464. Morison asserted that only nine bombers and three fighters from Ryujo attacked Dutch Harbor. Morison, vol. 4, 176; Prange argued that fourteen bombers and three fighters "were all that actually made it to Dutch Harbor." Prange, 153; A semi-official narrative reported that the two carriers launched thirty-six bombers and twenty-nine Zeros, and that one of the Zeros crashed while taking off. Karig, 265; A plane did crash on take-off, but it was a bomber. Garfield, 10; The Army's official history stated that the first attack on Dutch Harbor was carried out by seventeen aircraft, of which two were claimed by antiaircraft fire. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 261.
465. Prange, 152.
466. Morison, vol 4, 176.
467. Ibid., 176; Karig, 264-265.
468. New Interview. Dutch Harbor was not caught napping by the early morning raid. The garrison had been on alert since 2 June. Drake, 30.
469. Maxwell Interview. The Japanese did conduct aerial photographic reconnaissance during the first attack. Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, With a Foreword by Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1955), 140.
470. Morison, vol 4, 176.
471. Karig, 266. Some men of the 206th were detailed to the unloading of the President Fillmore. When the attack started, the men headed ashore to their units as the ship prepared to sortie. Harold Moody, interview by author, Tape recording, North Little Rock, Arkansas, 30 August 1991
472. Morison, vol 4, 176, note 29.
473. Moody Interview; Laubach Interview. Moody and Laubach referred to the unit as both the 100th and the 101st. Garfield noted the incident, but did not identify the unit. Garfield, 26. The author identified the Alabama Engineer unit from the listing of National Guard units inducted into federal service compiled by Jim Dan Hill. Hill, 377.
474. Garfield, 27.
475. Nash, 3 June 1942.
476. Morison, vol. 4, 177; Garfield, 38; Karig reported that fifteen fighters and eleven bombers took part in the second attack. Karig, 272; Louis Morton noted that the second attack on Dutch Harbor consisted of twenty-six aircraft, and that five of them were shot down by P-40's from Umnak. Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, gen. ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), 283.
477. Drake, 26, 32. The adequacy of the 37-mm. automatic guns has been called into question. Sergeant Aubrey Albright of Battery F said that the guns were not designed to track targets moving as fast as the Japanese Zeros. Aubrey Albright, interview by author, Tape recording, North Little Rock, Arkansas, 30 August 1991.
478. Garfield, 39.
479. Drake, 26; Garfield stated the attack occurred at about 4:00 P.M. Garfield, 39.
480. Karig, 273.
481. Lois Thorburn and Don Thorburn, No Tumult, No Shouting: The Story of the PBY (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1945), 44.
482. Mills, 63.
483. Morison, vol 4, 177.
484. Garfield, 40. The storage tanks contained more than 750,000 gallons of fuel.
485. Mills, 63.
486. Garfield, 39.
487. Morison, vol 4, 178.
488. William Ward Smith, 76.
489. Thorburn, 32-33.
490. Morison, vol 4, 178.
491. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 262.
492. Okumiya Masatake, Jiro Horikoshi, and Martin Caidin, Zero!: The Air War in the Pacific During World War II From the Japanese Viewpoint (New York: Dutton, 1956; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Zenger Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), 160-161.
493. Garfield, 42.
494. Conway Interview.
495. "U.S. Areas on Alert," New York Times, 4 June 1942, 3. In its lead story on page one, the newspaper incorrectly reported that a second attack had occurred about noon on 3 June.
496. "Joe E. Brown Says Dutch Harbor 'Ready,'" Arkansas Gazette, 4 June 1942, 16. The Gazette ran an Associated Press dispatch, which also reported the erroneous information on the second attack, in its page one lead story. Naturally, the smaller Arkansas newspapers also ran the incorrect information. cf. "Japanese Raid Dutch Harbor: Casualties Light," Russellville (Arkansas) Courier-Democrat, 4 June 1942, 1; "Dutch Harbor Raided Twice," Marianna (Arkansas) Courier-Index, 4 June 1942, 1.
497. "World Battlefronts," Time, 15 June 1942, 16.
498. "Fighting Fronts," Newsweek, 6 July 1942, 23-24.
499. "Dutch Harbor: U.S. Gets Look at Its Destruction," Life, 10 August 1942, 24-25.
500. Ira Topping, ed., The Best of Yank: The Army Weekly, 1942-1945 (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 12.
501. Lewin, 113-117.
502. Toland, vol. 1, 427.
503. Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, The Macmillan Wars of the United States, Louis Morton, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 229-230. Admiral Yamamoto's plane was shot down over Bougainville on 18 April 1943, by American P-38 fighters. When ULTRA revealed Yamamoto's itinerary, Admiral Nimitz decided to risk exposure of the code-breaking operation in order to kill Yamamoto.
504. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls: June 1942 - April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 3.
505. Ibid., 8.
506. Nash, 18 August 1942.
507. Drake, 41.
508. Ibid., 42.
509. Conway Interview.
510. Tarlton Interview.
511. Morison, vol. 7, 63; Garfield puts the friendly fire fatalities at twenty-four, with four more deaths from booby-traps or mines. Garfield, 288.
512. Morison, vol. 7, 65.
513. Mills, 73.
514. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 225.
515. Topping, 16 June 1944, 7.
516. Army Organizational Card, War Department Form, [photocopy], Fort McAlister Archives.
517. Maxwell Interview.
518. Army Organizational Card, War Department Form, [photocopy], Fort McAlister Archives.
Copyright by William E. Maxwell, Jr.
March 1992