206th - Conclusion

COMING HOME

The 206th left Dutch Harbor in the same way that it had arrived--the regiment was divided into detachments and traveled aboard available shipping. Batteries A and G left Dutch Harbor on 28 February 1944 aboard the World War I blockade runner Gargos.⁽⁵¹⁹⁾ During the journey to Seattle, the Gargos was shelled by a Japanese submarine. The old vessel sustained minor damage to the portside and stack.⁽⁵²⁰⁾ Arriving on 8 March, the batteries spent a few days at Fort Lewis before entraining for Fort Bliss to join the rest of the regiment.

An article in Yank, appearing at the end of the Aleutian Campaign, captured the sentiment of the troops who had been stationed in Alaska. The article noted:

The lessons in Alaska were in favor of the rule book. Nothing much new to learn, but a lot that had been learned was put to the test of 60-below-zero cold, interminable rain and fog, instantaneous freezing, rugged living. The men got along without women, radios, books, Coca-Cola and sunshine. And they sure want to get the war over so they may get to hell home.⁽⁵²¹⁾

This was certainly the fervent desire of the men of the 206th.

At Fort Bliss, the men of the 206th were given a well-earned furlough of twenty days.⁽⁵²²⁾ Most men immediately headed home to see their families--some after a separation of over thirty months.⁽⁵²³⁾ The men returned to Fort Bliss at the end of March and beginning of April to find that the 206th no longer existed.⁽⁵²⁴⁾ After twenty-one years of service, the regiment had been disbanded.

The War Department continued to modify the composition and organization of units throughout World War II, and in late 1943 it judged that the critical need for antiaircraft defense had passed. As a result, Coast Artillery antiaircraft regiments were disbanded.⁽⁵²⁵⁾ Although separate battalions were created from the regiments, many regimental personnel were freed for assignment elsewhere. This would happen to many of the men of the 206th.⁽⁵²⁶⁾

On 31 March 1944, the 206th's Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Battery ceased to exist. In a farewell letter to the regiment, Colonel Robertson noted that over 10,000 enlisted men and 500 officers had served with the regiment during its twenty-one years. Robertson stressed his pride in the performance of the regiment at Dutch Harbor:

I have never before and never expect to see greater valor, better teamwork and greater soldierly bearing than was displayed on the battle field at Dutch Harbor. The Regiment did not fail me when the crucial time came. I saw what you did. I saw demonstrated in each of you on the battle field your love for your country, your love for the Regiment, your interest in each other, and me, and the results of our weeks, months and years of training for the defense of our Country and our Flag. There has never been a finer bunch of officers and men associated together in a Military Organization.

Colonel Robertson concluded his farewell by noting that he was being transferred to Camp Stewart, Georgia. He urged the men not to lose their fine spirit wherever they were sent, exhorting them to "NEVER GIVE UP."⁽⁵²⁷⁾ After the war, in 1946, Robertson was promoted to brigadier general and assigned command of division artillery with the 39th (Delta) Division. The division artillery was composed of Arkansas and Louisiana National Guard artillery units and was headquartered at Little Rock.⁽⁵²⁸⁾

Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., remained commander of the Alaska Defense Command through its reorganization in November 1943 as the Alaska Department, a command independent of the Western Defense Command. Buckner commanded the Alaska Department until March 1944.⁽⁵²⁹⁾ Promoted to lieutenant general, Buckner commanded the new Tenth Army in the invasion of Okinawa which began on Easter Sunday, 1 April 1945.⁽⁵³⁰⁾ In that costly struggle, Buckner himself was killed in action, four days before the end of organized Japanese resistance on 22 June.⁽⁵³¹⁾

Under the 1943 reorganization of antiaircraft artillery regiments, it was contemplated that their first battalions would become separate gun battalions. The second and third battalions would become separate automatic weapons and searchlight battalions, respectively.⁽⁵³²⁾ The reorganization of the 206th proceeded along these lines, although the 1st Battalion was redesignated as an automatic weapons battalion. The 1st Battalion became the 596th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion on 9 March, but the new battalion was broken up on 29 March to release its personnel for assignment elsewhere.⁽⁵³³⁾

The 2nd Battalion became the 597th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion on 1 April. The battalion departed the New York Port of Embarkation on 10 December and arrived in Great Britain six days later. The battalion participated in the Central Europe and Rhineland campaigns in 1945. When the war ended in August, the battalion was stationed at Bad Lippspringe, Germany. The 597th returned to the United States in December 1945, and was disbanded at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, on 12 December.⁽⁵³⁴⁾

The 3rd Battalion, created in Alaska, was redesignated the 339th AAA Searchlight Battalion on 1 April 1944. With the decreasing need for antiaircraft artillery, the battalion was disbanded at Fort Bliss on 12 June and its personnel freed for reassignment.⁽⁵³⁵⁾ Many of these men wound up in Europe as infantry replacements.⁽⁵³⁶⁾

Following the war, the men of the 206th resumed their private lives, engaging in every type of business, and raising families. One former member of the 206th, Second Lieutenant Kaneaster Hodges, served in the United States Senate.⁽⁵³⁷⁾

In strictly strategic terms, the Battle of Dutch Harbor was insignificant. Had Yamamoto supported Kakuta's request to invade Dutch Harbor, however, the Aleutian Campaign may have taken a far different course. Symbolically speaking, Dutch Harbor was important since it marked the first aerial bombardment of North America. The most important consequence of the battle was the recovery of the first intact Zero. This serendipitous event undoubtedly helped the United States to defeat Japan. Wresting control of the air from Japan was a critical step on the road to victory.

The question of Midway and the Aleutian diversion remains a lively topic of debate. Certainly, the Ryujo and Junyo could have served Japan better at Midway. Whether these two light carriers could have altered the course of the Midway battle is, of course, unanswerable. But the Japanese loss at Midway did alter the course of the war. For the United States, the defensive phase of the war ended with the Midway victory. Japan had been checked. The air raids on Dutch Harbor, in a sense, may have cost Japan the war.

Scholarly appraisals of the performance of the National Guard in World War II fall along partisan lines. Many notable military historians of the post-World War II era served in the Regular Army or the National Guard, and their conclusions tend to provide loyal support for their institution. The official histories adopted a middle position that recognized the problems with the National Guard during mobilization and training, but fully acknowledged the contributions of the Guard to victory. These three distinct groups represent a historiography that has yet to produce a consensus. Much work remains to be done before a full appraisal of the National Guard's role in World War II can be determined.

National Guard supporters point to the enormous contributions made by the Guard during the war. The Guard contributed 300,054 officers and men to World War II, in eighteen infantry divisions, twenty-nine aerial observation squadrons, and "innumerable" nondivisional elements. These officers and men included fourteen who were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. In all, the eighteen National Guard infantry divisions suffered 185,561 battle casualties. As for leadership, the Guard produced 75,000 officers from the enlisted ranks--through OCS and battlefield promotions.⁽⁵³⁸⁾

The standard pro-Guard interpretation is typified by John K. Mahon's analysis:

Overall what contribution did the National Guard make to victory during World War II? Most important, in the critical period before the United States entered the war, it provided the principal organized body of men for national defense. . . . During the first fourteen months of the war in the Pacific, precipitated by Pearl Harbor, the Guard and the Marines made up the bulk of the American fighting force. By 1942, the United States was able to place fourteen divisions overseas in all theaters, of which eight originated in the National Guard. Counting the Americal Division, nineteen divisions started from the Guard. Although much diluted with much out-of-state personnel, these nineteen retained to the end a distinctive Guard flavor. They performed as well as the best.⁽⁵³⁹⁾

The Guard defenders also point to wartime treatment which they considered unfair, particularly the massive officer shake-up of 1940-41. In a War College address, National Guard Major General Ellard A. Walsh noted that General of the Armies John J. Pershing had testified before Congress that the National Guard never received full support from the Regular Army during World War I. "Unfortunately for us," Walsh continued, "this situation was to be repeated in a later World War, only to a much greater degree."⁽⁵⁴⁰⁾

General Marshall's age limitations for promotion and combat assignments irked many Guardsmen. Walsh protested the treatment of general and senior grade field officers. He felt these officers were relieved on flimsy pretexts.⁽⁵⁴¹⁾

However, one prominent Guard proponent, Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, attempted to ameliorate the rancor:

Without prolonging ad nauseum the discussion of the argument, the fact remains that despite the injustices of human error, both Regular and citizen-soldier were welded into an amalgam worthy of the encomiums of Winston Churchill expressed before the secretaries of war and navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Pentagon during 1946.⁽⁵⁴²⁾

Dupuy also tried to smooth over the "Battle of the Smiths" controversy. In June 1943, Marine Major General Holland M. "Howling Mad" Smith relieved Major General Ralph C. Smith from command of the New York National Guard's 27th Infantry Division during the invasion of Saipan. The Marine accused the Guard division of timidity. Dupuy characterized the incident as "unfortunate", and hastened to add that "elements of the 29th Infantry Division fought side by side with those of the 1st -- the 'Big Red One' -- across bloody Omaha Beach to gain the initial toehold."⁽⁵⁴³⁾ Dupuy also trumpeted the achievement of an individual Guardsman, Sergeant Curtis G. Culin from New Jersey's Essex Troop. Culin is credited with inventing the steel horn that, when attached to American tanks, permitted the penetration of the hedgerows in Normandy's bocage country.⁽⁵⁴⁴⁾

Critics of the National Guard seem to have a more difficult case to make. The National Guard's problems during mobilization and training surely were paid for in blood. The anti-Guard arguments therefore tend to stress that a militia system is inadequate for defense in the modern world.⁽⁵⁴⁵⁾

Official Army histories take the middle ground, noting the mobilization and training problems but stressing positive accomplishments.⁽⁵⁴⁶⁾ The Army Almanac, for example, noted that National Guard units participated in thirty-four separate campaigns and seven assault landings.⁽⁵⁴⁷⁾ The official one-volume history of the American military, edited by Maurice Matloff, noted that the War Department spent about one-tenth of its military budget to support the Guard in the interwar years. The civilian training program resulted in "an orderly and effective mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve elements into the active Army in 1940 and 1941."⁽⁵⁴⁸⁾

General Marshall's biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, emphasized the even-handed treatment that the National Guard received from Marshall. Pogue concluded that throughout the Regular Army versus National Guard controversy, Marshall kept the Guard's respect. As Chief of Staff, Marshall insisted that Guard officers be given every chance to prove that their efficiency. Marshall felt that the Guard officers were deficient because of a lack of experience and insufficient training time--not because they lacked the capacity for leadership. Marshall ordered that Regular Army officers were not to be assigned to Guard units if qualified Guard officers were available.⁽⁵⁴⁹⁾

The late T. Harry Williams asserted that the United States entered its second global conflict with a more efficient command system than it had in World War I. Citing the amazement of the British at American extemporization, Williams judged that "Roosevelt improvised in war as he did in politics." He continued:

Indeed, all great American leaders have been essentially improvisers. Improvisation . . . is a part of the American national genius and has been expressed in war as well as in other areas of national life.⁽⁵⁵⁰⁾

This seems a key point. The mobilization and training process may have been terribly flawed, but the result of American effort was victory. With our abhorrence of large standing armies, the democracy of the United States has perhaps been well-served by our improvisational style.

The historiography concerning Guard performance in World War II has, to date, focused almost exclusively on the performance of the National Guard infantry divisions. There have been few studies of the nondivisional units which comprised fully half of the Guard's mobilization strength. It would be presumptuous to assume that the nondivisional units experienced the same conditions as the divisions. What held true for the divisions may not have applied to the nondivisional units, and vice versa. Without detailed study of the nondivisional units, it is impossible to characterize their performance as a whole. It is entirely possible that regiments such as the 206th Coast Artillery were far more ready for active duty than the divisions.

For the 206th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment, the Alaska experience was a difficult duty, but one done with a fierce sense of determination. These citizen-soldiers answered their nation's call and served with distinction. The Arkansas National Guard can be justifiably proud of their record.

Considering the scarce availability of modern equipment until the late 1930's and the limited training time, the 206th was a rather proficient unit. The equipment problem was beyond the regiment's control, as it was for all National Guard units. The amount and type of training scheduled was also largely beyond their control. The Arkansas National Guard was probably as well-trained as one could reasonably expect non-professionals to be in peacetime. The citizen-soldiers made the best of a bad situation by doing what they could with what they had. The quality of training was certainly restricted by the lack of adequate artillery firing ranges within Arkansas. But the training was largely administered by officers with experience gained from the Mexican border mobilization and World War I. While many of these officers may not have had actual combat experience in France in 1918, they were at least "over there." These officers had extensive training and were very familiar with Army procedures. Their leadership produced good morale and, in the case of the 206th, a proud sense of unit identity easily discernable--during training at Fort Bliss, in combat in the Aleutians, and fifty years later.

519. Maxwell Interview; Major James M. Massey, "Factual History: Battery G, Helena, Arkansas," [photocopy of 2 page mimeograph, undated, but written after 1967] Marianna National Guard Archives.

520. Massey, 22.

521. Topping, 25 June 1943, 10.

522. Ibid.

523. Maxwell Interview; Conway Interview.

524. On 9 March 1944, the War Department's Adjutant General ordered the 206th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment disbanded "at the earliest practicable date." Army Organizational Card, War Department Form, [photocopy], Fort McAlister Archives. In keeping with Army reorganization begun in 1943, all Coast Artillery regiments were broken up to form separate specialized battalions that would be attached to larger tactical units as needed.

525. Stanton, 35.

526. The personnel of the 206th were reassigned throughout the Army. Some stayed in the United States while others were sent to every theater. New Interview.

527. Colonel Elgan C. Robertson to the Officers and Men of the 206th CA (AA), 31 March 1944, [photocopy] Marianna National Guard Archives. The 206th's regimental motto, included in the unit's insignia, was "Never Give Up." This insignia has been passed to the 206th Field Artillery, Arkansas Army National Guard, now headquartered in West Memphis. "Department of the Army Lineage and Honors, 206th Field Artillery" and attached correspondence, [photocopy, 8 pages], West Memphis National Guard Archives.

528. Lee County Sesquicentennial Committee, History of Lee County, Arkansas (Dallas: Curtis Media Corporation, 1987), 320-321.

529. Army Almanac, 601.

530. Spector, 532.

531. Clark G. Reynolds, War in the Pacific (New York: Military Press, 1990), 142.

532. Stanton, 35.

533. Army Organizational Card, War Department Form, [photocopy], Fort McAlister Archives.

534. Stanton, 505; Army Organizational Card, War Department Form, [photocopy], Fort McAlister Archives; Jackson Interview.

535. Stanton, 495.

536. Conway Interview.

537. Historical Annual, 88. Hodges is listed as a staff officer with the service battery.

538. R. Ernest Dupuy, The National Guard: A Compact History (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1971), 122.

539. John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, The Macmillan Wars of the United States, Louis Morton, ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 194-195.

540. National Guard Association, 33.

541. Ibid., 41.

542. Dupuy, 118.

543. Ibid., 123-124.

544. Ibid.

545. Kreidberg fully enumerates mobilization and training problems and concludes that the World War II mobilization was heavily flawed. Political scientist William H. Riker called for replacing the militia system with universal military training.

546. Kent Roberts Greenfield, general editor of the huge series, The United States Army in World War II, noted that the Guard divisions varied greatly in quality, but all needed assistance. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, United States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces, gen. ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1947), 35.

547. Army Almanac, 311.

548. American Military History, 411.

549. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Vol. 2, Ordeal and Hope: 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), 101. Marshall was, however, a stickler for what constituted "qualified."

550. T. Harry Williams, Americans at War: The Development of the American Military System(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 124-125.