Military Operations

2.3- Definitions
   Prominent military philosopher Carl Von Clauswitz defined war as 'politics continued by other means.' That is to say that the use of the military is a nation's means of imposing its policy on its neighbors by force, when diplomacy has failed. This may be putting down a nation's military might for fear of invasion, to forcing a change of government if the current one offends, to raping one's neighbor for valuable resources and living space. In 'Age of Anxiety', a nation may choose to use its military for any of those reasons, or any of an infinite number more. Of course, this does not come without a cost, in lost revenue, in destruction of land and industry- and in lives.
   Primarily, a nation's military falls into three separate but interrelated categories- land power, air power and sea power. These may take the more exacting forms of infantry units, armored brigades, fighter wings, bomber groups, battleships, submarines, aircraft carriers, or many more. Each of these specialized units are grouped into larger formations, for ease of command and handling; and  may be reorganized as needed.

2.3.1- Unit Types

2.3.1.1- Land Units
   The standard units in the game based on land are regiments. Each regiment represents roughly 3,000 men in an infantry formation, each assigned various small arms, such as rifles, grenades, bayonets, squad automatic weapons, and the like. Not all of those 3,000 are actual combat troops of course- some are administrative workers, quartermasters, logistical supply drivers, military police and other similar non-frontline functions.
    Regiments may be grouped into larger formations, for purposes of administration and force concentration. Groups of 2-4 regiments tend to be termed divisions, and may include organic support, such as machine gun units, artillery brigades, armored formations, and the like. Larger formations, consisting of (on average) 2-3 divisions or 5-15 regiments are called corps.
    Corps and division compositions may differ greatly depending on their mission- a heavy infantry corps, designed for defensive purposes mighty have attached heavy artillery units, machinegun support, and little in the way of transportation. On the other hand, a fast-moving, hard hitting armored corps would be more likely to transport it's infantry in a like number of half-tracks, trucks and jeeps; in support of heavy armored units and self-propelled artillery. In the end, any number of combinations are possible, and up to the player, though one would caution that the time-tested and proven formations are still used for a very valid group of reasons. Corps and/or divisions may themselves be gathered into larger commands, known as armies. Armies are fully independent formations, intended to be able to handle any situation or foe.
   The advantage of gathering one's forces into larger and larger formations is matter of support. Each unit requires support, in terms of fuel, food and cash, depending on it's size, composition and readiness. Each separate, independent command requires an additional amount of support, in addition to the basic consumption of logistical supply.
   Each command is deployed in or near major population centers, though this can vary, depending on the situation.
2.3.1.2- Air Units
   Air units are typically broken into two categories- fighters and bombers. Bombers specialize in striking targets behind enemy lines, with the purpose of disabling a nation's capability of fielding it's armies; whereas fighters' primary mission is to bring down those bombers, and other fighters protecting them. Some units may be capable of filling both roles, though they are usually masters of neither.
   Air units are made of of specific types of fighters, bombers, fighter-bombers or tactical bombers, typically in combat groups of 20-100 or so like aircraft, known as squadrons. These may, in turn, be grouped into larger formations, known as wings; again of the same type of aircraft. Finally, these to are grouped into larger formations known by many terms; typically an air force, or air command. The advantage of a larger command is the same as a land command- lessened administrative costs, though some flexibility of action is lost in larger commands.
   Air units may be based at a population center, though this is not necessary. However, they must be based where an air base facility is present. Air bases are built by infantry units, at a cost of industrial and manufactured units; and each airbase not located at a population center is further rated by the number of squadrons it can support, which depends on the amount of time and equipment invested in building it. In some cases, the terrain may limit the number of squadrons.    
2.3.1.3- Sea Units
   Sea units are individual vessels of a nation's navy or merchant marine, each with it's own individual strengths and weaknesses. This may be a mighty dreadnought battleship, a stealthy submarine, or an aircraft carrier. These may be grouped into similar or dissimilar formations, known as squadrons (similar) or task forces (dissimilar). These formations may themselves be grouped into a larger one, known as a fleet.
   Each independent command must be based at a population center with a port or shipyard facility. A naval command may remain at sea for a maximum of three months, plus an additional month for each merchant marine unit assigned to the fleet as supply vessels. At the end of that time, a fleet must put in to it's home port, or suffer a geometric loss in readiness for each additional month it remains at sea. Additionally, naval commands should put it not-irregular port calls for shore leave for it's troops.   

2.3.2- Force Proficiency

2.3.2.1- Untrained / Minimal Training
   Untrained or minimally trained units are typically those called up from the civilian population in the event of a national emergency, like an invasion by a foreign power, mass insurrections and the like. Normally, they are given nominal training in the use of their small arms, then thrown into action. Minimally trained troops tend to have very poor discipline, morale and skill; and thus tend to break and flee if challenged beyond their capability to cope. As such, they tend to be unreliable, outside their home districts; and are poor even there. Still, in some cases, there is little choice for a nation but to raise such troops, in the face of an invasion that regulars are not capable of containing.
   Untrained troops may be raised, for all intents are purposes, as quickly as a commander in chief would like, contingent on having arms to supply them with, and people to use them. Untrained troops may only be infantry. Historical examples of troops with this level of proficiency would be the British Home Guard raised when "Operation Sealion" was a valid concern; and the Volkssturm raised in defense of Berlin four years later.
   Untrained troops may not be placed on reserve status. Instead, they are simply returned to the civilian population when demobilized.
2.3.2.2- Militia / Irregular
   The next best level of training is Militia, or Irregular troops. These troops have been given better and more thorough training in the use of weapons and tactics than have minimally trained troops, and often militia members have operated as a group for years. They tend to have higher morale, discipline and skill than do untrained troops, though they certainly don't rise to the level of professionals. Militia, like untrained troops, tend to operate far more effectively in their home territory than anywhere else.
  Militia units require a good month of time to train and arm, and may learn to operate armor and artillery if need be; though weapons of that nature are best left to professionals. Historical examples of militia troops would include the masses of Soviet draftees in the early days of Operation Barbarossa- particularly those used in the 'wave attack' counteroffensives in defense of Stalingrad, Tito's anti-Nazi partisans in the mountains of Yugoslavia, or the massive Chinese armies used to repel the Marines and UN forces from North Korea during the Korean Conflict.  
2.3.2.3- Regular / Professional
   Professional troops, or 'regulars' in the military vernacular, are those whose primary duty is to be trained to fight in wars and conflicts. Known also as 'standing armies' during peacetime, regular troops form the backbone of any offensive or defensive force. They are well trained to use any and all equipment their military possesses, are disciplined and skilled, and have good morale.
   Training a regular unit takes a good two month's time, and usually requires a dedicated training camp. Only troops of professional quality or better may operate a nation's navy. Examples of professional armies abound in history, from the German Wehrmacht, to the US Army, to Britain's W.W.I Expeditionary Forces, and many more.
2.3.2.4- Elite
   Elite troops are those who get assigned some of the toughest jobs among the regular forces, and are generally specially trained in one arena of conflict or another; be this a specialization in amphibious assault, to operating in high mountains, to forming a special force of shock-troops for other force's assaults. Elite troops are highly skilled and trained, and have exceptionally good morale.
   Training an elite unit can take six months or more, depending on their special mission, and will always include time in a dedicated training camp, as well as time 'in the field', practicing their special mission. When raised, a national leader chooses the special mission of the force, pending the ability to train such troops. Some of the classic special missions for elite troops would be Shock Troops (such as the Soviet Guard and Waffen SS troops), Amphibious Assault (US Marines), Paratroopers (Airborne Divisions), Special Terrain (such as Mountain, Jungle, Arctic, Desert) and the like.
   Elite troops may make up no more than 1/5 of a nation's military, in number of brigade-scale units. Elite units must be maintained at at least a readiness level of Active Duty. 
2.3.2.5- Commando
   Commando units are, quite simply, the best of the best. They operate in much smaller units than do normal military forces (roughly 1/10 the size), but are more effective in all missions- save for massed combat In addition to the specialized training of an elite unit (which they do receive), Commando units are also trained to operate behind enemy lines for extended periods of time, out of supply, and out of contact with C and C. Commando units may also perform some duties of espionage units, such as demolitions and sabotage, assassination, reconnaissance, kidnapping and the like. Commando units may also train indigenous or rebel forces up to the level of Regular troops, without the benefit of a training camp- though this does take longer.
    Training a commando unit takes upwards of a year of constant drilling and exercise, much like that of an elite force. When raised, the national leader picks a specialty for the commando force, much as they would for an elite unit. Historical examples of Commando quality units would include the Israeli Mossad, British SAS and SBS, US Navy Seals, Soviet Spetsnaz, and US Special Forces.
   Commando troops may make up no more than 1/20 of a nation's military, in number of brigade-scale units, and must be maintained at Mobilized readiness.    

2.3.3- Mobilization Status (Readiness)
   Mobilization status refers to how prepared any given force is to move and take action against enemy forces. Generally speaking, the more ready a military unit is to operate, the greater the cost in terms of supply, support and manpower to the nation's economy. A nation's military may be kept, on a command by command basis, at whatever readiness status the commander-in-chief wishes, provided that s/he is willing to pay the appropriate support cost.
    A nation's military may only take offensive actions with forces that are 'mobilized', the highest level of readiness. A force in 'active duty' may participate in non-mobile defensive actions, while reserve units may may no actions at all, barring mobilization. Changing a unit's readiness status to the next level requires one week of time, during which the orders to mobilize or demobilize are given, troops move to the appropriate locations, vehicles and supply are moved as needed, and other tasks. This is cumulative, so preparing a reserve duty unit for a full mobilization will take two weeks (reserve to active duty, active duty to mobilized.)

2.3.3.1- Reserve Duty Units
    Reserve Duty is the lowest level of readiness a force may be kept at. When a unit is given reserve duty, it requires no upkeep in food, fuel or supplies, and it's members are added to the civilian workforce for the duration that they remain off active duty. On the other hand, reserve duty units may make no offensive or defensive action whatsoever, until such a time as they are recalled to active duty. Reserve units, due to the fact that their training is far from constant, may maintain no better a training level than Regular. 
2.3.3.2- Active Duty Units
Active Duty units are the median level of readiness. In this state, the troopers making up the military force are already gathered in one place, with their weapons and supplies, and await the call to action. They take part in regular drills and exercises to maintain their skill levels, and may participate in non-mobile defense. Active duty units may be of up to Elite training, as they do get regular chances to show their skills. Active duty units consume food, fuel and equipment, and may not contribute to the national economy, as their day is already taken up by military duties.
2.3.3.3- Mobilized Units
Mobilized units are those that are gathered fully in one place, with sufficient arms and equipment to launch an offensive or active defensive campaign at a moment's notice. Mobilized units may be deployed and redeployed at will by the commander in chief, and ordered into action, should it be necessary. Mobilized units constantly prepare for combat, if they are not involved in it already; and as such, are the only forces allowed to maintain a Commando level of training. As the entirety of the day of a mobilized unit is taken up preparing for war, in no way can mobilized units' troops participate in the national economy- they are far too busy to take on 'night jobs'. Mobilized units consume food, fuel, equipment and the munitions they use in constant live fire exercises- or open conflict. 

2.3.4- Military Doctrine
While a nation's generals are grossly unlikely to accept tactical commands from a 'meddling politician', those same politicians do have the capability and responsibility to set a nation's general military doctrine, which in turn reflects the way in which that nation will wage war.

2.3.4.1- Offensive Doctrines
   Nations which choose an offensive doctrine are those which will depend on striking their foes first, and hardest, in order to knock them out of the fight, and win the campaign. Nations which select offensive doctrines also tend to be expansionistic or imperialistic, as the offensive doctrine lends itself very poorly to waging a defensive war. As a result, offensive-minded nations tend to increase the stress level of those around them, and inspire enmity and competition.    

2.3.4.1.1- The Decisive Battle
   This is the doctrine espoused and practiced by many of the most storied military commanders, from Hannibal with his march over the Alps, to Napoleon Bonaparte and his steamrolling across Europe, to Robert E. Lee and his attempts to shock the Union with successful invasions of the north, to the grand von Schlieffen Plan itself.
    Nations that practice Decisive Battle doctrines prepare themselves for fast, massive thrusts, in an effort to knock their foes quickly from the battlefield. These plans are best practiced with massive standing armies, well prepared and mobilized; and if derailed, there is a tendency for the military plans to crumble, along with the army.
2.3.4.1.2- "Anaconda" Offensives
   Anaconda-style warfare was named by the famed U.S. general Winfield Scott Hancock, as a means to defeat the Confederacy in the American Civil War, and was also used to great effect by Germany during the world wars. The Anaconda Plan focuses on using superior forces to surround a foe to prevent any trade from coming in,or going out, of the enemies nation, literally starving the people and the industry of that nation to death; in a manner akin to a medieval siege on a massive scale.
    Anaconda plans are poor choices when executed against a force capable of breaking the blockade, but are quite efficient if the blockade can be maintained, causing a minimal loss of life and material for the attacking force. The key to the Anaconda is time- if the attacker cannot maintain the offensive longer than the defender can hold out, the Anaconda is worthless.
2.3.4.1.3- Attrition Warfare
   Attrition warfare is best employed by a nation with superior manpower and industrial resources. It calls for a nation to level attack after attack on it's opponent, literally bleeding that opponent white, until no force remains sufficient to stop it. The advantage of this method of warfare is that it requires very little in the way of skill or leadership, but it tends to inflict horrific losses on the attacker as well as the defender.
    Classic examples of the use of attrition style-warfare would be Grant's lethal campaign against Lee from the Wilderness to Petersburg, the Soviet defense of Stalingrad against Hitler's Wehrmacht, or Ludendorrf's siege of Verdun during the Great War.
2.3.4.1.4- Blitzkrieg
    Blitzkrieg, or "Lightning War" calls for a massive, combined effort on the part of the air and land forces of a military, whereby massive armored columns supported from the air, bypass strong points of a defense in order to strike at the rear command and control areas of the defender, while slower moving infantry engage and hold in place the defender's forces. This method of warfare requires a high degree of professionalism, as well as a highly mechanized force, in order to speedily exploit the gaps that appear in an opponent's defense, and complete the massive encirclements needed to cut off the foes troops from supply into small pockets.

2.3.4.2- Defensive Doctrines
    Defensive doctrines are those which focus on defending one's own land from attack, at the expense of troops well trained for initiative actions on enemy terrain. The most unfortunate result of defensive doctrine use is that most battles will be fought on home soil, devastating the land around it, as opposed to doing the same to one's foe.

2.3.4.2.1- "A Line in the Sand"
"Line in the Sand" style defenses call for a massive front line with one's foe, stopping the attacking force before they can penetrate inland. Line in the Sand style defenses tend to call for large standing armies, massed artillery support, and prepared positions to be of much value. Additionally, if breached, the value of the line-in-the-sand defense evaporates, as the foe moves into the soft rear areas.
Classic examples of line-in-the-sand defenses would be the massive trenches of the Great War, Lee's defense of Petersburg, Saddam Hussain's defense of Kuwait, the German Siegfried Line and the French Maginot Line. 
2.3.4.2.2- Defense-in-Depth
Defense-in-Depth is, generally speaking, the defensive opposite number of the attrition warfare offense. In the DID scenario, the defender attempts to wear the attacker down with multiple prepared defensive positions, constantly thrown in the path of the attacker. In such a defense, the defending force often depends on 'scorched earth' tactics to destroy anything of value in the vacated land, leaving nothing for the attacker to subsist on or gain by the offensive.
DID strategies have long been employed by Russia historically, notably succeeding in the defeat of Napoleon at Moscow; and notable for it's scale, the buffer states provided (though not tested) during the Cold War. The biggest drawback of defense in depth is the massive manpower requirements of maintaining so many defensive positions; and the actual devastation wreaked by one's own forces during the scorched earth retreats.
2.3.4.2.3- "A Mighty Fortress"
    The "Mighty Fortress" defense calls for the nation to pull all it's resources and manpower of value back into a single, designated area, and defend it with resources akin to the 'Line in the Sand' density and power. Normally, this method of defense tends to work only if a nation has the geographic capability to isolate itself thus; much as practiced by the United States, Britain during the Second World War, or Hitler's "Fortress Europe", with it's famed Atlantic Wall.
    The drawback to the Mighty Fortress defense is that the nation effectively concedes control of the outlying regions to one's foes when fully retracted, which can enable the foes to decimate the nation's trade and limit their communications.  

2.3.4.3- Special Doctrines
    Some doctrines do not fit well into any category, functioning either as both, or neither, depending on the situation and style of the actual utilization.

2.3.4.3.1- The Guerilla War
   The guerilla-style war tends to have aspects of defense- as it is usually employed in one's own territory, and of the offense, as the tactical style is to strike at an opponent's forces, rather than to wait for them to come to the guerilla.
   Guerilla troops tend to travel in small groups, across native country, coming together only to strike in force at an invading foe, before dissolving again into smaller groups, so as to limit the ability of the foe to strike at concentrations. The advantages and drawbacks of this form of combat are numerous. A guerilla force is very difficult to defeat, particularly if they have the support of the native population; as they can disappear into a population, disabling a conventional military strike against them. Likewise, a massive advantage is gained by a guerilla force that can hide in natural surroundings inhospitable to larger forces, such as the mountains of Afghanistan used by the mujahadeen, the Yugoslavian badlands employed by Tito's partisans, or Ho Chi Mihn's Viet Cong.
   On the other hand, command and control becomes very difficult for guerrilla commanders, and assembling a large enough force to strike at an opponent's strength can be frustrating at best. If standard lines of communication are besieged or destroyed, the commander must depend on word-of-mouth, or other- even slower- means of planning.

2.3.5- Giving Orders
    A commander-in-chief may give a military command orders at any time the commander chooses, though a unit that is not mobilized may take longer to begin to perform those actions than one that is mobilized and ready. For the purposes of the game, the nation's military leaders are not played by the commander-in-chief, but rather are played as non-player characters by the game master. The commander-in-chief may issue general strategic orders (for example- seize a bridgehead across the Rhine, invade the Philippines, or bomb Tokyo), but the specific tactics are left to the military commander in charge of the command. In the above examples, the military commander might choose the bridge at Remhagen as the best bridgehead into Germany; decide to invade the Philippines in a three-pronged landing, or choose to bomb Tokyo at night, to negate the daytime efficiency of Japanese fighters.
    As a natural result of this, the knowledge and skill of those commanders is of paramount importance to a successful military operation. This is reflected in the leaders themselves, which may be assigned from any of the actual, historical commanders available to those nations. Nations with rich military traditions will be best served by this, in that their commanders have experience and knowledge behind them, where new-born nations; or those without a long martial history may be at a disadvantage. French Field Marshall Petain, German Erich Ludendorff and US General John 'Blackjack' Pershing may well make better leaders than their opposite numbers in Abyssinia, Hejaz or Siam, for example.

2.3.5.1- Waging War
    The primary mission of any military is, of course, waging war. The military may take offensive or defensive action at any time it is needed to do so, but typically, this would be preceded by a full declaration of war. That is not always the case (to wit, Germany's invasions of Poland and the USSR in 1939 and 1940 were not presaged by an official declaration of war; though one might argue that air strikes and tanks are a fair indication of the offensive nation's belligerent intent). Once ordered into action (or forced into action by an attack), the civilian government should set a general policy for it's side of the conflict- One nation might be content with seizing and holding a certain stretch of border lands; while another might demand a full and total capitulation of the enemy; or another might be happy just wreaking devastation on a foe's countryside, in order to crush their economic capabilities.
    Once the leader has decided on a war goal, the nation's general staff will decide on specific tactics to obtain that goal. The difference in command levels here are dictated by the level of the operation. If the goal of the war is, for example, for R.E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia to seize Washington DC, and force the Union to abandon the war; the commander in the field would need to be given the authority to maneuver his army towards Washington in the most appropriate manner to achieve the war goals, and to conserve his own force to the greatest degree. The specific tactics may be reviewed by the civilian government, which also has input as to the operations- for example, when George McClellan proposed his plan to invade the Confederacy in 1862 by means of the Virginia peninsula facing Richmond; Union President Lincoln allowed this plan, but only on the condition that a portion of McClellan's army remain behind, in order to shield Washington from attack by uncovered CSA forces.
   

2.3.5.2- Logistics and Supply
    There are two adages which illustrate the incredible importance of supply to a military force. The better known "An army moves on it's stomach"; and "Tactics wins battles. Logistics wins wars." Without adequate supply from home, an army in the field quickly runs out of ammunition, fuel, food and medical supplies. Such a force will find itself quickly demoralized, and by the time the ammunition runs out, if there is anything left of the force, it will be utter incapable of defending itself. Throwing rocks will not defeat a fully equipped army.
    When a nation places it's forces into harm's way, they had best be sure that they have a means of supplying that force. Intrinsic to each force is a certain level of supply that is organic; carried in whatever form of transport that force has with it; be that trucks, horse-drawn carts, or just on the backs of the personnel. While this does allow for easy distribution of the supply, it is inadequate for sustained operations. In order to receive the goods being sent from home to support the unit, there must be some form of inorganic supply line. Rail lines are the best; as they can cheaply and efficiently move massive amounts of goods. Ports are also good, but limit the inland movement ability of the armed force. Roads are also handy, allowing trucks and carts to cover the distance quicker than if they were not presence.
    In the absence of some form of developed supply line, the amount of supply that can make it to a force from home degrades, the further the force gets from the point of supply. If a force is cut off completely from supply, such as if completely encircled by enemy forces, and cut off from air support, that force is all but doomed, unless it can fight it's way out of the predicament, and quickly.
    In some cases, positions can have massive amounts of supply already placed, in preparation for being cut off from supply. This happens most often in cities and with fortresses, when the defenders are expecting to be outflanked and encircled, and need to hold out for some time. This is, in fact, why nations need to declare where their strategic reserves are physically located- these strategic reserves form this stockpile, which can be food, ammunition, or what-have-you.
    Additionally- if a nation finds one of it's forces cut off from supply bases, it can attempt to resupply them using cargo planes or bombers. These aircraft make what amounts to a bombing run (if no airbase is available), or shuttle runs to an airbase, in order to drop off supplies. Each wing of cargo or bomber aircraft can move roughly one unit of supply, per month. Larger aircraft might be able to move more, depending on design. Of course, aircraft bringing supply to a cut-off force is subject to ground-to-air fire, and to interception from any enemy air wings in the vicinity.

2.3.5.3- Entrenchment and Fortresses
    Since time immemorial, mankind has sought to defend itself from aggressors behind walls of stone, concrete and steel. This has not changed, even in the modern era; though the techniques and materials used in the development of the fortresses has grown with the times.
    The effect of fortresses are quite impressive, and the better developed and protected the fortress is, the more effective. Since fortresses are typically built at positions of strategic importance- at a crucial road and rail junction, at a prime border crossing, or similar location, attacking forces, and their supply trains, will most often need to cross within the region of the fortress. Forces bypassing a fortress, and it's attending troop complement, run the risk of sorties from the fort cutting off their supply lines, and the disadvantages of having a troop in their rear areas. Thus, fortresses need to be contented with by military assaults; which is precisely what they are designed for. High, thick armored walls, massive gun emplacements, brutal kill zones where automatic fire may be coordinated; forts are lethal to the attacker, and allow a defender to make a massive impact on the field of battle, with relatively few men. Conventional military wisdom holds that an attacker needs to commit no less than 3:1 odds in an attack, to defeat a fortress.
    Fortresses are treated as a special form of facility, and as such, are granted a rating, usually ranging from 10 to 100; though in some cases, the rating may exceed even that mark. The stronger the fortress, the harder it is for the attacker to penetrate it's defenses, and harm the troops inside. Additionally, the fortress builder can place weapons in the fort- normally massive, immobile ones- in order to increase the fortress' troops capability to knock out the attacker. The more, (and higher-caliber), guns are placed in the fort, the greater the fort's ability to inflict grievous losses on any attacker.
    Most fortresses are built in a single location, such as around a city, or at a road junction; but during the Great War, the entirety of the front line was turned into a massive fortress, by means of a border-to-sea network of interlocked entrenchment. This simplest type of fortress may be constructed by any force, given an appropriate amount of time. These entrenchments may be improved up to a strength of 9, without utilizing other materials, and take a variable amount of time, depending on the number of forces working on them, and the space covered by the fortress. These may be improved as well, making an enormous fortress, (akin to France's Maginot Line); but the cost can be prohibitive, typically costing the base cost of the fixed fortification, multiplied by the number of miles it covers.

2.3.5.4- Surgical Strikes
    Another axiom of import with regards to military operations, was advanced in it's most entertaining and colloquial fashion by Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest; who when asked by a reporter how he managed to consistently defeat his strategically superior foes, responded "I gits there the fastest, with the mostest." This simple concept describes the key to many military victories, concentration against the enemy with as much force as can be mustered; at a point of the enemies' weakness. This concept is at the very heart of a special modern tactic- that of surgical strikes.
    A surgical strike is defined as extremely accurate attacks against key points of an enemies defense, industrial complex, or infrastructure; usually with the intent of severely hampering operations in one or more key areas, and delivered from the air. For example, during the attack on Normandy by the Allies on D-Day, the bridges behind the beachheads were major targets of allied surgical strikes, in order to prevent reinforcements from quickly getting to German positions, isolating the German troops against numerically superior landing forces.
    Surgical strikes may be called against specific targets, by an aggressor nation; be that target a bridge, a key facility, a command outpost, government offices, or the like. When called, the aggressor needs good intelligence about the target, including precise position and appearance. Generally speaking, surgical strikes become more and more effective as guidance technologies (driven by rocketry and mathematics) and delivery mass improves. Attempting a surgical strike against a key bridge over the Rubicon is quite a bit more effective with a 2000 lb. self-guided missile, than it is with a 5 lb, hand-dropped gravity bomb.   

2.3.5.5- Strategic Bombardment / Bombing
    Strategic bombing, practiced in it's first effective role by German airships during the Great War, is an effort to deal crippling damage to a nation's industrial capacity or morale, utilizing massive air strikes. There are two main types of strategic bombing campaigns- precision daylight bombing, and nighttime terror bombing.
    In the case of precision bombing, the effort is usually aimed at striking key industrial targets, in order to crush the foe's ability to continue to make war, by eliminating war-important facilities. In order to make such a bombing raid, the attacking nation must be able to define the type of factory being attacked (land vehicle, shipyard, munitions plant; etc), as well as what city it is located in. When a strike is called, any and all bombers that make it through air defenses and fighter cover to their targets, and successfully drop their munitions on the target, degrade the value of the factory and anything under construction in it, on a level prorated by the attack capability of the bomber. The more tonnage of bombs accurately dropped on target, the greater the damage done.
    The second type of bombardment attack is the much more inaccurate "terror bombing", such as was practiced by Germany during most of the "London Blitz" in 1940. In this form of attack, bombs are dropped more or less indiscriminately on civilian population centers, primarily in order to erode morale, and to perhaps do damage to some key industries. When effective, terror bombing can frighten a population into retreating to an isolationist stance; or even capitulate to a foe. In other cases, it might just rouse a nation to greater anger, and stronger morale for breaking a foe. In either circumstance, there is a fair likelihood that infrastructure in the population center will be damaged by repeated attacks, making military responses to land attacks in the region served by the transportation hub more difficult.     

2.3.5.6- Losses and Retreats
    Often, a force in the field may be forced to retreat from it's current position, due to some form of enemy action. This might be because of a significant outflank, massive losses, a break in morale, or some similar situation. Typically speaking, if a force takes more than 20% losses in a single action; or more than 3:1 losses:kills, that force is likely to pull back, seeking a better defensive position.
    When retreating, a force will back move along their current line of supply, towards the base of supply. Once reaching a position when no longer under fire (or minimal fire), that is fairly defensible, that force will again attempt to set up a defensive position. If that force cannot move far enough away from enemy fire, it will keep retreating- likely losing cohesion the entire way, until it either disintegrates completely; or reaches a point where it can redeploy and regroup for the defensive.
    This whole scenario is what makes having good, fresh troops to cover a retreat so important- troops which were normally unengaged in the initial conflict. These forces can harry and slow the attacking force in order to give the retreating mass more time to move, recover and prepare a defensive position, without having to deal with the attackers the entire time.
    Of course, in the next clash between the troops, the situation may well be reversed, should the attacker's losses mount. Then, the defender might become the attacker, driving the foe before them.  

2.3.5.7- Surrender
    In the functional life of any army, the time may come when it finds itself outmaneuvered, on the run, out of supply and broken. When this happens, that force may well offer surrender to it's foes; regardless if that is the desire of the civilian government. Typically, most well-trained troops will hold on past the point of no return, but constantly demoralized or low-quality troops may do it sooner, some even balking at the first sign of combat.
    Surrendered troops are at the mercy of their foes, and are usually sent back to isolated prison camps for the duration of the conflict- sometimes longer. Others are sent on merciless marches, with the intent to kill them by fatigue and starvation; where others are slain outright. In the event that the surrendered troops are left alive, they must be fed to some degree by their captors; and must also be guarded to prevent escape.
    Typically speaking, captured units need to draw as much food as active ones. However, most nations find themselves with shortages of food during wars, and thus reduce the rations to prisoners before all other people it feeds. The lowest level of rations that may be given to prisoners with any hope of keeping them alive would be roughly 1/10 rations; or one food unit for every ten brigade-sized groups.
   As far as guards go, the tighter the security around prisoners, the less likely they are to escape; wreaking havoc as partisans, or even escaping back to their homelands to fight again. The lowest prisoner to guard ration that would be likely to prevent mass havoc would be roughly 20:1.