Nikita Khrushchev took over the leadership of the Soviet Union in the wake of Joseph Stalin's death. As the Cold War raged on, Khrushchev held the decision making powers of Russia under tight reigns. An examination of his actions, an attempt to get in his head, will be the best way to understand how the Cold War came right upon the "brink" of nuclear war and also how that nuclear war was avoided. The facts surrounding either Kennedy or Khrushchev would be sufficient for simply examining how we came to the brink of war, but Khrushchev is much better for examining the last minute resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis because it was his level headed, peace loving actions that kept us from a thermonuclear Third World War.
     "To interpret Soviet decisions is to interpret Khrushchev. He alone decided on policy" (May & Zekilow, Major Problems  198). And, he did this decision making without the input of any advisors or aides. (May & Zekilow, Major Problems  198) This fact is limiting for the Russian leader, not only because it prohibits the multiplicity of knowledge and creativity of many people, but also because his ideas "in foreign affairs were disciplined by relatively little experience or knowledge" (May & Zekilow, Major Problems 198). Therefore, he relied on instinct more than calculation.
     This worked well for him sometimes. The Berlin Wall, which was constructed on August 13, 1961 to divide East Berlin from West Berlin and stop all traffic between the two, was the product of such instinct. Its effect was admirable: it stopped the cycle of confrontation in this torn city. (Boyer 174) Even President Kennedy admitted, "It's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than war" (Boyer 174).
     A year later, though, the site of confrontation was Cuba. The dangers were much more serious and more imminent than ever before and there was now all that could be built. The United States, on October 14, 1961, had photographed hard evidence of missile sites in Cuba that would give Cuba that capability of becoming a nuclear base. (Paterson, Major Problems 189) Two days later when President Kennedy saw the photos he immediately took it as a personal attack to his ego, snapping, apparently in reference to Khrushchev, "He can't do that to me!" (Paterson, Major Problems 189).
     The American leadership was puzzled as to why the Soviet Union would take the egregious step of putting nuclear warheads so close to their borders. An excerpt from a discussion of President Kennedy and his advisors shortly after viewing these photos includes dialogue between the President and McGeorge Bundy, assistant for national security affairs, that shows this puzzlement:"[JFK] Why does he put these there though?[JFK]....what is the advantage of that? It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs {Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles} in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam dangerous, I would think." (Kennedy, Major Problems 176)
     Bundy's reply might make a student think that it was not the United States that avoided tragedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis:  "[Bundy] Well, we did, Mr. President..." (Kennedy, Major Problems 176)
     The Soviet reason for putting nuclear missiles in Cuba was clear. As explained by Anastas I. Mikoyan, one of Khrushchev's officials, "Ours was a containment plan..." (Mikoyan, Major Problems 182). The bipolar nature of the Cold War had caused each pole to have equal and opposite claims for the other. It was not planned to be an act of war, just as our missiles in Turkey were not intended to make war, although it clearly came close to that effect. Some historians claim that Khrushchev "misread Kennedy" due to his inexperience (May & Zekilow, Major Problems 199). He apparently did misread Kennedy, but it seems far more likely that this was caused by Kennedy acting irrationally. President Kennedy was suffering from back pain during the time of Cuban Missile Crisis and was taking steroids and amphetamines. (Paterson, Major Problems 194) "Medical doctors have reported that the effect of these unorthodox injections might have been supreme confidence and belligerence." (Paterson, Major Problems 194). It appears that Kennedy exhibited the effects of these drugs as he wantonly took the world to the brink of destruction in a simian-like demonstration of power and status.
     It is Nikita Khrushchev that made it possible for the world to avoid nuclear destruction. He did so by writing to letters to President Kennedy on October 26 and 27, 1962. The first was the most significant. In it, he stressed the common desire for peace:
     Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still  more, communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives, but  more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, communists, are against all wars  between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we  came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a  game or a means of the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in  itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy  and a calamity for all the people. (Khrushchev, Major Problems 177)
    He pleaded for peace without loosing face or appearing weak - he went on to promise that if the United States had lost sense and wanted war, the could not escape without feeling the wrath of nuclear weapons on their soil. And, he made it clear what his goal was: "to compete with your country on a peaceful basis" (Khrushchev, Major Problems 178). He insisted that the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba was not intended to be offensive, but defensive. Perhaps he intended to have the same meaning as the United States' missiles in Turkey had. But, he proved to be the bigger of the two leaders as he broke the ice by first offering a peaceful settlement of the crisis: "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of aramaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba." (Khrushchev, Major Problems 179).
     This was an unsolicited offering of good will to thwart the crisis. He had a wise fear of brinkmanship. "You see how far things can go," he told his advisers. "We've got to get those missiles out of there before a real fire starts" (Paterson, Major Problems 194). In response to this letter, President Kennedy sent a letter that was tough and terse in the face of Khrushchev's cooperationism. But, Khrushchev told his advisers that "he did not want to trade 'caustic remarks' any longer with Kennedy" (Paterson, Major Problems 194). Rather than mirror the President's tone he said, "In order to save the world, we must retreat" (Paterson, Major Problems 211).
     Khrushchev's second letter to President Kennedy included the second demand that the United States remove their nuclear missiles from Turkey. At the urging of Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy responded officially only to the first letter and accepted its terms, but then secretly agreed to quietly remove the missiles from Turkey within a short time. With this agreement, the Russian's did not approach Cuba to arm the nuclear missiles and the crisis had passed. But, this was all made possible by the show of good will from Nikita Khrushchev in the face of testosterone, and amphetamine, filled brinkmanship from President Kennedy.


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Krushchev's Save: How JFK Nearly Caused a Crisis
By
Ryan Cofrancesco