IF we are to profit from the lessons of Libya, we must be honest with ourselves. The lack of that quality has lain at the root of most of the troubles (avoidable troubles) that we have suffered hitherto in the war. And even now there is far too much of the "bedside manner" in most of the comments on the state of the campaign in Africa. To tell the patient public portentously that there is no justification for "gloom," after statements that raise excessive hope, is just the way to give them a feeling that the situation is worse than they can be told. Of course there is no justification for gloom. Nor would there be even if our forces had been driven out of the enemy's territory (instead of keeping a strategically important lodgment there). Set-backs brace the British. They also have a beneficial effect in correcting our characteristic complacency, and in this case the unmistakable check we have suffered may correct the ridiculous idea so prevalent for the past two years that attack in itself, irrespective of the means and the circumstances, was a simple panacea for all ills. To "take the offensive" had become a popular quack remedy (a bottle of coloured medicine that was advertised as a military cure all).

Tank Armament

THE course of the operations in Libya should restore a more balanced view of the basic conditions of modern warfare and give us a clearer view of the problems that face us. All the more because that theatre of war, with its open flank and wide spaces, was exceptionally favourable for offensive tactics. But we had to tackle an opponent who, if quantitatively weaker, was well equipped with the essential modern instruments and well versed in the technique of handling them. The two German armoured divisions were a numerically small part of the opposing forces in Libya, and smaller still in proportion to our total forces, but they were the part that mattered most. And they would seem to have been not much inferior in number to our own armoured forces, while being equipped with more powerfully armed tanks. We have been apt to overlook the fact that the Germans' successes in attack during the earlier part of the war were gained against opponents who were badly deficient in the necessary modern counter means, and hopelessly our of date in technique. Similar results cannot be expected against opponents who possess these assets. It is not possible to discern whether there were any serious mistakes in the conduct of the Libyan operations. It may be true that there were no experts in mechanised warfare when so much depended on this issue. But we do know that apart from this qualification, the higher commanders were men of proved ability as vigorous and inspiring leaders. It would be unfair to blame them for the fact that results have fallen short of expectation if the conditions are properly appreciated. In particular, the inferior armament of our tanks (which is the handicap that reports from the spot have mainly stressed) had already been made evident in the abortive offensive last summer. It is clear, also, that we took the offensive without a numerical superiority in armoured forces commensurate with our general superiority of numbers. It is more immediately practical to weigh the situation as it stands, both in relation to our object and to the enemy's state. To do this, however, we need to get a clear outline of events, as to which neither the official communiqués nor the official commentator in Cairo have been of much help. So far as one can "read between the lines," the ring that we cast round Rommel's main forces was never firmly welded. The question naturally arises whether we forfeited the strategic advantage gained at the outset by an excess of the offensive spirit by trying to seek out and destroy the enemy's armoured forces in "sea battles on land" carried out by "cruisers" against "battleships."

German method

THE German in all their more successful operation during this war have exploited what might be termed the offensive use of the defensive. They have used their armoured forces to make an incision and sweep round a flank with the aim of reaching some suitable position in the opponent's rear where they could create a strategic barrier astride his line of communications and retreat. They have never, if they could avoid it, wasted either strength or time in battle on the way. An they have used their motorised troops, plentifully equipped with anti-tank guns, as well as with machine-guns, to line the pockets that the armoured division made and consolidate the barrier. Thus cut off from his supplies, the opponent has been forced to do most of the attacking in reverse and with shrinking resources. This method has repeatedly yielded the Germans a large "bag." It is difficult to gauge how far we attempted to apply such a method. Cyrenaica offered no water lines such as the Germans utilised in Poland and France, and it may have been considered that the topography was unfavourable to reliance on any strategic barrier in the enemy's rear. The communiqués certainly conveyed the impression that we were more concerned to seek out the enemy than to place him at a disadvantage. The question must be left for the war historians to clarify. What is clear now is the fact that the ring was definitely broken last Monday, and that our forces subsequently fell back southwards and eastwards. With that withdrawal disappeared the hope of compelling the bulk of the enemy's forces to surrender and thus of an early decision. The tank forces on both sides now appear to have joined battle again north of Bir-el-Gobi, and early reports seem favourable. In a battle of this nature, the British will feel the loss of their seaborne supplies through Tobruk. On the other hand, their desert supply problem is mitigated by occupation of the Sidi Omar area (the southern inland bastion of the enemy's original frontier defensive). As for the prospect of renewing our advance and driving it home, this is likely to turn on two factors, the extent to which we have already succeeded in reducing the enemy's armoured forces, and the extend to which the enemy has made use of the lull to recover his own strength in this respect. The situation might be described in terms of football as a game in which the two sides are level at half-time, the score being one goal all. The outcome of the second half will depend on which side has best kept or can soonest recover its "wind." If the finish should leave us where we stand now, the result might be reckoned a draw locally. The best result obtained up to now by our Libyan offensive is suggested in the latest German "explanation" of the causes of the retreat from Rostov, that General von Kleist's army had been weakened by the reinforcement of other fronts, including the dispatch of aircraft to Libya. Whatever be the truth of this explanation, it is clear that the manifest increase of our opponents's air strength in Libya can only have been carried out at the expense of other urgent calls. The successful progress of Marshal Timoshenko's counter-offensive during the past week has been the most encouraging development, not only of the week, but in the whole of the Russian campaign up to date. In its scope and flanking direction it has borne the stamp of a true counter-stroke by contrast with previous attempts. Already, there are signs of stiffening German resistance. But at the least, the imminent danger to the Caucasus oilfield has been averted and the menace removed to a safer distance. This is the more significant because of the paramount importance of that objective.

BACK