HKSAR government weak to spearhead Metrication change

                                                                                By K.C. Yan

                                                                                Doctorate student

                                                                                University of Newcastle, Australia

                                                                                Written in Hong Kong

May 2004

(Copyright reserved)

Abstract

Twenty-six years ago, the Hong Kong Government under British rule embarked on a metrication programme aiming to keep pace with the rest of world change.  Today, the government of the HKSAR has completely left metrication out of any agenda and the Imperial system is gradually crawling back into previously converted territories.  Ironically, instead of unifying with the mainland where metrication has long become the norm, the HKSAR under Chinese rule is now among the few economies still widely upholding Imperial units in social sectors.  This paper attempts to analyze Hong Kong’s metrication as a change process by applying some contemporary organization change theories, and to put forth strategies to drive for a successful change.   

1.          INTRODUCTION

1.             Background

Observing the trend that the majority of countries in the world were already metric or going to turn metric, and that Hong Kong’s international trade might suffer if it could not comply with the system of measures most of its trading partners were going to adopt, Hong Kong embarked on its road to metrication in the 1970s.  A forerunner of the whole change process was education, followed by government departments like the Royal Observatory and Water Supplies Department (Sing Tao Jih Pao 1979). 

In 1978, the government formed the Metrication Committee to co-ordinate matters arising from metrication.  Its chairman and Head of the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of Hong Kong, Professor S.Y. King, commented to the press (South China Morning Post 1978a), “We hope in five years the SI will become popular and most people in Hong Kong will know what metrication is.  But that depends on how hard we work and the amount of co-operation we get from the public.”  Though Professor King did not seem to have under-estimated the general public’s resistance to the change, it is unconceivable that after 25 years, metrication has gained little ground in Hong Kong outside the education, government and international trading sectors. 

Mr Y.H. Tam, the committee’s last chairman, admitted that progress had been slow and that three major sectors remained to be tackled, viz. property area measurement, Chinese herbal medicine weighing and fresh food sales (Ming Pao Daily News 1997).  However, he was optimistic that 1997 could be a turning point in Hong Kong as it would be natural to align more closely with the steps of the mainland which had been much ahead. 

Amid the major challenges Hong Kong was facing, the committee was dissolved in January 1998 shortly after the formation of the HKSAR government on grounds of “mission accomplished” (Hong Kong Yearbook 1999).  With the champions gone, not only has there been no progress in overcoming the left-behind challenges, considerable use of the Imperial System has also crawled back into the market place and even into the public sector; and hardly have there been any further discussions on how, when, why or why not the change should proceed. 

2.             Objective of the paper

This paper attempts to analyze the metrication process in Hong Kong as a change management programme using the steps for leading organizational change put forth by Kotter (1999, pp.75-92) as a framework.  Other change management theories are also referred.  A set of strategies that would enhance the chance of future success given the continuing process nature of change will be discussed towards the end.

2.        ESTABLISHING A SENSE OF URGENCY

The demand for change stemmed from trade and industry where there was a need to conform to international standards when dealing with overseas partners (South China Morning Post 1978b, South China Morning Post 1983b).  Since Hong Kong’s economy was largely export driven, the economic impact for failing to satisfy customer needs could mean loss in competitiveness and ultimately economic returns.

According to Senior (2002), the environmental triggers for change can be summarized as political, economic, socio-cultural and technological (PEST).  Certainly, economic trigger is the case in point as industrialists and merchants had a compelling need to take care of their own interests particularly when trading with the EEC.  Political trigger was a driving force for the change at the time when Britain, being the sovereign power overlooking the affairs of Hong Kong, had its mandate for metrication tabled.  However, that trigger seemed to have lost its momentum upon the resumption of sovereignty by the mainland as evidenced by the disbandment of the Metrication Committee.  Socio-cultural factors constituted little drive, if any, towards the demand for the change. For a man in the street, “changing to a system that is bewildering and at variance with the tried and trusted traditions of a lifetime” drew considerable stubborn resistance (South China Morning Post 1982a), not to mention initiating the change himself.  The drive for change under the technological environment was real but was likely to be restricted to education, scientific research and technological fields.  Whether that could boil down to trigger a need for change was doubtful.

In essence, other than those who were high enough to envision the need for the change, the general public, being the biggest group of stakeholders, failed to see what was in for them to get out of their comfort zone and break the orthodox.

3.        FORMING A POWERFUL GUIDING COALITION

Change will not happen if top management does not commit to it (Smith 1996). The Metrication Committee was obviously the steering committee to effect the change.  The fact that it was chaired by a professor (an advocate of metrication) and made of representatives from the Consumer Council, Federation of Hong Kong Industries, engineering, manufacturing and management sectors (Hong Kong Standard 1977) and in later years joined by secretaries or delegates of government branches in charge of economics, administration, government supplies, public works, trade and industry, and government information services (Hong Kong Standard 1980; Sing Tao Jih Pao 1982) demonstrated a certain degree of commitment of the government to the change.

Spencer and Pruss (1993) point out that it is important to involve the anti-change people as change agents. After debate and analysis of the issues, such people can often end up the strongest champions of the change.  The lack of involvement at the committee and strategy making level and thus champions in specific fields left little chance for the tough job of convincing vegetable market hawkers to change to succeed. This explains why after five years’ of implementation, “consumer and consumer services remained the biggest stumbling block to Hong Kong going 100 percent metric” and “industry and trade had grudgingly given ground” (South China Morning Post 1982a).

Another aspect measuring top management’s commitment to the change programme could be the budget in this particular case.  Spencer and Pruss (1993) assert that all change programmes should be treated like any other form of capital or revenue expenditure.  A study on organizational change carried out by Prosci (2000) concluded that inadequate budget was only second to non-supportive management behaviours amongst the top three obstacles to change.  As press reports repeatedly showed (Ming Pao Daily News 1993 & 1997), the government’s funding on publicity had been minimal.  South China Morning Post (1982a) reported that the committee had only $3.4 million to spend over five years to educate the public on the use of SI units, comparing to a one million budget the Mass Transit Railway Corporation planned spending over a few months on television advertisements merely to teach commuters to use its new interchange stations (which subsequently proved to be a smooth change).   

Spencer and Pruss (1993, pp.165-7) identify 17 general roles and duties change agents will perform in a change programme, including:

“demonstrating their commitment to the changes through actions and words, …sharing with fellow change agents their experience and acting as communication channels amongst different sectors, …identifying ringleaders of resistance to the change programme and counseling and instructing them to bring them on board”. 

Examining how other countries went through the same metrication process could provide some hint on what could be done realistically. 

Australia successfully completed its change between the set up of its Metric Conversion Board in 1971 and its disbandment in 1981 (Wilks 1992).  According to Reid (n.d.), the board assembled 160 committees, subcommittees and panels to analyze the problems likely to be encountered.  Any change programme without fullest consultation and voluntary cooperation from the industry concerned would not be implemented.  Since membership of all committees was nominated by the industry as experts with sufficient standing to make decisions on their own, strong leadership of the industry was assured.  Reid (n.d.) also indicated that the Australian Metric Conversion Board spent close to 6 million Australian dollars during its 11 years of operation and that the Commonwealth Government contributed another ten million dollars to the states for the change process.  Wilks (1992) wrote:

“One can’t help being impressed by the magnitude of the task, by how much thought, planning and effort went into bringing it about, and by how many members of the general community participated in it.  The change affected all Australians in both their private and professional lives and has been recognized as one of the great reforms of our time.”

By comparison, it appeared that representation from industry in the Metrication Committee in Hong Kong was far less extensive.  Australia’s successful experience in leading the change seemed to support the allegation that budget commitment for the change programme in Hong Kong was inadequate.

4.        DEVELOPING A VISION AND COMMUNICATING IT

Had there been a vision developed amongst Metrication Committee members, it would have been grossly under-communicated to the community at large, the biggest group of stakeholders.  From the writer’s own observation, most of the public were presented with the need for the change from the perspective of trade and industry.  They were advised the technicalities of conversion through posters or short TV announcements.  Little was focused on, say, how, as a vision, the people of Hong Kong should position themselves in the global trend, which would address the issue of “what is it in for me”. 

Schmidt and Gwin (1988) point out that for a social change like metrication, there are four levels varying in acceptance difficulty, namely, cognitive change, action change, behaviour change and value change.  They conclude that “the fundamental reason for the failure of the metrication conversion effort in the US was that a cognitive change was sought when a value change was required.”  Metrication in Australia, though much more successful than the US, suggested similar experience.  Looking back, Reid (n.d.) found that it was a little naïve to have decided to maintain a low profile in metrication because it was a very significant cultural change in everyday life and as a result opposition did develop.  Wright (2004) also points out that “there is a tendency for managers to emphasize low-level learning over high-level learning”, which is one factor “limiting the responsiveness of managers to industry changes.”  In the case of Hong Kong, the promotional tactics adopted in the change programme did little to arouse the public to appreciate the need for the change tied to their intrinsic values and thus did little to help them become champions of the change.

“No one really likes change,” unless “you are part of the group that has championed the change in the first place.” (Gillis 2004)  The most successful changes, according to Gillis (2004), would be coming from an internal driving force.  Connell (2004) argues, “It is all a question of where the change comes from: if it is imposed from outside it can feel like a threat” and “that people are defensive in the face of perceived threat”.  People may just feel indifferent or bias against the subject simply because “That’s not the way we’ve always done things here” (Bentley 1991).  In business communication theory terms, a kind of emotional psychological block (Bentley 1991) could have existed, causing the message to be distorted or interfered.

5.        ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO CHANGE

Though not explicitly stated and regarded as very difficult, the ultimate goal of the Hong Kong Metrication Committee was to have the public at large think in and use the metric units (South China Morning Post 1983).  High on its mandate, the committee had to direct and encourage certain industry sectors to set up their own timetable for the change and to ensure consistency amongst the processes.  It was also responsible for coordinating publicity work amid other roles (Sing Tao Jih Pao 1982).  To target specific stakeholders for the change, the committee formed six advisory subcommittees, which were: education and industrial training, consumer goods and service industry, manufacturing and engineering industries, public utilities and services, building and construction industry and public relations (South China Morning Post 1978a).  Five years after the change process began, the committee admitted that consumer and consumer services proved to be the biggest stumbling to the change, while the housewife had the hardest job adjusting (South China Morning Post 1982a).        

Casey (1993 cited in Connell 2004) points out that it is not the change that people actually resist, but the fear caused by the threat behind it. The Metrication Committee identified the wet market as the most difficult segment to implement the change because of its fear of losing business as a result of time lost in converting the measures (Ming Pao Daily News 1993).  On the other hand, industrial sectors which were driven by international demand to go metric proved to go along quite well in accepting the change.

Kotter (1999) points out that sometimes the obstacle for change may come from the organization structure or, worst of all, bosses who refuse to change.  For the metrication change, resistant parents or bosses of influential companies who have not been turned into change agents might dampen any efforts their children or employees may attempt to practise the new set of standards.

Lewin’s force field analysis developed in the 1960s could help to explain why the desired change had not been successfully implemented.  Forces for the change included keeping up with international demand for metric product specifications, foreign regulations, Britain’s metrication and visionaries.  Forces against the change were primarily those producers, traders or service providers who feared they would be disadvantaged should they start to change before the general public readily could accept it.  A case in point was the scale manufacturers who were afraid of losing business if they were to produce metric-only scales as urged by the Metrication Committee (South China Morning Post 1982c).

While certain segment of the general public might refuse to change as the old systems were traditions of a lifetime (South China Morning Post 1982a), the argument on the apparent lack of knowledge about the new system as a reason for resisting the change was weak.  A public opinion survey in Australia in 1976 indicated though many had little knowledge of the metric system, they knew even less of the Imperial system (Reid n.d.).   However, given the large number of people in this category, they represented a formidable force against the change that had to be weakened in order to shift to the new paradigm.

6.        GENERATING SHORT-TERM WINS

Commitment to a vision of change may become weakened on the way and therefore implementing change that will ultimately transform an organization is a long-term process (Senior 1997).  Wright (1999) asserts that a series of small, successful changes will help create new mental models that can propagate change in an entire organization.  Kotter (1999) points out that the achievement of ‘short-term wins’ is important as a motivating factor and as a mechanism for tracking progress towards the longer-term goals.  One way he suggests short-term wins can help the transformation is rewarding change agents with a pat on the back.  This will build morale and motivation.  Another way is to build momentum that can turn neutrals into supporters and reluctant supporters into active helpers.

A review on the work of the Metrication Committee shows that honours were once given to some students and scouts who had been keen to act as metrication ambassadors in their daily life (Hong Kong Yearbook 1997). However, little was said publicly, at a magnitude that the public could easily recognize, to praise and reinforce some “real-life” good practices in actual business context that had embraced the change.  A case in point observed by the writer was the use of metric measurements in the beauty contests organized by both television broadcasters, which did have extensive influence on building the change momentum amongst neutrals and even reluctant supporters. 

7.        CONSOLIDATING GAINS AND PRODUCING MORE CHANGES

At the beginning of the change process, the chairman of the Metrication Committee, Prof. King, emphasized that there would not be any compulsory programme and the committee only encouraged metrication (Hong Kong Standard 1978).  But by 1982, he admitted that Hong Kong would never go fully metric unless legislation was introduced to enforce the changeover (South China Morning Post 1982b).  In fact, Perera (1978) quoted an early senior metrication officer at the Economic Services Branch of the Hong Kong government saying that in every metrication country it was necessary to introduce some legislation at a later stage.  Kotler (1982 cited in Schmidt & Gwin 1988, p9) asserts:

“sometimes a change in values comes about only with the passage of legislation. … Public attitudes do not necessarily change with the law; however, the passage of time, and the new pattern of behaviour required by the law, eventually will achieve the desired attitude and value change.” 

When certain changes had been successfully achieved in Hong Kong, such as the beginning of the public to accept body weight measures in kilograms, the government could have seized the opportunity to enforce legal requirements on metric only scales in retail outlets.  Scale manufacturers in fact had claimed that they would only discontinue non-metric instruments only when such laws were introduced (South China Morning Post 1982c).

The successful changes the Hong Kong government won within its bureaucracy in fact provided a strong platform for more changes to build on it.  Unfortunately, the loss of thrust at the top, or the change strategists as described by Connell (2004), particularly after Hong Kong’s resumption of Chinese rule, has let many open leads die off.  The premature disbandment of the Metrication Committee in January 1998 before addressing the shortfall in accomplishing its mission (Hong Kong Yearbook 1999) marked the de facto termination of the change process.  If what had been announced as the reason for the disbandment was true, it would have been a case of declaring victory too soon.  In fact, what followed was neither consolidation nor further propagation of the change.  It had been widely observed by the writer that since then further public debates on how to move the change forward were close to none.  Today, discussion topics about metrication in Hong Kong on the Internet are virtually non-existent, in contrast with countries like the UK and USA where controversy and debate continue, and so does the change.  

Had the Metrication Committee lived to push forth further changes, including legislation changes, in the real estate sector based on the already gone-metric sales of land and home ownership scheme flats, one major stronghold of today’s non-metric community sector would have had a completely different outlook.  Likewise, food sales at supermarkets and at big stores could have successfully gone through the change had there been more coercion with the few major conglomerates on grounds of social responsibility as well as the success some local Japanese stores gained through selling in metric weights.  With these two major stumbling blocks won over, further consolidation would take place as the public would be much more exposed to metrication in their daily life.  Further changes to complete metrication would be conceivable as then the cultural change achieved would become a driver.

8.        INSTITUTIONALIZING NEW APPROACHES 

Connell (2004) points out the importance of reinforcing and solidifying changes through recognition or reward, and “changing procedures and processes so that change can become a regular part of operation”.  She asserts that “promotion, performance review and reporting systems must be aligned to this change” or otherwise there is a danger that old behaviour will come back “if the key managers leave or pressure to change is removed”.  Robbins, Millet, Cacioppe and Waters-Marsh (1998) stress the need to refrozen the successful situation after the consolidating the change so that it can be sustained over time.  Kotter (1999, pp 90) warns that “until new behaviours are rooted in social norms and shared values, they are subject to degradation once the pressure of change is removed.”  These change theories tell exactly why the Hong Kong metrication change failed to reach its intended target. 

Before being disbanded, the already financially weak Metrication Committee was confronted with a different set of priorities at the government level (Ming Pao Daily News 1997).  After the disbandment, not only did the change process stagnate, but also reversion to old behaviour was easily noticeable.  Evidence of such crawl-back was most obvious in media reports on land sales falling back from dual units to Imperial only, in Housing Department flat sales promotion and Police Department’s crime reports adopting Imperial units, and in the almost exclusive use of Imperial standards in TV entertainment programmes, etc.  In daily living, even young people who had been measured in metric height in weight since birth at hospitals and were supposedly strangers in Imperial units started to tell their weights and heights in pounds and feet outside the classroom.  Educating the Public (2004) attributes this phenomenon to the cultural environment.  It writes:

It is a simple case of both a lack of rôle models and reinforcement of learned subject matter which is the key to whether individuals use metric units or not. After all, humans are little more than sheep, often choosing to conform and follow the way of the many, rather than that of the few. To be accepted in our society a conformity of ideas and values is often seen as the only way... the mores of a society have a lot to answer for when it comes to how its members think and act.

9.        SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER CHANGE

As discussed in the previous sections, urgency for the change amongst international trading and manufacturing firms was well established but that amongst the public needed much more arousal. The guiding coalition suffered from the lack of government funding and patronage from key manufacturing and service sector icons as champions.  Involvement from a large number of the public as change agents in their own fields was lacking.  The vision of a metric Hong Kong and the consequence of its failure were not widely communicated with the public, which made conversion-technicalities-based publicity irrelevant to those already well educated and confusing to those who lacked the knowledge.  While the committee did well to coordinate changes in the government and public utilities sectors, the barriers to change in society as a whole had not been removed.  Failure to acknowledge, consolidate and reinforce the changes achieved in certain sectors through some form of legislation or structural re-organisation to cement the changes has let changed behaviours slide back to old habits.  Changing leadership both in the government and in the committee meant different priorities and hence different resource allocation, which eventually led to the premature disbandment of the key agent for the change.

The ADKAR model (Prosci 1998 cited in Hiatt & Creasey 2003) can help highlight some practical steps to bring metrication to its next stage.  In terms of awareness, it would not be a major issue to let the public aware of the need for the change since the change publicity campaign had gone through a long period.  As to knowledge and ability, the fact that metric units at school have been taught for 30 years and a significant portion of the population is made up of mainland migrants already exposed to metric measurements, the scores can be anticipated to be relatively high. 

The weak element is likely to be desire.  A strong, government-led guiding coalition consisting of key representatives from leading enterprises and fields, as well as patrons, role models or celebrities in support of the change will help communicate the message to the public at large and arouse their desire to change.  At the same time, the broader vision of the change extensively communicated will win support from those motivated by higher level thinking.  Re-inforcement will be the most important element for the change to become part of the culture and thus sustainable.  Consistently practising what has been taught at school and advocated by the change committee at international, domestic business and social levels, and suitably cementing such behaviours through legislation and organization management framework will bring about the desired changes.   Given the knowledge, capability and the positive attitude towards continuous learning of the Hong Kong people, the time taken to achieve a complete change will depend on whether small wins in changed practices can be consistently reinforced by the government and the public bodies through their deeds. 

REFERENCES