Now that we are into a new paragraph, and I hope that the shock has worn off a bit, allow me to explain. Ever since the Oslo Process had its inauspicious beginnings in September 1993, Rabin has been consistent in one regard. He has always insisted that negotiations on Jerusalem be left until the "final status" talks, which are scheduled to begin no earlier than May of 1996. In the interim, the choice was his how far he would go to ensure that Jerusalem remained a protected issue until then. He had failed miserably for the first 18 months of the process, allowing Orient House and nine other Palestinian official offices to operate in Israel's capital with no recriminations. Many believed that this indicated Rabin's preparedness to allow Jerusalem out of Israel's firm grasp. I still believe that Rabin should take whatever actions are necessary to close these institutions and force their operations back into Gaza.
But now, Rabin seems to be working toward his own redemption by expropriating 131 acres of land in the northern and southern suburbs of Jerusalem for use in the building of Jewish and Arab housing. By this move, Rabin is showing that Israel is still willing to exercise its claim over the territory of its capital. Yet, everyone except his own inner cabinet is insisting that he place Jerusalem on the agenda now, rather than in a year as Oslo calls for. And each side has its own reasons for doing this. The Arabs claim that Israel is attempting to create facts on the ground in advance of negotiations in an effort to make those negotiations meaningless. This claim is being voiced anew, and with greater clarity in light of the US move last week to veto a UN resolution condemning Israel's expropriations. The Arabs feel that they have lost the initiative on Jerusalem, and that its acquisition is now much farther away from reality than it had previously been. Of course, they are correct, in light of the US veto, but their demand to negotiate on Jerusalem now is self-defeating. Since Jerusalem is the one issue that will not result in any agreement with Israel, negotiating it now precludes any further gains in other areas.
The Israeli right believes that since Jerusalem will be the roadblock of the negotiation process, its placement at the end of the process prejudices the outcome of the Jerusalem talks in favour of the Arabs. Their thinking goes that if Jerusalem is the only thing standing in the way of a full agreement, it will not be allowed to remain in Israel's hands. On the other hand, if it is discussed now, the process will break down completely, precluding any further Arab gains in the interim. This thinking is quite sound, but it leaves out one important factor -- the 1996 elections.
It is my fear, that whenever Jerusalem is negotiated, Rabin will eventually concede the issue to the Arabs just as he has conceded every other issue on the Palestinian track. Quite frankly, while I would just as soon see no Arab gains whatsoever, Jerusalem is one thing that cannot be conceded at all -- even if it means concessions in other areas. Rabin, by insisting on delaying the Jerusalem negotiations until 1996, effectively eliminates any possibility of concessions in this regard.
I do not credit Rabin with much awareness of public sentiment, nor do I credit him with any intestinal fortitude in negotiations. This is by now no secret. Therefore, I cannot but hope when I see his steadfast refusal to open the negotiations on Jerusalem. They are set to begin in May 1996, and this is important. For that is the month that Rabin's four-year term as Prime Minister runs out. What I can credit Rabin with is a hunger for power no matter the consequences to Israel. His political fortunes are dwindling fast. But they are not yet gone. The final nail in his coffin will be the relinquishment of Jerusalem, and he knows it. By delaying the negotiations until election time, he disables any thought of concessions, because any concessions at all will spell his political doom.
The Israeli right should take note of this tactic now, and plan to use it for the election. Read everything above over again, and think. Rabin intends to fight the next election on one issue alone -- Oslo. He will claim that Jerusalem is the last issue that needs to be resolved, and that if it is not, all the achievements of the previous four years will have been for nought. He will use the classic Jewish guilt trip to convince voters to accept his plan to divide Jerusalem out of fear of losing everything else. The strongest consensus issue in Israeli history will become a divisive issue that Rabin will try to parlay into another term. His position on the issue is unpopular, but his hope is that the ransom will be too high for Israelis to pay.
What the right needs to do is call his bluff. They must plan their campaign with the aim of killing his ransom note. Rather than presenting Israel with a Jerusalem or withdrawal choice, the right must present Israel with a Jerusalem or bust choice. They must mount a concerted effort to paint Rabin as the leader who has done more than any other to divide the nation against itself and to sell out Israel's security assets and resources. They must bore Israelis to tears reciting quotes from Rabin's 1992 campaign and showing how he has failed to live up to his commitments. Then they must drive home the point that Jerusalem is the essence of Rabin's leadership, just as it is the essence of Jewish history.
Rabin will use Jerusalem to divide Israel just as he has divided Israel in every other conceivable way. He will then divide Jerusalem as well. He will not live up to his commitments on Jerusalem as they stood in 1992, and he may even admit that in the 1996 campaign. The right must use Jerusalem for the symbol that it is. It must take Orient House and shove it in the face of Israelis as an example of what Rabin could not do.
1996 will be a propitious time for Jerusalem. It will be the capital's 3000th anniversary. It will be the time of the capital's renewal. It will be the time when the city defeats its enemies and unifies the Israeli people. But only if the right accomplishes its mission as it should.
Copyright 1995. Reproduction in electronic or print format by permission only.
