ALEXANDER HAMILTON: 74 pg422 - "The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: 74 pg422 - PG.423 - He is also to be authorized "to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for the mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fat would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of the government than a body of men.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
74 pg423 - PG.424 - The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in
the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to
the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon
the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body. I
shall not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring
in this particular the concurrence of that body or of a part of it. As
treason is a crime leveled at the immediate being of the society when the
laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness
in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment
of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition
of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded.
But there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted
that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate
conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the
remission of the punishment than any numerous body whatever. It deserves
particular attention that treason will often be connected with seditions
which embrace a large proportion of the community, as lately happened in
Massachusetts. In every such case we might expect to see the representation
of the people tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the
offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy
of the friends and favorers of the condemned, availing itself of the good
nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the
terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition
had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major
party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy
demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument
for reposing the power of pardoning in this case in the Chief Magistrate
is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical
moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may
restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to
pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory
process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose
of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion
of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour,
may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed that a discretionary power
with a view to such contingencies might be occasionally conferred upon
the President, it may be answered in the first place that it is questionable,
whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law;
and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand
to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding
of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed
into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency
to embolden guilt.