1. Failure to foresee the fact that the Ethiopian Government and the EPRDF would bitterly oppose the aggression:

It was a grave error of judgment on the Eritrean side not to predict that the Ethiopian Government and the EPRDF would make the aggression known to the whole world and present the issue before the Council of Ministers and before the House of Peoples' Representatives at home. It was also a serious miscalculation not to foresee that the Ethiopian Government would vow to defend the country's sovereignty unless the aggression was undone.

2. Blind assumption that the Ethiopian Defense Forces were not ready enough to check the advance of the invaders.

The fact that there were no regular Ethiopian troops stationed around the border area had given the wrong impression to the Eritrean rulers that they could advance into Ethiopian territory without any resistance. However, it was the local militia which they had underestimated earlier that inflicted the first casualties on them.

3. Erroneous judgment that the Ethiopian army was in disarray and was not capable of defending the territorial integrity of the nation.

It was a big gamble to think that Ethiopia had no defense force at all. The Ethiopian Defense Force is now deploying around the border area. The number of volunteers reporting at training camps to be deployed to the defense effort is simply overwhelming . Nonetheless, the Ethiopian Defense Force has already proved its existence by dealing a heavy blow on the invading army at the Badme, Zalambessa and Assab fronts.

4. The Eritrean regime had assumed that, considering the border conflict to be a problem for the Tigray people alone to solve, the other Ethiopian peoples would never raise arms against them.

Here lies the center-piece of their miscalculation. To think that the Ethiopian peoples were unable to distinguish difference in political persuasions from the territorial integrity of their motherland is not only a mistake, but also sheer arrogance.

5. Belief that they could persuade the whole world to support the Eritrean regime's case:

The Eritrean regime had tried to hoodwink the OAU and the UN by claiming that Badme used to be administered by it six months before the incident. It was mere blindness not to see the fact that the presence of massive evidence in Ethiopia could lay bare its cheating.

6. Gambling on the notion that the Ethiopian Government would not take measures against Eritrean citizens living in Ethiopia:

Does the Eritrean regime expect the Ethiopian Government to sit with folded arms when Eritreans living in Ethiopia pose a real threat to the security of the country?

Is it not also naive to assume that the Ethiopian Government would do nothing when the authorities in Asmara are taking whatever measures they wanted against Ethiopians living in Eritrea?

7. Miscalculating the fact that the Ethiopian Government would opt to delay the war:

At first, the Eritrean regime had wrongly predicted that things would go its way. However, the Ethiopian Government exercised maximum restraint and patience to the utter dismay of the aggressors.

8. Failure to recognize Ethiopia's resolve to teach the invaders an unforgettable lesson:

Here is another gamble. The authorities in Asmara had failed to recognize the capability of the Ethiopian Government to put an end, not only to the invasion, but also to their arrogance and chauvinism.

9. Lack of respect for major international political organizations: Apart from their disregard for International norms governing civilized relations between states the Eritrean authorities had described The United Nations as an otiose institution. They had even gone as far as likening the OAU to the prehistoric dinosaur.

10. The making by the authorities in Asmara of rash and vulgar statements of which they would be ashamed sooner than later.

Suffice it to mention here what Eritrean President Issayas told his country's media: "Our withdrawal from Badme is as unthinkable as the sun never rising again... as the sun setting forever..."