1. The aggression of belligerent Eritrea on peace loving Ethiopia is a continuation of the aggressive policy of the Government of Eritrea on its neighbors. The Hanish Crisis involving Eritrea and Yemen and border incident with the Republic of Djibouti, and now the aggression against Ethiopia, etc. are the result of the provocative and aggressive policies of the Eritrean Government . It is to be noted that in order to advance their aggressive and expansionist policies against their neighbours, the Eritrean authorities have been transforming their country into a virtual military camp by training and arming the overwhelming majority of their able bodied citizens and inculcating in them racist and jingoist ideologies.
2. The Ethiopian territories such as Badme and its environs, Seboa-Una Shahak, Aiga-Alitena and Bada areas, etc. claimed by the expansionists in Asmara have perpetually been under the jurisdiction of Ethiopia. This holds true to the periods when Eritrea was under the colonial boots of the Italians, under the protectorate of British Administration, during the period of struggle for independence and right up to the Eritrean referendum and Eritrean statehood. The Eritreans have no basis in fact or history to lay claim on these territories, except their expansionist ambitions.
3. Prior to the incident of May 6 and the Eritrean aggression of May 12, 1998, both the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides had complaints concerning some incidents along the border. In fact, it was the Ethiopian side which had raised more of the complaints regarding the issue. Since the Eritreans had made encroachments on Ethiopian territory starting from the time of the downfall of the Dergue regime, Ethiopia had continuously complained to the Eritrean authorities about their encroachments on the Badme, Bada and areas on the Assab road. Regarding Bada and areas on the Assab road, the Eritrean authorities were telling the Ethiopian side that they were there to fill the vacuum and provide some social services to the people. In any case they were not forthcoming and clear about their intentions. But they never ever frankly told the Ethiopian side about their claims on these territories. Prior to sending military units to Bada, the Ethiopian side had informed the Eritreans of its plan two weeks earlier and they had accepted it for they had no legitimate reason, territorial claim or otherwise, to oppose it. Whatever complaints the Eritrean side had made after the event, it can only be an after-thought in order to placate some of their chauvinist cadres and army commanders who were thinking and working on the basis that Bada was Eritrean territory. As far as Badme was concerned the Ethiopian side was complaining to the Eritrean side of encroachments perpetrated by the adjacent Eritrean district authorities. It was at latter stages that the Eritrean side began to raise complaints regarding some incidents around the Badme area. Taking into consideration the above facts one wonders whether the whole issue is a border issue or whether there is an ulterior motive and a hidden agenda under the disguise of a border issue.
4. Since the issues around the border areas and to a large extent the policy differences on economic issues between the two governments were making the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea relatively more tense, the Ethiopian side proposed that a mechanism be initiated to permanently settle whatever border issues there might be. And as a consequence a Joint Commission was created to look into the modalities of settling the issue. The first meeting of the joint body took place in Asmara on 14 November 1997. And after discussing the issue, the Joint Commission agreed as follows :
a. that a technical sub-committee to look into the border issue be established consisting of representatives of the two sides and that this committee should report on its activities to the Joint Commission. And that each side should inform the other of the names of its delegates.
b. until the border issue is permanently resolved, the status quo on the ground should be maintained.
c. that the two sides should cooperate to reduce tensions in the border areas.
5. Sometime in March 1998, the two sides communicated and scheduled a meeting of the Joint Commission for 8 May 1998. Meanwhile on 6 May 1998 an armed confrontation was provoked when armed Eritrean troops in violation of earlier understanding crossed into Ethiopian territory in the Badme area. The Ethiopian police on the spot reminded the Eritrean troops of the existing agreement that crossing to either side of the border with arms in possession is prohibited and that they should leave their arms on their side of the border if they wished to enter Ethiopian territory. The Eritrean troops not only refused to comply with the Ethiopian Police's request but also opened fire and so there ensued an exchange of fire causing some causalities on both sides. It should be underscored here that this exchange was between Eritrean regular troops and local police and militia since there were no Ethiopian regular troops along the border where the incident took place or anywhere along the entire Ethiopia-Eritrea border for that matter. This was so because Ethiopia never expected that such a trusted and close neighbour as Eritrea would entertain any aggressive designs against Ethiopia.
6. Just two days after the Badme incident, on 8 May 1998, the Joint Commission met in Addis Ababa and discussed the border issue and also the Badme incident. The meeting was cordial and the following agreement was reached:
a. Two members of the Joint Commission (one from each side) would meet in two months time in Asmara with all the relevant facts regarding the border and hammer out an agreement and schedule a meeting of the Joint Commission to present their report.
b. The Eritrean armed units which had made an incursion into Ethiopian territory since May 6 would evacuate and return to Eritrean territory.
c. Crossings of armed personnel from one to the other's territory should be prohibited in line with past agreements.
d. The status quo and the stability of the border should be maintained pending a final agreement.
e. Efforts to reduce tension should be undertaken and as a means of reducing tension the incident of May 6 should be investigated jointly.
7. It was also agreed on 8 May 1998 that the Eritrean delegates would spend the following day (May 9) in Addis Ababa in order to consolidate the May 8 agreement through informal talks. But the Eritrean delegation left Addis Ababa on the morning of May 9 without even notifying its host, the Ethiopian side.
8. On 10 and 11 May 1998,several efforts were made by high officials of the Ethiopian government to seek clarification of what was occurring when the movement of armed units and tanks were observed taking positions near Badme town, contrary to the agreement. On 10 May 1998 when the Ethiopian Chief of Staff spoke by telephone to the Eritrean Minister of Defense on the matter in detail the reply was that the Eritrean authorities were discussing the matter and that any situation contrary to what had been agreed to on 8 May 1998, would be rectified.
Also, on 11 May 1998 , Prime Minister Meles Zenawi sent a message to President Isayas via the Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa, demanding that the massing of troops in the Badme area should be halted and that Eritrean armed forces should vacate Ethiopian territory on the basis of the agreement of 8 May 1998.
9. 12 May 1998: Early in the morning, columns of the Eritrean army, backed by tanks, moved into Badme town and its environs and overwhelmed the local police posts and the militia and invaded Ethiopian territory. There were no Ethiopian army units in the area, when the armed force of the Asmara Government invaded this area which had never been administrated by any colonial or present Eritrean government.
10. On 12 and 13 May 1998, Prime Minister Meles by contacting President Isayas Afewerki tried to work out a peaceful solution, but did not succeed.
11. On 13 May 1998, the Council of Ministers and House of Peoples' Representatives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia passed a resolution condemning the aggression, demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean invading forces and warning that Ethiopia reserved the right to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Eritrean military action is a violation of international law and many joint agreements between the two countries.
12. In response to the Eritrean military action, the Government of Ethiopia mobilized its armed forces to protect the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This involved stationing troops along many parts of the common frontier between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
13. On 17 May 1998, Vice President Paul Kagame of Rwanda came to Ethiopia at the start of an effort to defuse the crisis. His delegation was joined by a delegation of the Government of the United States. The two delegations conducted joint facilitation meetings with the governments of the two countries in a shuttle between Addis Ababa and Asmara which continued until 29 May 1998.
14. On 30 May 1998, President Isayas of Eritrea said that withdrawal of his invading forces from Ethiopian territory was "morally unthinkable and physically impossible", publicly rejecting the peaceful avenue as a means of resolving the crisis.
15. From 31st May - 6 June 1998, Eritrean forces launched repeated invasion attempts in the Zalambassa, Alitena and Aiga areas in the hope of creating new facts on the ground. All the attempts were foiled by the Ethiopian Defense Forces.
16. On 4 June 1998, Ethiopia accepted the peace proposals submitted to both sides by the US/Rwanda Facilitators. The key elements of the package are:-
17. On 5 June 1998, the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in a Special Session in Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso, urgently appealed to the two parties' to put an end, concurrently and simultaneously, to all hostilities, accept and implement the recommendation of the [US/Rwanda] facilitators.'
18. On 5 June 1998, Eritrea twice bombed Mekele, the capital of Tigray, deliberately targeting civilian neighborhoods and hitting an elementary school in session. 51 civilians including children and parents were killed and 136 wounded in the air raid. The first raid was followed shortly afterwards by a second raid when parents had arrived to fetch their children from the wreckage of the school. It is therefore clear that the strikes were deliberately directed at the civilian population. In the same raid, Mekele airport runway was also bombed.
19. On 5 and 6 June 1998, in self-defence to the bombing of Mekele, the Ethiopian Air Force made two air raids on Eritrean military installations specifically the air force base outside Asmara destroying military planes and other airforce installations.
20. On 8 June 1998, in his message to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting in the capital of Burkina Faso, the President of Eritrea proposed direct talks with Ethiopia, arguing that "this we believe will ensure a speedy resolution, as the facilitation process that has been underway has been a time-consuming process."
Then on 9 June 1998, he was quoted by Reuters News Agency as saying:"...the problem with the peace process is the hasty way it was managed by the Americans... they believe in quick fixes and bulldozing and that does not work. It is not our culture."
21. Starting on 9 June 1998, Eritrea expelled over 4,000 Ethiopian peaceful civilians and detained about 600 others, confiscating their property including personal belongings and inflicting inhuman sufferings. Those imprisoned are still held incommunicado without access to their families and the ICRC .
22. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its 34th Session in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, held 8 to 10 June 1998, decided to launch an initiative to defuse the crisis based on the United States/Rwanda Facilitation Plan. The Assembly appealed to 'the two parties to put an end, concurrently and simultaneously, to all hostilities, accept and implement the recommendations of the facilitators' and decided to send a delegation of Heads of State and Government to Addis Ababa and Asmara to help resolve the crisis.
23. On 9 June 1998, Ethiopian positions at Zalambessa were attacked. This involved Eritrean troops crossing into parts of Ethiopian territory that the Government of Eritrea has never even claimed. The fighting that ensued was the heaviest since the beginning of the Eritrean aggression. Eritrean causalities were high.
24. On 10 June 1998, at 6 a.m. Eritrean forces attacked an Ethiopian post on the Badme /Sheraro front at Erde Mattios near the Takeze River and the attackers were repulsed sustaining heavy causalities.
25. On 11 June 1998, Eritrea attacked on the Assab road around Bure but its forces were repulsed once again sustaining heavy casualties.
26. In the afternoon of 11 June 1998, after being categorically defeated on these two fronts and out of desperation Eritrea bombed civilian targets with cluster bombs in Adi-Grat, killing 4, wounding 30 civilians including an 18 month-old baby and a pregnant woman and destroying a grain store of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission in which large quantities of grain and edible oil were destroyed.
27. On 12 June 1998, Ethiopia announced some precautionary measures with respect to Eritreans that were considered likely to pose a threat to national security, while at the same time stressing that peaceful Eritreans should feel safe because there would be no change to the policy on Eriteans living and working peacefully in Ethiopia.
The precautionary measures concerned the following three categories:
a. Ex-combatants of the EPLF and conscripts of the Eritrean regime suspected of posing a threat to national security on account of their training have been detained at temporary camps, while they make a choice of the country where they wish to go. Numbering about 1000, they have been visited at the temporary camp by the ICRC.
b. Functionaries and officials of the EPLF office and other party interests in Addis Ababa were expelled.
c. Individual Eritreans who were found engaged in spying activities and mobilizing financial and other resources to support the Eritrean aggression were also expelled.
Those in categories b and c number about 1045 and have been taken by transport to the border with Eritrea, accompanied by representatives of the ICRC.
28. On 15 June, Ethiopia accepted a proposal by President Clinton of the United States to suspend the use of air strikes while efforts were underway to seek a peaceful end to the crisis, once more giving peace a chance. However, Ethiopia served notice that it reserved the right to end the moratorium if and when it is convinced that the peace process has come to an end.
29. The OAU Mission visited Addis Ababa on 18 June 1998. It discussed the implementation of the United States/Rwandan Facilitation Plan, which had become a plan adopted by the OAU, with the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Mr. Meles Zenawi. The Mission left for Asmara the same day and found that intransigence prevailed. The OAU Delegation briefed the Ethiopian Prime Minister on 19 June 1998 on the conclusion of its mission characterized as unsuccessful by Secretary General Salim A. Salim of the OAU because, he said, Eritrea rejected the plan proposed by the United States/Rwanda facilitators, accepted by Ethiopia and adopted by the OAU.
30. Nevertheless the OAU Mission of Heads of State decided on a mechanism to continue with efforts to resolve the crisis by peaceful means.
24 June, 1998
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