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Ethiopia Has Suspected Outbreak of Cholera; At Least 34 Dead -- By Jason McLure, Aug. 31 (Bloomberg) --
Comment: The Gov't declared that the word "cholera" was illegal in Ethiopia because no one had checked to confirm the presence of the cholera pathogen. So epidemics of "Acute Watery Diarrohea" were reported instead. The semantic distinction is useless for the victims. And the problem got worse. Now we are on the verge of a disaster. Rather than playing word games the health ministry should have confronted the problem in a forthright way and prepared the population for the danger. Now what? Are we going to reject the cholera treatment centers being offered by the UN because TPLF propaganda officially denies the presence of cholera in Ethiopia? To have a cholera epidemic in a nation's capital is shameful. It is a sign of a badly run administration. Providing at least a minimum level of sanitation and clean water is a basic function expected of a city administration. The TPLF should have focused on maintaining Addis Abeba's water supply and improving the sanitation system. Instead they wasted the budget on real estate adventures (better left to the private sector) and prestige projects like the costly and premature Ring Road. Huge amounts of gov't funds have almost certainly been diverted to TPLF cadre work - recruiting new members and setting up spy cells throughout the city down to the block level. Capital Newspaper: Aug 30, 2009: "A five stage strategic plan approved six months ago by the Addis Ababa Administration anticipated a possible outbreak of such water related diseases... The most alarming part of the findings indicate that the city’s poor sewerage system is bedded close to one of the main fresh water systems that supplies 37 percent of Addis Ababa’s water needs." A strategic plan six months ago? This problem has been known for a long time... Read the following about the Shashamene famine of 2008, and the Meles Regime's denials both of the famine and the cholera:
Ethiopia 2.0 - A visitor to Eritrean websites will quickly notice two inter-related debates that have been raging in cyberspace for some time now. The first debate concerns a crtical re-evaluation of the Eritrean struggle for independence, while the second concerns the marginalization of non-Tigrean Eritreans. The first debate was touched off in 2008 by a series of articles by the prolific Eritrean writer Yosief Ghebrehiwet:
Romanticizing Ghedli (II): Self-Preservation at Any Cost 09 Apr, 2008 Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth All the Sacrifice? (I) 16 Jun, 2009 Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth All the Sacrifice? (II) 16 Jul, 2009 These articles have been highly controversial. This is because they represent the first time that the Eritrean independence struggle has been subjected to normal methods of historical analysis and criticism (at least in the mass Eritrean 'media' such as it is). Regardless of the conclusions reached by the author, any such exercise is bound to reveal deep flaws. Eritreans who object to de-romaniticization of Eritrea's founding myths are often the same ones who were previously busy de-romanticizing Ethiopia's. The past three decades have seen extensive critiques and re-evaluations of the nature of Ethiopia and the assumptions of its existence. The result has been what can perhaps be called "Ethiopia 2.0" - an emerging consensus of what Ethiopia is and what it should mean to its citizens (minus Eritrea). "Ethiopia 2.0" is still rejected by important segments of society that it needs to embrace. Ethnic federalism remains highly controversial. Many still demand the breakup of the country. And there is no guarantee that it won't break up. But the process of questioning and critiquing is absolutely essential. In this regard, Yosief Ghebrehiwet's articles have implications for the TPLF and its supporters. If the Eritrean struggle for independence was deeply flawed and perhaps not worth it, what does that say about the TPLF's unstinting support for the EPLF? And shouldn't the TPLF be evaluated - not by its own propaganda - but by normal historical research? Former members of the TPLF have published damaging allegations and credible evidence of the TPLF's abusive methods. Shouldn't these be discussed in the Tigrean mass media? With mounting evidence of a potential new famine after 18 years of TPLF rule, shouldn't Tigreans ask "Was this worth it?" Was there no other way to achieve Tigrean autonomy, decentralization and language freedom? Was it correct for the TPLF to eliminate all other progressive force that were working in Tigray at the time? Was signing off on the EPLF's demand for Eritrean separation from Ethiopia - and belittling Ethiopia's need for a sea port - worth it? Honest discussions of the above topics and their analysis using normal historical analysis techniques will improve "Ethiopia 2.0" and help the next generation build "Ethiopia 3.0". Ethnicity and Identity: More complex than recognized by the Ethiopian Constitution - Neither Ethiopian nor Kenyan, just Gabra, Garre or Borana - East African, M Wachira, Aug 31 2009 --- "The issue of citizenship baffled many people living in the north of the country where Kenya shares a border with Ethiopia. Most are nomads from the Borana, Gabra or Garre communities, which are found on both sides of the border." Comment: The Ethiopian constitution does not recognize the Boran, Gabra or Garre. Nor does it recognize the rights of individuals to choose how to express their national identity themselves. The constitution has taken that power away. It establishes pre-defined Oromo and Somali nations and assigns all Boran, Gabra, or Garre political membership in either of these nations. The constitution allows creation of separate sub-regional ethnic zones, but denies the existence of multi-ethnic regional identities and hence prohibits the creation of multi-ethnic political entities. "Oromo" and "Somali" are the only identities that are given national political rights. There is no other option. Thus, key issues regarding the livelihoods of these people are now wrapped up in the agenda of ethnic nationalist elites in far-away Jigjiga or Addis Ababa. The primary objective of these Oromo and Somali ethnic nationalists is to preserve the territorial integrity of their nation. This objective is translated into reality in the mixed ethnic regions inhabited by the Borana, Gabra, and Garre. These ethnic groups have had a long-history of interaction and two-way assimilation. They are now being forced to "purify" themselves and reduce their identity to either Oromo or Somali. There is no middle ground. The Ethiopian constitution does not recognize regional identities. It does not recognize the existence of mixed communities sharing the same area. Thus ethnic boundaries are being sharpened and the ideals of harmony between ethnic groups and peaceful coexistence are threatened. The cut-and-paste application of Soviet nationality theory to the Ethiopian constitution is having deadly results: Pastoral conflicts and state-building in the Ethiopian lowlands T Hagmann/A Mulugeta, Afrika Spectrum 43 (2008) 1: 19-37:
"A major incentive for pastoralists to identify with pre-defined ethnic collectivities and to adopt expansionist political tactics to the detriment of neighbouring groups, was the extension of fiscal and administrative resources from regional capitals to districts." Also note: "The OLF organized the opposition and even waged guerrilla war in many parts of Ethiopia. They had not, however, established themselves in any significant way among the Boran, and thier pan-Oromo ideology had not made much of an impact in Boranaland. The term "Oromo" was simply unknown to many ordinary people: people regarded themselves as being Boran, or Garre or Gabra." - A. Shongollo. The Poetics of Nationalims, in Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires. 1996. Book of essays edited by PTW. Baxter, J Hultin, and A Triulzi Also see: EthnoPolitics and Gabra Origins. G. Schlee, 2008 commenting on: The People of the Five "Drums": Gabra Ethnohistorical Origins And: Garreonline - a unique "Voice of Garre" newsletter that provides original news about the Garre from correspondents in the region. Recent dispatches:
Dismissing the warning signals: - Millions facing famine in Ethiopia as rains fail - Independent (UK), Aug 30, 2009 - In recent weeks, Time Magazine and the Economist have written articles on this topic. But in Ethiopia, this remains a "hidden hunger" as the state media has completely ignored what would be a headline story in a normal country. Hunger and potential starvation directly affect at least 15% of the population. But the Ethiopian new year party at the Sheraton Hotel is only two weeks away... nothing can spoil the fun for Ethiopia's ruling elite.
Comment: Regarding the performance of the Meles Regime, the Independent newspaper should have consulted the 2008 report by the UK Gov't foreign aid department (DFID): Encouraging economic growth in Ethiopia: Perspectives on agricultural input markets, agricultural extension and advisory services, and agricultural education and training - scroll down to read excerpts - . The Meles agric. policies have been counterproductive. Seed supply, fertilizer distribution, extension services, rural finance - these sectors are all substandard and subject to excessive state control. On top of this we have the damaging land tenure policy and the poor infrastructure constraints that hinder rural investment - particularly telecoms. Road construction is the only bright spot, and the World Bank deserves the credit on that score. The very fact that a huge famine emergency is developing, should by itself serve as an indictment of the Meles regime, which has had 18 years to implement sensible policies (policies that that been proven to work everywhere eles in the world). As with the Derg however, the TPLF absolutely refuses to implement policies that will weaken its political control. So Ethiopia continues to be a famine-prone country. The article seems to place responsibility for feeding Ethiopians on rich Westerners. This is wrong. It is insulting and patronizing and demeaning. Ethiopia can and should be able to feed itself. Although the Derg and the TPLF have together made Ethiopia into a beggar nation, "dependent on the generosity of those in the rich world," this will be fairly easily rectified when Ethiopians are able to demand accountability from their government. No one could tell Mengistu anything. He wouldn't listen and would kill anyone who tried to hold him accountable. His successor, Meles, doesn't listen either. You can't tell him anything. You cannot tell him that rations have been cut and millions of Ethiopians are in danger of starvation. If Meles were to pay a severe price for the reduction in rations, if he were to pay severe price for each and every famine death (for example be arrested for criminal negligence), he would quickly change his policies in order to survive. But in Ethiopia, political leaders do not pay the price for their misrule. Small children pay that price with their lives. More Scholarly Papers Refute TPLF Propaganda: - Post-war Ethiopia: The Trajectories of Crisis - Review of African Political Economy, Volume 36, Issue 120 June 2009 , pages 181 - 192 $$ required for access - free from univ. libraries
Comment: As has been reported in the media (foreign and non-state), Ethiopia is currently in the midst of a severe foreign exchange crisis, which forced the gov't to devalue the birr and ration foreign exchange. According to the IMF, the loan "is expected to contribute to the rebuilding of international reserves to 2½ months of imports by 2010/11. By itself, the loan is not much, but other donors are now likely to step up aid, once they see the IMF's approval. Based on the statistics, the IMF has rejected the TPLFs claim of 10.2 percent growth, but they are still listing an unreasonably high value of 7.5 % for the fiscal year just ended (July-June 2008/09.) Future growth is predicted at 7-8 percent for the next two years. [Note that with Ethiopia's population growth rate near 3 percent, the per-capita growth is even less at only 4-5 percent.] The Meles regime conducted the loan negotiations in secrecy, possibly because it did not want Ethiopian people to bring their concerns and suggestions to the IMF. For example, the IMF might be interested in some of the details concerning the ruling party's abuse and misuse of state funds, and its siphoning of resources out of the state bank. It might be interested in alternative or additional conditions for ensuring that this IMF loan benefit Ethiopia's people, and not just a corrupt elite closely tied to the TPLF/EPRDF. These are the "Key Program Policies and Objectives" that the Meles Gov't has committed to for the next year:
Remember the nasty arguments about excessive gov't borrowing back in 2006, 2007, and 2008? Remember what Meles was saying? Remember his insults? Look at the above bullet points and draw your own conclusions.
EPRDF Membership "Green Cards" Required for Gov't Employment: - Ethiopia: Writing Its Own Obituary? - Ayenew Haileselassie, Daily Monitor via All Africa, Aug 25, 2009 --- (note - this is completely consistent with the information I am hearing from Ethiopia)
Meles Gov't Seeks Up to $200 million loan from the IMF: - --- On July 15, 2009, the TPLF had an "Informal Briefing" with the IMF's executive directors to discuss "High-Access Financing" under the IMF's Exogenous Shock Facility. Although this loan won't be large enough to address Ethiopia's financial crisis, other donors typically wait for an IMF program to be in place before they commit additional resources. The loan terms appear to be under negotiation. The IMF requires borrowers to institute "appropriate" economic policies. In Ethiopia's case, this typically involves the IMF pressing Ethiopia to abandon failed Soviet-era policies that assign the state a dominant role in the economy. However, the Meles regime has a pattern of initially agreeing to conditions, but then using a variety of tactics to avoid action. The current crisis will also require additional monetary restrictions to compensate for the excessive gov't borrowing and subsequent inflation of 2005-2009. The Meles gov't is, as usual, conducting these negotiations in secrecy and with zero input from civil society or the public in general. No one is being informed of the important issues being discussed and decisions being made. More information may (perhaps) be obtained by contacting the IMF resident in Ethiopia,
Resident Representative in Addis Ababa Heritage Plaza building Cameroon Road Addis Ababa E-mail: rr-eth@imf.org Office telephone (251-11) 662-7800 Fax: (+251) 116 627 803 Or the IMF email for Ethiopia: ETHContact@imf.org The IMF has appointed an NGO liaison officer to help improve communciations between NGOs and staff. NGO Relations:
Malnutrition Among Children Under Five Is Prevalent: Food Security Update Aug 2009 - Kiremt rains remain poor thus far - FEWS via ReliefWeb, Aug 25, 2009. Excerpts from the full report:
Investment or Plunder?: -
References:
Comment: This news illustrates the desperation of the TPLF/EPRDF to show results for their "Developmental State", and the difficulty they are having in attracting real investors. Akgun construction is a tiny firm (based on the website and assuming it is the same company) that has never completed a project of this scale. It obviously has no significant financial resources to invest. Rather, this appears to be a scaled-up version of the Attila Yildrim saga, whereby a Turkish businessman came to Ethiopia empty-handed, obtained two factories from the government, obtained loans from the government, and then disappeared with the money. This businessman already had a poor reputation elsewhere and the Reporter newspaper warned the government in advance of this man's poor reputation and lack of resources. But no one can tell Meles anything... The interview is telling - when asked to describe his company, Mr. Yusuf Akgun changed the subject and talked about the Iketelli industrial zone where he was (a bureaucrat?) in charge of centralizing various small industries moved from Istanbul. The company itself is clearly way too small and inexperienced to engage in such a 10-billion dollar project. Another problem is the involvement of Seyoum Mesfin, a man who revealed his limited capabilities during the Ethio-Eritrea arbitration. It is very easy to take advantage of such a weak and uncomprehending person. Then there is the issue of gigantism. Why should the state concentrate its infrastructure in this one area? A few months study is sufficient to direct the ministries to create rail, phone, roads, water etc. networks here? We are already suffering huge deficits in infrastructure across the entire country. Provision of this infrastructure, along with bank loans, financial guarantees from the government, free land, etc... is essentially a risk-free business opportunity for the Turks. If it succeeds they profit. If it fails, its not their money - the Ethiopian people lose, as was the case with Attila Yildrim and the Arba Minch and Dire Dawa textile factories. Nothing prevents the gov't Ethiopia from building roads, phone lines, water and sewer networks, and railroads.... EXCEPT lack of money. Ethiopia has so little money it can't even rebuild the critical Djibouti-Addis rail line. To talk about rail lines in Legetafo to fulfill the investment requirements of a 37-person Turkish company is ludicrous. We need a normal banking sector, a competitive telecoms sector, a functioning land market, professional merit-based civil service, and a true private business sector. We need reliable access to the sea for trade. We need the party-affiliated and state monopolies dismantled. Then we will see Ethiopia take-off.
Censorship: - Ethiopia - Only country in sub-Saharan Africa to actively engage in political Internet filtering - CyberEthiopia, Aug 21, 2009 --- Reference: Article 29 of the Constitution of Ethiopia: Right of Thought, Opinion and Expression:
Open Net Initiative (ONI) testing results for Ethiopia:
Hidden Hunger; Politicized Food Aid: - Farmers in Oromiya Worry About Next Year's Harvest - VOA, Aug 18, 2009
ALSO: Starvation Reported in Western Shoa
Kenenisa: - Matching Bolt's Success, Stride for Elegant Stride - NY Times, Aug 20, 2009 - "smooth to the point of hypnotic" Economic Notes (Aug 19, 2009): -
Arbitration Awards Monetary Damages (Aug 18, 2009): - Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission --- 2001-2009 The Commission awarded Ethiopia $174,036,520 and Eritrea $161,455,000 (US dollars). In addition, four individual Eritrean-Ethiopians were awarded a total of $2,065,865, with most of this sum being $1,500,000 for Sertzu Gebre Meskel, owner of Nile Construction. It should be noted that a major Ethiopian claim - for property stranded at Assab - was dismissed in 2005. SOMALIA: - The Number One Failed Nation --- Nat'l Geographic, Sep 2009 (online now) Gimgema: - TPLF/EPRDF Says it Will Conduct Fundamental Gimgema --- Reporter (amh), Aug 16, 2009 --- Comment: "Every revolution has its scum," said Lenin, " Why should we be any different?" Indeed. And why should the TPLF be any different? But how do you get rid of this 'scum' when the entire leadership has coalesced into an untouchable aristocracy led by the TPLF royal family? How do you fix an organization when its basic problems (dictatorial leadership, TPLF chauvinism, reliance on force, bankrupt ideology) are off the table and cannot be discussed? How can there be any improvement when no one in the TPLF/EPRDF dares criticize the 'genius' leadership of Meles Zenawi? "Rent-seeking" is a good description of how the TPLF has captured a large proportion of Ethiopia's revenue-generating sectors and funneled it to party-affiliated companies. How can a "rent-seeking" party fight "rent-seekers?"
Most of the new office-holders were not young and honest revolutionaries, but unprincipled careerists who were willing to carry out any order Stalin gave, with no concern for the interests of the people... "We never finished gimnazii [secondary schools], but we are governing gubernii [provinces]," a well-known Bolshevik declared in the late twenties, and his audience applauded. When such people ran into difficulties, they often turned into simple executors of orders from above, valuing blind discipline most of all. The closed mind, the refusal to think independently, was the epistemological basis of the cult of personality. Roy A. Medvedev. 1971. The Social Basis of Stalinism, excerpt from Let History Judge republished in The Stalin Revolution, edited by Robert V. Daniels, 1997.
Can this model be applied to Ethiopian Problems? : - Can Game Theory Predict When Iran Will Get the Bomb? --- NY Times Magazine, Aug 16, 2009 --- "The computer model, in short, predicts coalitions. And computers are much better at doing this than humans... This is why, he says, his model often produces surprising results... it methodically works through not only the obvious coalitions we know about and expect but also the invisible ones that we don't." Economic Notes this Week: -
Comments: The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) is state-owned and Ethiopia's largest bank. The state controls the financial sector by setting interest rates and requiring state agencies and enterprises to keep their accounts at the CBE. This captive market and guaranteed interest-rate spread allows the CBE to easily make money. But even this easy-money business was threatened by the huge non-performing loans that were mostly due to the TPLF-affiliated businesses. The solution was to transfer these loans from the CBE to the DBE. That is why the CBE can boast that it has dramatically reduced its NPL level. The DBE appears to have simply erased these loans. What is the consequence? A huge amount of money (2-3 billion birr)was created and injected into the economy via the TPLF businesses. This was a contributor to inflation. The inflation made most Ethiopians poorer. Any Ethiopian who had saved money became poorer. Any Ethiopian who was buying essential items - food, shelter, transport, became poorer. To control inflation the gov't was forced to reduce its budget expenditures. Schools were not built. Health budgets were cut. So most Ethiopians paid the price for these loans to the TPLF-affiliated companies that were never repaid. Who benefited? Well the TPLF now has a vast business empire and a new class of "revolutionary" businessmen has emerged. But the DBE continues to flounder - it has a whole new class of non-performing loans. The stunning nnews that the flower sector as a whole is not servicing its loans raises serious questions about the capacity of the Meles administration. Is it a good idea for the state to be the majority partner in new investments (up to 70%)? According to the article the Meles bureaucracy simply lacks the know-how and qualifications to enter into such investment agreements. Another example is the recent Turkish textile firm, which only agreed to move to Ethiopia only if the government took a majority stake. Endless Cycle of Hunger, Famine: - Drought and Famine: Ethiopia's Vicious Cycle Continues - Time Magazine, Aug 15, 2009
How can Ethiopian Agriculture be Transformed?: - Encouraging economic growth in Ethiopia: Perspectives on agricultural input markets, agricultural extension and advisory services, and agricultural education and training - DFID (UK gov't intl aid agency), 2008 The paper states: ."THE STATE CONTINUES TO PLAY A DOMINATE ROLE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS INTERVENTIONS IS NOW COMING UNDER INCREASING SCRUTINY. These realities are discussed below for each major component of the GoE's cereal intensification program - seed, fertilizer, credit, extension, and education:"
Recommendations from the paper:
Serious Risk of Large Famine Emergency by 2010: - Below-normal kiremt rains could further exacerbate food insecurity Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), July 28 2009. - (ETHIOPIA ALERT)
After five good harvests from the main rainy season (June-September), we may have run out of luck. The current rainy season is below-average so far, and the meteorological predictions don't offer much hope. We are already in a deficit situation. Many food-aid recipients are seeing their rations cut. In some areas there is no money for routine children's medicines. Children have already died because of this - (see IRIN report below). The FAO/WFP post-harvest assessment (of last years harvest) was released on July 28 - scroll down to see the link to it. According to this detailed report, as of April 2009, the food import requirement was 695,000 tons. Commercial imports through the end of April were 25,000 tons, while food aid imports were 259,000 tons. This leaves 411,000 tons of food aid that is not available in Ethiopia - either in commercial or government warehouses. Readers can verify this by inspecting Table 1: Ethiopia: Grain supply/demand balance, 2009 (tonnes) on Page 6 of the report. The port of Djibouti is congested. The WFP has already publicly expressed concern about the difficulty of getting the required food aid into Ethiopia this year. Imagine the potential disaster if the rainy season continues to be poor, and food aid needs skyrocket upwards. To top it off, the Meles government has chosen to proceed with a total reorganization of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency:
Full Report (case study): Humanitarian governance in the new millennium: an Ethiopian case study (Feb 2009) - This has been the Achilles heel of all Ethiopian regimes: the absolute belief that the prevailing ideology is the solution, has left no room for critique. Time will tell. The next, inevitable crisis will reveal the true mettle of the post-BPR system of humanitarian governance in Ethiopia. The above case study is quite favorable, at times, to the Meles government. Tedros Adahnom is briefly mentioned and highly praised. But even this article raises deep concerns about what the TPLF is doing and the way it goes about doing it. The children of Ethiopia will pay the price if things go wrong and the new system is unable to handle an emergency famine situation. Meanwhile, Meles talked to the Economist Magazine: Ethiopia's resilient prime minister - The two sides of Meles Zenawi (Aug 13, 2009)
World Bank's Aid Flows into TPLF-affiliated organizations: - 1. At the website of the Ethiopian Social Accountability Project: http://www.ethiosap.org/ , you will find the report (in MS Word format): Piloting Social Accountability in Ethiopia; Analytical Report with Case Studies -- Protection of Basic Services (PBS), Component 4, Multi Donor Trust Fund, Grant No. TF057683, June, 2009. This project was supposed to work with 12 real NGOs (or CSOs - civil society organizations). Instead, the TPLF forced the project to include at least three large 'GONGOs' (govt-operated NGOs), namely REST, ODA, and ADA. It is farcical to refer to these GONGOs as "independent." But this is the Meles vision. A new NGO law criminalizes the real independent organizations that Ethiopians have created, and all that are left are the TPLF-affiliated GONGOs and a few token others. In this way the TPLF perverts the meaning of civil society and grabs more and more resources for itself. 2. The procurement plan for phase II of the Pastoral Community Dev. Proj. has been released by the World Bank. One task is to hire a media firm to broadcast information about the program. The Ministry of Federal Affairs told the World Bank that TPLF-affiliated Radio Fana should be given a sole source contract to do this job. This bogus "private" company was set up by the TPLF for the TPLF. All other Ethiopians were strictly forbidden from using their own airwaves until a few token stations were allowed recently. Why are state employees in the Ministry of Federal Affairs acting as salesmen for Radio Fana? Shouldn't they be advocating for Radio Ethiopia at least?
Radio fana is the only private firm having full coverage of radio broadcasting its programs to pastoral areas of Somali, Afar, SNNP and Oramiya regions in their respective local languages namely Afarigna, Somaligna, Oromifaa, and Amharic FPCU, threfore, believed no other legally and technically competent firm with regard to the coverage, apprpriate media types and proven institutional capacity to properly disseminate the intended assignment up to the required extent. Military Justice... or Paranoia? - Military Court Sentences Six High-Ranking Officers (five are Colonels and Lt-Colonels) to Prison Terms of 10-23 Years For Conspiring With Kinijit in 2005 -- Reporter, Aug 12, 2009. Comment: I find this news not credible. According to the article, the TPLF's "gimgema" procedure was what led to these officers being exposed. Gimgema is derived from the Leninist practice of "criticism and self-criticism" which was supposed to guide the party and substitute for real democracy. True-believers in Leninist ideology have an almost mystical belief in the power of gimgema. In fact, this device quickly becomes a tool of the party elite to control their subordinates. The TPLF is no exception. TPLF defector Tesfaye Gebreab wrote about a stage-managed gimgema session in his book, "The Journalists Memoir" . His boss (I believe it was Bereket Simon) assigned him the role of making false charges against a colleague. The TPLF has yet to refute this and all the other charges in the book. In addition, the prosecutor cannot provide the dates and times of the key events where alleged conspiracy meetings and arms thefts took place. Its just not credible to assert that Kinijit was collecting weapons. Meles and the TPLF felt comfortable with illegal mistreatment of a highly public figure such as Birtukan Mideksa, so I believe they would not hesitate to torture anyone into making false accusations. In the larger picture, the paranoia of Meles and the TPLF is clearly getting out of control and is entering the self-destructive phase. There will be consequences. Ethiopian Government Forced to Refund World Bank for Portions of Mismanaged Pastoral Community Development Project - First Phase Pastoral Community Development Project - Implementation Completion and Results Report -- World Bank June 26, 2009. Although this project had many good outcomes, the report states the following towards the end:
If we had a normal media in Ethiopia this would be the subject of in-depth investigative reporting. The government has wasted perhaps millions of dollars that were spent with zero result, but still must be refunded to the World Bank. Who is responsible for this? Who is accountable? Also having a project where the borrower performance (Ethiopia) is rated as "moderately unsatisfactory" along with the outcomes, could negatively affect future loans/grants. A related problem was that the TPLF decided to abolish the DPPC (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission). However disaster preparedness was one component of the project (read more about the DPPC saga in "interesting articles" section to the right - "Humanitarian governance in Ethiopia"):
Here is part of the summary of Gov't performance (GOE = Govt of Ethiopia)
World Bank's $39.5 million dollar project to improve Tourism (especially at Lalibela and Aksum): - Sustainable Tourism Development Project -- World Bank June, 2009. Comment: - Most Ethiopians are probably not aware of the degree to which the World Bank, IMF, and bilateral donors are driving what development we see in Ethiopia. Beyond just money, the donors are bringing knowledge and expertise to the TPLF-controlled government. The TPLF has filled the government ministries with poorly-educated, unqualified, and subservient people. This means that the donors have to engage in basic hand-holding and remedial training. The report states: "Due to the very limited capacity in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, it was determined that implementation responsibility could not be mainstreamed at this stage, and that the set up of a Project Coordination Unit staffed with dedicated full-time professionals recruited on a competitive basis, is necessary to ensure efficient implementation" . After eighteen years the ministry is still in shambles. Foreigners have to come in and run this simple project. Dedicated professionals will finally be recruited on a competitive basis - after 18 years. But the shambolic Ministy of Tourism is not to blame by itself. The debilitating policy choices of Meles are also a factor:- The poor quality of telecommunications services in Ethiopia limits sector professionals and tourists' ability to leverage technology in accessing information, marketing the destination, and maintaining the necessary communication during a trip... Moreover the absence of modern payment systems, which hinges on poor quality ICT hinders spending by tourists... While principles of land allocation have been well articulated, the cost and time of access have been severe constraints... Is this news?: - Southern region gripped by food shortage -- IRIN, Aug 11, 2009. Comment: Why are the life-and-death struggles of Abebech, Embet Markos, and Abdo Shafi invisible in the state media? Wouldn't media attention help focus resources so that we don't have a "suspension of therapeutic food" and a "shortage of routine medication" for small Ethiopian children? The new TPLF-authored law says that the children of Meles and other top TPLF/gov't officials will be flown to Europe and the USA for medical care paid for by the people of Ethiopia. How about the children of Abebech and Embet Markos? Why are they ranked so low? Luxury goods for the villa-and-landcruiser elite continue to flow in to Addis Abeba, but no one in the government is demanding that therapeutic food and medicine be given priority. How is it that obesity is epidemic amongst top TPLF/EPRDF leaders while tiny children are starving to death?
Somalia: - Analysis: Eritrea confounds US in Somalia -- Reuters, Aug 8, 2009
Comment: This has serious implications for Ethiopian opposition organizations that are based in Eritrea or working with Isayas Afeworki. In a Changing Somalia, Islamist Forces See Support Wane -- Washington Post, Aug 7, 2009
Food Aid Needs in 2009: - FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Ethiopia. Phase 2: Integrating the Crop and Food Supply and the Emergency Food Security Assessments U.N. FAO July 27, 2009 (pdf) --
Comment: Starting in 2003, the government (Meles) insisted that the population that was chronically in need of food aid be excluded from the count of those needing food aid. (Does this make sense?). So in this report they have to be careful to say that "only" 6.4 million Ethiopians need food aid. However an (inadvertent?) footnote on page 7 states that "this is additional to the 7.5 million persons currently benefiting from PSNP. Therefore a total of 12.4 will need support in 2009." Furthermore, the report states that the 7.5 million people in the PSNP (productive safety net program) show "no signs of reduction in the near future." The PSNP was supposed to be a transitional program. It seems to be failing in its long-term goal. If we don't play with semantics, we can say clearly from this report that about 15 percent of the population of Ethiopia is dependent on food aid in 2009. And this is in a relatively good year - the fifth good meher harvest in a row blessed by good rains! God help us when our good luck runs out and a poor harvest year occurs. What use will semantics and propaganda be then? Crony Capitalism?: - Editorial calls for gov't to monitor the gold mining investment by MIDROC (al-Amoudi) Reporter, Aug 2, 2009 -- Comment: MIDROC bought the Lega Dembi gold mine in 1997 for $172 million (also reported as $175 million) with purchase finalized in March 1998. Lega Dembi was discovered in the mid-1970s by government geologists and began producing in the 1980s. It is a world-class resource with nearly 3 million ounces (about 85 tons) of proven/probable reserves. Although the price of gold was at historic lows in 1997 (dropping below $300 per ounce), the Lega Dembi auction attracted worldwide interest, with eleven international firms submitting bids. It was somewhat surprising therefore, when a newly formed company with no mining experience whatsoever (MIDROC) submitted the winning bid. Rumors abounded at the time that MIDROC was given inside information allowing it to slightly top the nearest rival bid. Mining investment in Ethiopia has been negligible subsequent to the Lega Dembi auction, despite the presence of numerous mineral prospects. Had a major mining firm won the Lega Dembi auction, it is likely that it would have infused the Ethiopian mining sector with international interest, expertise and investment. Midroc however, struggled early, (it had no gold mining experience) and did not ramp up production as fast as expected. Nevertheless, based on published production data, gold prices, and adjusting for inflation, MIDROC could probably have recouped its investment (incl. plant upgrades) by 2005. Through 2008 it has produced a total of about 40 tons of gold, leaving it with about 45 tons more to go. With the gold price over $900 and expected to go higher, MIDROC is probably looking at over a billion dollars in profits over the remaining 10 year (approx) life of the mine. Plus, adjacent areas offer gold ore that may extend the mine life even further. A great investment indeed! A separate question, (also implied by the Reporter editorial) is why this mine was privatized? The TPLF has been reluctant to privatize Ethiopia's major industries, and has kept more than half of industry under government control. Why did this one have to go? What percent of the profits from Lega Dembi does Midroc donate to the TPLF/EPRDF for political activites? As the Reporter editorial indicates, there is little information and evaluation concerning the privatization of Lega Dembi. Many questions need to be asked and answered. The public has a right to know. The Midroc gold website does not provide much information. Donors and Road Building: - Ethiopia Road Sector Development Project Drives Economic Growth and Opportunity World Bank, Aug 3, 2009 -- The Bank, with other donors, has provided grants and credits to the program since 1998; so far, total Bank support is over $1.1 billion. Democratisaton?: - Ambiguous elections: the influence of non-electoral politics in Ethiopian democratisation Kjetil Tronvoll, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 47, Issue 03, September 2009, pp 449-474 (Published Online by Cambridge University Press 28 Jul 2009) -- $$ subscription required to read full article online
ALSO - The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and Civil Rights in Ethiopia - Lovise Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll, Review of African Political Economy, June 2009 -- $$ subscription required to read full article online
Papers of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, held in Norway in 2007 are being published on the web: - We have now started to publish the Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies and you will find the first few papers below... Here is one of the first papers (pdf): The Archaeology of Islam in North East Shoa Kassaye Begashaw, AAU Thanks to the organizers of the conference for making this material accessible! Four part essay at Oromoindex: - Failure to Deliver: The Journey of the Oromo Liberation Front in the Last Two Decades (Part I) - Jawar Mohammed, July 28 2009; "By writing this article, I understand that I am touching on one of the most closely guarded taboos, the untouchability of the OLF..." Failure to Deliver: Part II Failure to Deliver: Part III Failure to Deliver: Part IV Shabab: - Alarm over Somalia's child soldiers - BBC, July 29 2009; ""A child of about 12 years old, armed with a gun and a whip works at a crossroads in Mogadishu's Bakara Market," he says. "The boy stops public transport and checks if there are men and women passengers sharing the seats. "If he finds them, he tells them to get off the bus and flogs them in public while other members of al-Shabab sit under roadside trees nearby." " Iran Not Finished Yet: - Iran hard-liners warn Ahmadinejad he could be deposed - LA Times, July 29 2009; "It seems you want to be the sole speaker and do not want to hear other voices," the group's letter says, noting that recent actions by Ahmadinejad have frustrated his own supporters. "Therefore it is our duty to convey to you the voice of the people." AND - Reports of Prison Abuse and Deaths Anger Iranians - NY Times, July 28, 2009; "The anger has spread from opposition supporters into Iran's hard-line camp in part because of the case of Mohsen Ruholamini, the son of a prominent conservative figure, who died in prison after a severe beating." Comment: If the Iranian peoples struggle to reclaim their votes succeeds, it will be a huge boost the struggle of suppressed people elsewhere in the world, and a sign of doom for the TPLF. Ethiopian Airlines: - Boeing, Ethiopian Airlines Announce Order for Five 777-200LRs - Ethiopian is first African carrier to order long-range 777-200LR - Boeing, July 28 2009; Comment: Perhaps true non-stops between the US and Ethiopia will begin next year (no stop in Rome). But $1.3 Billion (list price - actual cost prob. much lower) is going to stress Ethiopia's serious balance-of-payments situation. Mogadishu: - Ugandan gets 200 death threats daily - New Vision, July 25 2009 Comment: It's sad that Ethiopian troops in Somalia were hindered by the TPLF's obsolete, secretive, and counter-productive media strategy (or lack of strategy). If you go into another country and can't explain what you are doing, can't address the concerns of the population, can't respond to suggestions/criticism, can't even present yourself with a human face, then you are doomed. The Ugandans realize this and have a far more intelligent, far more open and productive communication policy. In Ethiopia the antagnostic Bereket Simon makes a mockery of the title "public relations advisor." Southern Yemen Unrest: - Four Yemeni Forces Killed, Another Wounded in Abyan Governorate - Yemen Post, July 28 2009; Confrontations in Abyan result in tens of deaths and injuries - Yemen Observer, July 25 2009; Desperate youth challenge state at the cost of their lives - Yemen Times, July 22 2009 The Value of Sham Democracy: - How to stay in charge: Not just coercion, sham democracy too - Economist, Jul 23rd 2009; A special report on the Arab world
A second instrument of control is the government bureaucracy. With no rotation of power, Arab countries have blurred the distinction between ruler and state. Bloated civil services, says Brookings's Mr Pollack, provide the regimes with a way to dispense patronage and pretend-jobs to mop up new graduates. The size of these administrative behemoths is staggering. In 2007, he reckons, Egypt's civil service was about 7m strong, and as a proportion of their population the Gulf oil producers' public-sector payroll is higher still. Elections galore, signifying nothing And yet, strange to say, one of the regimes' most effective instruments of control is the elaborate system of democracy - sham democracy, that is - they have devised in order to channel and contain political dissent. Most Arab countries have parliaments and hold formal elections. In recent years national constitutions have been earnestly revised, and then revised again. The catch is that the parliaments have few powers and the elections are rigged to ensure that the ruler or his party cannot be unseated. Note: The article refers to Algeria's election earlier this year, describing the claimed 90% vote for President Abdelaziz Bouteflika as "entirely implausible". How about Ethiopia? In 2005, Meles wrote a "letter to the editor" where he proudly declared that 99% of the people of Bugna woreda had voted for his confidant, Bereket Simon, in a revote after Bereket had lost the original contest. "Embarrassing" - that was how the Economist referred to the letter at the time. World Bank Document Declares ADLI a Failure: - The document notes that the share of industry has falled from 14% in 2003 to 12.9% in 2008, and goes on to state: " One would have to conclude, given the extremely low level of manufacturing and industrial development, the remaining low productivity levels, the extremely wide trade deficit, that Ethiopia's approach to industrial development has not yet worked. " Note: (ADLI=Agricultural-Led Industrial Development) Given that the report was largely written by Ethiopians in Ethiopia who are apparently sympathetic to the government and could be punished for writing critical comments, the above statement is quite extraordinary. After eighteen years of implementation, the Meles regime's prime economic program "HAS NOT YET WORKED. I think it is fair to say it has FAILED at this point. This should have been a highlighted conclusion of the report, but political sensitivites are ever-present when dealing with the TPLF so this stunning conclusion is buried in the report. Link to the Document: - Ethiopia: - Toward the Competitive Frontier; Strategies for Improving Ethiopia's Investment Climate Finance and Private Sector Development, June 2009 The document also offers this recommendation:
Comment: To me this sounds like a call to change the government. If, after 18 years the government - which has been led by the same people the entire time - has failed to engage in sincere dialogue, and has failed to implement a broadly-accepted development strategy, then shouldn't the government be changed? The TPLF is currently boasting about its great successes. How could it be "fully-open to new solutions" when it doesn't even recognize a problem to begin with? No Stone Left Unturned : -
CIVICUS Condemns Suspension of NGOs in Ethiopia - July 24, 2009 Comment: Most Ethiopians, along with all respected international human rights, NGO, and media organizations are protesting the expansion of dictatorship in Ethiopia. On the other hand, a few TPLF chauvinists, TPLF die-hard followers, and discredited bureaucrats (e.g. Bereket Simon) are boasting about how the TPLF is bringing democracy to Ethiopia. Take your pick - who is more credible? SHABAB: - Islamist Militia Threatens Kenya's Border - NY Times, July 21, 2009 - According to Meles Zenawi, the 2006 version of Shabab was a "clear and present danger" to Ethiopia, but the greatly strengthened Shabab of 2009 is no longer a "clear and present danger." Does this make any sense?
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Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents Reaching Out to Diaspora Community from Somali Region of Ethiopia
Challenges of Productive Safety Net Program Implementation at the Local Level: The Case of Kuyu Woreda
- F Nigussa and I Mberengwa. Inst. of Regional and Local Dev. Studies, AAU, Ethiopia.
Can the Young Despots in Somali Regional State Reconcile
With the Diaspora Communities? Building on Progress? Chinese Engagement in Ethiopia Nationhood: Ties that Bind, or Free? ...the most violent problems stemmed from old, and previously almost forgotten, "internal" boundaries, drawn up on alleged ethnic principles, which sprang to life with new rigidity...
...a fictional template of a sovereign nation-state was being applied in circumstances for which it was rarely, if ever relevant - and more disastrously revived in circumstances in which it was disastrous.
...people can maintain multiple, parallel identities if they are not forced to choose between one and the other... tensions and prejudices become manageably domestic when disentangled from lines on the map and demands of exclusive loyalty.
Drought and Famine: Ethiopia's Vicious Cycle Continues Ethiopia's resilient prime minister - The two sides of Meles Zenawi Computer viruses slow African expansion Unrest in the Ogaden Why I took up arms against Ethiopia Radical Islam in East Africa Exploring New Political Alternatives for the Oromo in Ethiopia: Report from Oromo workshop and its after-effects Analysis of poverty and its covariates among smallholder farmers in the eastern Hararghe highlands of Ethiopia THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND GROWTH
IN RURAL ETHIOPIA: MICRO EVIDENCE Humanitarian governance in Ethiopia See main pdf report here: (balanced and thorough) Humanitarian governance in the new millennium: an Ethiopian
case study (Feb 2009) Ethnic Protest in Ethiopia: The Politics of Mobilization and Policing in Oromia Region
Strategies of Invisibilization: How Ethiopia's Resettlement Programme Hides the Poorest of the Poor 'Dissident Movements' and Non-Violence: -
"The 'dissident movements' do not shy away from the idea of violent political overthrow because the idea seems too radical, but on the contrary, because it does not seem radical enough." Shabaab al-Mujjahideen: Migration and Jihad in the Horn of Africa Pastoral conflicts and state-building in the Ethiopian lowlands |
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TRUSTING ISAYAS AFEWORKI: - Petros Solomon's Children Attempt Escape From Eritrea - Awate, July 21, 2009 Comment: Those Ethiopians who are telling us to trust Isayas Afeworki should first convince the children of Petros Solomon and Aster Yohannes to trust Isayas. In Democratic Countries the Leaders Pay for Their Mistakes; but in Ethiopia, the People (especially the children) Pay for the Leaders' Mistakes: - Ethiopia: Humanitarian Bulletin - 20 July 2009 - UN OCHA
"WFP reports that salt and sugar will not be available for distribution, except in the Eritrean refugee camps where they are already in camp stocks" DEVALUATION: Informed discussion: Does Devaluation Make Sense in Ethiopia Now? - Fortune Editors Note, July 19, 2009 TPLF CHAUVINISM: The TPLF is unquestionably the most chauvinistic organization to ever rule Ethiopia. The following quote, which pertains to the Ogaden, applies to all parts of Ethiopia. The TPLF has deliberately, consciously, and cynically sought out weak, unqualified, malleable, and very young non-Tigrayans and assigned them high offices along with TPLF "advisors" to help them. Not for the good of any part of Ethiopia, but for the good of the TPLF. Is it for the good of Ethiopia that the president of the Commercial Bank is only 31 years old and has not had the NBE-required ten years of senior management experience? No. This is done to advance the interests of the TPLF. The TPLF cannot survive if it is called to account for its corrupt use of the CBE. Standard operating policy across the country:
- Abdullahi Jalalaqsi, Garowe Online: Point of no return! But going to nowhere (see article below) LEARNING DEMOCRACY and OPPOSITION PARTIES:
- Jean-Francois Revel, The Totalitarian Temptation Where are the people of Ethiopia learning democracy? Only in the opposition parties, in NGOs where people govern their own associations, in those professional associations that the TPLF hasn't infiltrated, co-opted, or otherwise controlled... This is where Ethiopian democracy is growing. It may look ugly. It may seem discouraging. But this is the way it is done and this is exactly the way all democracies develop - by people freely and openly discussing their values and principles and then freely choosing to form or leave associations of like minded individuals. Compare this with the TPLF. There the secretive Politburo decides everything under mysterious circumstances. Laws and policies arrive in public almost fully formed. Per TPLF Leninist doctrine the Politburo is infallible. Everyone is expected to follow the directives without any dissent. In Ethiopian history, only the Derg was able to instill comparable party discipline. You never heard diverse viewpoints, or any type of internal disagreement. The Derg always stood united (at least after 1977/78). The TPLF is the same or actually even better considering the circumstances. But is this vanguardist, Leninist party a place where people learn about democracy? Did the Derg learn about and practice democracy? When do TPLF rank-and-file ever get to actually practice democracy? To speak openly without fear? To self-organize and conduct campaigns to win people over to their positions? It never happens. The TPLF is a dead, fossil party. It is like an irritating song that has long gone out of fashion. TPLF leaders climbed a mountain top and received perfect wisdom from an unknown source. Thus they don't have to learn democracy. They dont have to practice it in their party. Those who have a monopoly on "Recieved Wisdom" feel entitled to lecture everyone else about any topic under the sun. They become teachers without learning. They make belittling comments on the few, harassed, repressed Ethiopian opposition political parties while their own has terminal stage cancer. The following quotes have clear applicability to the state of thinking in the TPLF: (The TPLF politbureau does the thinking. TPLF followers are expected to replace their own thoughts with those provided by Meles, or stop thinking at all.)
"If I am certain of the truth of my doctrine, why should I permit freedom of opinion when it will only propagate error?" - Jean-Francois Revel, The Totalitarian Temptation OGADEN: Point of no return! But going to nowhere - Garowe Online, July 13, 2009 Eyewitness report of a trip from Jijiga to Shilabo via Degahabur and Kebri Dehar. Observations on the conduct of army and ONLF, transport, attitudes of the population, and opinions of the author. SOMALIA: Mogadishu battle "marks turning point" IRIN, July 15, 2009 Uganda Calls For Change Of UN Mandate In Somalia AFP, July 14, 2009 - Uganda wants authorization to directly engage Shabab. This comes after this weekend's attempt by Shabab to overrun the government positions. They were stopped with AMISOM help but three Ugandan soldiers were killed - incidentally we never heard anything from our government on the Ethiopian casualties. I commend Uganda for its civilized and mature public relations as compared to the backward, primitive TPLF public relations and obssessive secrecy ALSO: Meles says Shabab is not a "clear and present danger" to Ethiopia. Of course it is. It was so in 2006 and is even more so now. As a simple example, a Shabab takeover in Mogadishu would likely lead to a determined attempt to destabilize and eventually overrun Puntland and Somaliland. The World Food Program has turned to Somaliland to try to get food aid into Ethiopia. There is a crisis hunger situation developing. This lifeline would obviously be threatened. But should Ethiopia intervene in Somalia? Its the wrong question. We have a foreign ministry led by a person (Seyoum Mesfin)who has made a fool of himself in public. And behind the scenes he has been ineffectual and confused when it comes to formulating a strong, sustained policy to Somalia that builds a durable partenership with the Somali people. Seyoum Mesfin and Meles tried to replicate their chauvinistic EPRDF creation in Somalia. They selected people who they thought would be their puppets. It didnt work. It was fiasco. As long as Seyoum Mesfin, and Meles are in charge, its hard to see how things will improve for round 2. What is the real state of Ethiopia's economy? From election turmoil to economic progress Capital, July 11, 2009
- exiting Netherlands amabassador, Alphons Hennekens According to the article the ambassador arrived in September 2005. He has been here less than 4 years. For GDP to double in 4 years would require an average growth rate of 19%. Not even the TPLF claim this. The ambassador is obviously not well-educated nor well-informed. He may have been looking at non-inflation adjusted data. If we dont adjust for inflation, then Zimbabwe and Ethiopia are the top two in growth, not only in Africa but the entire world. The real growth figure is probably half the 10 percent avg that the TPLF claims. Then it needs to be reduced further by nearly 3 percent due to population growth, so the real PER-CAPITA growth figure is probably about 3 percent on average for the last four or five years. That is too low for Ethiopia to achieve a meaningful transformation in our lifetimes. Regarding the investment in schools and roads, that is commendable. Thanks is due to the World Bank, the EU, and the U.S. And we are dependent on foreign aid more than ever to continue. This is the TPLF begging-led industrialization policy. If we had pro-Ethiopia policies, over the past 18 years we would have generated internal capacity to fund and maintain most of our own infrastructure. Thanks to Meles and the TPLF we are the greatest beggars in the world and our development stats consistently rank at the bottom of the world. How many other countries in the world have over 50 percent of the economy in the hands of government or party-affiliated companies? How many countries in the world have made their farmers tenants who dont even own the land they farm? How many countries in the world have a govt monopoly on telecoms? How many countries in the world have a closed, govt-dominated financial sector. How many countries in the world have allowed a tiny party ( i.e. TPLF - a party that bars 95 percent of the Ethiopian population from joining on ethnic grounds) to dominate key sectors of the economy such as transport, cement, sesame export etc... ? Pro-TPLF policies are strangling Ethiopia and these fantasy "doubling of GDP" propaganda that the ambassador picked up is a total joke. Ethiopia Devalues Birr 9.9% After Foreign Currency Shortages - Bloomberg - July 14, 2009 COMMENT: Propaganda and statistical manipulation can only work for a limited time. The real facts can't be ignored. Imagine what would have been the case if foreign aid hadn't nearly doubled last year. According to the article, the devaluation was apparently due to IMF conditions as the government negotiates to get more loans. Now why would a government with an economy expanding at 10% annually need emergency IMF loans again?
SOMALIA: A Call to Jihad From Somalia, Answered in America - NY Times - July 12, 2009 The Party is the State: Five hundred EPRDF cadres moved from the regions to Addis Abeba and assigned vague jobs in various government offices - Reporter - July 5, 2009 COMMENT: Political cadres should be paid by party funds not by government funds. If there are true job openings then all Ethiopians deserve a chance to apply and the best should be selected. It is understandable that any administration will always use political criteria in assigning a limited number of top positions. But modern government is built on the idea of a professional civil service that is loyal to the country - not to a party. It appears that the EPRDF has simply created these 500 new jobs so that its cadres can be paid by the government and continue doing their EPRDF cadre work. In any case this is a sign of the financial pressures that are squeezing the TPLF/EPRDF. Discontent, ethnic rivalry, jealousy, and greed, combined with out-of-control TPLF chauvinism will likely lead to explosions within the TPLF/EPRDF camp. According to the article, these cadres are already complaining about money and jobs. Ethiopian PM pledges to stand aside and Transcript: FT interview with Ethiopia�s prime minister - FT Times - June 23, 2009 Comment: A favorite topic of Meles is.... himself. I might resign, I might not, my party could beg me to stay... This whole drama is the result of excessive, unseemly, self-indulgence. Its embarrassing. As if there is an independent "public opinion" within the TPLF that can make decisions (forget about the EPRDF). In any case, Meles or Bereket or Sebhat Nega, are insignifcant to Ethiopia's future. They are already obsolete. Years of repressing and abusing the Ethiopian people has devalued them and chained them tightly to Ethiopia's past. The interviewer makes a good point on the NGO law: The TPLF government itself is heavily funded by aid. And aid is fungible. Thus the TPLF iself would be barred from political activity according to the new law. ALSO: Invisibilization - According to researcher L. Hammond, "invisibility is a function of governmentality in Ethiopia that has enabled inaction on the part of a wide range of stakeholders See: Strategies of Invisibilization: How Ethiopia's Resettlement Programme Hides the Poorest of the Poor Invisibilization is a basic TPLF policy that helps to define the parameters of all interviews given by Meles. Many crucial topics are left out because the TPLF has hidden the evidence, or at least made it difficult for the Ethiopian people to express concern. Here are some other examples of what Meles has made invisible:
Web Pries Lid of Censorship by Iranian Government - NY Times - June 22, 2009
"Despite the crackdown, the videos and tweets indicate to many that broadly distributed Internet tools - and the spirit of young, tech-savvy people - cannot be completely repressed by an authoritarian government." Comment: The Meles internet policy is pro-TPLF. Not pro-Ethiopia. Not pro-Tigray. But the slow, dim-witted TPLF/EPRDF cannot win this battle. Like their Iranian counterparts, young Ethiopians will play a key role in swamping the TPLF dinosaurs when the uprising comes.
Who is Responsible for the Electricity Crisis? - Reporter amh - June 21, 2009 The Electric Corporation's Board of Directors's is reported to be unqualified. But what was the role of Meles? Oh, Meles says it is all Ken Ohashi's fault - Ethiopia Says World Bank to Blame for Power Blackouts - Bloombeg, June 22, 2009 Ken Ohashi of the World Bank is right. This charge is BOGUS. Why was the Tana Beles project delayed while Tekeze fast-tracked? Meles was heavily involved in that project which disrupted the Electric Corporation's strategic plan. The World Bank has gone beyond the call of duty to keep Ethiopia's economy functioning despite the bad policy choices of Meles. Ethiopia can't even afford a generator because Meles:
Ken Ohashi has no power to make policy choices and direct the economy. To blame this hardworking professional for the mistakes of Meles is pathetic. Meles is a typical petty, little man. Can't take responsibility. Whines about other people not giving into his overbearing demands. Pathetic. ALSO: Where is my vote? Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran�s 2009 Presidential Election - Chatham House - June 21, 2009 The TPLF vote fraud in 2005 was far more widespread and easily detected using a variety of measures
Brainwashing, June 20, 2009: Shabab used this young (boy?) as the suicide bomber in Beledweyne to kill 42+ and injure dozens more Soomaalinews.com MARG BAR DICTATOR! June 20, 2009: NY Times blog on Iran - The Basiji - militia equivalent to how Meles misused the elite Agazi troops - are in action, attacking protesters but... "I don't know where this uprising is leading. I do know some police units are wavering. That commander talking about his family was not alone. There were other policemen complaining about the unruly Basij."
Do we want the death of dictator Meles Zenawi? Its the wrong issue. We want justice. We want liberty. We want the death of the dictatorship. The dictatorship is not the product of one man, but of a human society. It is the product of forces that lie deep within every human being (ala A. Solzhenitsyn). The only known way these negative forces can be controlled is by the independent action of other human beings freely pursuing and defending their own interests. Meles and the TPLF dont understand this, and in any case, after years of drug abuse (power is a drug) their brains are brittle and deformed - just like those of crack addicts. Killing a pitiful, petty little man like Meles is a far too base and negligible a goal for such a noble campaign as the Ethiopian democratization movement. Shabab and allied hard-line Islamists nearing victory, June 20, 2009: Somalia's cabinet declares state of emergency Reuters - TFG is asking for emergency support "We want them to come here within 24 hours," he said. "We've been forced to make this request because of the escalating violence. Those fighting the government are being led by a (former) Pakistani army general, they are burning the flag and killing people," Madobe said." ALSO: Fighting Restarts in Mogadishu Shabelle al Shaabab spokesman warns Kenya - "Kenya had been saying that it will attack the mujahideen of al Shaabab for the last four months. If it tries to, we will attack Kenya and destroy the tall buildings of Nairobi," Sheik Hasan Yacqub told reporters in the southern port city of Kismayu. BUT: Hizb-ul-Islam and Shabab are at odds over the suicide bombing that has killed at least 45 people in Beled Weyne. Sh. Aweys actually condemned the act: "I am saddened by the loss of so many lives...the enemy is behind this [attack]," Sheikh Aweys said, but he did not elaborate who the enemy is. Asked if his comments could trigger a conflict with Al Shabaab, Sheikh Aweys dismissed the possibility but stated that "anything is possible" if the various armed factions fighting the Somali government do not have a "unified ideology." (Garowe Online) MEANWHILE IN IRAN: A TPLF-style crackdown appears to be underway, though it hasn't reached the standard set by Meles Zenawi yet.
The most successful Shabab Operation Yet: Somalia minister killed by bomb BBC, June 17, 2009 - But like al-Qaeda in Iraq, Shabab is creating enemies. In this case, the clan whose elders were killed is likely to react violently against Shabab. ALSO: Any remaining Ethiopian fans of Shabab please read what else your "freedom fighters" are doing: Meanwhile, the U.N. children's agency says al-Shabab continues to occupy the UNICEF compound in Jowhar, preventing the distribution of aid to women and children in the area. - VOA
Top Somali warlord: willing to talk? CSM, June 17, 2009 - Typical Somalia conflict; fight, kill, switch, negotiate, shift alliances, start again ALSO: Sharif (TFG) may have lost another police station to Shabab, while Shabab has killed the TFG police commander .
These Tehran University students are disputing state media. They are organizing without a permit. They need to be beaten like they were Ethiopian AAU students: Savage Attack on Student Dormitories Rooz Online, June 16, 2009 June 16, 2009: Temporary halt to six months of pleasurable torture of Birtukan Mideksa: I have no doubt that the isolation of Birtukan Mideksa in a small cell is done at the direct behest of Meles Zenawi. I also have no doubt that he derives pleasure from doing this, and from openly showing Ethiopians that he is not subject to any law, and has the power to torture anyone at will. Birtukan Temporarily Placed With Two Inmates - Abugida Source from Addis Abugidainfo, June 16, 2009 Birtukan out of dark cell after six months Ethiopolitics, June 16, 2009 Meles, if we ever get our hands on you... ... No you should't be tortured. You shouldn't be physically mistreated. Instead read this:
UN 'runs out of aid for Ethiopia' BBC, June 16, 2009
"But even when the grain gets through the WFP says there is an acute shortage of trucks, with the Ethiopian authorities preventing the agency from bringing in its own fleet from Sudan." "The UN says the Ethiopian authorities have exacerbated the situation by refusing it permission to use a fleet of trucks to transport the grain from Djibouti." Comment: This is an example of a conflict between a TPLF priority, and a Ethiopia and Tigray priority. As usual the TPLF makes the pro-TPLF policy choice. Not the pro-Ethiopia or pro-Tigray choice. The TPLF priority is to make high profits transporting food aid. Why should the interests of nursing mothers and small children in Tigray and elsewhere in Ethiopia take precedence? As proof that the TPLF is more important than these nine million suffering Ethiopians, note that you will not find this news on any state media or any TPLF follower website. They do not represent these people and hence will not advocate for their interests. Here is a proposed amendment to the constitution: IF ANY CHILD IN ETHIOPIA DIES OF STARVATION, THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE EXECUTED FOR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OR MURDER. (if this were the law, Meles would have thousands of bullets in him by now). ALSO: Give Africa economic freedom, says Ethiopian leader Reuters, June 16, 2009 "I do not know whether I need to explain why sovereign African nations should plead to be given policy space," said Meles. "The simple answer is that they are not so sovereign when it comes to economic policy making." Comment Meles relies on begging rather than giving Ethiopians the economic freedom that most people in the world enjoy. Without the insistent begging last year, the Meles government may have imploded due to its own economic mismanagement. Meles should be grateful that they saved him by nearly doubling aid to Ethiopia last year.
June 14, 2009: - Five Imprisoned Coffee Exporters Released - Reporter (amh). They were imprisoned for "causing harm to the national economy". Almost all had been awarded prizes by the government in previous years for export performance. Also: World Bank representative Ken Ohashi, expresses disbelief at the gov't -reported 10 percent growth rate for 2008/09. And: Gov't projects 10 billion birr budget deficit for 2009/10; with 6.5 billion birr of the deficit to be covered by govt' domestic borrowing. This is way off target as compard to what the gov't promised the IMF. Meles said gov't domestic borrowing would be zero in 2008/09 (what was the actual figure?) and IMF projections indicate an expectation of only 0.3% of GDP govt' domesitc borrowing for 2009/10. Now who knows what the real GDP is, but gov't domestic borrowing was 6.2 and 6.5 billion birr in 2006/07 and 2007/08 respectively. This was a major factor in the inflation crisis. So this magnitude of borrowing in 2009/10 means the gov't is partially retreating on the fight against inflation, and instead wants to continue its free-spending ways (to get support). The resutl will be the same as before. High inflation rates that punish the poor and anyone else with no access to gov't money sources.
Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Vote NY Times, June 14, 2009
Comment: Shouldn't these people be slaughtered like in Addis Abeba, June 2005? Meles gave the "shoot-to-kill" order with no hesitation. The TPLF shares a solidarity with all ruling groups that have ever been rejected by their people. Ahmedinajad should hire TPLF advisors to show him how its done.
Comment: "They ignored my shouting..." In Ethiopia, shouting will get you jail - if you are lucky enough to be married to an EPRDF official - or a bullet in the head if not.
June 13, 2009: - An Open Letter to my fellow Tigrayan brothers and sisters who are supporting the TPLF - Obang Metho, Executive Director Of the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia Comment: I wonder if any TPLF official, or follower/supporter, will have the courage to publicly respond in an honest and constructive manner to Obang Metho? Probably not. The TPLF is a vanguard party. The TPLF Politburo, under the direction of Meles, establishes the party line on any subject. The party line is then transmitted to the central committee which organizes the cadres. The cadres then implement the party line by herding the people in the direction Meles wants them to go. Vanguard parties do not allow members to publicly express independent opinions or honest assessments that differ from the party line. Thus no TPLF supporter can raise the issue of TPLF chauvinism. In fact, most remaining TPLF supporters are probably hardcore TPLF chauvinists themselves. What is TPLF chauvinism? It is a fatal illness that has crippled the EPRDF, and will destroy its host organization too. I think there is a difference between ethnic chauvinism (e.g Tigrean chauvinism) and the emerging TPLF aristocracy (which exhibits an extremely high level of organizational chauvinism that is congruous with Tigrean ethnicity - a very unhealthy and dangerous development for Ethiopia). To put it simply: the TPLF is fundamentally pro-TPLF and not pro-Tigray. With every passing year, as its internal kinship and elite class ties strengthen, the distance between the TPLF and the people of Tigray will increase. In this respect they are following the typical path of all ruling elites in human history. Read more here - very rough 2007 draft of Theory of TPLF Ethiopian Chauvinism (In actuality there are almost no TPLF supporters. They are virtually all followers in that they have absolutely no chance to influence the leaders. In a normal party the leaders are constantly checking with their supporters because they cannot continue to lead without support. In TPLF-style parties, the leaders are dependent not on support, but on control. Control of media, control of military, control of land, control of internet, control of telecoms, control of cement, control of fertilizer, control of transport etc... All this leads to Control of People, including control of TPLF follower/supporters).
June 13, 2009: - Ahmadinejad Re-Elected; Protests Flare - NY Times. At his news conference, Mr. Moussavi cited irregularities that included a shortage of ballots. He accused the government of shutting down Web sites, newspapers and text messaging services throughout the country, crippling the opposition's ability to communicate during the voting. June 11, 2009: - Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen - NY Times.
One senior American military official who follows Africa closely said that more than 100 foreign fighters had trained in terrorism camps in Somalia alone in the past few years. Another senior military officer said that Qaeda operatives and confederates in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia had stepped up communications with one another. Link to article at AbbayMedia - June 9, 2009: - In Search of Peace: Ethiopia�s Ethnic Conflicts & Resolution - by Messay Kebede. Articles like these are too rare. Why don't more Ethiopian intellectuals write for the public? Compare the ideas and depth of understanding and synthesis in this article with the output by Meles and the TPLF. The articles by Meles/TPLF on this topic are rehashed, plagiarized, mind-numbing Leninist dogma. Ethiopia needs to move on and engage its challenges with new perspectives as outlined in Messay's paper. June 7, 2009: Intl Narcotics Agency Reports that Mexican Drug Cartels Tried to Use Front Companies In Ethiopia to Import Chemicals for Making Banned Drugs: - International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) - Feb, 2009 annual report. (The INCB is an independent, quasi-judicial monitoring body for the United Nations)
Read more and watch PBS program online (arhived 2006): The Meth Epidemic
June 7, 2009: Market Failure or "Genius" Failure? Who is responsible for the disastrous cement and electricity policies? (OPINION) - As usual, Meles has disappeared from view. He always goes underground when a crisis becomes acute. Underlings are left to take the blame. A good example is the electricity disaster in Ethiopia. Severe blackouts have become common. As the Reporter newspaper commented recently, we find out about electricity problems only when the power goes out. The population was completely unprepared for this because state media had been broadcasting non-stop boasts about electricity exports. The same situation occurred with cement. Why is the planning process so bad in Ethiopia? We have a "genius" who sets policy and directs in detail the work of government ministries. According to Meles, the state needs to play a very active role in the economy because of "market failures." The free market, he says, is driven to make bad choices and unproductive investments, so the state (i.e. Meles) should make those choices. Cement policy is currently completely controlled by the state. In 1999, Meles (who is a genius) analyzed the cement demand in Ethiopia and determined that there was a production surplus. The TPLFs Messebo cement factory was just finished and Meles did not want the free market to import cement or produce cement at cheaper locations (closer to Addis Abeba). So the "genius" prohibited private sector investment in cement and prohibited imports. It turns out to have been a spectacularly bad decision. A genius failure. The electricity sector in Ethiopia is completely state-controlled. The private sector is not allowed to invest in production (although some changes were made recently). Utilities are all state owned of course. The state electricity corporation had a strategic plan to build power plants on various rivers. Tekeze was not one of these rivers because the civil war had prevented adequate study of dam sites and river hydrology. But the genius decided that a Tekeze dam had to built now, ahead of those other dam sites that had already been studied in detail. A rush contract was developed. The World Bank and other lenders can not fund dam projects this way. So Ethipia had to invest $300 million dollars from its own limited funds to build the dam. The contract went to the Chinese (of course). They were suppposed to build the dam within a specified number of years. They are several years overdue (of course). And Ethiopia has no money to even temporarily rent generators to cover the electricity shortfall. Another genius failure.
Jun 7, 2009: SOMALIA - Reports of Sheikh Aweys Death Premature - (SHEIKH AWEYS WOUNDED, POSSIBLY DEAD) - AFP and VOA talked to him: Somali Insurgent Leader Denies Reports of Death On the other hand, Reuters reports: Aweys is either dead or badly hurt - family Somali battle kills 123, rebels deny leader Aweys dead - (Reuters); 50 killed in central Somalia clashes, Aweys 'wounded' - (Garowe Online); Sheikh Aweys (a major hardline islamist figure) had traveled from Mogadishu to the south central town of Wabho to lead a big attack on the moderate Sufi milita Alhu Sunna. Sheikh Aweys a former officer under Siad Barre, has had a long and eventful career in Somalia politics, and was active in Al-Ittihad during the 1990s.
Neither side controlled Wabho on Saturday, locals said, but the battles had halted for them to collect and bury corpses. Who are the proven Assassins? - June 4, 2009: - Ethiopia charges 46 with 'assassination plot' - AFP - Comment: Shouldn't we first investigate the evidence of Meles-ordered or at least Meles-condoned assassinations? For example, Tesfaye Gebreab, the former government media director working under Bereket Simon, has made serious allegations; here is an English translation excerpt of one assassination that has never been resolved: Tesfaye Gebreab: Committees of Woyane Members Vote to Kill Prominent Oromo Nationalists. How about the well-documented assassination (or execution) of Etinesh Yimam? Also: Harsh Austerity Measures Implemented in Ethiopia - VOA, 04 June 2009.
"At first it was all about we want a faster Internet connection and I wish I could have this and that. But now it has come down to, I wish I could have electricity. We're just hoping for some improvement," he said.
Comment on Ginbot 7, Andargatchew Tsige and Isayas Afeworki; June 2, 2009: - The "Ethiopian Review" (self-appointed, unofficial spokesman for the Ginbot 7 opposition party) has announced that Andargatchew Tsige, secretary general of the party, is in Asmara for talks with Isayas Afeworki. ER also announced that Ginbot 7 hopes to establish temporary headquarters in Asmara. ER further indicated that Berhanu Nega himself may go to Asmara soon. Ginbot 7 has not issued a denial since ER published this information on May 29. Nothing positive for Ethiopia will come from these talks. On the contrary it will damage Ethiopia's democratization movement. The example of the Eritrean-directed AFD is instructive. Soon after proudly announcing the alliance, the ONLF massacred over 70 people in the Ogaden. And the Ethiopian people were supposed to cheer this? Where is the AFD now? What is Andargachew planning for Round 2? An alliance with Shabab to establish bases in Southern Somallia? Isayas Afeworki is sponsoring them too so it will be more efficient to share supplies and logistics. But why stop with Shabab? Why doesn't Andargachew sign an alliance with Shabab's parent organization al-Qaeda? As long as it helps get rid of the TPLF then its ok? No principles can stand in the way of Andargachew's revolution? What is the price for getting visas to Asmara? What are the secret side agreements that will assuredly accompany any deal with Isayas? Resumption of Eritrean killing squads in Ethiopia, suppression of anti-Isayas Ethiopian parties, economic privileges, Assab obviously off-limits, and Irob wereda signed over to Isayas (Has anyone asked the Irob people about this?). Who, other than lunatics like ER, trusts Isayas Afeworki? Why on earth would someone put themselves and their organization at his mercy? This self-destructive behavior defies belief. |
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