***Note: The work below is solely that of Elizabeth Jordan.  Any attempt to copy it without permission from the author is plagiarism and not worth it since you will be caught.***

Constitution Versus Reality in Jordan
Written for Introduction to Comparative Politics
Freshman Year - Spring 1998

In 1952, the country of Jordan instituted a new constitution which sought to liberalize the relationship between the King, the Cabinet, and the National Assembly that had been set up previously in the constitution of 1947. This new constitution attempted to set up a political environment which gave the Legislative Branch of the Jordanian government more power and made the Cabinet "more responsible" to the Legislature, "especially in the matters of. . . votes of confidence, and dissolution" (Vatikiotis 1967: 53). It also attempted to limit the power of the Executive Branch as manifested in the King and the Cabinet. Although the document itself does stipulate limits on the King’s power and improves the relationship of the Legislature and the Cabinet, I believe that the main force behind the Jordanian government is still King Hussein even though his tight grip on the government is beginning to weaken.

The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of 1952 declares the government to be "parliamentary with hereditary monarchy" (I:1). The Constitution outlines the workings of all three branches of the government: the Legislative, Executive and Judicial. The Legislative Power is granted to "the National Assembly and the King" (III: 25). The Executive Power lies in the King, "who shall exercise His powers through His Ministers [the Cabinet]" (III: 26). The Judicial Power is given to the "different courts of law, and all judgments shall be given in accordance with the law and pronounced in the name of the King" (III: 29). The prominent stature of the King is evident in these descriptions of the three branches of government; the King is a part of all three. In other words, a strong separation of powers in Jordan does not exist.

Chapter Four of the Constitution describes the power of the Executive Branch and how the inheritance of the throne shall work. In order to be king of Jordan, you must be male, a Muslim, and a direct heir of the dynasty of King Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein (the Hashemite Family). The powers given to the King include approving all Acts of Parliament and directing "the enactment of such regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement of such acts" (IV: 31). The King is also in charge of the armed forces and holds the power to declare war and peace and make treaties and accords.

The King is given great legislative power in Jordan. He calls elections to the House of Deputies (the lower house of the Jordanian National Assembly) and appoints the members of the Senate (the upper house) and the Speaker of the Senate. The King also "convenes the House of Deputies, opens it, adjourns it, and prorogues it" (IV: 34, ii). The Constitution also gives the King the power to dissolve the House of Deputies and the Senate or he can "suspend the membership of one of its Members" (IV: 34, iv). The Prime Minister is appointed by the King and may also be dismissed by the King. The Ministers of the Cabinet are appointed by the King "on the recommendation of the Prime Minister" (IV: 35).

Part II of Chapter Four of the Constitution delineates the powers of the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) headed by the Prime Minister and consisting of "such number of Ministers as may be needed and as the public interest may require" (IV: 41). The Council of Ministers is given the responsibility of administering the affairs of the state that are not constitutionally controlled by some other person or body. If the Prime Minister is dismissed or resigns then all the members of his cabinet are considered to "have automatically resigned or been released from their offices" (IV: 50). The House of Deputies is given the power to cast votes of no-confidence in the Council of Ministers. This provision of the Constitution of 1952 did not exist in the previous constitution and was intended to make the Cabinet more responsible to the Legislature. If the House of Deputies casts a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet, then the Cabinet must resign. A vote of confidence can be held at the request of either the Prime Minister or called by a petition signed by not less than ten Deputies.

The other powers of the National Assembly are divided among the Senate and the House of Deputies. The Senate is restricted to a membership of "not more than one-half of the number of the members of the House of Deputies" (V: 63). Members of the Senate must have previously held or currently be holding one of the following offices: Prime Minister, Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, or Speaker of the House of Deputies. Members of the Senate may also be appointed from retired military officers with a rank above Lt. General and former Deputies who were elected at least twice. The lower house of the National Assembly is the House of Deputies. Deputies are "elected by a secret ballot, in a general direct election" (V: 67). The House of Deputies elects its Speaker at the beginning of each session. The Speaker is elected for one calendar year but can be reelected.

As for the actual policy formation in Jordan, the process begins when the Prime Minister places a draft law before the House of Deputies. The House of Deputies has the options of accepting, amending, or rejecting the draft but it must always pass the law on to the Senate. The law will not be enacted "unless it is passed by both the Senate and the House of Deputies and confirmed by the King" (V: 91). If one house accepts the draft while the other rejects it twice, then a joint meeting of the houses is set up and the law will be adopted if a two-thirds majority of the Senators and Deputies present decide so. Every law that is passed by either house of the National Assembly must be approved by the King in order to be enacted. The King holds the power to veto the laws but the National Assembly reserves the right to override the veto by a two-thirds majority of the Senators and Deputies. When the National Assembly is not in session, the Council of Ministers can, with the King’s approval, issue provisional laws "covering matters which require necessary action and which could not be delayed" (V: 94, i). However, any provisional law passed while the National Assembly is not convened must be approved by both houses of the assembly as soon as they convene again. Policy can also originate in either the House of Deputies or the Senate (as opposed to the Cabinet) if any ten Senators or Deputies propose a law.

The Constitution of 1952 also addresses the role of the Judicial Branch. The Judicial Branch is described in Chapter Six and is set up as independent from the rest of the branches and "subject to no authority other than that of the law" (VI: 97). However, the judges are appointed by the King, giving the King power in this branch of government as well.

According to the Constitution of 1952, the National Assembly is allotted a large role in policy making and is able to hold the Cabinet responsible through votes of no-confidence. However, the Constitution makes it very clear that the King of Jordan in fact holds most of the power in the government considering that he affects every branch and/or the actions of those branches. I believe that the powers given to the National Assembly by the Constitution have been marginalized in practice. In other words, although the National Assembly is given power independent of King Hussein, in reality, these powers are rarely employed to disagree with the King. I believe that King Hussein has been the true and absolute power of the government of Jordan.

King Hussein controls the rest of the government, especially the National Assembly. This was most evident when he dissolved the National Assembly from 1974 to 1984 after the Arab League decided to make the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) the "sole, legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people (Satloff 1986: 69). However, even when the National Assembly was permitted to convene it has served as more of a rubber stamp for King Hussein’s policies and preferences than an actual forum for public opinion. A recent example of this exertion of King Hussein’s power is the 1994 National Assembly approval of the Israel-Jordan peace accord. Both houses of the National Assembly gave their go-ahead to the peace accord despite the fact that only a small minority of Jordanians expressed support for the accord (Jehl 1998: 8). This was also evident with the passage of the Press Laws of 1993 which banned the publication of "any news which disparages the king or the royal family, the armed forces, the security forces, heads of friendly states" (Kamal 1997: 11). These laws directly limit the Jordanian citizens’ democratic freedom and yet were passed by the institute which is supposed to represent the people of Jordan.

King Hussein has enjoyed great success thus far in convincing the Jordanian people of the legitimacy of his rule and extensive power. He does this by exploiting both the tribal ties and Islamic traditions that run deep in Jordanian society. He keeps the tribes loyal by awarding tribal leaders with governmental positions and tribes themselves with public works in the tribal area (Brand 1995: 48). King Hussein has been able to garner feelings of legitimacy from Muslims in Jordan because of his claim to be a direct descendant of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam (Brand 1995: 55). However, since his support of the shah of Iran in the Iranian Revolution in opposition to Khomeini who wished to establish an Islamic state, King Hussein has lost the loyalty of many of the Muslims in Jordan (Satloff 1986: 38).

This loss of loyalty of some Muslims to King Hussein has started a process which seems to imply that the days of King Hussein’s unlimited power in Jordan are numbered. Recently, King Hussein has met with unprecedented amounts of opposition to many of his policies (mainly those restricting democratic freedoms, like the Press Laws of 1993) (Kamal 1997: 11). Most of this opposition takes the form of Islamist parties. These parties have proliferated since the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace accord and were even beginning to gain seats in the National Assembly (implying a popular support for the parties). King Hussein quickly took steps to halt the influx of Islamist party members into the National Assembly by issuing an Electoral Law in 1993 that changed the voting process to "one-person/one-vote" (Omaar 1997: 4) from the previous ranking system. This reduced the number of Islamist party members because Jordanians tend to vote along tribal lines before religious lines (Satloff 1986: 60). The tribes in Jordan are, for the most part, remaining loyal to the Hashemite rule.

The Islamic parties have not shrugged off these blatant attempts by King Hussein to limit their influence on the national government. In fact, the parties took to direct action in the form of a boycott of the November 1997 National Assembly elections (Omaar 1997:4). This boycott proved that at least some of the people of Jordan are no longer satisfied with the extensive powers exhibited by King Hussein and indicates a cry in Jordan for a more liberal and democratic government. And although the boycott resulted immediately in a House of Deputies that is largely pro-Hashemite, because of the absence of Islamic candidates, I believe that it is a sign of a shift in power to come in Jordan. I do not think that King Hussein can survive as the sole institute of power in Jordan as he has up to now. The people are starting to demand a voice in the government and I believe that King Hussein will increasingly be forced to oblige that demand.

 Works Cited

Brand, Laurie A. "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity." Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 4 (Summer 1995): 45-61.

"The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan." Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Ed. Albert P. Blausten and Gisbert H. Flanz. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1984.

Jehl, Douglas. "Uneasy Lies its Crown as Jordan’s Troubles Grow" New York Times Vol. CXLVII, No. 51, 1470 (22 March 1998): 8.

Kamal, Sana. "Fettering the press" Middle East International No. 551 (30 May 1997): 11-12.

Omaar, Rageh. "Elections a tribal affair" Middle East International No. 561 (24 October 1997): 4.

Satloff, Robert. Troubles on the West Bank. New York: Praeger, 1986.

Vatikiotis, P.J. Politics and the Military in Jordan. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1967.