***Note: The work below is solely that of Elizabeth Jordan. Any attempt to copy it without permission from the author is plagiarism and not worth it since you will be caught.***

The Destruction of Neat Little Boxes
Written for History of 19th Century Philosophy
Sophomore Year - Fall 1998

Throughout Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel focuses on the relationship between sets of opposites like true/false and master/slave. Hegel disagrees with the idea that opposites are completely distinct from one another or merely externally connected to each other. He instead believes that opposites are at the same time independent of one another and dependent on each other. In Hegel’s dialectic, opposite ideas are synthesized to become part of a larger whole. It is this process of synthesizing opposites and reflecting on that synthesis that Hegel calls "Absolute Knowing." As opposed to previous ideas of Absolute Knowing, Hegel claims that it is not something that one can possess but that it is the process itself. In other words, the end, Absolute Knowing, is in the process of synthesizing ideas or concepts that are seemingly opposites. Hegel discusses the realm of relationships between opposites from the abstract level of the "True" and the "False" (22) to the more complicated human level in the section, "Lordship and Bondage." Hegel shows throughout this work that the idea of opposites as merely externally related and independent of one another is fallacious and proves that opposite are both necessarily invested in and dependent on another. In other words, each idea or concept contains within it the idea of its opposite.

Hegel begins the preface of Phenomenology of Spirit with a discussion of the development of a philosophical system. The emergence of a new philosophical system is seen merely as either an "acceptance or rejection" of an old system (2). A new philosophical system is seen as the opposite of an old system since it must contradict in some way with the old system. If the new system did not contradict the old at all, then there would be nothing new about it. However, Hegel points out that every old philosophical system is present in any new system. Hegel uses the metaphor of a bud growing into a blossom and a blossom growing into fruit to show how philosophical systems develop. Although the blossom replaces the bud and the fruit replaces the blossom, they are still "moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other" (2). The blossom cannot exist unless the bud precedes it. In the same way, a new philosophical system cannot emerge without the prior existence of the old system. The creation of a new philosophical system implies a knowledge and comprehension of the old system. That knowledge of the old system is the way in which the new system is dependent on the old. The old philosophical system is part of the new system even though it is not clearly visible in it; just as the bud is part of the blossom even though it has seemingly disappeared.

The idea that something can be simultaneously overthrown and carried forth, as in the bud to blossom metaphor, is called aufhebung. Hegel returns to this idea throughout Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the clearest articulation of how Hegel believes opposites interact. Opposite ideas may overturn or contradict each other but they are at the same time constantly involved with and present in one another.

In Section 39, Hegel turns to the concepts of true and false. "‘True’ and ‘false’. . . are held to be inert and wholly separate essences. . . each standing fixed and isolated from the other, with which it has nothing in common" (22). However, true and false cannot be treated as separate and distinct entities. The idea of the false must derive itself from what is held by another to be true. To call something false, is to imply an understanding of what is true. False may be a negation of what is true but it is a "determinate" negation in that it gives insight not only into the "false" but into the "true" as well. The same occurs from the side of the "true" since every concept can be seen as either true or false; so, Hegel says that "truth therefore includes the negative also, what would be called false" (27). The idea of what is true lies in the articulation of the false just as the idea of what is false lies in the articulation of the true.

Hegel claims that one cannot negate a proposition without first engaging it. In other words, the false cannot be articulated unless one begins with what has been claimed to be true. The relationship between true and false again illustrates the idea of aufhebung. When one claims that something is false, the true is canceled out or overthrown. However, Hegel makes it obvious that the true has also been brought forward since it is present, though perhaps not visible, in the idea of what is false.

After the preface, Hegel begins his recounting of the journey of the phenomenological "We" to Absolute Knowing from natural consciousness. He begins with a section on "Sense-Certainty" or the idea of obtaining knowledge from empirical data. Sense-certainty is usually considered the most immediate and concrete way of knowing something. "Sense-certainty appears to be the truest knowledge; for it has not yet omitted anything from the object but has the object before it in its perfect entirety" (58). It is assumed that no mediation between the subject and object occurs in sense-certainty. However, Hegel shows that mediation between the subject and the object does occur using what I call the dialectic of the "Now."

Two players are involved in sense-certainty; namely, the "I" and the "This." (58) Sense-certainty attempts to answer the question; "‘What is the This?’" (59). Hegel examines the process of sense-certainty from the side of first the object (the "This") and then the subject (the "I"). He discovers that neither an objective nor a subjective approach results in immediate knowledge of what the "This" is.

In the objective approach, Hegel examines the role of the "This" in sense-certainty. He bifurcates the "This" into "‘Now’ and. . . ‘Here.’" (59) It becomes obvious that Now and Here are determined by time and place. In other words, they are mediated by time and place. A person may say at one point: "Now is Night" but once the sun rises the statement is no longer correct. "The Now. . . is preserved" (60) but the idea of Night has shifted. "This self-preserving Now is, therefore, not immediate but mediated; for it is determined as a permanent and self-preserving Now through the fact that something else. . . is not." In other words, Now is mediated through the flexibility of that which it is professed to be (e.g., night).

When Hegel makes the shift to the subjective side of sense-certainty, it again becomes clear that a mediation occurs between the subject and the object. Using the subjective approach, Now and Here are determined by who the "I", or subject, is. One person may claim: "Here is a tree" while an other says instead: "Here is a house." (61) The meaning of Now or Here is dependent on, or mediated by, the person who is defining it. Thus, sense-certainty "comes to know by experience that its essence is neither in the object nor in the ‘I’, and that its immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other" (62).

Hegel turns now to the dialectic of the Now in an attempt to figure out if any aspect of sense-certainty is immediate since the "moments" of sense-certainty, as defined by the subjective and objective experiences, are not (62). In the dialectic, one first points out the ‘Now.’ However, ‘Now’ changes in the amount of time it takes a person to articulate it. Therefore, ‘Now’ is really what has been; it is something in the past or "something that has been superseded" (63). So, the first truth of the ‘Now’ must be set aside and replaced with the second truth: ‘Now’ is what "has been." "But what has been; is not" (63). The second truth must also be set aside. One must "negate the negation," as Hegel puts it. This would seemingly return one to the first truth, "that the ‘Now’ is" (63). However, the first truth has changed during this dialectic. It no longer refers to a singular Now but the "absolute plurality of Nows" (64).

The reason the third truth is different from the first truth is apparent if the dialectic is considered in the framework of aufhebung. The setting aside or supersession of each truth cannot be seen merely as a disregarding of that truth. The first and second truths are not set aside in the sense that they no longer apply to the dialectic. Instead, they are canceled out and brought forward in the dialectic. Thus, by the time one reaches the third truth, "that the ‘Now’ is," (63) she is articulating a truth that contains both the first and second truths of the dialectic. The first and second truths are opposites but Hegel shows through the dialectic that they are not merely externally related but, through the process of synthesizing into the third truth, they become internally connected. Through this dialectic, Hegel is able to show that sense-certainty is not immediate as was previously assumed but does involve a process of synthesizing and reflection.

In "Sense-Certainty" in becomes obvious that relationships between opposites become more complicated as Hegel moves beyond the abstract level of true and false. In "Sense-Certainty," Hegel must introduce a third party or concept, the third truth, to show how the opposites of the first and second truths are related to and dependent on one another. However, in the introduction of a third concept, Hegel shows the importance of the synthesis of opposites in Absolute Knowing. It is not enough to know that opposites are dependent on and inherent in one another. One must be able to synthesize opposite ideas and reflect on that synthesis for it is this process that is Absolute Knowing.

The relationship between opposites is complicated further in the section, "Lordship and Bondage" as Hegel begins to apply his theory to human situations. In this section, Hegel expounds his master/slave dialectic. This dialectic stems from the basic human desire for "Recognition" from an independent consciousness. Hegel says that "self-consciousness. . . exists only in being acknowledged" (111). In other words, self-consciousness cannot exist strictly independently because it must be recognized by something outside of itself.

The self, thus, seeks out an other to recognize it. At first glance, these two entities, the self and the other, are opposites and independent of one another. However, when the self seeks the other to recognize it, the self, in essence, seeks itself in another being since it is seeking its reflection in the other. Hegel says that this search for recognition from an other "has a twofold significance" (111). The self has "lost itself" in the sense that it recognizes itself in "an other being" (111). But the self has also overcome the other because it objectifies the other. It no longer sees the other "as an essential being" but merely as a way to see itself (111). The self, however, desires to supersede the other in order to prove "itself as the essential being," or the independent subject. To do this, the self ends up superseding not only the other but its "own self" as well since it exists within the other.

Through the two supersessions of the other and the self, the self returns "into itself" much the same way the third truth in the dialectic of the Now appeared to return to the first. However, the self cannot find an easy way to synthesize its desire for independence with the appearance of itself within the other in the way that the first two truths in the dialectic of the Now synthesized. The relationship becomes complicated since the self desires to be independent but begins to realize that it is must have the recognition of the other.

At the time that the self is attempting to supersede the other, the other is also trying to supersede the self. The self thinks of itself as a subject and thinks of the other as an object. The other considers itself to be the subject since from its perspective it is the self. So, both entities "see the other do the same as it does" (112). The action of each is "indivisibly the action of one as well as the other" (112). In other words, the self and the other are not independent of one another or externally related but constantly invested in and involved with the actions of the other.

The self and the other realize that they are at the same time acting as a subject and being treated as an object. Both the self and the other are an "immediate being" in that they use the other entity as a means to gain recognition. On the other hand, both are the "middle term" or mediating factor for the other to gain recognition (112). "They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another" (112). Neither can accept this duality of its existence. Unlike the concepts of true and false which could be synthesized with little trouble, the presence of opposite roles within a human consciousness cannot be tolerated. Both the self and the other desire to be free of their dependence on and objectification by the other. This desire results in what Hegel calls the "life-and-death struggle" (114).

The self and the other desire to be independent. The most basic dependence of each consciousness is the dependence on life. In order to gain independence, both the self and the other must show that "it is not attached to life" (113). Each seeks the death of the other to rid itself of any dependence. However, when the self seeks the death of the other it is necessarily "staking its own life" since the other is at the same time seeking the death of the self (113). Hegel says that this struggle is necessary for the self and the other to "raise their certainty of being for themselves" or, in other words, raise their certainty that they are independent (114).

At one point during the life and death struggle, one consciousness turns away from the other in apathy. This turning away results from the realization that "death is a natural negation of consciousness" (114). In other words, the life and death struggle would be fruitless if played out to its conclusion. The self and the other desire recognition in order to affirm the independence of its own consciousness. If the life and death struggle plays itself out completely, only one consciousness remains with nothing left to recognize it. So, the self turns away from the other because it realizes that a more effective death of the other is to be apathetic towards it.

When the self turns away in apathy, it becomes what Hegel calls the "lord." The other becomes the "bondsman" (115). By turning away in apathy, the lord asserts his independence from the bondsman. The lord sees the bondsman merely as an object; something for him to use. The lord uses the bondsman to fulfill both his desire for recognition and his desire for material goods. The bondsman serves the lord and supposedly gives the lord what he desires; recognition and material goods. However, Hegel shows that the relationship is not as simple as it seems.

The lord believes he is completely independent of the bondsman since he sees and treats the bondsman merely as a thing. But the lord is dependent on the bondsman on many levels. He depends on the bondsman to fulfill his desires for material goods by ordering the slave to produce them. He is also still dependent on the bondsman in that he cannot gain the recognition he needs for self-consciousness without the existence of the slave. But the lord does not obtain self-consciousness in this relationship. Self-consciousness is obtained through recognition by an independent consciousness. The lord has enslaved the bondsman and therefore made the bondsman a dependent consciousness (117).

The bondsman looks at first to be merely a slave completely dependent on his master for his existence. But the bondsman in this relationship actually gains what the lord was seeking in enslaving the bondsman: self-consciousness. The bondsman is not dependent on the lord in his quest for self-consciousness. During the life and death struggle, the bondsman "experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord" (117). The lord never experienced this fear since he turned away from the life and death struggle. In this fear, the bondsman was "quite unmanned" (117). In other words, he ceased to be dependent on humans and could see only his utter dependence on nature and nature’s apathy towards him. The bondsman understands that nature is completely independent of him. Nature could kill the bondsman and the world would continue to exist.

In his relationship with the lord, the bondsman serves as the mediating factor between the lord and nature. The bondsman fulfills the lord’s desires for material goods by working on nature (116). "Through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence [nature]. . . and gets rid of it by working on it" (117). To serve the lord, the bondsman must face his fear and dependence on nature in order to produce the material goods that the lord desires. At the same time, the bondsman receives recognition from nature. This recognition occurs when the bondsman sees nature respond to his working on it. For example, when he plants a seed and sees the plant grow. Therefore, the bondsman gains self-consciousness since he gains recognition from and independent consciousness; nature (118).

Both the lord and the bondsman are dependent and independent of each other at the same time. Their relationship shows how opposites exist simultaneously. Neither the lord nor the bondsman could be completely independent or completely dependent on the other. The synthesis of the opposites of dependent and independent occurs in the very being and actions of the lord and the bondsman. However, it is obvious through the life-and-death struggle that this synthesis was not as simple as the synthesis of true and false or of the first and second truths in the dialectic of the Now.

The process of aufhebung does not play out neatly with opposites when humans are involved. True and false cannot resist the process of canceling out and bringing up. Humans, on the other hand, can and do resist it. I think this resistance to the presence of opposites within a human consciousness stems from the human desire to label others and ourselves. Humans tend to want to fit things into categories which are necessarily defined by either this or that (never both). To accept the presence of opposites within human consciousness could lead to the elimination of labels. Even Hegel’s labels of "lord" and "bondsman" could be challenged. The lord is master over the bondsman but the bondsman can be seen as a "lord" over nature. In the same way, the lord could be seen as a bondsman to nature since he is constantly dependent on it and even though he never realizes it. Hegel shows throughout Phenomenology of Spirit that opposites are internally connected; they exist within each other. In so doing, Hegel offers a powerful critique of and challenge to the human desire to shove all of nature into neat little boxes.

Works Cited

Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford University Press: New York, 1977.