***Note: The work below is solely that of Elizabeth Jordan.  Any attempt to copy it without permission from the author is plagiarism and not worth it since you will be caught.***

On May 14, 1948, Great Britain’s mandate over Palestine ended at 6:00 P.M. eastern-standard time. The British flag was lowered in Palestine and the British High Commissioner Sir Alan Cunningham departed from the port of Haifa (Snetsinger 111). At the same time, Zionist leaders convened in the Tel Aviv Museum of Art where David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the independent state of Israel. Eleven minutes later, President Harry S. Truman announced to the world that the United States had granted "de facto recognition" of Israel (Fraser 49). Thus the United States became the first country in the world to grant recognition to the fledgling state. Despite Truman’s quick act in recognizing Israel, American policy towards the issue of Palestine had been anything but hastily devised. In fact, the recognition of Israel came only after years of debate regarding the issue of Palestine between Truman’s White House and the Departments of State and Defense. Truman’s recognition of Israel can be understood only when this debate and the development of the American policy towards Palestine is taken into consideration.

To better understand the development of American policy towards Palestine it is helpful to look at the situation at different levels of analysis: at an individual level, at a domestic level, and at the level of the international system. In the individual level of analysis, one must take into account the influence that individuals have on policy. At this level, policy could be shaped by an individual’s personality, role in government, or personal ambitions (Class Notes 9/21). In American policy towards Palestine, the individual level of analysis deals primarily with Truman’s desire to win the election in November of 1948 and his need to garner Jewish support in order to attain that goal (Snetsinger 97). The individual level of analysis of this policy must also deal with the influences of certain White House staff members on the decisions of President Truman--namely, Clark M. Clifford, the president’s special counsel from June 1946 (Snetsinger 94) -- and on President Truman’s genuine humanitarian concerns for the plight of the Jewish people (Fraser 3).

To understand foreign policy at a domestic level, one must look at events occurring among government organizations and officials of a country (Class Notes 9/21). In the development of American policy towards Palestine, the domestic level of analysis focuses on the policies promoted by the State Department regarding Palestine in the late 1940s. Through most of the late 1940s, the policies of the State Department concerning Palestine were in direct contradiction to Truman’s policies and beliefs.

At the system level of analysis, the foreign policy of a country is considered to be dependent on the international system in which it developed (Class Notes 9/21). In the late 1940s, the United States was immersed in the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (Spiegel 114). Thus American desire to reduce or eliminate Soviet influence in the region of the Middle East was a factor in the development of policy involving the issue of Palestine. However, I believe that the quick American recognition of Israel, although dependent on many factors, was largely a result of the individual influences and ambitions of President Truman and American Zionists and sympathizers like Clark M. Clifford. Thus it is most helpful to consider the event using the individual level of analysis, although the importance of domestic and system factors cannot be ignored.

After World War I, Great Britain was given mandatory rights in Palestine from the newly-formed League of Nations in 1922 (Smith 63). In Palestine, the British found themselves forced to balance Arab interests in order to protect access to oil reserves and Jewish interests due to their commitment in the Balfour Declaration which declared to Zionists across the world that Great Britain "‘views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’" (Snetsinger 3). Jewish immigration to Palestine continued between the world wars supported by the Zionist drive to establish a Jewish homeland there. However, due to Arab pressures and British desire to maintain good economic and political relations with the Arabs, the British issued The White Paper in April of 1939 recommending "a policy of drastic limitation, and eventual termination, of the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine" (Snetsinger 4). The White Paper attempted to clarify the terms of the Balfour Declaration by claiming that "‘framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country’" (Smith 105). The British call for limitations on immigrants directly contradicted the terms of the League of Nations mandate by which Great Britain governed Palestine (Bailey 1). The League of Nations was considering the revocation of the mandate when World War II broke out in Europe. The mandate was not revoked and in fact continued under the auspices of the United Nations when it formed at the end of World War II.

World War II and the Nazi Holocaust of European Jews inspired a renewed and more active Zionist push for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. British leaders in Palestine faced the problem of containing Jewish and Arab rebellions which began after the issuance of the White Paper and increased in violence after the end of the Second World War. Once awareness of the atrocities of the Holocaust reached Palestine, many Jewish underground agencies such as the Hagana stepped up their violent opposition to British rule in the region because of its lack of support for Jewish immigration to the region (Lenczowski 22).

Harry S. Truman was sworn in as President of the United States on April 12, 1945. Six days later Truman received a letter from Secretary of State Edward Stettinius "warning him" of expected Zionist lobbying regarding the creation of a Jewish state (Fraser 7) and encouraging him to use caution when making statements about Palestine. On April 20, Truman was encouraged by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, to help in the resettlement of Jewish persons released from concentration camps or forced out of their homes and to urge Great Britain not to restrict Jewish immigration but to instead allow 100,000 Jewish peoples entrance into Palestine immediately (Lenczowski 22). Truman was of course preoccupied with ending World War II and thus did not turn his attentions to the issue of Palestine until the wars in Western Europe and the Pacific were complete. However, with the war’s conclusion, the issue of Palestine became a large part of Truman’s political agenda. American policy towards Palestine from this time until the recognition of Israel was formed mainly by Truman and other members of his White House staff with almost a complete disregard for State Department views or policies regarding the issues. As Evan M. Wilson in the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Office said: the letter Secretary of State Stettinius sent Truman at the beginning of his administration was "‘the last time that the [State] Department exercised a dominant role in our Palestine policy’" (Fraser 7) since Truman did retain caution about the Palestine issue for awhile.

Truman became increasingly concerned about the conditions in which Jewish refugees in Europe were living after World War II. Many Jews who had been released from Nazi control in concentration camps were still living as prisoners (though, they were legally free persons) on the sites of former concentration camps. Truman received notification of the conditions of Jewish refugees in August of 1945 through Earl G. Harrison whom Truman had sent to investigate the "problems of displaced persons" in Europe (Snetsinger 17). Thus Truman’s primary concern immediately after the end of the war was the humanitarian aspects of the situation in Europe (Lenczowski 23; Fraser 9; Snetsinger 17). His goal, at this point, was not necessarily to help with the creation of a Jewish state but to improve the conditions of Jewish refugees. Harrison recommended Truman support a Zionist request allowing the British issuance of 100,000 immigration certificates to Jews living in former concentration camps (Snetsinger17).

The United States State Department urged Truman not to support this Zionist request. Members of the State and Defense Departments, especially Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and at a later time Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, felt that American support of this policy would harm American-Arab relations and perhaps American access to Arab oil (Fraser 29). The issue of access to oil was one of primary importance to the State Department since World War II had depleted domestic reserves of both the United States and its Western allies. However, Truman felt more convinced of the necessity of protecting the lives of Jewish refugees than of protecting American access to oil reserves.

Thus Truman supported the call for the allowance of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine by forwarding Harrison’s report to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Clement Attlee (Wilson 63). Truman also sent Attlee a letter on August 31 personally requesting that Great Britain grant the 100,000 certificates to Jewish refugees (Fraser 9). According to Evan Wilson, this action occurred without consultation with the State Department. In fact, "nearly a month later the Near East Division [of the State Department] was seeking confirmation of press reports that the President had written Attlee on the subject" (Wilson 63). This aspect of American policy towards the issues surrounding Palestine, therefore, is best understood at the individual level of analysis since American support of the 100,000 Jewish immigrants was derived not from domestic factors involving the State Department’s recommendations but from Truman’s personal humanitarian desires to help the Jewish refugees.

Great Britain viewed Truman’s call for the issuance of 100,000 immigration certificates with great disdain and annoyance. Prime Minister Attlee replied to Truman’s request by reminding the President that Great Britain was still the mandatory power of Palestine and "‘had the Arabs to consider as well as the Jews’" (Fraser 9) implying that the British government viewed Truman’s action in terms of his political goals of pleasing American Jews. Finally, Attlee reminded Truman of President Roosevelt’s letter to Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, declaring that the United States believed that "‘no decision altering the basic position of Palestine should be reached without full consultation of both Arabs and Jews’" (Fraser xi). In the beginning of his administration, Truman was constantly reminded by the State Department of this letter and the promises Roosevelt had made to the Arabs in it. The State Department repeatedly tried to convince the Palestinian Arabs and other Arab states that the United States had not abandoned its policy of "full consultation" but in the future, consideration of the Arab position in Palestine by Truman decreased as the active Zionist lobbying forces in America became more influential and personally involved in policy formation.

In response to Truman’s request for the 100,000 immigration certificates, Prime Minster Attlee also suggested the formation of an Anglo-American committee to look into the situation in Palestine and to recommend a remedy for the violence and conflict between the Arabs, Jews, and British Mandatory forces (Lenczowski 23). The committee was an attempt by the British to gain American economic and military support since the British government resented Truman’s critique of British rule without American willingness to accept responsibility for the violence that was bound to occur in the area if the 100,000 Jews were permitted entrance into Palestine. The appointment of American members of the committee is also best understood at the individual level of analysis since Truman thought it was of great importance to have members on the committee who were sympathetic with Zionist causes (Fraser 13). Truman felt this need because of political pressures from American Zionists. No Jews or Arabs were allowed to sit on the committee but Truman was successful at appointing a few non-Jewish supporters like Bartley C. Crum, a lawyer from San Francisco (Snetsinger 23). The committee’s findings in 1946 asked that Great Britain allow the immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. As for the political future of Palestine, the committee supported the idea of a continued British mandate and perhaps a United Nations trusteeship at a later date. The committee was strongly against the creation of either a Jewish or Arab state in the region (Snetsinger 23). Thus American policy still centered around just the question of immigration.

American Zionists were jubilant about the committee’s recommendation for the 100,000 immigrants but were furious about the committee’s failure to support the establishment of a Jewish state. The Arabs were not pleased with the committee’s report either since they saw the allowance of more Jewish immigrants into Palestine as a contradiction of the British White Paper of 1939 and felt that the Western powers were trying to make the Arabs pay for the atrocities for which the European countries, not the Arabs, were responsible during the Holocaust (Snetsinger 26). Thus both the American and British governments found themselves in situations where they had failed to satisfy either the Jews or the Arabs.

Great Britain stalled the implementation of the committee’s report to try to gain American economic and military support to counter the violent reactions of both Arabs and underground Jewish forces to the committee’s policies (Fraser 16). However, Truman was unwilling to make troop commitments to the region on the advice of the State Department. This is one aspect of American policy towards Palestine that is best seen not on an individual level of analysis but on either a system or domestic level of analysis. Truman and the State Department were concerned that the presence of American troops in Palestine would anger the Arabs to such and extent that they would abandon their already tenuous relationships with the United States and Great Britain and the Soviet Union would thus gain influence in the region (Snetsinger 27). Troop commitment to the region was denied in order to keep Western access to Middle East oil reserves. However, there were also domestic factors to Truman’s denial of troop commitment to Palestine. The war had ended less than a year earlier and America was involved in a rapid demobilization process in order to facilitate a quick return to civilian life. Truman and the State Department both realized the time was not right for mobilization of troops (Fraser 18).

Truman did, however, continue to exert pressure on Prime Minister Attlee regarding the 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Truman’s motivation was primarily the large amount of Zionist lobbying taking place in Washington, D.C. supporting the immigration aspect of the committee’s report. American Zionists placed pressure on members of Congress and President Truman himself in order to get the immigration clause carried out expediently (Fraser 17). But it became obvious that, despite Truman’s pressure to do otherwise, the British would not permit the immigration of the 100,000 Jews. A full year after President Truman acknowledged his support of Jewish immigration into Palestine in August of 1945, no immigration had occurred and many Jewish people were still residing in former concentration camps. The Zionists felt the Anglo-American committee was nothing more than a stall tactic by the British and American governments and thus Truman began to lose American Zionist support in 1946 (Snetsinger 32). In addition to the fact that Jewish immigration had not as yet been permitted, Zionists were growing disillusioned with Truman’s failure to commit to the idea of an independent Jewish state in Israel.

This disillusion with Truman became of great concern to the administration during the mid-term elections in 1946. Many Jewish voters were shifting away from the Democratic party because of Truman’s lack of support for the creation of an independent Jewish state. David K. Niles, a member of the president’s staff and a Zionist sympathizer, was able to convince Truman in 1946 that his commitment to the creation of a Jewish state would help the Democrats in the election. Niles was able to quell Truman’s fears about Arab reactions by convincing him not to worry about Roosevelt’s promise to Ibn Saud because FDR had once said to his White House staff that "‘he could do anything that needed to be done with Ibn Saud with a few million dollars" (Snetsinger 38). Niles also attempted to downplay the threat of a violent Arab retaliation predicted by the State Department by claiming that "‘the danger of unifying the Moslem world can be discounted because a good part of he Moslem world follows Gandhi and his philosophy of non-resistance’" (Snetsinger 38). Truman, convinced by Niles and other Zionist lobbyists, announced on October 4, 1946 (the eve of Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement) that American policy had shifted from supporting just Jewish immigration to Palestine to supporting the creation of "‘a viable Jewish state’ in Palestine" (Snetsinger 42).

This action again directly contradicted the State Department’s policy regarding Palestine. The State Department had been considering four possibilities for a solution to the problems in Palestine. The first of these involved making Palestine into an entirely Jewish state. However, the department dismissed this option because of the ramifications of it for Arab-American relations and American access to oil in the Middle East. Similarly, the State Department rejected the second alternative which called for the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine. This policy would be unacceptable because of the domestic political consequences and because it would leave the large Jewish minority in Palestine without "‘the just and equitable treatment to which that minority is entitled’" (Fraser 10). The third alternative was a partition plan that would create two states in Palestine: one Arab and one Jewish. This policy was rejected because in 1946 there was no confidence that it could be implemented. The final possibility, and the one the State Department supported and preferred up until the moment Israel declared its independence was to leave Palestine under a British trusteeship. The State Department justified this policy because of the importance of Palestine to the three monotheistic religious traditions. Officials in the department were aware that neither the Jews nor the Arabs would be completely satisfied with this solution but they still felt that this was the only option that could both be implemented and protect American interests in the region (Fraser 10-11).

Truman’s support of an independent Jewish state was given despite the fact that the State Department did not think of it as a viable option. Yet again, Truman’s individual influence and ambitions outweighed those of the domestic government organizations. Unfortunately for the Democrats, Truman’s statement in support of an independent Jewish state came too late to affect the outcome of the election and the Republican party won control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. This does not change the fact that Truman was largely motivated to make the statement by his desire to swing the Jewish vote to the side of the Democrats (Smith 134).

Meanwhile, in Palestine, Great Britain was attempting to deal with resistance from both the Arabs and the Jewish forces. In April 1947, Great Britain reached its breaking point and decided to turn the issue of Palestine over to the United Nations. After numerous Jewish terrorist attacks on British mandatory forces due to greater British restriction on Jewish immigration, Great Britain asked the United Nations to call a special session of the General Assembly with the sole purpose of appointing a commission to study the problem of Palestine (Snetsinger 49). At the special session, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was composed of delegations from Sweden, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Australia, Canada, India, Iran, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru (Smith 136). The Palestinian Arabs boycotted UNSCOP while Zionists decided to attempt to convince the committee to promote the alternative of partition in Palestine (Fraser 25).

UNSCOP submitted its report in September of 1947. It unanimously called for the termination of the British mandate. However, the members of UNSCOP differed on their views of what independence in Palestine would look like. India, Iran and Yugoslavia supported "‘an independent federal state’" after a period of trusteeship under the United Nations. The majority of the members of UNSCOP, however, presented a partition plan in which Palestine would be divided into a Jewish state and an Arab state with Jerusalem remaining under United Nations trusteeship because of its importance to both sides (Snetsinger 57). When this plan was presented Great Britain declared that it would withdraw from Palestine on May 14, 1948 thus leaving no room for debate on the issue of the end of the mandate. However, the report generated a major debate on the issue of partition versus trusteeship.

The American delegation to the United Nations attempted to find a solution that both the Arabs and the Jews could approve of but was unable to proceed along those lines when members of the Arab League began moving troops towards the Palestinian border in preparation for the end of the British mandate (Snetsinger 58). Truman, alarmed by Arab aggression, instead issued an order that the American delegation announce its support for the UNSCOP partition plan. Once again, Truman’s personal desires for policy towards Palestine triumphed over State Department concerns regarding national security and access to oil reserves.

Before the General Assembly vote regarding partition, the White House was inundated by telegrams and letters from American Zionists urging Truman to support the partition plan rather than trusteeship. The lobbying efforts reached such a feverish pitch that Truman was becoming increasingly annoyed with the American Zionist community. However, despite the obnoxious lobbying of the American Zionists, David Niles, Truman’s trusted staff member, was able to convince him that partition was the best solution for the situation in Palestine (Fraser 27). But Truman was reluctant to actively lobby other delegations in the General Assembly because he felt that such an act would undermine the integrity and purpose of the United Nations. Evidence is unclear as to whether or not Truman coerced other nations into voting for partition but there is wide support that he was not very active at all until a few days before the General Assembly vote which was scheduled for November 29, 1947 (Snetsinger 67). Many scholars believe directions for the American delegation to step up active recruitment of countries to the side of partition came directly from the White House a few days before the scheduled vote (Snetsinger 68; Smith 139). Up until the day of the vote victory was not guaranteed for the Zionists forces. However, on November 29, 1947 the United Nations General Assembly voted 33-13 with ten abstentions for partition in Palestine (Smith 139).

Passing the partition plan and actually implementing it turned out to be two distinct and difficult battles. Great Britain announced soon after the vote for partition that it would not be responsible for implementing the plan (Snetsinger 73). It became obvious to the State Department that implementation of partition would not come without the expectation of American troop commitments through the U.N. Security Council. It is evident why this would be undesirable to the State Department when the issue is looked at from a system level of analysis. Security Council action would give the Soviets an excuse to move troops into Palestine which could possibly lead to extended Soviet influence in the area, a consequence unacceptable to the United States in the current Cold War system (Fraser 39). Also, some Arab states began threatening American access to oil reserves with the demand that Truman adopt a position more sympathetic to the Arabs.

Thus the State Department began to actively lobby its preferred alternative of trusteeship to Truman who was enjoying a renewed Zionist backing due to his support of partition (Smith 139). George F. Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff, advised Truman that partition could not "‘be implemented without the use of force. . . and that the US would inevitably be called upon to supply a substantial portion of the money, troops and arms for this purpose’" (Fraser 37). This analysis led to a reversal in American policy that cost Truman much embarrassment and the temporary support of his Zionist allies. Truman agreed with the department’s argument that partition could not be implemented without violence and thus approved an American support of temporary trusteeship. However, when Warren Austin, a US ambassador to the United Nations addressed the U.N. with the possibility of postponing the implementation of partition on March 19, 1948 Truman reacted with great anger (Snetsinger 87). Although Truman did in fact approve the shift in policy he did not have the chance to approve a draft of Austin’s statement to the U.N. or the timing of Austin’s address. One day before Austin’s address to the United Nations, Truman had met with Chaim Weizzman, a prominent Zionist leader, and promised him that the United States, and Truman in particular, still stood behind partition (Fraser 42). Truman publicly reacted to Austin’s address with rage and insisted that he had not approved any such reversal in policy. His reaction has been considered by some as being "something of an act" he put on in an attempt not to lose the support of the American Zionists (Fraser 43) although he was genuinely embarrassed by the timing of the event. However, Truman did make a point to publicly acknowledge and approve of the reversal most likely to give the appearance of a unified American front on the issue of Palestine. The American proposal for trusteeship failed in the United Nations because of a lack of support from other nations (Snetsinger 94). In the meantime, Zionist support was shifting away from Truman yet again. The plan for partition continued with no mechanism for implementation just months away from the May 14 end of the British Mandate.

In 1947, Clark M. Clifford, special counsel to the president, had presented Truman with a plan for election in the 1948 campaign. At the time that he wrote his plan, he did not appear to believe that Truman must carry the Jewish vote in order to win the election. However, as the November 1948 election drew near, Clifford apparently began to believe that the Jewish vote was in fact essential for a victory for Truman and thus attempted to influence Truman’s policy "to improve the president’s standing with the American Jewish community" (Snetsinger 97). Clifford’s most influential advice to Truman regarded American recognition of an independent Jewish state that was bound to form after the British mandate ended. Clifford felt Truman should make an announcement before the end of the mandate conveying an American plan to recognize a Jewish state once one was declared. Officials in the State Department, however, were not convinced of the wisdom in recognizing a Jewish state in the first place but also felt strongly that if the president must recognize the state, then he should do it after the state was declared in accordance with international law (Wilson 142).

In a conference on May 12, 1948 between Truman, Clark and Niles and members of the State Department, Clark argued that the United States must recognize the Jewish state as soon as possible in order to preempt Soviet recognition and possible Jewish attachment to the Soviet bloc (Fraser 47). The members of the State Department found this a weak argument and instead believed that Truman’s motivation in the early recognition of a Jewish state was "‘based on domestic political considerations’" (Fraser 47). Truman decided on a compromise between the two positions and gave the Jewish state of Israel de facto recognition eleven minutes after it was declared on May 14, 1948.

Truman was up for election in November of 1948 and earlier that year found himself without the popular support necessary to win election. The recognition of Israel was seen by Truman and his special counsel Clark as an expedient way to garner Jewish support in the election. Since there was no large Arab constituency in America at the time, Truman could safely promote Zionist policies without alienating other voters. Truman was undeniably motivated by factors other than political ambition. He truly felt humanitarian concerns towards the displaced Jewish persons after World War II. These concerns coupled with his desire to win election in 1948 shaped American policy towards Palestine in the late 1940s. Although the importance of domestic and system factors in the policy in the form of the State Department’s support of trusteeship and the Cold War climate in which the policy developed did influence some aspects of Truman’s policy, the biggest influence on Truman’s policy was Zionist pressure from individuals on his staff and Truman’s personal desires, ambitions and beliefs. Thus American policy towards Palestine and Israel is best understood at the individual level of analysis as opposed to the domestic or system levels.

Works Cited

Bailey, Sydney. Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process. St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1990.

Class Notes. International Politics. Dr. Robert Snyder. Southwestern University. Fall 1998.

Fraser, T.G. The USA and The Middle East Since World War 2. The Macmillan Press LTD: London, 1989.

Lenczowski, George. American Presidents and the Middle East. Duke University Press: Durham, 1990.

Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Third Edition. St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1996.

Snetsinger, John. Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel. Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, 1974.

Spiegel, Steven L., Mark A. Heller, and Jacob Goldberg. The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East. Lexington Books: Lexington, 1988.

Wilson, Evan M. Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel. Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, 1979.