***Note: The work below is solely that of Elizabeth Jordan. Any attempt to copy it without permission of the author is plagiarism and not worth it since you will be caught.***

Virtue and Knowledge in Plato’s Meno
Written for History of Ancient Western Philosophy
Freshman Year - Fall 1997

"Is virtue something that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but natural aptitude or something else?" (70A). This is the question that Meno originally brings to Socrates to begin Plato’s dialogue, The Meno. In other words: "How is virtue acquired?" Socrates insists that he cannot answer this question because he does not even know what "virtue" is. Meno, like the good Socratic interlocutor that he is, declares that he knows what virtue is without a doubt and thus, Socrates’ and Meno’s pursuit into virtue and how one acquires it begins. However, the discussion turns to the subject of knowledge and how it is acquired many times throughout the dialogue. Socrates and Meno come to the conclusion that virtue is a kind of "divine knowledge" but I believe Socrates truly thinks of virtue as the activity of pursuing knowledge not blindly accepting the city’s traditions (or opinions).

At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates immediately transforms Meno’s question of how one acquires virtue to the question of what virtue is. Meno insists that he knows what virtue is and answers without hesitation that there are many types of virtue (different ones for a man, woman, slave, child, etc.). For example, Meno says that a man’s virtue lies in "managing the city’s affairs capably, and so that he will help his friends and injure his foes while taking care to come to no harm himself" (71E). Socrates, of course, is not satisfied with this answer as it is merely a list of types of virtue and not the eidos of the concept "virtue."

In his list of virtues, Meno blatantly leaves out justice. He does not seem to feel that in order to be virtuous a man must govern justly, just that he must govern. Socrates points out this omission of justice and Meno is quick to add it to his "definition." Socrates then shows Meno that the rest of his virtues would use justice in one way or another. So, all people need to act justly in order to be virtuous and thus, are "good in the same way" (73C). In order to be "good in the same way," all people must share the same virtue and it is this "same virtue" for which Socrates is searching.

So, in order to please Socrates, Meno offers another definition. Virtue "must be simply the capacity to govern men" (75C). This definition excludes the possibility of women, slaves, or children possessing virtue and contradicts Meno’s earlier statement that these people can possess virtue. Plus, Meno once again omits the concept of justice from his definition. Socrates adds the phrase "justly but not otherwise" (73D) to Meno’s definition. Meno agrees with this addition because "justice is a virtue" (73D). He then proceeds to give Socrates another list of virtues but not a true definition.

Since Meno obviously does not understand what sort of definition Socrates is after, Socrates tries to show him through defining shape and color in the manner in which he expects Meno to define virtue. Socrates says first that shape is "what alone of the beings always accompanies color" (75B). Meno rejects this definition because Socrates uses the concept "color" to define shape. In this episode, Meno attempts to use Socrates’ method of questioning but fails. Meno merely feigns ignorance of color in order to antagonize Socrates. In the dialogue, Socrates never feigns ignorance of a concept that he understands. Socrates realizes that one has to accept some pre-suppositions in order to arrive at an answer. To please Meno, however, Socrates offers a second definition of shape and a definition of color. His definition of color states that "color is an effluence of shapes commensurate with sight and perceptible by it" (76D). Meno is pleased with this definition and yet Socrates calls it "a tragic answer" because he realizes that to merely challenge pre-suppositions will never lead to knowledge of a concept. Although Socrates agrees that one must question those pre-suppositions about which you are ignorant, he thinks it futile to challenge even the ones of which you have an understanding.

Now that Meno knows what sort of definition Socrates is searching for he says that "virtue is. . . ‘to rejoice in the fine things and have power’. . . [and] desiring fine things and being able to acquire them" (77B). However, as Socrates points out, everyone desires good things. Even those people who desire evil things do so in the belief that the evil things are, in fact, good. If everyone desires good things, then "no one is better than his neighbor" (78B) and this can not be the correct definition of virtue. In Athens, certain men are called "good" or "virtuous" whereas others are not. Virtue appears to be a way to set yourself above others; it is very hierarchical. If you possess virtue, you are better than those who do not. Therefore, the first part of Meno’s definition must be dismissed because it does not allow for anyone to be "better than his neighbor" (78B).

This leaves us with the definition that virtue is having the ability to acquire the good things. The good things, according to Meno, are those that could contribute to his power such as health and wealth. However, once again, Meno leaves out the condition of justice until Socrates reminds him of it. Socrates and Meno come to the conclusion that these goods must be acquired justly or not at all. Therefore, "to have such goods is no more virtue than to lack them" (78E). Instead virtue must be understood as "whatever is accompanied by justice" (79A). But earlier in the dialogue Meno and Socrates dismissed this sort of definition because justice was seen as merely a part of virtue and not the whole.

Throughout the dialogue, Socrates must constantly remind Meno to include justice in his definitions of virtue. For Meno, virtue is power and the strength to acquire that power. He seems to imply that it does not matter how one obtains that power. Meno’s ultimate desire is to be autonomous. He appears at first to be upholding the city’s view of virtue in that the city also finds it virtuous to govern men. But the city holds that it is virtuous for the city as a being to govern men and virtuous for the men of the city to, in a way, submit themselves to that governing. Meno desires to be his own city. He wants to step outside of the grips of the city’s control in order to control others. He thinks that he is upholding the city’s virtue by desiring autonomy but he is, in fact, destroying the very tradition he tries to uphold. The city’s tradition holds that men should not desire autonomy because it challenges the city. In his desire to be autonomous, Meno has transgressed the city’s traditions.

Socrates also transgresses the city’s traditions but in a different way. He refuses to accept the tradition of virtue or any other concept the city holds without first questioning it. The difference between Meno and Socrates is that Meno in a sense desires to overthrow the city and replace it with his self-rule. Socrates, however, understands that he needs the city to facilitate his ability to question it. Socrates has no desire to overthrow the traditions. He merely wants to know why the traditions are what they are. This, however, is just as dangerous to the city as Meno’s attempt to be autonomous. The city cannot tolerate questioning of its traditions or virtues because that may ultimately lead to the discovery that the city’s traditions are the way they are solely because that’s how things have been for as long as anyone can remember not necessarily because that’s the way things should be.

Meno becomes fed up with Socrates constant dismissal of his definitions and compares him to a sting-ray that "numbs" those with whom it comes in contact. Socrates tells Meno that his comparison is unfair since Socrates himself has been "paralysed" by their dialogue in that he is also perplexed by the concept of virtue. Socrates says that he does not perplex others "knowing the answer" himself but "infect[s] them also with the perplexity [he] feels" (80C). Socrates is not badgering Meno because he knows what virtue is but because he desires to find out what it is. Meno thought he understood virtue before meeting Socrates. In fact, he gave Socrates the first definition of virtue without hesitating for a moment he was that sure of his knowledge of the subject. But now Meno has realized that he has no knowledge of virtue. Meno tells Socrates that it is impossible for them to actually learn what virtue is because they have no idea what they are looking for. In other words, Meno dismisses the chance of anyone ever learning anything. Either a man has knowledge of what he’s looking for and then has no need to learn it or he has no idea what he’s looking for and thus never knows when he has found it.

Socrates dismisses this paradox of learning by telling Meno that learning is merely the recollection of knowledge one already possesses. He tells Meno of the belief that a man’s soul is immortal and has therefore lived many lives. Through all these lives it has gained knowledge about everything in this world and in Hades. "So we need not be surprised if it can recall the knowledge of virtue or anything else which, as we see, it once possessed" (81C). The soul is able to recollect all the knowledge it has acquired throughout its previous lives and this recollection is the process we call learning. Though it’s not clear whether or not Socrates actually believes this doctrine he does believe that it is a safer and more productive idea to follow than the one that states that learning is not possible. This "doctrine produces energetic seekers after knowledge" (81D).

Socrates exhibits this doctrine through his "teaching" the slave boy about how to double the area of a square. The example with the slave boy exactly parallels the method Socrates uses to get knowledge out of his interlocutors in all of the dialogues. Socrates first asks the boy how long the side of the square with double the area of the original square will be. The slave boy answers, without hesitation, that the length of the side of the new square will be double the length of the side of the old square. The boy seems completely confident of his knowledge of this subject just as Meno seemed confident of his knowledge of virtue. However, Socrates quickly shows the boy that his answer is wrong just as he showed Meno his error. The boy still does not know the right answer but he does know that his previous answer was wrong.

It’s Socrates’ belief that the boy is now in a better state than he was originally. The boy has become aware of his ignorance. It is only this discovery of one’s ignorance that can lead to knowledge. In other words, men start out thinking that they know the answers to questions like: "What is virtue?" because they never actually asked those questions of themselves or the tradition on which their assumptions were based. Men live first with a false sense of knowledge based on the tradition in which they were raised. This tradition is forced on them merely through living in the city. The tradition is not something that is ever articulated. It is instilled in men through the political life. It is only when a person realizes that they are ignorant on subjects the tradition is supposed to explain that they begin to question those assumptions forced on them by the city. It’s only through this realization of one’s ignorance that the pursuit of knowledge can begin. But the city cannot tolerate this type of virtue as the character of Anytus will show later in the dialogue.

Socrates uses the slave boy to show Meno that learning is possible but is a type of recollection. The slave boy finally "recalls" what the length of the square must be in order to double the area but Socrates calls the boy’s current state one of "true opinion" (85C). The boy will only gain knowledge on the subject not "from teaching but from questioning" (85D). Socrates believes that this pursuit of knowledge is the most virtuous act a man can perform. He says: "we shall be better, braver and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don’t know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don’t know we can never discover" (86B-C). The only true virtue for Socrates exists in pursuing knowledge about the traditions one is supposed to accept while living in the city. In other words, a man is virtuous when he questions the city’s traditions because it is through this questioning that a man pursues knowledge.

Socrates and Meno now try and determine whether or not virtue is teachable by starting with the idea that if it is a sort of knowledge, then it must be teachable (or able to be recollected). They come to the conclusion that virtue must be a sort of knowledge through Socrates’ questionable argument in which he changes the type of knowledge he is discussing from episteme (a sort of scientific knowledge) to nous (knowledge that one already possesses) to phronesis (knowledge gained through experience). Socrates finally concludes that since "virtue is an attribute of the spirit. . . which cannot fail to be beneficial, it must be wisdom" (88C) because it is wisdom that makes the other spiritual qualities advantageous instead of harmful. It follows from this that since virtue is a type of knowledge, it is not something innate in man. Therefore, men are not virtuous or good by nature. Since Socrates and Meno have now established virtue as a type of knowledge (although it isn’t clear exactly which type) they can now assume that it is teachable. But, for something to be teachable there must be both teachers and students of the subject. Their next task is to discover whether or not teachers and students of virtue actually exist.

At this point, Anytus enters the dialogue. Anytus completes the dialogue. He represents Athens and her traditions perfectly. Both Socrates and Meno are trans-political in some way. They both desire to step outside the city’s traditions. Meno desires to be autonomous and thus wants to take the city’s traditions and apply them to only himself. Socrates, on the other hand, desires to know why the city’s traditions are the way they are. Anytus is the only character in the dialogue that follows the city’s traditions as a member of the city is meant to. In other words, he knows that the city must govern men and that he must, in a way, submit to that rule. Meno sees that the city must govern men and applies that to himself, thinking that he, too, must become exactly like the city.

Socrates asks Anytus if he believes that anyone can teach virtue and, if so, who are the teachers of virtue? Socrates suggests that the teachers of virtue in Athens are the sophists. Anytus vehemently denies that the sophists would have anything to teach about virtue. I think Socrates and Anytus disagree about who could teach virtue because they disagree about what it means to actually learn or obtain knowledge about virtue. Socrates believes that to obtain knowledge about virtue is to first realize that you don’t know what it is. In other words, one must first realize that their original assumptions are incorrect and become aware of their state of ignorance. From this state, one can begin to question those assumptions and move towards actual knowledge on subjects about which one only had opinions. Anytus believes that knowledge is the blind following of the city’s traditions.

The city cannot allow for its citizens to go further than the traditions. There is a rigidity in the city that the citizens must follow to keep the city functional. In other words, the city functions in the "state of opinions" if you were to place it on Socrates model of the stages of learning. The city has to stop at its assumptions. It can neither admit that these assumptions hold no actual knowledge of subjects such as virtue nor can it admit the questioning of these assumptions. The city cannot become aware of its own ignorance. It is stuck in the first stage of learning in which it claims that it knows the answers to all questions about its traditions and yet has never asked these questions. This is comparable to the state of both Meno and the slave boy when they first came in contact with Socrates.

Anytus believes that the only teachers of virtue can be the Athenian statesmen. He says that sophists cannot teach virtue because they ruin men instead of making them better. Socrates asks Anytus how these statesmen gained their knowledge on virtue. Anytus tells him that they got it from the statesmen before them and those statesmen got it from the ones before them, on and on. Anytus says this cycle continues forever into the past but there had to be a starting point to this chain of events. Anytus believes that he is appealing to the tradition of Athens but ultimately he’s appealing to the beginning of that tradition. In order to start a tradition, someone had to step outside of the tradition already in existence. Athens demands stability of its tradition and its citizens but its very foundation is in the instability of the beginning of a tradition. Its very foundation contradicts everything it enforces. The tradition cannot allow for people like Socrates in the city and yet the tradition itself formed when someone like Socrates began to question the former tradition.

However, Socrates proves to him that the statesmen cannot teach virtue by showing him the example of Themistocles’ son. Themistocles was an upright man in Athens and yet none would consider his son virtuous. Socrates gives many other examples of virtuous Athenian statesmen with deplorable sons. If these men were truly able to teach virtue, surely they would have taught it to their sons and yet none of their sons possess virtue. So, neither those who claim to have virtue (the statesmen) nor those who claim to teach virtue (the sophists) are teachers of virtue. Therefore, there are neither teachers nor students of virtue. It follows that since there are no teachers or students, then virtue cannot be taught (96C).

But, virtuous people do exist. It has been proven earlier that men are not born virtuous and just proven that men are not taught to be virtuous. So, how does virtue come to be? Socrates mentions that perhaps he and Meno are mistaken in assuming that knowledge is a prerequisite for being virtuous or a good leader. As long as someone "has a correct opinion on the points about which [another] has knowledge" (97B) he will be just as successful as the person with knowledge. True opinions are therefore just as valuable as knowledge.

However, the problem with following true opinions only is that they do not always "stay in their place" (98A). The only way to keep true opinions from constantly changing or moving about is to subject them to the process of learning (or recollection) by questioning their correctness. When one succeeds at "tethering" a correct opinion it becomes knowledge. If one just accepts the opinion and never questions it, one will never have true knowledge.

Athenian tradition claims, as did Meno, that virtue is knowledge (specifically the knowledge of how to govern men). It is a knowledge given to man as if from the gods. Perhaps this is why Socrates and Meno believe virtue to be "divinely dispensed" in the end of the dialogue. Virtue is something that is given and accepted blindly as if it were merely a gift to be received and not a goal to be achieved. In essence, the Athenian tradition is claiming that virtue is a true opinion held without question of its validity.

Virtue is, I believe, not the blind acceptance of true opinions but the pursuit of knowledge. This is evident in the process of learning. As one comes closer to actually obtaining knowledge he becomes a "better" man as admitted by Meno. The slave boy was in a far better position when he could recognize that his former opinion was wrong than when he held that opinion to be true without question. However, this virtue cannot be tolerated by the city. In order for the city to function, men must be content with the opinions handed to them by the city’s tradition. The city cannot tolerate the pursuit of knowledge because it could serve to destroy the city’s traditions. The city will definitely function better without Socrates’ virtue.

However, Socrates’ virtue cannot exist without the presence of the city. In order for the learning process to begin, one must start with assumptions and opinions handed down by the city’s tradition. It is only when one asks why these opinions are the way they are that one can enter into the state of ignorance necessary to pursue knowledge. The only truly virtuous life is one of philosophy. Philosophy is the only science or art that goes beyond the assumptions forced on people by the city. The philosopher is the only person who is aware of his ignorance or incompleteness and thus the only person who can proceed to knowledge. It is in this realization of one’s ignorance and subsequent pursuit of knowledge that one can be virtuous. And, therefore, virtue has to be not knowledge itself but the activity of pursuing knowledge.