*** Note: The work below is solely that of Elizabeth Jordan.  Any attempt to copy it without permission of the author is plagiarism and not worth it since you will be caught.***

Impious Piety
Written for History of Ancient Western Philosophy
Freshman Year - Fall 1997

In the Platonic dialogue, the Euthyphro, Socrates searches for the definition of the virtue of piety with the help of Euthyphro, an Athenian religious fanatic. Euthyphro and Socrates encounter each other outside the courts in Athens. Socrates is facing Meletus’ indictment on charges of corrupting the youth by making "novel gods and [not believing] in the ancient ones" (3b); or, in other words, being impious. Euthyphro, however, is at the courts to prosecute his father on the charge of murdering one of Euthyphro’s servants.

Socrates is shocked at Euthyphro’s actions against his father and wonders how Euthyphro can justify them. Most Athenians would assert that "it is impious for a son to proceed against his father for murder" (4d) and Socrates questions Euthyphro on this point. Euthyphro claims that the Athenians do not truly understand "how the divine is disposed concerning the pious and the impious" (4e) and that he "know[s] all such things precisely" (5a). Euthyphro claims knowledge of the virtue of piety as it is supposed to be believed in Athens. Socrates then asks Euthyphro to explain the pious and the impious to him so that he may use his education in such matters to defend himself against Meletus’ charges. In the course of the dialogue, Socrates solicits many definitions of piety from Euthyphro. However, all of these definitions turn on themselves leaving the reader with no clear-cut definition of piety and, most importantly, the idea that the Athenian view of piety (as represented by Euthyphro), in reality, is radically impious.

Euthyphro’s first definition of piety starts out simply defending his present action in prosecuting his father. He tells Socrates that "to proceed against whoever does injustice regarding murders or thefts of sacred things, or is doing wrong in any other such thing, whether he happens to be a father or mother or anyone else at all" (5d) is pious; and, "not to proceed against him is impious" (5e). Basically, he tells Socrates that it is pious to do as the gods do; a very self-serving definition considering Euthyphro’s current situation. Euthyphro attempts to justify prosecuting his father by pointing to the story of Zeus and his father, Kronos. Zeus punished his father for doing injustice; so, Euthyphro assumes that he can do the same and that, in so doing, he will be pious.

However, a problem exists with the notion of imitating the gods. Euthyphro says that the people of Athens "contradict themselves both concerning the gods and concerning [him]" (5e), suggesting that the same laws should apply to humans that apply to the gods. First of all, it is questionable whether or not any laws should or do apply to the gods; a problem that will be further explored in a later definition. But, also there is the question of whether or not, if these laws do exist, they would be the same for humans and the gods. This notion seems to raise humans to a level close to or equal to that of the gods; an action that would seem to be very impious. Imitating the gods is not worshipping them, but desiring to be like them, a very impious idea. If one desires to be like the gods, one may desire to overthrow the gods; there is no piety in overthrowing a deity. It rejects the basic entity that requires piety; namely, the gods.

Socrates dismisses Euthyphro’s first definition of piety. He tells Euthyphro: "I didn’t bid you teach me some one or two of the many pious things, but that eidos itself by which all the pious things are pious" (6d). Socrates demands the idea of piety from Euthyphro, not mere examples. So, Euthyphro presents a second definition of piety for Socrates. "What is dear to the gods is pious, and what is not dear is impious" (6e). Socrates quickly points out the problem in the second definition.

Socrates and Euthyphro agree earlier in the dialogue that "there really is war among the gods against one another, and terrible enmities and battles" (6b) and that in order for the gods to be at war they must be disagreeing on such things as "the just and the unjust, and noble and shameful, and good and bad" (7d). So, logically, some gods would hold some things dear and other gods would cherish other things. "Then the same things, as is likely, are both hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be hateful-to-the-gods as well as dear-to-the-gods.... Then the same things would be both pious and impious" (8a). Therefore, Euthyphro’s second definition does not identify piety in a way in which it can be easily distinguished from something impious.

So, Euthyphro revises his second definition saying "that the pious is whatever all the gods love, and that the opposite, whatever all gods hate, is impious" (9e). Socrates quickly asks Euthyphro: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?" (10a). Do the gods love the things that are pious prior to their loving them, or do the things the gods love become pious?

Two possibilities stem from this definition. First of all, the gods can love things because they are pious. Or, things can become pious because the gods love them. Both of these ideas contradict piety and even the existence of the gods as supreme beings. If the gods love the things because they are intrinsically pious than it reasons to follow that there exists an idea of piety to which even the gods must pay homage. The ideas stand above the gods. They were not created by the gods but are worshipped by the gods. So, in order to achieve true piety, people must strive towards the idea, or eidos, of piety just as the gods do. So, why not just worship the ideas instead of the gods? This definition again calls for the overthrowing of the gods; a very impious act.

If the second case is true and the things the gods love become pious then there is nothing intrinsically pious about the pious things. There are no ideas; just "willful gods" who bicker constantly about what is right or wrong. Piety would be completely subjective and left to the disgressions of the gods. The only reason something would ever be pious is because the gods love it. Therefore, the definition of piety could change depending on what the gods hold dear at any given moment. This notion would destroy the idea of piety. There would be no absolute idea of piety and, thus, any action could be justified as being either pious or impious, depending on which mythological story you pointed to in support of your action. These first two options result in either gods that are not willful and serve the ideas or gods who are completely subject to their wills.

Socrates does not accept this definition of piety because in it Euthyphro tells him only "of a certain affection concerning it [piety]" (11a) but not what piety actually is. At this point, Euthyphro becomes very agitated with Socrates and begins to give up claiming that Socrates makes his arguments go "around and not [stay] in the same place" (11c). However, Socrates pulls Euthyphro back into the dialogue by making him agree that "all the pious is just" (11e) and that "the pious is part of the just" (12d). And, so, Socrates asks Euthyphro "what part of the just the pious would be" (12d).

Euthyphro answers that the pious is that part of justice "which concerns the tendance of the gods, while that which concerns the tendance of human beings is the remaining part of the just" (12e). One comes to discover that by "tendance," Euthyphro means "care of the gods" as "the herdsman’s skill is a tendance of cattle" (13b) and "the huntsman’s skill is a tendance of dogs" (13b). Euthyphro believes that it is a care that, like the others, is for the benefit of the thing which is tended. So, Socrates asks, does piety "make the gods better?" (13c).

If piety did improve the gods in any way it would show that the gods had room for improvement. The gods would not be self-sufficient but would actually need humans in order to function. This definition again demotes the gods from the status of supreme beings. They end up, once again, on the same level as human beings. The gods are no longer revered as something beyond human beings. According to this definition, the gods are not much better than human beings; they still have needs that must be fulfilled.

Euthyphro revises his definition to say that the tendance of the gods would be "the one with which slaves tend their masters" (13d) or "a certain skillful service to the gods" (13d). However, in a servant/master relationship, the master turns out to be the most needy participant. The servant provides for the master unrelentlessly because the master is not self-sufficient. The servant may even appear to be at an advantage to the master in that he can provide for himself. The master, on the other hand, must be provided for; he lacks either the initiative, the skill, or the time to do something for himself and must depend on his servant. Gods cannot function in this way and still be gods. Gods must be entirely self-sufficient in order to be surpreme beings. They should not be dependent on anything to survive; especially humans, the very beings they are meant to control. So, this definition of piety again undermines the very beings (the gods) that piety is supposed to support.

Socrates asks Euthyphro what this "skillful service" to the gods is supposed to produce. Euthyphro avoids this question saying that "to learn precisely how all these things are is a rather lengthy work" (14a). Instead he tells Socrates that "if someone has knowledge of how to say and do things gratifying to the gods by praying and sacrificing, these are the pious things.... the opposites of the things gratifying are impious" (14b). It seems to me that Euthyphro points out the main problem with this definition before he even gives the definition. He tells Socrates that it is a great task to learn of the many "gratifying things" and one that most people do not accomplish. I believe that Euthyphro would probably claim that he’s the only one who has ever accomplished such a feat. So, how can the ideal of piety be such that it is unattainable by the very beings that must practice it? If it is impossible to know what the "gratifying things" are, then it must also be impossible to do them.

However, Socrates finds another problem with this definition. He gets Euthyphro to admit that the pious is "a certain kind of knowledge of sacrificing and praying" (14c) or "giving gifts to the gods [and] making requests of the gods" (14c). Therefore, the skillful service to the gods is requesting things from and giving things to the gods. Piety would be "an art of commerce" in that both parties involved would get what they need from the other party. However, the problem is: what do the gods get from the humans? What can they possibly need that they don’t have? One would hope that the answer would be "nothing"; for, the supreme beings should be lacking nothing. But, if the answer is "nothing" than how can this be pious? The gods receive nothing and therefore are not benefited at all by the pious actions.

Euthyphro claims that the gods receive "honor and respect, and... gratitude" (15a) and that these things are dear to the gods. So, one again, piety is "what is dear to the gods" (15b) and, again, there is nothing intrinsically pios about anything. Euthyphro has not reached a final definition for piety but he leaves Socrates’ company, most likely annoyed by Socrates’ "gadfly" method and questioning of the very beliefs that Euthyphro holds dear.

The only thing Euthyphro accomplishes in this dialogue is the destruction of his firm beliefs concerning piety and the divine things. He comes to no conclusion concerning the idea of piety but appears to prove that the Athenian views of piety don’t hold water. Every definition Euthyphro offers turns out, upon examination, to be radically impious when one accepts the basic fact that piety must serve to revere the gods not to demean them. The Euthyphro does not offer a final answer as to what the idea of piety is but makes the reader question any pre-existing notions of piety he or she may have; the most important step towards finding the eidos.