October 18, 1970. Three cables related to coup planning between CIA headquarters in Langley, VA., and the CIA Station in Santiago address the secret shipment of weapons and ammunition for use in a plot to kidnap the Chilean military commander, General Rene Schneider. "Neutralizing" Schneider was a key prerequisite for a military coup; he opposed any intervention by the armed forces to block Allende's constitutional election. The CIA supplied a group of Chilean officers led by General Camilo Valenzuela with "sterile" weapons for the operation which was to be blamed on Allende supporters and prompt a military takeover. Instead, on October 22, General Schneider was killed by another group of plotters the CIA had been collaborating with, led by retired General Roberto Viaux. Instead of a coup, the military and the country rallied behind Allende's ratification by Chile's Congress on October 24. Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive, CHILE: DECLASSIFIED U.S. DOCUMENTS ON PINOCHET AND THE 1973 COUP
November 18, 1970: CIA, Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970: The CIA prepared a summary of its efforts to prevent Allende's ratification as president and to foment a coup in Chile -- track I and track II covert operations. The summary details the composition of the Task Force, headed by David Atlee Phillips, the team of covert operatives "inserted individually into Chile," and their contacts with Col. Paul Winert, the U.S. Army Attache detailed to the CIA for this operation. It reviews the propaganda operations designed to push Chilean president Eduardo Frei to support "a military coup which would prevent Allende from taking office on 3 November." Source: Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive, CHILE: DECLASSIFIED U.S. DOCUMENTS ON PINOCHET AND THE 1973 COUP
Track II: The documents reveal that an early coup plan -- known as "Track II" -- continued through the assassination of pro-constitutional Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider, who was gunned down by military plotters on Oct. 22, 1970. The fuller documentary record contradicts the long-standing claim by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that "Track II" was shut down a week before Schneider's murder. After Allende's inauguration, Nixon did not give up. The documents detail what his administration did to make the Chilean economy "scream," how the CIA spread "black" propaganda, and how Washington finally goaded the Chilean army into the coup of 1973. Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
Allende's victory also sent Nixon into a rage and started the president's men plotting how to stop Allende's inauguration. Cables focused on a scheme to derail formal ratification of Allende's victory by Chile's congress on Oct. 24, 1970. According to one idea, the congress would defy the electorate and pick the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, "who would renounce the presidency and thus provoke new elections in which [outgoing president Eduardo] Frei would run." On Sept. 12, Korry and Assistant Secretary of State John Richardson met secretly with Frei at the presidential palace. While much of the conversation remains classified, Korry reported that Frei saw only a "one in 20 chance" to stop Allende, but added that he could not "afford to be anything but the president of all Chileans at this time." Despite the odds, Nixon ordered the CIA to try. The covert action to reverse the results of the Chilean election -- by political or military means -- took the code name, "Project FUBELT." Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
On Sept. 16, CIA director Richard Helms informed his senior covert action staff that "President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States," according to one declassified CIA memo. "The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him," Helms added. The CIA had 48 hours to present an action plan to Kissinger. Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
Soon, the CIA was pressuring Frei. "CIA mobilized an interlocking political action and propaganda campaign designed both to goad and entice Frei" into the "so-called Frei re-election gambit," according to a declassified "Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities." The scheme had "only one purpose," Helms told the NSC: "to induce President Frei to prevent Allende's [formal] election by the congress on 24 October, and, failing that, to support -- by benevolent neutrality at the least and conspiratorial benediction at the most -- a military coup which would prevent Allende from taking office." Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
Kissinger went to great lengths to distance himself from the assassination, both in testimony to Congress and in his memoirs. Kissinger claimed that CIA coup plotting was "turned off" at a meeting on Oct. 15 -- a week before Schneider was murdered....CIA deputy director of plans Thomas Karamessines carried from his Oct. 15 meeting with me an instruction to "turn off General [Roberto] Viaux's coup plot and a general mandate to preserve our assets' in Chile in the (clearly remote) chance that some other opportunity might develop," Kissinger wrote in the White House Years....But a declassified "top secret" memorandum of that Oct. 15 meeting undercuts Kissinger's account. At the meeting with Karamessines and Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger was quoted as demanding "that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight -- now ... and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given.".. Kissinger also demanded tight secrecy around the coup plotting. "Dr. Kissinger discussed his desire that the word of our encouragement to the Chilean military in recent weeks be kept as secret as possible," the memo said. Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
"Mr. Karamessines stated emphatically that we had been doing everything possible in this connection, including the use of false flag officers, car meetings, and every conceivable precaution." The next day, a secret "eyes only" cable from CIA headquarters to Henry Hecksher, CIA station chief in Santiago, revealed that Kissinger's marching orders were relayed to the field. "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup ... prior to October 24," the cable read. "But efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. ... It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG [U.S. government] and American hand be well hidden," the cable continued. "Please review all your present and possibly new activities to include propaganda, black operations, surfacing of intelligence or disinformation, personal contacts, or anything else your imagination can conjure which will permit you to continue to press forward toward our [deleted] objective." While undercutting Kissinger, the records back the 1975 testimony of the CIA's Karamessines. He told a congressional investigation that "Track II was never really ended. ... What we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II."Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
After Allende's inauguration on Nov. 3, the CIA continued working toward a military coup. The geo-political rationale was outlined in a CIA postmortem dated Nov. 12, 1970. It noted that "Dr. Salvador Allende became the first democratically-elected Marxist head of state in the history of Latin America -- despite the opposition of the U.S. Government. As a result, U.S. prestige and interests ... are being affected materially at a time when the U.S. can ill afford problems in an area that has been traditionally accepted as the U.S. 'backyard'."Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
Diplomatic Pressure. But the CIA covert operation was only one leg of what U.S. officials called "a triad" of actions toward Chile, according to National Security Decision Memorandum 93. A second leg was "correct but cool" diplomatic pressure and a third leg was the "invisible blockade" of loans and credits to Chile. For years, historians have debated if such a blockade existed, or whether Allende's socialist economic policies led to the loss of economic credit. But the new NSC records show conclusively that the Nixon administration moved quickly and quietly to shut down multilateral and bilateral foreign aid to Chile. At the Inter-American Development Bank, the NSC simply informed the U.S. representative that he did not have authority to vote for loans to Chile. A secret report -- prepared for Kissinger several weeks after Allende's inauguration -- said, "the U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank understands that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on pending loans to Chile. As ... an affirmative vote by the U.S. is required for loan approval, this will effectively bar approval of the loans." At the World Bank, U.S. officials worked behind the scenes to ensure that Chile would be disqualified for a pending $21 million livestock improvement credit as well as future loans. In addition, the president of the Export-Import Bank agreed to "cooperate fully" with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer on the discontinuation of new credits and guarantees to Chile... Peter Kornbluh, "The Chile Coup - The U. S. Hand" , October 25, 1998.
Diplomatic Isolation. The Nixon administration also moved to isolate Allende's government diplomatically around the world. Secret strategy papers were drawn up by an inter-agency working group in early December 1970. The papers reported on "USG consultation with selected Latin American governments ... to promote their sharing of our concern over Chile." The mix of economic sabotage, political propaganda and army prodding worked. Allende found himself confronted by growing disorder and soaring inflation. At every turn, his policies encountered well-funded adversaries.
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