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Reprinted Materials from "Space Team Online"
Permission granted to reprint by Mark Seigel, Editor.
Tile Probems on STS-87
[Editor's note: Greg is a mechanical systems
engineer at the Kennedy Space Center for the group that is responsible for the shuttle's
external tank, solid rocket boosters, main engine and thermal protection system.]
WORKING ON A TILE DAMAGE MYSTERY
By Greg Katnik
http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/shuttle/team/katnik.html
December 23, l997
STS-87 rolled to a stop; the mission was complete! That statement is true for the flight
of the Columbia, however, a new mission began when the wheels of the Columbia came to a
stop: the post flight inspections. My division is responsible for the overall analysis of
these inspections and we insure that all changes made, due to these inspections, do not
affect other areas that may jeopardize the flight-worthiness of the shuttle. This division
does not focus on one specific area, but analyzes all information and ensures that all
aspects are kept in balance.
Immediately after the Columbia rolled to a stop, the inspection crews began the process of
the post flight inspection. As soon as the orbiter was approached, light spots in the
tiles were observed indicating that there had been significant damage to the tiles. The
tiles do a fantastic job of repelling heat, however they are very fragile and susceptible
to impact damage. Damage numbering up to forty tiles is considered normal on each mission
due to ice dropping off of the external tank (ET) and plume re-circulation causing this
debris to impact with the tiles. But the extent of damage at the conclusion of this
mission was not "normal". The pattern of hits did not follow aerodynamic
expectations and the number, size and severity of hits were abnormal. Three hundred and
eight hits were counted during the inspection, one-hundred and thirty two (132) were
greater than one inch. Some of the hits measured fifteen (15) inches long with depths
measuring up to one and one-half (1 1/2) inches. Considering that the depth of the tile is
two (2) inches, a 75% penetration depth had been reached.Over one hundred (100) tiles have
been removed from the Columbia because they were irreparable. The inspection revealed the
damage, now the "detective process" began.
During the STS-87 mission, there was a change made on the external tank.
Because of NASA's goal to use environmentally friendly products, a new method of
"foaming" the external tank had been used for this mission and the STS-86
mission. It is suspected that large amounts of foam separated from the external tank and
impacted the orbiter. This caused significant damage to the protective tiles of the
orbiter. Foam cause damage to a ceramic tile?! That seems unlikly, however, when that foam
is combined with a flight velocity between speeds of MACH two to MACH four, it becomes a
projectile with incredible damage potential. The big question? At what phase of the flight
did it happen and what changes need to be made to correct this for future missions? I will
explain the entire process.
The questions that needed to be answered were:
* what happened?
* what phase of flight did it happen in?
* why did it happen?
* what corrective action is required?
At this point, virtually every inch of the orbiter was inspected and all hits were
documented and mapped to aid in visualizing the damage. Maps were constructed of the lower
surface, the left and right surfaces and the top surface of the orbiter. At this point, a
"fault tree" was created. The fault tree provides a systematic approach in
considering all possibilities of what may have happened. Everything that is on the fault
tree is considered to be legitimate until it is totally ruled out. Some of the
considerations were where the damage occurred -- in the OPF, in the VAB, or on the pad
before launch. These were quickly eliminated because an inspection at T-3 ("t minus
three") hours takes place on each mission and everything was normal. After these and
many other considerations were eliminated, the focus was placed on the ascent, orbit and
re-entry phase of the mission. Because of the fore and aft flow characteristics of the
damage sites, and the angle of penetration, the ascent phase seemed most likely. The orbit
phase of flight was eliminated because the characteristics of these types of hits (most
likely meteorites or space debris) occur in a random pattern and direction. Re-entry was
eliminated because the "glazing and re-glassifying" of the tiles due to heat
upon re-entry (a normal process) indicated that the damage had occurred prior to this
phase. The fault-tree was now pointing to the ascent phase.
The pictures that were taken by cameras mounted in the orbiter umbilical began to give the
first clues. These cameras are designed to turn on during the solid rocket booster (SRB)
separation, and turn off after the separation is complete, thereby recording the event.
This process occurs once again when the external tank separates from the orbiter. The
initial review of these photographs did not reveal any obvious damage to the external
tank. No foam missing, no "divots" (holes) and no material loss.Everything
appeared normal. The SRBs were then focused on for the answers. After inspection of the
SRBs, no clues were found. In fact, the solid rocket boosters looked to be in great
condition. Where to now? The external tank photographs were magnified and reviewed once
again. This time some material loss was noted, but not in a significant degree. The
attention was now focused on the crew cabin cameras. These cameras gave more of a side
view of the external tank as it tumbled back to Earth. These photographs revealed massive
material loss on a side of the external tank that could not be viewed by the umbilical
cameras!
Where did that leave us? One of the questions had now been answered. The ascent phase of
flight was when the damage occurred. With the information provided by the photography and
the mapped flow of damage, a logical reason could be established as to "what"
happened. It was determined that during the ascent, the foam separation from the external
tank was carried by the aerodynamic flow and pelted the nose of the orbiter and cascaded
aft from that point. Once again, this foam was carried in a relative air-stream between
MACH 2 and MACH 4!
Now the big question -- why? The evidence of this conclusion has now been forwarded to
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) because this is the design center for the external
tank. MSFC will pursue the cause of damage. Here are some descriptions of some of the
possible causes:
POSSIBILITY 1
The primer that bonds the tank foam to the metal sub-stream was defective and did not set
properly. This was eliminated as a cause because the photography indicated that the areas
of foam loss (divots) did not protrude all the way down to the primer.
POSSIBILITY 2
The aerodynamics of the roll to "heads up." The STS-87 mission was the first
time this maneuver had ever been completed.
POSSIBILITY 3
The STS-86 mission revealed a similar damage pattern but to a much lesser degree than
STS-87. The STS-86 tile damage was accepted ruled as an unexplained anomaly because it was
a night launch and did not provide the opportunity for the photographic evidence the
STS-87 mission did. A review of the records of the STS-86 records revealed that a change
to the type of foam was used on the external tank. This event is significant because the
pattern of damage on this flight was similar to STS-87 but to a much lesser degree. The
reason for the change in the type of foam is due to the desire of NASA to use
"environmentally friendly" materials in the space program. Freon was used in the
production of the previous foam. This method was eliminated in favor of foam that did not
require freon for its production. MSFC is investigating the consideration that some
characteristics of the new foam may not be known for the ascent environment.
POSSIBILITY 4
Another consideration is cryogenic loading, specifically hydrogen (-423 degrees
Fahrenheit) and oxygen (-297 degrees Fahrenheit). These extreme temperatures cause the
external tank to shrink up to six (6) linear inches while it is on the pad prior to
launch. Even though this
may not seem much when compared to the circumference of the external tank, six inches of
shrinkage is significant.
This is where the investigation stands at this point in time. As you can imagine, this
investigative process has required many hours and the skills of many men and women
dedicated to the safety of the shuttle program. The key point I want to emphasize is the PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION, which is coordinated amongst many people
and considers all possibilities. This investigation has used photography, telemetry, radar
coverage during the launch, aerodynamic modeling, laboratory analysis and many more
technical areas of expertise.
As this investigation continues, I am very comfortable that the questions will be answered
and the solutions applied. In fact, some of the solutions are already in progress. At
present the foam on the sides of the tank is being sanded down to the nominal minimum
thickness. This removes the outer surface, which is tougher than the foam core, and
lessens the amount of foam that can separate and hit the orbiter.
Check back with Space Team Online for
future developments on this story!
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