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Chapter V

Challenges and Opportunities
The Army in the 70's and towards the EDSA Revolution

For the Philippine Army, the 70's up to the early 80's was a time of great challenges and immense opportunities that proved the effectiveness of the organization and the mettle of the soldiers. The Army faced two challenges during this period and its capabilities were pushed to the limit. In Luzon and in the Visayas, there was the communist rebellion where the Army fought the New People's Army. In Mindanao, there was the Muslim secessionist movement where soldiers fought the well-trained and well-armed Bangsa Moro Army in Central and Southwestern Mindanao and in the Sulu archipelago.

                With the challenges came the opportunities to build a professional and capable organization. The Army reorganized and transformed itself into a force for both defense and nation-building. The Philippine Army Revitalization Plan was launched along with the Home Defense program which made the Army a part of the country's march towards self-reliant defense and socio-economic development.

The birth of the communist insurgency was a product of peasant unrest fused with nationalism. It was radically shaped by a number of internal and external factors: the Cultural Revolution in China which brought in the ideas of Mao Tse Tung, inequitable Philippine-United States relations which, along with the Vietnam War, was branded by radicals as "US Imperialism" and political radicalism characteristic of the schools and universities in the 60's and 70's.

The present Maoist oriented Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) has its roots in the Stalinist oriented Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). In the early 60's, Jose Maria Sison, founder of the CPP, began organizing small groups of students and workers in Manila using nationalist political and economic ideas. He founded two youth organizations: the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP) as a professor in UP in 1959 and later, the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) during his stint as the head of the PKP's youth department. Sison was able to establish a cadre loyal to his plans and visions in these two groups which became instrumental in the formation of the CPP. In 1963, Sison was invited to join the withering PKP and became head of the movement's youth department. Sison began to work out his revolutionary agenda for a nationalist crusade that will involve students, peasants, workers and intellectuals.

In 60's, two major events shaped the revolutionary movement : the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution. The Vietnam war united the radical movement with a single issue that could be used against the government while the Cultural Revolution brought the new ideas of Mao Tse Tung which would result in an ideological split within the PKP and eventually, the formation of the CPP by Sison.

By 1966, domestic opposition to the Vietnam war was growing and the issue galvanized the radical movements all over the country. Denouncing "US Imperialism", anti-war protests attracted many students. The protests were culminated by a massive rally at the opening day of the summit on the Vietnam War held in Manila on October 24, 1966 between US President Lyndon Johnson and various Asian leaders. It was on this day that the first bloody confrontation between the radical movement and government forces occurred. The police roughly dispersed the demonstrators using guns, truncheons and firehoses. Sison and some of his followers were arrested and many others were beaten and bruised.

The filtering of the ideas of Mao Tse Tung and the effects of the Cultural Revolution plunge the PKP into a generation gap with the old cadre following the Stalinist view while the younger generation, spearheaded by Joma Sison, believing in the new Maoist line of thinking. Sison was able to convince the old guards in the PKP that a "rectification" campaign was needed to revitalize the movement. What came out was a blistering criticism of the PKP leadership under the Lavas. Angered, the Lava faction accused Sison of adventurism and propagating a Maoist cult in the movement. They expelled Sison and his followers from the party.

Following his expulsion from the PKP, Sison sought to create his own movement. In 1968, he had already gained a substantial number of followers to his cause and his plan of "armed revolution". By September of that year, Sison was already working on a new communist party constitution and planning to launch an armed revolution. By December, everything was set to convene the first party congress.

December 26, 1968 was the date set for the founding congress. Chosen as the historic venue was the town of Mangatarem in Pangasinan. The province was chosen for the reason that it was located in the boundary of Central Luzon which was the center of rural unrest and the Cordilleras, a potential stronghold for the armed struggle. Fearing a military raid or attack by political rivals, the meeting was postponed to January 3, 1969. The 12 founding members, however, agreed that December 28 should be placed on record as the founding Congress. This date coincides with the birthday of Mao Tse Tung.

After the first meeting of the new Communist Party of the Philippines in January 1969, the immediate task was the building of an army to protect the party and provide the force for the armed revolution to be waged. Expansion of the Kabataang Makabayan was pursued by the other members of the Central Committee while Sison was preoccupied with the building of an army which would launch the "people's war". He attempted twice to approach Commander Sumulong, the Huk leader in Central Luzon, but Sumulong failed to appear to talk with Sison.

In the same month as the founding congress, Sison met with Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante at the Huk leader's stronghold in Barrio Santa Rita in Capas, Tarlac province. The meeting was brokered by Congressman Jose Yap who had earlier approached Sison in late 1968 for the possibility of meeting with Dante who, by this time, nurtured a similar dream of agrarian revolution like the CPP Chairman. After a night of discussion, Sison and Buscayno agreed in principle to join their forces.

March 29, 1969 was chosen as the date to formally launch the party's armed group, the New People's Army. This was the same date that the World War II guerilla movement, the Hukbalahap, was founded twenty seven years earlier. In the evening, Sison talked at length about the revolution they were about to launch and after the speech, they all took an oath of allegiance to the Party and the NPA. The new revolutionary army was composed of 50 men and had an arsenal of some 35 weapons. This was later to grow and become a serious security threat to the government.

On June 1969, a military patrol entered Barrio Santa Rita and discovered voluminous documents of the CPP, to include Sison's blueprint for revolution. Confirming the existence of the New People's Army, the military launched a flurry of combat operations against suspected rebel hideouts in southern Tarlac using helicopters and armored trucks. The rebels, however, were able to effectively use their mass base in moving from house to house in order to avoid the troops.

The first armed encounter between the NPA and the Army occurred in September 1969 in the barrio of Baluarte, near the town of Mabalacat in Pampanga province. Soldiers encountered the NPA troops under Juanito Rivera. The government troopers had their first victory over the NPA with four rebels killed.

The Philippine Army deployed several battalions in the region and relentlessly conducted combat operations to flush out the rebels and destroy the New People's Army. Almost daily patrols and raids took a heavy toll on the NPA. The most crippling blow was when the NPA main force of about 60 guerillas was surprised by soldiers on patrol and the NPAs lost some 30 firearms along with a number of dead and wounded. Many members of the Central Committee were forced to move away from Central Luzon. Some moved to Manila, while others to Batangas, Laguna and Quezon where they organized communist cells. Sison and Dante, along with other members, went to establish another front in the northern province of Isabela where the Sierra Madre mountains provided a natural stronghold and base of the conduct of the armed struggle.

The event later to become famous as the First Quarter Storm began on January 26, 1970 when a crowd of about 20,000 jeered President Marcos and his wife, Imelda and threw rocks and bottles at their car. The police scattered the mobs. Four days later chanting demonstrators numbering thousands marched to Malacanang Palace. The crowd rammed the gates using a commandeered fire truck, entered the Palace grounds and burned automobiles, all the while chanting about the revolution. The police fought off the demonstrators up to nearby Mendiola bridge killing six people in the process. The following day, the demonstrators attacked the US Embassy using molotov cocktails and in the succeeding days, they attacked the Hilton hotel and other symbols of US presence in the Philippines.

The First Quarter Storm was a turning point for the revolutionary movement. The violent response of the government transformed the students, workers and intellectuals into radicals who vowed to topple the government. The movement was further strengthened by a steady stream of young recruits who joined the movement in the rural areas as a result of the recruitment and propaganda of the Kabataang Makabayan and the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan, the two major youth organizations of the Party.

On the early morning of 29 December 1970, a young Constabulary lieutenant by the name of Victor Corpus entered the gates of the Philippine Military Academy riding on a military jeep. He was accompanied by two cars on which rode nine guerillas whom he earlier met at Baguio City's Burnham Park. The group proceeded to the Academy's armory where they hogtied the guards and loaded 21 automatic rifles, 14 carbines, 6 machine guns, several grenade launchers, a bazooka and some 5,000 rounds of ammunition into their cars. The group drove all night to Cauayan town in Isabela province where they linked up with the group of Commander Dante in an NPA camp deep in the Sierra Madre mountains.

Two months prior to the raid, Corpus met with Sison in Cauayan, Isabela and expressed interest to join the communist movement. Corpus was dismayed at the corruption and unprofessionalism in the Constabulary and the Armed Forces. Sison asked if he can steal the weapons from the PMA armory to beef up the armory of the fledgling NPA. A few weeks later, Corpus again met with Sison and agreed to lead the raid.

The defection of Corpus and raid on the PMA armory was an embarrassment to the government and a tremendous propaganda boost to the revolutionary movement. This caused President Marcos to conduct "loyalty checks" in the Armed Forces due rumors of impending military coup.

Relentless operations by the Army in Central Luzon forced the Party to establish another base and no other place could have provided a safer haven than the Sierra Madre mountains in Isabela province. By 1970, the rebels, numbering about 100 men and women, have established a base and headquarters in Isabela. They lived an idyllic life, safe from military operations. For months, their presence remained undetected. Recruits from Manila clandestinely went to the camp to undergo political and military training. Graduates of the training course were assigned to various guerilla units in the Isabela front.

In November 1971, the Army learned through reliable intelligence sources the existence of the guerilla fronts in Isabela. Three battalions were deployed to the province, namely the 4th, 5th and 20th Infantry Battalions for a series of combat operations. The rebels were outnumbered and outgunned and lost an entire 30 man platoon. Weapons were little and ammunition was scarce. In mid-1972, due to immense loses and the imminent landing of arms from China, the rebels avoided contact with government troops. They wanted to make the government believe that it had already crushed the rebellion so the arms shipment from China will not be compromised.

On the dawn of July 4, 1972, a fishing trawler named "Karagatan" arrived off Digoyo Point in Palanan Isabela where three NPA platoons composed of some 80 men commanded by Victor Corpus were waiting. The group had traversed the Sierra Madre mountain for 21 days to reach the point. The Karagatan was loaded with some 1,200 rifles, thousands of ammunition and other war materiel from China.

While the NPAs were unloading the precious cargo, a plane carrying a logging company personnel spotted the ship. He reported the mysterious ship to the military authorities. Compromised, the Karagatan was moved towards the mouth of the river to speed up the unloading. As the rebels were dragging the crates into the jungle, two air force planes appeared and fired upon them. The NPAs quickly scattered and hid the crates in the jungle. The Karagatan was grounded on a sandbar as it tried to move out of the river.

Soldiers onboard a tugboat later attempted to tow the boat but they were fired upon by the rebels. The tugboat skipper and two soldiers were wounded. Bad weather delayed military response for a few days. When the weather cleared up, soldiers were rushed into the area through helicopters. On July 9, elements of the 4th Infantry Battalion were ambushed and three soldiers were killed. Coordinated air and naval bombardment, together with ground attacks, were conducted on the rebels' position. When the rebels withdrew and abandoned the area, they left behind much of the cargo of the Karagatan. The Army was able to recover 900 firearms, six M-40 rocket launchers and 160,000 rounds of ammunition.

The Karagatan incident placed the Isabela front in danger and NPAs had to move to other areas. Corpus and his men moved southward towards Quirino province, walking for 200 miles of thick jungle and rugged terrain of the Sierra Madre. They passed through four provinces in eight months, encountering military patrols, unfriendly villages, diseases and the dangers of the jungle. More than a dozen rebels during the long trek. They were able to link up with other guerilla units in early 1973.

Even before the Karagatan Incident, military intelligence pointed out the organization of guerilla fronts around the country, not only in Northern Luzon but also in Southern Luzon, the Visayas and in Mindanao.

Before the declaration of martial law in September 1972, the Philippine Army launched massive offensive operations in Northern Luzon. In Isabela, continuous operations dismantled the sympathetic mass base that the NPAs carefully built for two years. Leaders of subversive organizations and guerilla leaders were either captured or arrested. In October of the same year, the Army pinned down the Isabela Plains Platoon, killing some rebels and capturing the leader.

In Cagayan province, intensive operations destroyed NPA strongholds and the rebels were left without logistical support from the population. The almost 100 strong NPA company was weakened with sickness and many deserted or surrendered to the government. Combat operations were also conducted in Ifugao and Aurora provinces.

After three years of relentless operations, the Philippine Army was able to weaken the NPAs in Northern Luzon and caused many desertions among the ranks. Some surrendered to the government. By early 1976, many cadres and guerilla leaders have been either killed or captured and the NPAs lost much of their mass base. With heavy loses, the remaining leaders ordered a retreat to the north. They reached the town of Baggao in Cagayan province sometime in 1977.

Army units pursued the rebels and by the end of 1977, the soldiers were able to corner the rebel force in Baggao. The NPAs fought bravely but due to the overwhelming numbers and firepower of the government troops, they were forced to withdraw after so many rebels were killed. All in all, about 300 NPA rebels died in operations in Northern Luzon between 1970 and 1977. The Army, through relentless offensives thwarted the dream of the communists to create a stronghold in the Sierra Madres like Mao's Yenan.

While operations in Northern Luzon were destroying the rebels forces, elsewhere around the country, the CPP/NPA was moving forward with its recruitment and propaganda in the countryside. They opened strategically placed guerilla fronts around the country. By the late 70's, the NPAs had about 8,000 troops nationwide fighting in 43 of the country's 73 provinces.

To contain the growth and spread of the communist movement, the Philippine Army conducted operations throughout the archipelago. In the Bicol Peninsula, the Army supported by the Air Force conducted massive campaigns against communist bases and camps. Soldiers gradually tightened the cordon around the rebel camps and the situation in the rebel camps deteriorated. The camps were repeatedly bombarded by artillery and strafed by aircraft. The NPA collapsed in 1974 and the leaders surrendered to the government along with some of his troops.

In Samar island in Eastern Visayas, the Army launched combat operations in December 1977 against the jungle bases of the communists and forced the rebels to abandon their bases.

In Mindanao, the communist movement concentrated on building of mass bases and recruitment for the NPA. The rebels conducted only low level guerilla operations while the Army was preoccupied with the Muslim secessionist problem. By the early 1980's, the communist had already built strong mass bases and guerilla fronts in Eastern Mindanao, notably Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur and the provinces of Agusan del Sur and Agusan del Norte. By the early 1980's, Davao was a communist bastion where communist assassination teams roamed the cities gunning down soldiers, policemen and government officials. NPA squads roamed the countryside collecting revolutionary taxes, conducting recruitment and propaganda activities and terrorizing the people. To combat the communist menace in this part, the Philippine Army deployed the First Scout Ranger Regiment to Davao. Working with the Marines, local police forces and the local militia, the Civilian Home Defense Forces or CHDF which were being handled by the Army's Special Forces, the Scout Rangers were able to effectively contain the threat and bring peace and order to the province.

In August 1976, Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante was arrested. The next year, CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison was captured in La Union on November 10, 1977. Rodolfo Salas succeeded Sison as CPP Chairman and closely followed the Maoist line he had learned from his mentor, Sison. Salas was CPP chairman from 1977 to 1986.

Salas continued with what Sison and Buscayno left. He reconstructed the Party hierarchy and led the NPA to its astounding growth. Military training was improved and support units were developed along with the rural mass bases. By the early 1980's, the NPAs were able to deploy large formations and launch attacks on municipal halls, police stations and military outposts. By the end of 1983, the NPAs boasted of a strength close to 20,000 full-time fighters. By its peak in 1987, the rebel forces numbered more than 25,000 personnel with some 15,500 firearms. In Maoist terms, the communist movement have reached the defensive substage of their struggle.

Simultaneous with the operations against the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army in Luzon and the Visayas, the Philippine Army was also busy fighting the secessionist movement in Mindanao. The struggle was spearheaded by the Moro National Liberation Front or MNLF with its armed component, the Bangsa Moro Army.

The secessionist movement traces its origins from past movements in Lanao, Cotabato and Sulu. In Lanao, it was led by Datu Pandak in 1924. In Sulu in the 1950's, the Sultanate wanted to establish an independent Sultanate of Sulu. In May 1, 1968, former governor Udtog Matalam organized the "Muslim Independence Movement" in Pagalungan, Cotabato. Under the banner of self-determination, the aim of this organization was to establish an Islamic state out of Mindanao, Palawan and Sulu which was to be called, "The Republic of Mindanao and Sulu". It cited, among other factors, the "Corregidor Fiasco" in reference to the infamous "Jabidah Massacre" as a symbol of the policy of "isolation and dispersal" that the government pursued to the detriment of the Muslim communities. The MIM was significant because it awakened the Muslims to secessionist issues, united them to a certain degree and planted the seeds of the war between the MNLF and the government. The youth section of the MIM was the underground birthplace of the Moro National Liberation Front. The MIM did not last long because the government forced its disbandment in the early 70's.

The "Jabidah Massacre" of March 1968 was an offshoot of "Project Merdeka", a clandestine operation of the Armed Forces. Based on the Senate investigation of the incident, the casualties in the "Jabidah Forces" included 6 dead with strong evidence of violent deaths and 14 missing (believed to have been killed). There were three Muslims among the dead and almost all those missing were Muslims. One Muslim trainee, Jirin Arula, was wounded but was able to escape and reported the incident to the authorities and the media. The investigation further revealed that there were more victims as the AFP was not able to present a definitive list of recruits. The clearing of 21 officers and enlisted personnel involved in the project (charged with murder, frustrated murder and violations of the Articles of war) further enflamed Muslim outrage and adversely affected Muslim relations with the government.

The "Jabidah Massacre" was significant not only because it destroyed the credibility of the defense establishment but more so, because it affected Philippine relations with Malaysia and led to ties between MNLF leadership and certain sectors in Malaysia who encouraged the secessionist movement. Many of the MNLF leaders were trained in neighboring Borneo Island. From Mindanao, they would take "kumpits" or small inter-island vessels to go to the clandestine training camps. The MNLF was formally organized in one of the training camps, in Pulao Pangkor, and Nur Misuari, a Tausog from Sulu, former political science instructor at the University of the Philippines and former member of the Kabataang Makabayan, and who was among the first batch of trainees, was chosen as Chairman. Though the name Moro National Liberation Front was adopted by the Central Committee sometime in early 1969, the date officially adopted as the MNLF foundation day is March 18, 1968, the same day as the "Jabidah Massacre".

The forces of the Bangsa Moro Army, the military arm of the MNLF, was building up its forces since 1969. Training was conducted in clandestine camps abroad, Sabah and Libya in particular. The courses covered basic military skills like map reading, intelligence and counter-intelligence, weapons and marksmanship and demolition. Returning to Mindanao, the trained cadres recruited, conducted training, formed fighting fronts and built logistical bases. Arms, ammunition and other war materiel were shipped from abroad. MNLF commands were organized in Cotabato, Daval del Sur, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan and Sulu. By 1972, the Bangsa Moro Army was organized, trained and armed to stage offensive operations.

The escalated violence which coincided with the 1971 elections precipitated the secessionist war. The violence and bloodshed between Muslim groups (the Barracudas and Blackshirts) and Christians (the Ilagas) was pronounced in Cotabato and Lanao del Norte. Political and not religious reasons drove the violence as the Christian majority, the result of years of migration, threatened Muslim political leaders and their personal interests. The two most publicized incidents were the Manili Massacre on June 1971 and the ambush of some 200 Muslims lured by "safe conduct" passes. In the Manili Massacre, some 150 Muslim men, women and children were gathered in a Mosque by Christian mercenaries accompanied by Philippine Constabulary officers. There, the Muslims were killed with grenades and gunfire.

The violence focused national and international attention on the Muslim plight and the schism between the Muslims and Christians in Mindanao. The atrocities drew not only protests from Muslim leaders around the world but also logistical and financial support to the Mindanao secessionist movement from Islamic countries, particularly Libya under Muammar Khaddafi.

The declaration of martial law in September 1972 marked a turning point in Muslim-Christian relations. Muslim leaders perceived the imposition of martial law as the government's move to forcibly integrate them so they will forever remain as second class citizens in Mindanao. The first Muslim attack was on Marawi City which occurred in October 21, 1972, a month after the declaration of Martial Law. Muslim rebels seized the airport, the Constabulary headquarters and the Mindanao State University. Upon the arrival of government reinforcements, the rebels retreated to the hills and appealed for support from the Muslim community. The call for support did not go unheard and thereafter, fighting broke out in Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga and Sulu, with the Cotabato operations as the main effort towards the creation of a Bangsa Moro Republic. Thousands of Muslim and Christian families were displaced as a result of mass evacuation from the critical areas.

Responding to the rising violence in Mindanao, the Philippine Army was initially on the defensive. The 4th Infantry Division led the defense effort while the 1st and 3rd Infantry Division was being redeployed to Mindanao. The Central Mindanao Command under General Fortunato Abat was hastily established in 1973 to exercise command and control over operations in Central Mindanao and organize the campaign against the secessionists. With 4 Infantry Brigades and a Home Defense Brigade, CEMCOM organized task forces to conduct operations in particular areas. As the area became stable, the task forces were dissolved and the attached units returned to their mother units. Many of the units belonged to the "Kamagong" battalions which were composed of trainees supervised by a cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers from the regular force.

The tasks of CEMCOM were to "conduct offensive operations to destroy insurgent forces and restore peace and order, assist in the socio-economic development of the area in close coordination with other government agencies, local officials and civic organizations and support national and local agencies in law enforcement activities in the area". To accomplish its mission, CEMCOM implemented a five-phased strategy which served as the basis for the planning of CEMCOM's campaigns. The five phases are:

PHASE I: CONSOLIDATION AND BUILD-UP - The objectives of this phase was to consolidate the existing forces in the area, augment them with regular troops and the local self-defense forces and build-up sufficient military equipment. The intent was to shift from the defense to the offense after there is sufficient build-up of forces.

PHASE II: OFFENSIVE - Major twin objectives were to destroy the rebel armed groups and the recovery of areas under enemy control.

PHASE III: RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL AUTHORITY - Objective was to restore full civil control of the local government over the area. This included the appointment of local officials, strengthening of police forces and reopening of schools.

PHASE IV: RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION - The objective of this phase was the uupliftment of the masses through the restoration of main arteries of communication, construction of irrigation systems, re-establishment of local industries and schools, municipal buildings and health clinics.

PHASE V: RECONCILIATION - Ultimate objective was the eradication of sources of Muslim-Christian prejudices and animosities through reorientation of values and attitudes.

Initial combat operations were covered under campaign plan, "Bagong Buhay", the objectives of which were to secure the Cotabato area through a series of operations in the surrounding areas. This operation was spearheaded by the 6th Infantry Brigade. By March 1973, the operations were able to secure lines of communication and made Cotabato a secure base from which to launch offensive operations. Additional troops and materiel also arrived and resources were already adequate to recover areas lost to the Muslims in the central plains of Mindanao.

Prepared, CEMCOM launched successive offensive operations from March to May 1973. It was during this period that famous names and battles emerged such as:

Maganoy - where government defensive positions were sieged by some 2000 rebels only to be repelled by timely air support from the Philippine Air Force and reinforcement of the 5th Infantry Battalion;

Datu Piang - where psychological operations using leaflets was effectively used to cause the rebels to defect and surrender and the citizens, to evacuate the beleaguered area;

Sultan sa Barongis - where CEMCOM suspended operations and for the first time held peace talks offering amnesty;

Taragona - the diversionary attempt of the rebels in Davao Oriental on April 1973

Liguasan Marsh - when Pagalungan, the birthplace of the Muslim Independent Movement in 1968, was occupied on 8 May 1973 and Muslim Leader Udtog Matalam, founder of the Muslim Independence Movement, promised to cooperate to restore normalcy in Cotabato.

Tran - The Tran operations from June 6 to August 6, 1973 was the hardest fought battle during the campaign. As it was the main logistical base of the MNLF, Tran was fortified with trenches, bunkers, landmines and even, air-raid shelters. It was occupied by some 600 rebels which put up heavy resistance. Air strikes were conducted on rebel positions. C47 gunships conducted interdiction and harassment at night, the area lighted by illumination shells from the naval task group. Army casualties were mostly the result of sniper fires, anti-personnel mines and anti-tank weapons. After a month of hard fighting, the rebels surrendered on August 6.

CEMCOM's initial campaigns in 1973 were significant for a number of reasons: first, it forced the rebels to over-spend their resources and over-extend their capability that eventually, they had to scatter into small groups and could only conduct low-level unconventional operations like ambuscades, harassment, sabotage and terrorism; second, the effectiveness of psychological operations through tri-media operations directed towards the rebels and the population was proven; third, the Engineers proved their usefulness not only in combat works but also in civil related construction activities and; fourth, it was during the campaign that the "Kamagong" trainees of the Army experienced their baptism of fire and proved their worth as soldiers.

Offensive operations continued the next year, in 1974, to destroy remaining pockets of resistance and bring development into the affected areas. From 2 February to 26 March, CEMCOM conducted operations at Reina Regente, which was being built by the Muslims as a base of operations for attacks against Christian communities in Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato. After 52 bitter days of fighting, the Army was able to occupy Reina Regente, but only after 15 soldiers were killed and 45 others wounded. In the rebel side, 159 were killed in action.

Following Reina Regente was the battle for Awang Airport in June when the 6th Infantry Brigade conducted counter-mortar fire on enemy mortar positions and launched intensive "search and destroy" operations killing 86 rebels and securing the airport and Cotabato City.

The battle for Upi occurred on July. For two successive days, government troops held on before withdrawing due to overwhelming enemy strength. The rebels occupied the town and burned buildings. The town was retaken on 2 August and the CO, 2nd Infantry Battalion was designated as acting mayor to administer the reconstruction of the town and bring normality to the lives of the citizens.

Other operations were conducted in Raguisi-Pinaring area, in Kolong-kolong, in Lampari-Banga, in Solon-Tarikan and in the Carmen area. By December, the situation was very much manageable that CEMCOM opened the river traffic in Central Cotabato. In effect, there was an undeclared ceasefire that brought peace to the holiday celebrations.

1975 started with a bang when the rebels mortared Awang airport on the second week of January. The sporadic attacks brought fear and anxiety to the population and the threat had to be removed. CEMCOM launched Operation Thunderball on 28 January.

After several weeks of conventional and unconventional fighting, the town of Tumbao was captured on 18 March and the mortar attacks ceased. The threat to Cotabato City and Awang airport was removed and Operation Thunderball was terminated.

Another major operation in 1975 was the Tangkal-Munai operations in Lanao Norte. The area has long been a sanctuary of the rebels who lived off the protection money they extorted from the numerous logging companies. Tangkal was occupied by the 10th Infantry Battalion on 10 February.

In a series of operations lasting three years, from 1973 to 1975, the Central Mindanao Command effectively neutralized the military capability of the MNLF and put a blunt to the rising secessionist movement.

While the Cotabato operations were ongoing, the MNLF in the Zamboanga peninsula and Sulu archipelago were building up its organization and beefing up its military capabilities. When hostilities commenced, the Army found itself confronted with a force armed with sophisticated firearms and well-trained in the art of warfare.

In February 1974, the MNLF launched an attack on the headquarters of 1/4 Brigade based in Jolo. Army units doggedly repelled the attack and the rebels withdrew to the hills but not before burning the town of Jolo to cover their retreat. Pursuit operations were conducted which resulted to the destruction of numerous rebel strongholds in various parts of Jolo island. After the "burning of Jolo", the MNLF rebels staged attacks on Army camps and detachments and police outposts in nearby Basilan island and in the Zamboanga peninsula.

Four months later, in June, three battalions, the 14th, 18th and 24th, under the direction of the 2/1 Brigade launched massive operations around the Tayungan area. The purpose of the campaign was to disrupt the delivery of firearms (which included crew-served weapons) and ammunition to rebel forces. The MNLF intended to stage attacks on military units in the area once they have acquired necessary weapons and equipment. On July 3, the rebels abandoned the area and government troops occupied Mt. Tayungan and established control over the outlying areas. Result of the operation was 36 rebels killed and 13 killed on the government side.

In August, the 1/4 Brigade conducted offensive operations around Indanan, Sulu where some 600 rebels were camped. The object of the operation was to pre-empt the rebel plan to attack government forces in the area. After this operation, the rebels were not able to stage major attacks except for occasional sniping incidents. There were sporadic encounters throughout 1974 which continued well into the 1976 ceasefire and up to the 80's.

Meanwhile, in mainland Mindanao, Zamboanga del Sur was virtually under MNLF control in early 1974. Well-organized and armed, the rebels ambushed public transport, attacked villages and extorted money from businessmen and wealthy families. They occasionally staged attacks on police outposts.

To regain control, the Army launched "Oplan Kingfisher" which consisted of operations designed to clear the Baganian area and the western towns of Zambo Sur. The 16th Infantry Battalion proved their skill in battle when they outmaneuvered the rebels forces and forced the enemy to retreat to their sanctuaries along the coast. This operation crippled the rebels and rendered them incapable of staging a large scale offensives.

In mid-1974, the rebels once again stepped up their terroristic activities around Pagadian City. In response, the 4th Infantry Division, supported by the local police, launched "Oplan Sea Breeze". The military and police units conducted numerous zonal search operations in and around the vicinity of Pagadian. Numerous firearms and ammunition were seized from suspected rebels. In a short while, the terroristic activities stopped.

By the mid 70's up to the early 80's, the campaign against the secessionists had gradually transformed into a war of attrition as Army operations dealt heavy blows and losses to the rebels in terms of manpower, armaments and ammunition. Ambuscades, harassment and sniping became normal nuisances that the troops had to contend with. Soldiers on patrol would often encounter rebel forces in a meeting engagement that would normally result in the rebels withdrawing and going to their sanctuaries.

On 23 December 1976, the Tripoli Agreement. Among the provisions was the creation of Autonomy in Southern Philippines and a ceasefire which was to take effect after the signing of the agreement. For the next ten years following the Tripoli Agreement, the secessionist problem slowly receded. The 1st Infantry Division maintained its headquarters in Jolo, however, to serve as deterrent and safety factor to Muslim groups who still had the capability to launch small scale attacks.

A sad footnote to the ceasefire and the Tripoli Agreement was the Patikul Massacre. On October 10, 1977, 35 soldiers which included the commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, Brigadier General Teodulfo Bautista and some of his senior staff, were killed at a marketplace in the village of Danag in the Patikul district of Jolo. General Bautista was on a mission to meet MNLF chieftain Usman Sali to discuss enforcement of the ceasefire or to come over to the folds of the government.

The Mindanao campaigns featured "hard and soft" approaches. The "hard approach" covered the military operations that led to bloodshed and destruction. The "soft approach" featured the government's policy of attraction. This "open arms" policy was covered under Presidential Decree 95 which offered selective amnesty to surrenderees. "Safe conduct" passes and on occasion, ceasefires, provided the Muslim rebels the opportunity to return to the folds of the law and live a normal, peaceful life in the community. Many rebels took advantage of the opportunity and some of them were even commissioned into the Armed Forces as officers.

The Philippine Army knew that the secessionist movement cannot be quelled by military operations alone. The roots of the struggle are embedded in the socio-economic conditions of Muslim communities which had long been neglected. Army units, therefore, linked up with the local government, the national government agencies and non-governmental organizations for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of communities affected by the war and the restoration of the people's livelihoods and economic well-being. Army units undertook civic action activities in coordination with concerned government agencies and non-governmental organizations. These included medical and dental projects, repair of schools, public buildings, health centers, churches and mosques. The Army engineers played a big role in the construction of infrastructure that facilitated the rehabilitation of communities in Mindanao.

The four day "people power" revolution at EDSA on February 22-25, 1986 was a turning point for the Philippine Army. For years during martial law and the years that followed, the Philippine Army degraded into an unprofessional organization. The organization was besieged with military politics, favoritism and corruption. The EDSA revolution galvanized the division between the loyalists of the administration and those who wanted reforms in the Armed Forces and the national government. The Philippine Army during this historic four days was under the command of a commanding general who was loyal to the administration.

Torn between duty to the duly constituted authority and the need for reform, officers and soldiers defected to the side of the rebels scattered and piecemeal. Senior Army officers decided on their own, some bringing with them their units and men. Among the first to defect was Regional Unified Command 8 which had an Army commander. Many units had the "wait and see" attitude and it was a seesaw battle for loyalty and personal conviction.

Crucial to the downfall of the administration and the victory of the EDSA rebels under Enrile and Ramos was the deliberate refusal of Armor units to use their firepower on the thousands of people gathered at EDSA. Another was the unwillingness of the elite and combat experienced First Scout Ranger Regiment to go on a mission directed by Marcos. The non-participation of these major units removed from the administration their greatest weapon against the rebels.

By Day 4, on February 25, a great number of Army officers and their units defected to the rebel side, cementing the victory for the rebels.

EXPANSION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

The 70's and early 80's was a period of gradual build-up for the Philippine Army in terms of manpower, organization and equipment. In 1965, Army strength was only 21,000 and by 1985, it was 58,000 -- an increase of 176%. This growth in manpower, which was accompanied by the steady procurement of modern equipment and the upgrade of existing inventory, was largely a result of two major factors: the anti-dissident campaigns and the expanded role of the Philippine Army.

The counter-insurgency campaigns against the CPP/NPA and the MNLF demanded a substantial increase in the number of fighting soldiers integrated into a responsive and efficient organization. It was also imperative to procure new and modern armaments and equipment. The Army's expanded role meant that it was not only a force for the defense of the country, it was also a force for nation-building. The Philippine Army was not only the defender and protector of the Republic, it was also a partner of the people for socio-economic development and progress. Relatedly, it was not only concerned with tactics and battle plans, it was also involved in various national development programs.

This chapter will discuss some of the major developments in the Philippine Army during the 70's and early 80's particularly in organization, training, logistics and home defense activities. The Philippine Army Revitalization Plan and the Tanglaw Program, two major programs during this period, will also be discussed.

The Muslim secessionist problem and the communist insurgency demanded an efficient and effective fighting force. To win in a two front war required not only troop build-up but also a major force restructuring to meet the numerous tasks the Army had to perform.

In 1970, the nine battalion combat teams or BCTs, which were the basic organization of the Army during the Hukbalahap campaign in the 1950's, were deactivated and transformed into infantry battalions and integrated into the infantry divisions. The concept then was to maintain a small regular force backed up by strong, readily mobilizable reserves. This was to change at the start of the MNLF problem in 1972 which demanded a rapid build-up of forces. In response, the Army launched the "Kamagong" concept which called for the recruitment, training and subsequent employment of 20 year old citizens for combat duties in Mindanao and in other parts of the country.

Other notable organizational innovations followed after 1972 in response to the changing tactical situation:

1974 - The 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades were upgraded to infantry divisions.

1976 - More infantry battalions were created to fill-up the four infantry divisions.

Two engineer brigades were activated.

The first armor unit, the Light Armor Regiment, was organized.

The Army Support Command was activated to provide for the centralized management of the Army's logistical requirements.

The 701st Signal Battalion was upgraded to form the Army Signal Group.

The Philippine Army Civil Relations and Information Service was (PACRIS) organized for the purpose of sustained civil-relations activities and tri-media operations.

The Philippine Army School Center was upgraded to form the Philippine Army Training Command (PATC).

The Army Management and Information Service was organized to provide the Army with a computerized information management system.

1977 - The Army Reserve Command was organized for centralized reserve training

1978 - The Special Warfare Brigade was activated. It was initially composed of the Scout Ranger Training Unit, the Home Defense Forces Group (Airborne) and the Civil Disturbance Control Company of the Security and Escort Battalion. By the early 80's, prior to its deactivation, the brigade was composed of four special units: the Home Defense Forces Group (forerunner of today's Special Forces), the Scout Ranger Group, the Special Operations Group and the Army Aviation Battalion.

The Light Home Defense Brigade (Seaborne) was activated. The mission of this unit was to deny enemy access and use of the waterways and islets in the Sulu archipelago for the infiltration of personnel, supplies and equipment.

1981 to 1985 - More infantry battalions were created and integrated to the divisions. Total number of battalions reached 55.

The training environment in the Philippine Army underwent revolutionary changes during the 70's and 80's. The anti-dissident campaigns brought into the open the lapses and inadequacies in the Army's training program which required quick and drastic modifications. There were two major changes made: first, the programs of instruction shifted emphasis to unconventional operations and tactics instead of conventional warfare and second, non-traditional military concerns as a result of the Army's expanded role were introduced into the training program. The second modification included the addition of modules on civil-military operations or CMO, law enforcement and the famous Tanglaw program.

For the fighting units, training emphasized small unit/scout ranger type tactics as well as civil-military operations. Infantry battalions underwent rigorous retraining and were vigorously evaluated prior to redeployment. In-unit training was emphasized in the division training programs and regular Troop Information and Enlightenment or TI & E was stressed among unit commanders and staff to ensure that soldiers were updated on latest developments and standing policies.

Training was also conducted for the reservists, draftees and the Civilian Home Defense Forces or CHDF. Reserve training concentrated on mobilization, refreshers on tactics and proficiency in weaponry and the Army's equipment. Draftees were provided with vocational skills which they could put to good use after they leave the service. The CHDF were trained in internal security operations for the protection of their community so the regular troops can be deployed to more critical areas.

To fulfill the growing training requirements of the Philippine Army, the Philippine Army Training Command was transferred to Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija where the huge military reservation provided ample space for realistic training in a variety of terrain. Additionally, army training groups were established in Visayas and Mindanao to decentralize the training of enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers.

Massive operational requirements and troop movements resulted in a tremendous increase in the logistical requirements of all Army units -- combat, combat support and combat service support. To enable Army units to accomplish their mission efficiently and effectively, the budget for maintenance and operations expenses or MOE was dramatically increased. The MOE is used to support combat essentials like individual clothing and equipment, ammunition, communication equipment, medicines, combat rations, hospitalization, utilities, vehicle spare parts, etc.

The weapons procurement program placed emphasis on improving the soldier's capability to "move, shoot and communicate" so he can fight better. Major acquisitions during the period included:

1970 and 1973 - 105mm and 155mm howitzers

1972 - Armored Personnel Carrier M113A1 (Diesel) - this added to gasoline fed APC M113 earlier procured in 1968

1974 - M16 Rifles

1975-Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) nicknamed the "Scorpion" and "Commando" V-150 Armored Vehicles

1980 - Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles and APC M113A2

1984 - V-150 "Commando" Armored Vehicles

For the Army's transport requirements, several vehicles were acquired: US Kennedy type jeeps, US M35 6X6 trucks, Romanian trucks, British Land Rovers and locally produced mini-cruiser jeeps. In field communications, old radio sets were replaced with modern communication equipment which were smaller, more manageable, with greater output and required less maintenance.

To facilitate the efficient procurement, storing and distribution of equipment and supplies, the Army organized the Army Support Command or ASCOM and created the 72-100 Reimbursable Fund in 1973. ASCOM then established the Forward Administrative Service Support Units or FASSU's in strategic areas like Cotabato, Cagayan de Oro, Samar and Zamboanga. The FASSU's enabled units in far flung areas gain closer and easier access to much needed supplies and equipment.

The 72-100 Reimbursable Fund was designed for the easier procurement of fast moving items like office supplies, janitorial supplies, batteries, tires and vehicle parts. Supplies that the units get can be deferred, reimbursed or charged to army appropriations.

The Home Defense Program of the Philippine Army was based on the AFP wide program launched in 1970. The program was based on the pronouncement of the Commander in Chief that "the AFP must intensify its efforts to attain a convincing posure as the protector of the people through an integrated program of good community relations, assistance in civic action and other nation building programs of the government and the proper behavior of the individual soldier". Towards this end, the program envisioned the following broad objectives :

1. To develop a citizenry responsive to their military and civic obligations to the Republic of the Philippines

2. To help attain a state of military preparedness to cope with both internal and external threats

3. To promote the AFP's image as the people's protector and partner.

4. To help strengthen the social, political and economic structure of the Philippines in order to enhance its national security posture.

To achieve these objectives, the Philippine Army was involved in four types of activities namely: reserve affairs, civil assistance, community relations and agro-military. Under community relations were civic action, command information, public relations and psychological operations. These activities constituted the "left hand" effort of the Army in support of the "right hand" effort which was tactical operations. Home Defense activities were directed towards the consolidation of tactical gains and ultimately, the elimination of sources of discontent which breed the insurgency.

Reserve affairs activities concentrated on reserve force development organization, training and mobilization tests of reserve units. Many reserve units were deployed for disaster relief and rescue operations and mobilized in support of various socio-economic programs. Civilian Home Defense Forces underwent were trained on both combat and community development activities.

In civil assistance, the Army was heavily involved in infrastructure development, rehabilitation and resettlement projects. Engineer units coordinated with local government agencies for the construction of roads, bridges, schoolhouses, barangay centers, health clinics, etc. Notable among these numerous infrastructure projects are the three major projects in 1980: the 197 kilometer power distribution system that enabled far-flung areas in Cagayan and Isabela to have electricity, the 318.53 kilometer electrification project in the Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, Bukidnon, Lanao Sur area and the Rugnan River Irrigation project in Tampara, Lanao Sur which provided and continues to provide irrigation to about 1700 hectares of agricultural land.

Also as part of the civil assistance activities, Army units were deployed to respond to natural disasters in evacuation, rescue and relief operations. Other forms of public assistance included legal assistance to poor families, transport assistance to remote barangays and occasionally, blood donations.

In community relations, Army units conducted countless medical and dental civic actions nationwide. Medical and dental teams composed of military and civilian doctors, dentists, nurses and midwives were brought to remote areas. These teams not only treated the people for ailments, they also informed the people of the importance of health and sanitation. For public information, the Philippine Army used tri-media outlets (print, radio and television) to create public understanding of the mission and functions of the Army. Many of the info campaign projects were embodied in the famous TANGLAW program. The "Army News" was published as a weekly newspaper. There were also regular TV programs like the "Dialogue and Action" and "Dial OCR for Information Action" aired in the Visayas. The "PA Singing Soldier of the Year" was a unique project designed not only to promote Filipino culture and values but also to tell the people that soldiers are also human beings like everyone else. Additionally, numerous psychological operations projects designed to gain favorable public attitude towards the military and the government were undertaken throughout the country.

Agro-military activities included food production activities, reforestation and animal raising. Idle military reservations were transformed into agricultural lands, planted with rice, corn and a variety of vegetables and orchards with a variety of fruit-bearing trees. Denuded areas in military reservations were planted with trees in response to the government's reforestation program.

The Tanglaw Program had its roots in the psychological operations seminars first conducted by the mobile training teams of the Office of Civil Relations in 1974. PSYOPS activities were an important component of the Home Defense Program which was launched in 1970. The purpose of the teams were to instruct the soldiers about the ideological foundations of the communist insurgency not only to make them better understand the nature of the enemy but also to realize that to win the war involved a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the people. The subjects included tri-media operations, human relations, Filipino cultural values and other related topics. In 1976, the program was expanded and named "Motivation and Enlightenment". It was aimed at making the soldier a protector of the people and at the same time, a partner for peace and progress.

In 1976, these motivational programs were transformed into the TANGLAW courses which were incorporated in the TI & E of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. TANGLAW, which literally means "beacon" or "light" stood for "Tanod at Gabay ng Lahi at Watawat". The Philippine Army Civil Relations Service was designated as the primary implementing arm of the TANGLAW program of the Army.

The objectives of the Philippine Army TANGLAW program were:

1. To help strengthen the Army's sense of commitment to the nation an its constituted authority.

2. To help strengthen the Army's awareness of its role and responsibilities in helping build the Filipino nation.

3. To help instill in the Army a set of values that reflects the goals of the New Republic.

4. To help create a new tradition based on the ideological framework of "Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa".

5. To help develop a strong nation founded on a just, egalitarian and stable society designed for the general welfare of the entire Filipino population and perpetuating the rights and liberty of the people as mandated by the New Constitution.

Essentially, the TANGLAW program was aimed at motivating and enlightening the soldier of the goals of the national government so that he can become an effective agent of change. Seminar/workshops were conducted by mobile training teams sent to units throughout the country. In 1979, all courses in the Philippine Army Training Command included a TANGLAW module. Line unit commanders also conducted their own TANGLAW lectures to their troops as part of their regular TI & E program.

PACRIS extensively used print media in its information dissemination efforts. It produced the weekly Army News and the quarterly Army Journal which were circulated not only within the Army and the Armed Forces but also to external publics like key government officials, school heads and non-governmental organizations. The line units, through the Civil Relations and Information Service Groups, also produced their own publications.

Broadcast media was also used for wider dissemination of information concerning the Army. In Metro Manila, there was the "Ugnayang Bayan" aired over DZCA. The Civil Relations and Information Service Groups also maintained radio programs in their respective areas of responsibility. The 5th CRISG had "Radyo Gabay" over DWAR in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The 3rd CRISG maintained the radio program "Kasayuran Ug Alagad" in Cebu and the television program, "Dial OCR For Information and Action" which reached Cebu, Tacloban and Cagayan de Oro.

Other media used to create public awareness and appreciation for the Army's mission was the Philippine Army Cultural Troupe which performed live stage performances for soldiers and for the public, photo displays in public places and also briefings about the Army to various audiences within and outside the Army. A unique but very significant component of the TANGLAW program was the Army Literacy Patrol System or ALPS. Soldier-teachers were sent to far-flung areas to educate residents the rudiments of writing and reading.

The anti-dissident campaigns and the involvement of the Army in nation building activities exposed many inadequacies and limitations in the capabilities of the Army. Four areas were identified to have limiting effects on the accomplishment of the Army's mission: personnel, organization, training and equipment.

In personnel, there were far too many reserves compared to regulars at a ratio of 1 regular to 2 reserves; likewise, there was no inventory of military occupational specialties

In organization, there was a need to manage properly the Army reserve program.

In training, there was no coherent doctrine as the capability of the Doctrine Development Center at the Training Command was very limited; there was a need to emphasize good marksmanship and fire discipline; and there was need to make soldiers realize the value of preventive maintenance of equipment and weapons.

In equipment, there was no air defense capability, air mobility and effective combat support equipment; there was no night fighting capability; artillery was inaccurate; engineer combat support was nil and engineer essential services like field fortification, river crossing and water purification services were virtually non-existent; anti-tank capability was obsolete; transport and communication capabilities were sadly wanting.

Realizing the imperative to improve its capabilities, the Philippine Army launched the PA Revitalization Plan in 1977. Based on a realistic assessment of national and regional security issues and concerns, the PA Revitalization Plan was designed to develop an Army that can effectively meet internal security concerns while maintaining adequate defense capabilities against external threats. The plan had three major objectives:

1. The restructuring of the Philippine Army organizational set-up and organization of units to effectively carry out its missions and to meet future contingencies.

2. The modernization and fill-up of equipment of the Philippine Army, consistent with its mission and anticipated tasks.

3. The determination of the fund requirement needed to acquire new weapon systems in its modernization effort.

The Revitalization Plan was divided into two five year phases (first phase: 1978 tot 1982; second phase: 1983 to 1987). The first phase was designed to develop the full capability of the Philippine Army to cope with insurgency situations and the second phase, to develop a limited capability to meet external threats.

The Revitalization Plan was moderately ambitious but it was beset with political and financial problems that coincided with the general downtrend in the country in the late 70's and early 80's. The planned Aviation Battalion, Mechanized Infantry Division, Air Defense Battalion and Engineer Rivering Battalion of the Army Field Force never got off the ground. Corollarily, equipment for these units which would have modernized the Army were never procured.

The Army Reserve Force, however, was more successful in its programs with the establishment of the Army Reserve Command, the major unit that handled the Army's reserve programs. The ARESCOM was responsible for the registration of all reservists, organization of reserve units, training and the mobilization forces to augment the regular force in critical areas, for disaster rescue relief operations and also for support of national government programs.

Sources used for this chapter:

1. Colin Chapman, Inside the Revolution,

2. Victor Corpus, Silent War, VNC Enterprises, Quezon City, 1989.

3. Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement, Westview Press, San Francisco, 1989.

4. History of the Philippine Army, Volume 2 (draft), Army Historical Division, Philippine Army, July 1996.

5. Reestablished Communist Party of the Philippines, published by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

6. "Rebel in the Net", Far Eastern Economic Review, November 25, 1977.

7. Report of CG, PA to the President, April 27, 1983.

8. The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, document from Civil Affairs Group, Philippine Army.

9. The Finest Tradition, Philippine Army, 1982.

10. Fortunato U. Abat, The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao: The CEMCOM Story, FCA Inc., Manila, 1993.

11. Fortunato Abat, "CEMCOM: Guidelines for Stability Operations".

12 Fortunato Abat, "Applied Strategy in Stability Campaigns".

13. Mariano Dumla, "The Moro National Liberation Front and the Organization of Islamic Conference: Its Implications to National Security".

14. TJS George, Revolt in Mindanao, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980.

15. Peter Gordon Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 1983.

16. Alunan Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration?, Cardinal Bookstore, Manila, 1971.

17. Lela Garner Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines", Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia, 1976.

18. Jose Rene Jarque, "The Mindanao Problem: Implications for the Army", Army Journal, 1995.

19. Harvey Stockwin, "A State of Violent Suspense", Far Eastern Economic Review, March 18, 1974.

20. Samuel Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle: 1900-1972, Filipinas Foundation, Inc., Manila, 1977

21. Rodney Tasker, "Peace Takes a Bloody Knock", Far Eastern Economic Review, October 21, 1977.

22. Rodney Tasker, "Zamboanga Waits and Worries", Far Eastern Economic Review, October 28, 1977.

23. The Finest Tradition, Philippine Army, 1982.

24. "The Massacre: A Wider Toll", Asiaweek, October 28, 1977.

25. Accomplishment Report: 1965 to 1985, Headquarters, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Makati.

26. Annual Report, Philippine Army, 1980.

27. The Philippine Army in National Security and National Development : Performance and Prospects, Headquarters, Philippine Army, 1982.

28. The Philippine Army Tanglaw Program: An Assessment. Report Submitted to G3, PA dtd 16 June 1982.

29. The Philippine Army Revitalization Plan, Headquarters, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, 1977.

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