Political violence exploited on February 27, 1989, followed by the coup attempts of 1992. These events did nothing but prove that the three key pillars of the political system were undermined: 1) economic strength (Black Friday, 1983); 2) parties' capacity to channel and control participation (Caracazo, 1989); and 3) parties' hard-won superiority in the balance of forces with the military (4-F-92, 27-N-92) (Komblith et al, 1995: 38-39).
Military officers, once in power, have had smashing popularity as they began their government by changing those old structures built by previous elites. They (President Chavez and his team) have used democratic means to achieve those changes, and more importantly, most of the civil society - besides the military - has supported them through the ballot. There is no doubt, at least from my viewpoint, that Venezuelan political society (like many other Latin American societies) will have yet to grow older, politically speaking, to conceive the military as an "apolitical institution."
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