During the first phase of the "process," the Revolutionary government focused on the dismantlement of the puntofijista institutional structure. A new constitution was approved through a national referendum in 1999. The new constitution provided numerous privileges for the military - including the right to vote, and autonomy in the management of the budget - and centralized the authority in the Chief Command (the President himself) (Ferrero, 2002: 18). As for the military rights, the new constitution contends in its article n. 330 the military's right to vote, acknowledging though that they are not allowed to participate in acts of propaganda or political proselytism (Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2000: 121). Yet, it has no article claiming the non-deliberative aspect of the Armed Force (claimed in the 1961 Constitution), or condemning eventual politicization of the institution, which somehow encourages military men to engage in politics.
Regarding structure and functions of the military, President Chávez has made some crucial changes to the institution: 1) he abolished the command unity of the Armed Forces (so as to avoid complicity between two or more forces to plan possible coups); 2) he promoted military involvement in national development as an attempt to merge the military with civil society; 3) he ordered military participation in public order.
Not simply has president Chávez increased military budget in unprecedented ways, assuring the institution's loyalty, but also has he extracted highly qualified officers from the institution to occupy key political positions in foreign embassies, and in state enterprises such as Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA, the state oil company), CITGO, the National Budget Direction, and Communication and information Direction . More importantly, most of the ministers of President Chávez have been military officers retrieved from their duties and given retirement to perform as ministers. At present, 5 ministers, out of 17 in total are military officials (Justice and Internal Affairs Ministry, Defense Ministry, Infrastructure Ministry, Communication and Information Direction, and Planning and Development Ministry). And nearly 40% of all pointed ministers since 1999 have been military men (from 54 appointed until the year 2000, 12 came from the Armed Forces)(Glob. "Politica").
Most of the changes achieved by President Chávez and his governing team are at the political level. The leader of the Bolivarian Revolution has centered his efforts in modifying the rules previously established by the two dominant parties. Namely: 1) bicameral legislative system was changed to unicameral (National Assembly, instead of Chamber of Deputies, and Senate); 2) the presidential term was changed from 5, to 6 years; 3) presidential reelection is now allowed immediately and only for two consecutive periods (under the previous rules, the president could not be reelected until two presidential periods had passed); 4) public financing of political parties was eliminated (so as to cut off with corruption, and somehow isolate AD and COPEI from the public money); 5) and personalized proportional representation was established in the National Assembly to strengthen representativeness, and participation (Payne et al, 2002: 83-115).
Venezuelans have had plenty of opportunities to express their support for president Chávez's reforms; in fact, most of them have been approved by national referendums. Since 1999 up until present, four national referendums have taken place. The first was held in February 1999 for consulting the creation of a National Constituent Assembly. This assembly was to displace the traditional Congress, and it was approved by 88% of the electoral population (CNE, Rep. Bol. Ven.). Such approval confirmed the general discontent with the functioning of previous Congresses. The second referendum called for approving the new 1999 Constitution crafted by the new National Assembly. It was also approved by an overwhelming majority of 78%. The third consult called for new leaders of the Workers Union in December 2000 (Referéndum Sindical). This one was approved by 62% of the votes ("El Tema". Glob). And the fourth referendum, and last one so far, is the Presidential reelection of Hugo Chávez for a new period that began in the year 2000. Here, President Chavez was reaffirmed in power by 59, 7% of the population, who granted him 6 more years in power - besides the year that had already passed from his formal 1998-2003 period (CNE, Rep. Bol. Ven.). The loss of belief in "traditional" political actors, and in old policy making drove the masses to look for desperate solutions in new military leaders. But more importantly, massive support given to president Chávez' initiatives meant nothing but two crucial things: expression of repudiation for the old "establishment," and the only means for people to punish corrupt politicians.
Concerning the party system, a study conducted by Mark Payne contends that representation in Venezuelan electoral system has increased from 4.2 in 1979, to 6.25 in the year 2000 (in the same 1 to 20 scale, Ecuador had the highest score in 1989 with 17.04). Also, the effective number of parties represented in the Legislature increased from 2.65 in 1979, to 3.44 in the year 2000 (Payne et al, 2002: 117-121). This drastic change in the party system is due to two primary reasons: the overwhelming popularity of the government party (Quinta Republica), which managed to be at the top in the 1998 elections, and the plurality that president Chávez has promoted inviting other political groups to join his government, such as indigenous groups (who now have four seats in Congress), and left-oriented political parties (Patria Para Todos, PPT). AD and COPEI have had a hard struggle to remain in the political scene. Even though president Chávez has maintained respectful of their political rights; attacks, restraints, and political maneuvers against the two parties are everyday issues in 2003 Venezuela's polity.
CONCLUSIONS
Venezuelan party system has undoubtedly promoted military intervention in politics. Failure to deliver effective policies, joined to an increasing disbelief on traditional governing style drove military leaders to feel responsible for the nation's well-being, and hence intervene. Clearly, the characteristics of the party system such as corruption, reverse clientelism, encapsulation of social groups, and parties' incapacity to channel citizens' demands, not only contributed to build a strong and stable political environment for embracing the new democratic times, but also provoked its own collapse in the long run.
This research provides enough evidence to support the initial hypothesis "the Venezuelan military involvement in politics has emerged in the last five years due to two main reasons: the existence of an excluding two-party system arrangement, and a breakdown of legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness of previous political system (Partidocracia)." All of the six variables drawn from this hypothesis directly promote military engagement in politics. Namely, excessive control of party structure by top leadership, hegemony by the two-party establishment, encapsulation of social groups by the two dominant parties (AD and COPEI), informal representation of elite interests (reverse clientelism), and the incapacity of the system to cope with citizens' basic demands, which accordingly cause political violence.
The lack of parties' internal democratization devised excessive control by top leaders over candidates' nominations to public offices. The bulk of legislators constrained their political actions to adapt to party line exclusively. Their loyalty was warranted to party leaders, since they owed their positions to them. Therefore, peoples' demands were unattended, or worse, completely ignored. This situation accentuated across the years, increasing peoples' discontent, reaching to high levels of public rejection towards political authorities, and increasing popular support (or desire) for a sudden break with the prevailing political scheme: military rescue.
The Punto Fijo accord, on the one hand, established certain order that was necessary for democratization, but on the other hand, helped the two dominant parties to capitalize their strength. Small parties never had fair representation in the country's policy making. Venezuelan Presidents had never been but from one of these two parties (AD or COPEI). Hence, political life (and rules) has grown up from within those organizations, which has led to charges of partyarchy. The most significant outcome of partidocracia is the inability of minority parties to access policy-making, and achieve representation of minority populations; whereby military intervention is sought to solve political conflicts. Nearly all venezuelan institutions were politicized and party structured. AD and COPEI (but mostly AD) exerted a sort of social vacuum, impeding thus nonpolitical organizations to form. Parties' excessive domination suffocated civil society to such extent that they organized students' groups, professional organizations, and neighborhood associations on party lines and discipline. Military leaders' mounting concern with this political scenario ended up with consecutive upheavals since 1992.
