The Rational Actor Model (RAM) focuses on government action as a choice made by one “agent.” This agent is a unified actor who makes decisions according to his/her goals. The rational choice model posits that all individuals and agents have a utility function that includes a variety of goals and objectives. The model assumes that actors are “rational” to the extent that their behaviors and choices are consistent with the attainment and maximization of their goals. Thus, the model postulates that an actor is constantly faced with a variety of alternatives, but will always “choose” the option that he/she “considers” will maximize utility. Such deceptively simple reasoning has been used extensively in studies on public policy, decision-making, international bargaining and negotiations, strategic interactions, foreign policy, etc.
The core concepts of this model are the following: First, goals and objectives, which are the interests and values of the agent and represent the desirability of alternative sets of consequences. The second concept is made up by the alternatives. That is, “The rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before him/her in a particular situation” (Allison and Zelikow 18). Here, the specification of a course of action must be sufficiently precise to differentiate it from other alternatives. The third concept is the outcomes. That is, “to each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen. And, fourth, there is the choices (18), consisting of selecting that alternative whose consequences rank highest in the decision maker’s utility function.
For the purpose of explaining the possible reasons for the militarization of Venezuelan politics during the administration of President Hugo Chávez, this thesis will utilize the basic reasoning of the rational choice model. This analysis assumes that President Chávez is a purposive actor who has specific goals that may be maximized by the increasing militarization of Venezuelan politics. Accordingly, it is assumed here that the militarization of the country’s political system is a direct result of a choice made by President Hugo Chávez.
This chapter will accomplish the following: First, identify the set of goals of President Hugo Chávez. These goals or objectives are gleaned from reading and analyzing declarations and speeches made by the actor (Chávez). Second, demonstrate how Chávez’s choices and actions since he came to power in 1999 have been unsurprisingly consistent with the objective to “militarize” the political space in Venezuela’s political system. Third, conduct an analysis of the choice made by the actor and the risks inherent to such alternative. It will conclude with an assessment of the levels of support or rejection of the second argument proposed in this thesis: “If the following conditions emerged in Venezuela: 1) an excluding political system; 2) the breakdown of legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness of previous regimes; and 3) the eruption of political violence, then militarization of Venezuelan politics has also emerged in the last five years.”
The goals of President Hugo Chávez:
1) Achieve a revolutionary change in Venezuela’s political system based on the active participation of the military in the public arena. 2) Transform the political and juridical structure of Venezuela.
These objectives were widely publicized by President Chávez in various interviews and public discourses since he became publicly known for the failed February 4th coup. In an interview conducted by journalist Angela Zago in 1992, President Hugo Chávez defended the role of the military in politics, asserting that “the military function is essentially political, and therefore, it has the right to act in politics” (qtd in Zago 127). Six years later, in an interview by historian Agustin Blanco Muñoz, Chávez expounded that his objective was to make a “revolutionary change in the country’s national model: this implies a radical change of society in the political, economic and moral spheres” (qtd in Blanco, Habla el Comandante 115). Also, in the same interview he stated that his “political project was born within the military headquarters, and that it should remain there” (344). During his inaugural speech on February 2, 1999, he announced, “Now, I come as Chief Commandant not to command parachutists but to command a process of reincorporation of uniformed men and women into the socio-political national emergence […] Our brothers in arms cannot be locked in the headquarters and in the Naval Bases. They should be incorporated into the development programs demanded by the critical times in the country” (qtd in Venezuela, Presidencia 33-34). In another interview conducted by journalist Marta Harnecker in 2001, President Chávez affirmed that “cleaning up the political structure was his primary goal” (21), and that “he counted on the support of the army as an agent for socio-political change” (16). Also, in the manifest of Movimiento Bolivariano-200 (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement), made public on February 4th, 1992, he acknowledged, “The governmental plan includes the merge of civil and military forces in order to break with the tradition of political and social corruption” (Ortega 4047) . Regarding the second goal/objective, President Chávez has noted that the “juridical and political branches are the weakest structures in Venezuela because they have been under the control of Acción Democrática, AD, and COPEI, the two dominant parties, for too long” (Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 62).
The Preferences/Preferred Alternatives of President Hugo Chávez:
Here, the actor organizes a series of preferences in order to accomplish his objectives. Each preference has a consequence/outcome. Therefore, the agent chooses the alternative or preference whose consequences are preferred in terms of the agent’s risk threshold. Preferences are ranked as follows:
1) Armed Insurrection/Military Coup:
This alternative was tried in the past, when Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez launched a coup attempt on February 4th 1992. The reasons for the coup were basically the same that drove President Chávez to militarize Venezuelan political system six years later: political control of a two-party system arrangement and lack of efficacy of previous regimes. Regardless of the popular success of Hugo Chávez, who emerged as a charismatic figure in 1992, the rebel movement failed. The coup leaders were imprisoned and President Pérez’s government continued to govern until 1994. The rebel officers became widely known as golpistas (antidemocratic) inside the country and abroad. However, before launching his presidential candidacy Chávez acknowledged his disposition to use arms again if it was necessary. In a 1996 interview by Blanco Muñoz, Chávez avowed that the use of violence was still an option to achieve the political changes he wished to carry out in the country. Specifically, he noted that “appealing to the armed fight again was possible and that the movement (MBR) has the capacity and skills to do it either to reach power or to control power” (qtd in Blanco, Habla 345). In order to cope with this scenario, he stressed that his movement “was making big efforts to organize the popular masses for the fight” (166). During this period Chávez viscerally rejected the possibility of running for president in the 1998 elections. Moreover, he had promised that he would never be a candidate of the old/traditional political system (291). Once he launched his candidacy in mid-1997, however, Chávez reaffirmed his will to use the military support he enjoyed to declare “war” against an electoral fraud from the prevailing system (586). This statement evidenced his motivation to appeal to ththe military force to reach power and the use of violence to attain his goals.
Outcomes:
Another armed insurrection would have brought an illegitimate regime in Venezuela. Even if the Electoral Council had alleged election fraud against Chávez, the use of force is by no means a democratic action. Even though this alternative would have successfully accomplished the goals of Chávez (as it presupposes total control of the military over politics), the outcomes suggest a very negative scenario. First, a violence-generated regime is extremely dangerous for the stability of the country’s economy. Since Venezuela’s economy depends heavily on the international oil markets, there is a risk that foreign countries would turn to other markets and isolate Venezuela as a potential oil provider. As a result, an acute economic crisis would have diminished the regime’s efficacy and effectiveness, repeating, thus, one of the reasons that caused Chávez’s rebellion on February 4th 1992.
Second, undemocratic regimes are not supported in the region as they were in the past. Moreover, they are severely rejected by democratic leaders, as reflected in the case of Cuba. This would have caused the political isolation of Venezuela in the international arena. Third, the international community can exert deep pressure to adopt commercial measures against the country. In this respect, the new trend of international free trade requires countries to be democratic so that a proper legal environment can be granted to commercial partners and foreign investors. Again, this scenario brings crucial consequences for Venezuela as an important oil supplier. Fourth, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would stop conceding loans to Venezuela. The same could happen with foreign countries who, aware of the economic instability inherent to undemocratic systems, would not take the risk of loaning money or establishing commercial exchange with Venezuela. And fifth, a regime based on the use of violence to remain in power, as Chávez publicly pointed out in Blanco Muñoz’s interview, may have decimated the popular support that he enjoyed since 1992. The Venezuelan public disapproves a return to authoritarian rule. In this respect, a study conducted by pollster and economist Alfredo Kéller revealed that by the end of 1993 “only 15 percent of radical Venezuelans were potential supporters of a coup d’ etat, or some other break with the past” (Coppedge, Venezuelan Parties 131)..
Risks:
The risks of this alternative are: 1) acute economic crisis; 2) political isolation by the international community; 3) popular dissatisfaction due to undemocratic measures, which in turn may have ensued social explosion (this risk implied an immediate erosion of the regime’s legitimacy; another reason for Chávez’s uprising in 1992); and 4) The risk that the Armed Force would not have attended Chávez’s call for insurrection. Independent from his ascendancy among the rebel factions formed since 1982, the military institution as a whole rejected and condemned Chávez’s violent leanings. In addition, shortly after the February 4th coup attempt, the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez expelled revolutionary-oriented officers caught in the insurrection. The officers who could remain in the institution were those who did not participate in the revolt, either for fear of losing their careers, or because they had ideological or tactical differences with Chávez (Harnecker, Militares 28). As a result, Chávez did not have an accurate notion of the strength of the rebel movement within the military. He did not have reliable information on how much support he would receive from the Armed Forces if he decided to use violence. In sum, the risks of this preference were too high, and there was no guarantee that he would achieve his goals in a definite way.
