- Between military obedience and immoral orders: If a statesman orders such things as genocide or territory occupation, military consciousness must prevail. The military man must act as a free individual morally responsible for his actions (Huntington, The Soldier 77-78). The activation of the Ávila Plan was considered unconstitutional and immoral by the military as it involved unnecessary retaliation of civil society. As General Vásquez Velasco noted in a personal interview, “It was both a personal and professional decision to disobey the president’s orders.” The military would be morally responsible for the numerous deaths that the application of the plan would have cost (Vásquez Velasco). For this reason, they cited Article 25 of the Bolivarian Constitution: “In exercise of the public power every act that violates or lessens the rights granted by this Constitution is null, and the compliance with a superior order will not serve as an excuse to be exempted from penal responsibility” (Venezuela, Congress 10).
Military Motives for the Coup
Military intervention on April 11th, 2002 was motivated by three reasons. Two of them fit in Samuel Finer’s classification of military motives for intervening; namely, national interests, and sectional interests (corporate self-interests of the armed forces):
1. The Use of the Armed Force as a Political Platform: This use took four different forms. First, the use of active military soldiers in social Plan Bolívar 2000. In the long run, the plan became the president’s means to appeal directly to the population, treating the institution as his own political party. Second, active military men retrieved from their functions to work in non-military tasks directly appointed by the president. Third, the president’s use of economic prerogatives to guarantee loyalty of the high command.
2. Institutional Fracture of the Armed Force: a. military re-incorporation of ex-coup leaders: the re-incorporation of at least 60 former golpistas into the institution damaged the morale of the officers (Venezuela, Asamblea “Reincorporación”; Urdaneta 19). B. Loss of prestige of the military within society: The armed forces have a high degree of disrespect in Venezuelan society. General Vásquez remarks that as of today, “civil society views the military as part of the Chavista government. People feel betrayed by the institution, and do not think it defends the interests of the nation” (Vásquez). This issue is reaffirmed by Gen. Nestor González González, who declared his rejection against Chávez’s government on April 10th, 2002 (González 25). C. Loss of authority: President Chávez directly controls the garrison commands, causing a break in the chain of command. D. The appointment of military soldiers, whose loyalty toward the president is evident, to positions in the high command. This is a flagrant violation of meritocracy as the top command is not composed of the best-qualified officers. E. Militias: the early formation of “reserves” into the armed force devises a threat to the unity of the institution. These reserves are being trained in military arms, defense and combat, and most are members of the Bolivarian Circles (Poleo et al., 8-17). F. The increasing reduction of resources for the operational maintenance, equipment and training has tremendous effects on military action capacity. General Vásquez notes that by January 2002, he received a budget reduced in 50 percent compared to the previous year, while the budget for Plan Bolívar was increased by nearly 100 percent (Vásquez).
3. Violation of Human Rights: The April 11th, 2002 violation of human rights precipitated the military pronouncement against President Chávez early that afternoon. This issue is explained in depth in my previous discussion.
The coup coalition took power in the morning hours of April 12, 2002 and placed business leader Pedro Carmona in the presidency. He lasted less than two days before the military command deposed him and appointed the vice-president, Diosdado Cabello. He immediately sent for Chávez and handed power back to him. Those events underscore the extent to which the armed force had become divided (Ellner 109; “Presidente Interino” 1-1, 2-4). Moreover, the events of April 11-13, 2002 demonstrated the degree of factionalism within the military high command. According to Gen. Vásquez Velasco, by 2003 only 70 percent of the military soldiers were “institutionalists,” and the remaining 30 percent were Chavistas or undefined. However, the April 11th “coup” gave President Chávez the chance to purge the institution’s high command of disaffected officers, and appoint close friends and ex-comrades in arms. According to the Military Intelligence Direction, DIM, nearly 75 percent of the country’s generals – which is 39 high-ranking officers - were involved in the coup attempt (“Informe” 1; “Datos” 1). In order to fill the gap left by these generals, by mid-May 2002 numerous officers were promoted and a whole new high command was appointed (Cardona, Armada Domina 1-2). Numerous officers were purged from the Armed Forces through varied methods:
First, there were a few Generals from the Air Force (six) who were sent home with no mission and no specific charges, as there was not sufficient evidence to judge them (Cardona, Comandante de la Aviación 1-2). Second, there were officers confined to administrative and non-commanding posts shortly after the events of April 11th. These were the cases of five Admirals whose involvement in the coup was proved, but were “exculpated” by President Chávez directly when they appealed to his pardon (“Chávez Exculpa” 2). Their punishment also included the obligation to do “academic research” (Poleo, La Presión 16; Socorro 1). Third, most of the officers involved in the coup attempt, and those who declared rejection of the President in the days prior to the coup, were given early retirement by the Military Investigation Council. Some of these officers were: Air Force Gen. Román Gómez Ruíz, Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo, Gen. José Visconti, Gen. Guaicaipuro Lameda and Gen. Ovidio Poggioli. Prior to the coup, these Generals held key positions in the government such as the presidency of PDVSA, the vice-ministry of Citizens’ Security, the Armed Forces Direction of Armaments and the Direction of the Country’s Council of Defense (“Molina Tamayo” 1; “Sale Guaicaipuro Lameda” 1-2; La Rotta, Apareció 1-3; La Rotta, Lameda Y Poggioli 1-2; “Gómez Ruíz” 1; Alonso 1; “General de Brigada” 1-3; Carmona 1-2).
A fourth purging method was the appointment of military officers to foreign embassies. For example, Admiral Bernavé Carrero Cuberos was Chief of the Military’s General Major State when the April 11th coup occurred (Méndez 4), and by June 2004 was Venezuelan Ambassador to Germany (Venezuela, Ministerio Relaciones Exteriores 1). In Chávez’s own words, during the morning hours of April 11th, 2002, Admiral Carrero tried to persuade him to resign (Hidalgo, Reconozco 2). Moreover, this officer placed himself under the orders of the 48-hour President, Pedro Carmona. Another example was the short-lived appointment (from March to May 2002) of Admiral Molina Tamayo as Ambassador to Greece (“Gómez Ruíz” 1).
Finally, the leaders of the military insurrection Generals Manuel Rosendo (former Chief of the Armed Forces Unified Command), Efraín Vázquez Velasco (former Army’s General Commandant), Vice-Admiral Héctor Ramírez Pérez (former Chief of the Navy’s Joint Command), and Admiral Daniel Comisso Urdaneta were all put on trial but were found innocent of military rebellion and conspiracy charges (Álvarez 1-2). These officers were given retirement. Furthermore, by April 15, more than twenty generals and admirals from the high command were in prison waiting for legal prosecution (Brando 5).
A few officials who were openly involved in the events of April 11th were prized, rather than being punished/purged. Such are the cases of Chávez’s close friends Generals-in-Chief Lucas Rincón and Jorge L. García Carneiro (current Minister of Internal Affairs and Defense respectively). The same happened with Vice-Admiral Luís Torcatt Sanabria, who was member of the Army’s Joint Major State on April 2002, and was appointed as the institution’s General Inspector in July 2003 (Hernández, Torcatt Recibió 1). According to an interview conducted by El-Universal Newspaper to Admiral Daniel Comisso, during the events of April Vice-Admiral Torcatt “played for both sides.” He “negotiated his future position in the institution with the rebel officers, and at the same time reiterated his loyalty to President Chávez” (Hernández, Vicelamirante Torcatt 1).
Further reactions from the military have not emerged against the government. On the contrary, the last year and a half is characterized by a relative silence from within the institution. President Chávez made sure to protect this low profile within the institution by frequently offering salary increases, social benefits and numerous cash bonuses to the military (‘Chávez Anunció’ 1-2). Military officials continue to control key positions in the government, and this trend seems to strengthen as political polarization also increases. As a result, the militarization of Venezuela’s political system seems to be inversely proportional to the gradual loss of support for Chávez’s government. However, as of today there is no way to assess how much support Chávez enjoys within the ranks of the military. As a final point, this chapter highlights the argument that the Venezuelan Armed Forces produced and trained an individual, Hugo Chávez, who is politically ambitious and talented. Chávez uses factions within the military that help him to lead the militarization of the country’s political space. The next chapter will examine why this militarization occurred in the last five years.
