Through the militarization of Venezuelan politics, Hugo Chávez was able to accomplish his prime objectives: to transform Venezuela’s political system, and to incorporate the military into the public arena. Regardless of the risks involved, the level of success in accomplishing his major goals was high. Therefore, Chávez’s value-maximizing choice was Preference 3, militarization of Venezuela’s political system. The costs/risks were not as high as in preferences 1 or 2. Even though Preference 2 would have had some degree of success, the risks of its applicability were too high. Thus, by running for president, Chávez was allowed to: 1) focus his electoral campaign on organizing popular support to legitimize his revolutionary project; 2) capture long-term loyalty from social groups for his party MVR; 3) reach power via democratic means; and 4) enjoy full authority to appoint military officers in the political system.
As discussed in Chapter Three of this work, President Chávez won the 1998 elections with an overwhelming majority of 56.2 percent of the vote. However, an outstanding record of 37 percent turnout abstention marked these elections (Venezuela, CNE “Elecciones Presidenciales” 5). By mid-1999, there was, as Chávez had promised, a new Constitution and a new National Constituent Assembly composed by 131 seats, out of which 121 were MVR members. These 121 MVR seats included 19 military ex-rebels from the failed February 4th, 1992 coup (“El Sanedrin” 62). As recently as June 2004, the Assembly composition had grown to 165 seats, out of which 70 belong to the government party MVR (Venezuela, Asamblea “Lista de Diputados” 1-2). From these 70 seats, 7 belong to retired military officers. More importantly, at the time of this writing on June 24, 2004, the President of the National Assembly was a retired military rebel, Cap. Francisco Amelliach, who was elected President of the Assembly for the 2003-2004 period (Venezuela, Asamblea “Directiva” 1). Other parties such as the Indigenous Movement (PUAMA), Popular Unity (UPV) and the Communist Party (PCV) obtained a fair representation of 15 to 20 seats in the National Assembly. Traditional parties AD and COPEI have only 24 and 07 seats respectively. Hence, President Chávez’s objective of displacing the prevailing adeco-copeyano structure by a more open and participative system was successfully achieved (Venezuela, Asamblea “Lista de Diputados” 2). Also, his objective of fostering the active participation of the military in the public arena has remained as more officers continue to be appointed in key positions of the national polity.
The previous analysis provides sufficient evidence to conclude that the militarization of the Venezuelan political system has emerged in the last five years due to the reasons expounded in Hypothesis Two of this work: 1) an exclusive political system; 2) the breakdown of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness of previous regimes; and 3) the eruption of political violence. Through the widespread incorporation of military soldiers into the public management, President Chávez assured a revolutionary change in the political system. This new system was intended to displace and eradicate old political formulas based on popular exclusion. Since the main objective of President Chávez was to annihilate the previous political arrangement, he sought to articulate large support within military factions to make this annihilation possible without major conflict. For President Chávez, the AD-COPEI political formula had collapsed. Those parties had long ago lost their legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness. For these reasons, there had to be a crucial change in the country’s political structure, but this change must be under the direction of patriotic and nationalistic leaders. Chávez mentioned many times that this leadership had to rely on the military men as they were the “real sons of the motherland” (patria) (Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 21). In other words, according to him, military men were called upon to recover the legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness of the state apparatus through their active participation. Also, the political violence of the 1989 Caracazo events served as both a source of inspiration and a point of departure for military officers to proof that they did not exist to “oppress, but to serve the people” (Harnecker, Hugo 22; Harnecker, Militares 114-116).
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this research was to understand how and why the Venezuelan political system militarized since Hugo Chávez Frías became President in 1999. For attaining this purpose we have to acknowledge that the Venezuelan military has been involved in politics in the past. In fact, independent Venezuela was born from violent coups back in the 1800s and its first political class emerged from the Army’s ranks. However, large differences exist between the role of the military in politics before 1999 and thereafter. First, between 1814 and 1958 the military as an institution functioned as the state power. The re-militarization of politics under Chávez’s government, in contrast, is led by factions of the military and not by the institution as a whole. Here, the transformation of the country’s polity is performed by ex-coup leaders who, failing to attain power in the past, stepped into the governmental apparatus to achieve crucial changes from a position of power. Second, military officers who participate in politics (since 1999) are democratically elected or directly appointed by the President. During the years of authoritarian dictatorships military leaders reached power by force. The era prior to the early sixties was marked by the absence of a democratic culture and public knowledge of political liberties. This eventually strengthened - and justified - military intervention in state matters. And third, the re-militarization of Venezuelan politics since 1999 responds to the implementation of a new political thesis, Bolivarianismo. This thesis defends military virtues (organic unity, discipline and obedience) and applies them to the political milieu. Moreover, it presents the military soldier as a vital agent for socio-political change. These differences not only mark the line between militarization of politics before and during Chávez’s government; they also suggest a new scheme of the military role in politics.
The new scheme of the role of the military in politics was implemented by the increasing military prerogatives extended by President Chávez since 1999. The framework developed by Alfred Stepan to measure military prerogatives in state areas permitted the categorization of these prerogatives as low, moderate and high during the 1999-2003 period. Out of the total eleven state areas where the Venezuelan military was granted participation, only two were low; one was moderate and the remaining eight areas were highly dominated by military factions. Therefore, military prerogatives remained high between 1999 and 2003, thus increasing the military presence in the country’s political space. These findings support the first hypothesis proposed by this thesis: As President Chávez has increased military prerogatives in state areas, the militarization of Venezuelan politics has also increased. To enable such militarization of the political system, President Chávez 1) drafted a new constitution; 2) launched a social program led by military officers; and 3) encouraged military participation in formal politics.
The 1999 Bolivarian Constitution contains five major changes regarding the military: 1) It eliminates the term “apolitical” in the definition of the military institution, present in the 1961 Constitituion; 2) It removes the “non-deliberative” character of the Armed Forces, also present in the previous Constitution; 3) It establishes the military’s right to vote in Article 330; 4) It eliminates parliamentary control over military promotions and leaves the issue in the hands of the President; and 5) It assigns to the Armed Forces responsibility over virtually all weapon-related issues, including import, export, commerce and trade. These changes altogether implied a fair space of political activism and granted the military a wider scope for political debate. They legitimated and legalized the entrance of military officers into public management.
The social program Plan Bolívar 2000 not only strengthened the non-military mission, it also served as an effective means for increasing military politics through the constant interaction between the military and the poor sectors. However, this plan underscored the technical inadequacy of the military man when he deals with non-military tasks. Charges of corruption, misuse of resources, and authoritarian organization arose as soon as military Garrison Commandants began to put in place the social plan in 1999. Nevertheless, the plan achieved its goal: it prepared the Venezuelan people to welcome the military into the public sphere.
Starting in February 1999, President Chávez began to appoint military peers to the Cabinet, to state-owned institutions, and to the foreign affairs sector. Through a Constituent Enactment he re-incorporated ex-military rebels into their former ranks in the Armed Forces and encouraged them to actively participate in politics. Since the year 2000, Venezuelans have elected military officers to state governorships, local majorships, and other public posts. On the other hand, President Chávez enticed military peers to publicize his Bolivarian Revolution abroad by forcing a new diplomatic career law that allowed him to appoint military officials to almost 48 percent of the total foreign embassies.
Why did this happen? Why did the Venezuela’s political space militarize under Chávez’s government?
The answer is not short, much less simple. In fact, the answer involves both structural and circumstantial factors. The former refers to the varied motives that the Venezuelan military - and Latin American militaries in general - has always had for intervening in politics. Those motives, as we saw throughout Chapters Two and Three, include: 1) the providential mission of the soldier as a savior of his country (Manifest Destiny of the Soldier); 2) the military belief that they have the right to exert custodianship when they feel civil authority threatens national interests (National Interests); 3) the military’s anxiety to keep its autonomy and defend its shared sense of organic unity (Corporate-Self-Interests); and 4) the attainment of economic, social or political objectives through the use of the military status as an effective means (Individual Self Interests). These motives were evident in the famous oath that Chávez and his comrades-in-arms made back in 1982, when they swore to “rescue the values of the motherland, dignify the military career, and fight against corruption” (Harnecker, Militares 234).
The latter evolves from a specific juncture in Venezuela’s socio-political history, the social explosion in the 1980s. This explosion erupted in the 1989 Caracazo upheavals as a result of a prolonged economic crisis. The effects of the “Black Friday” in 1983, joined to the mounting corruption in the government and the shock caused by the liberal package applied in 1989, motivated the explosion of violence. The legitimacy of Pérez’s government was lost when he used force to obtain civilian obedience in the Caracazo riots. Efficacy was lost due to a series of governments who, far from delivering efficient policies, deepened inflation, poverty, and austerity. Ultimately, the loss of effectiveness was evinced by the widespread dissatisfaction among the Venezuelan public. These conditions altogether set the perfect environment for a call for military rescue. As a salient feature, MBR military faction came to the rescue in 1992. The militarization of Venezuelan politics six years later, in my viewpoint, responded to a massive demand for drastic changes in the political system. It responded - democratically - to the Venezuelans’ call for the military to rescue of national values.
