The findings reveal that the variables proposed by the second hypothesis of this work - exclusive political system, and the breakdown of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness - had a direct effect on the militarization of Venezuelan politics. The incorporation of military officers into the political space aimed to displace the old political actors who represented the excluding political system. New military leaders were called upon to recover the legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness that previous governments had lost. Also, the eruption of political violence in the 1989 Caracazo riots, as an intervening variable, accelerated the entrance of MBR members into the political sphere and strengthened their determination to prove that the Venezuelan military was not meant to oppress but to serve the nation. More importantly, in Chávez’s own words, “the Caracazo events offered the chance to convince the public that the military had the right to intervene in politics” (qtd in Zago 127). Therefore, the evidence collected throughout this work supports the second proposed hypothesis: “If the following conditions emerged in Venezuela: 1) an exclusive political system; 2) the breakdown of legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness of previous regimes; and 3) the eruption of political violence, then militarization of Venezuelan politics has also emerged in the last five years.
To what extent does the militarization of the Venezuelan political system, under Hugo Chávez’s government, represent the emergence of a new type of military democracy in Latin America?
Assuming that a military democracy is a system whose leader comes within the military ranks and reaches power though democratic and legitimate means, then the trend began with the 2002 election of President Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador. However, we cannot assert that this is going to be a continuous trend in the region. Venezuelan military factionalism, political polarization, and President Chávez’s decreasing popularity do not offer a positive antecedent for future military leaders. According to a poll conducted by economist Alfredo Keller, President Chávez popular support dropped from 80 percent in 1999 to 33 percent in 2003 (Keller 6). Chávez has had to cope with a military coup attempt, numerous military dissidents, increasing public criticism and, in August 2004, a Presidential Recall. More importantly, denouncements regarding systematic violations of human rights have arisen in the last two years. Since early 2001, Human Rights Watch has released a series of denouncements regarding Venezuela’s civil and political rights, the April 11, 2002 killings of demonstrators, the killings of opposition supporters and the increasing threat against the media freedom (Human Rights Watch, Venezuela 1-8). As recently as June 17, 2004, the same organization released the report Venezuela: Judicial Independence Under Siege. The report explains how President Chávez’s governing coalition began to implement a new court-packing law that seeks to strip the Supreme Court of its autonomy and warns about threat the government posses to the country’s rule of law (Human Rights Watch, Judicial 1-3). Therefore, the extent to which the militarization of Venezuelan politics represents the emergence of military democracies in the region will depend on how much traditional politicians ignore people's needs and expectations. We should not forget that the military institution across the region has been in power quite longer than the so-called political democracy. And, in critical times, there is always the risk that military intervention comes out as a poder moderador.
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