B) – Through Plan “Bolívar 2000”
Once President Chávez took office, all military personnel embarked on a far-reaching campaign called Plan Bolivar 2000. The plan aimed to fight poverty and improve national infrastructure (Ellner 44). It utilized an initial budget of $21 million and thousands of military officers from the four branches to cope with various problem areas (La Rotta, Avanza la Acción 1-2). Inaugurated on February 27, 1999, the plan is a popular program led by military officers, with some participation by civilians. The date of its inauguration was deliberately chosen by President Chávez to mark the tenth anniversary of the Caracazo riots (Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 89, Militares 99). The main idea was to vindicate society’s image of the military.
The program contained numerous sub-plans. Each branch of the services was required to formulate a social plan. The Air Force created the “Social Routes” Plan, by which military aircrafts transport people at no cost. The Navy designed the “Fishing Plan 2000,” whereby officers organize cooperatives for fishermen and facilitate their transportation and equipment maintenance. The National Guard was responsible for the National Plan for Citizens Security, launched in May 1999 (Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 89).
Also, Plan Bolívar gave State Garrison Commandants the opportunity to develop their own plans according to the local needs. As a result, General García Carneiro – the current Minister of Defense – developed the “Plan Avispa” (Wasps Plan) to build small houses with civilian workers in the state of Aragua (Harnecker, Militares 35, 183). In the same vein, the “Plan Barrio Adentro,” and the “Robinson,” “Ribas” and “Sucre” Plans offered medical assistance in shantytowns and the countryside, literacy in poor sectors, and university-level education (Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 89-92; Cardona, Hoy Arranca 2).
During its first year the plan focused on “repairing and building.” By the end of 1999, 1,500 schools and 80 hospitals were repaired, 400 roads were cemented and 2,500 streets underwent repairs (Cardona, Plan Bolívar 2-1). The plan drew a sharp contrast with the image left by the 1989 military repression. Nevertheless, it has strengthened non-military missions, as the institution continues to be used in civilian activities. Therefore, one of the main reasons for the February 4 uprising – misuse of the Armed Forces in populist programs – is repeated and magnified by President Chávez. In short, the plan has a political objective: to draw a contrast with the past image of the military officers who used repressive violence in the Caracazo events. According to the president’s perspective, “If a soldier is put in contact with people’s basic needs, a political conscience will surely rise up, and he will be an integral leader with political, social, and military values” (qtd in Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 93). This perspective proves true when we learn that through - or because of - Plan Bolívar, numerous military officers have gained state governorships. Such is the case of a Colonel of the National Guard who won the governorship of Cojedes after the application of Plan Bolívar in that state (94). Social plans are therefore an effective means for increasing military politics in Chávez’s government. Furthermore, those plans offer tools for socio-political interaction between military officers and the poor, who demand rapid solutions to their problems. As discussed previously, the use of the military as a base for popular support is a vital principle of the Revolutionary Project idealized by Douglas Bravo.
Even though civilians participate in the plan, military Garrison Commandants control operations and administration of the budget. Twice a year, Venezuelan state’s garrison commandants meet with the president to report the achievements of the plan (“Chávez Vigorizará PB-2000” 1). In this respect, criticisms have been raised against the autocratic management of military officers. Civilian members complained about the strict military control applied to the organization of the plan (“El Aplauso y la Crítica” D-2). In addition, accusations increased regarding corruption in the management of resources for the plan. Since 1999, an annual average of $40 million was allocated for the plan, and nearly $4 million were “lost” between 1999 and 2000 (Ventura D-2). Also, some state entities run by military officers reallocated great amounts of money to this plan without proper legal approval. In October 2000, members of the political opposition submitted to the General Comptroller the first corruption accusation against Plan Bolívar (Cardona, El Próximo A-1). As a result, Caracas’ Garrison commandant, General López Hidalgo, publicly admitted his responsibility for the loss of $2 million. Likewise, Gen. Victor Cruz Weffer, Army’s Commandant, was removed in 2001 after a group of journalists made public documents that inculpated him in illegal use of public money (Pacheco, Rancho de los Cuarteles 9). However, no charges have been made against them (Rosales, Las Cuatro Mosqueteras 19). Still, denouncements regarding invoices forgery, “ghost” contract companies, and the writing of personal checks with government funds are pending judicial process. To this matter, in an interview conducted by journalist Marta Harnecker, President Chávez himself acknowledged the military’s lack of experience in managing large resources. He asserted, “Some investigations have been successful, and that he had personally fired some corrupt officers” (qtd in Harnecker, Hugo Chávez 73).
C) – Trough the Inclusion of the Military in Formal Politics
As early as March 1999, the official list of active and non-active military officers in government positions included fifty-two people. Such positions were in legislative commissions, PDVSA’s management, Judicial Police Corps (CTPJ), International Airports Network, Internal Affairs Ministry, Sports National Institute (IND), Civil Defense Institute, National Budgetary Office (OCEPRE), and Agriculture Ministry. The Caracas Subway System – Metro de Caracas - is another state entity led by military officers. Since mid-1999 two military colonels have been appointed to the direction of the system (Saldana, El Militar D-2, Militares en el Poder D/2, D/3). Likewise, by mid-1999, six military officers were appointed to the new Directorate of the Electricity State Company composed of a total of ten directors. The new direction is based on the premise that electric installations are vital to the State Security and Defense, and the armed force is obligated to guard them (Díaz, E/1).
A Constituent enactment on January 2000 permitted the re-incorporation of ex-military rebels into the active ranks of the armed forces (Venezuela, Asamblea “Reincorporación del Personal”; Cardona, Reincorporan D/1; Urdaneta 19). Hence, most of February 4th, 1992 coup leaders were permitted to return to the institution with their former ranks intact, and also to be involved in politics. Specifically, the bulk of Chávez’s military peers joined the government in 2000. Some of them were elected State’s deputies for MVR. Others joined the MVR directorate. And many more were appointed to the Cabinet. For example, General Arévalo Méndez Romero, a classmate of Chávez in the Military Academy, became his private secretary. Also, military officers were – and continue to be - appointed throughout the bureaucracy, in consulates and embassies.
The fourth referendum carried out under Chávez’ administration was named the “2000 Mega Elections.” This was a general referendum to re-elect the president, governors and mayors throughout the country (Sarmiento 4-7). From that moment, President Chávez was reaffirmed for six more years in power by the support of 59.7 percent of the electoral population (Venezuela. Consejo Nacional “Estadísticas Electorales”5). Also, of the total 23 governorships, 14 were gained by MVR candidates, out of which 7 were military officers (Bermúdez 1-12). Furthermore, accusations of militarizing the state increased as appointments of active generals in government positions were made in 2001. General Guaicaipuro Lameda became president of Petróleos de Venezuela, PDVSA (Venezuelan State Oil Company), and General Lucas Rincón Minister of the Presidential Secretariat (Chávez, PDVSA 20-22).
In regards to diplomatic appointments, the “Galileo Operation” permitted the new administration to establish a quota system of a minimum of 51 percent of professional diplomatic personnel. The other 49 percent is composed almost completely of ex-military officers (Venezuela, Asamblea “Ley de Personal” 12; “Personal de Carrera” C-3). During the first two years of Chávez’ government, fifty-four diplomatic missions out of a total of eighty-nine were removed. In other words, 61 percent of the appointments to foreign missions corresponded to diplomatic professionals and the remaining 39 percent were political designations dominated by military officers (“Senado Aprobó” D-2; Subero, Cancillería A-4).
By April 2000, former Defense Minister Raúl Salazar retired from the Army to become Ambassador to the United States. Eight more military officers were appointed to embassies in Asia, Latin America, and Europe during the year. These appointments marked the government trend of militarization of the diplomatic corp. Later, three high-ranking officers retired from the Armed Forces to lead the top three oil and mining state companies: CITGO, PDVSA, and Corporación Venezolana de Guayana, CVG (National Metallurgic Enterprise) (Subero, La Tercera Ola A-2; Olivares E-2). These designations marked advancement toward the militarization of key state companies.
Since Chávez took power, three officers have rotated in various positions within the executive. They are General Lucas Rincón, with six different positions in the Cabinet as of mid-2004; Captain Diosdado Cabello with three different positions and currently candidate to the governorship of the State of Miranda; and Colonel Luís Alfonzo Dávila with three different positions (Rojas A-5; La Rotta, Lucas Rincón 2-1). In this respect, the following table demonstrates the changes in the Cabinet from February 1999 until November 2003 and the number of military ministers appointed during this period:
Table 1
Name of Ministry Total Appointees 1999-03 Total Military Officers Appointed
Internal Affairs & Justice 07 04
Foreign Relations 05 02
Health & Social Development 03 01 (currently military vice-minister)
Finance 05 02
Presidential Secretariat 06 03
Defense 06 05
Commerce and Production 05 02
Land & Agriculture 02 00
Mining & Energy 03 00
Employment (Work) 04 00
