Natural Resources & Environment 04 00 (04 military sector directors)
Planning & Development 03 00
Education & Culture 02 00
Higher Education 01 00
Science & Technology 03 00
Vice Presidency 04 02
Communication & Information 03 03
Special Zones & Sustainable Devel. 01 00
Sources: www.globovision.com/eltema/ministros; www.mci.gov.ve/ministros; www.mf.gov.ve; ?http://www.globovision...ambios/gabinete.actual/index.shtml?; www.venezuela.gov.ve
?http://www.globovision...02.01/gabinete.cambios/index.shtml?; www.mre.gov.ve/personal; www.minfra.gov.ve/organigrama; www.me.gov.ve/estructura; www.mpc.gov.ve/organigrama
www.mij.gov.ve/estructura;
Between February 1999 and November 2003, President Chávez made seventy-three appointments to his cabinet, thirty-five of which have been military officers. In other words, 48 percent of the appointees were military officials. As we can see in the table, out of a total of nineteen ministries, only nine have not been led by military men. However, numerous state institutions and vice ministries have been/are occupied by military officials, such as the National Institute for Educational Cooperation (INCE), the Central Command of Plan Bolivar 2000, the Social Strengthening Fund (FIEM), the Customs Administration, SENIAT, and the Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization (FIDES). As of June 2004, there were five military ministers (Infrastructure, Internal Affairs & Justice, Commerce & Production, Communication & Information, Defense), four military ministerial directorates, and two military vice-ministers (Health & Social Development, and Vice-presidency) (official ministries web pages).
D) - Factionalism
As recently as mid-2000, officers questioned the president’s military policies. By March 2000, a group of 100 retired officers created the Frente Institucional Militar, FIM (Institutional Military Front). The front is a non-political organization that demanded the end of (1) military politicization, (2) the use of the Armed Forces as a personal instrument, (3) the use of the institution for ‘civilian’ tasks such as Plan Bolivar, and (4) the overall compromising of military professionalism. FIM emphasized its concern about the incorporation of former February 4th and November 27th, 1992 coup participants into the Armed Forces (Frente Institucional; Cardona, Culpan a Chávez A-2). Months later, another civil-military group emerged. The group Junta Patriótica Militar (Patriotic Military Junta) requested President Chávez’s resignation. It criticized a wider scope of issues: the corruption of Plan Bolívar 2000, Chávez’s undemocratic concentration of power, and the problematic church-state relationship (“Mensaje de la Junta” D-4). In January 2002, a group of high-rank military officers rebelled against Chávez’s government. By the year’s end, 125 officers had revoked their support of the president. Some of the officers who participated in the April 11 coup attempt declared Legitimate Disobedience to push for the president’s resignation (“125 Militares” 1). Legitimate disobedience is granted as a citizen’s right by the 1999 constitution (Venezuela, Congress “Constitución Bolivariana” 129).
On April 11, 2002, factionalism was evident. Army’s general commandant Gen. Efraín Vásquez Velasco refused to send military troops to repress a civilian march that was heading toward the presidential palace. As a result, he removed military support from President Chávez. More than thirty high-ranking officers rebelled against Chávez’s government between April 11 and 12 (Mayorca D/6).
E) – Military Prerogatives Vs. Military Contestations
In order to measure military prerogatives and military contestation in Chávez’s Venezuela, Alfred Stepan’s framework of “Coordinates of Civil-Military Relations” will be applied. As discussed earlier, military contestation is the extent to which there is intense dispute between the military and the incoming government. Military prerogatives are areas where the military, as an institution, assumes it has acquired a right or privilege to exercise control over its governance or play a role within extra-military areas (69). To measure this, Stepan builds the following coordinates of civil-military relations: 1) Unequal Civilian Accommodation: Low military contestation and high prerogatives; 2) Near Untenable Position for Democratic Leaders: high military prerogatives and high contestation; 3) Unsustainable Position for Military Leaders: Low military prerogatives and high contestation; and 4) Civilian Control: Low military contestation and low prerogatives (99-103).
Conflict areas such as legacy of human rights violations; reaction to new government initiatives in mission, structure and control of the military; and the military budget measure military contestation.
- Legacy of human Rights Violations: Refers to the treatment of human-rights violations committed by the previous regime. It does not apply to this study.
- Reaction to New Government Initiatives: Here, initiatives regarding military mission, structure, and control are sources of conflict. During Chávez’s government, the original military mission has changed in three aspects: 1) the omission of the institution’s non-deliberative character in the constitution; 2) the military’s participation in national development issues; and 3) the appointing of qualified officers to administrative positions. The major structural change made by President Chávez is the redefinition of the military into: (1) an administrative organism, led by a civilian Minister of Defense; and (2) an operational organism, headed by the Armed Forces Commandant in Chief (Ferrero 97). The last issue concerns the control of the military. The redefining of a unified force and the elimination of legislative approval to promote high-ranking officers increase the president’s power over the military. Dissident officers declared themselves in disobedience due to the lack of "meritocracy" for military promotions, and to the politicization of the institution (“125 Militares” 1).
- Military Budget: fluctuations in the budget can cause military conflict with the new government. Chávez´s administration has increased the military budget in unprecedented ways. In comparison to the 1998 budget figures (during President Caldera’s administration), the first defense budget approved by President Chávez represented a fiscal increase of 80 percent, from $377 million in 1998 to $641 million in 2000. The amount for the Armed Force Social Security and Wellness increased nearly 50 percent between 1998 and 2000. However, the budget for 2003 was cut, dropping to $31 million, of which 76 percent ($22 million) was destined for military social welfare (Venezuela, OCEPRE 2). These changes were used to generate military “enchantment” with the revolutionary process. Nevertheless, the drastic cut in 2003 is explained by two major reasons. First, by the end of 2002 President Chávez felt confident of military support, so it was not necessary to keep increasing monetary resources. Second, during the first year of his mandate, President Chávez included resources for Plan Bolivar into the military budget. He increased salaries and social benefits to grant cooperation of the military in the development plan and to gain popular support for the 2000 Mega Elections.
The military budget should not be a source of conflict for Chávez’s government, yet it is. Dissident officers claim that the major recipients of this money are officials whom the president trusts (“125 Militares” 2). In personal interview, the Army’s general commandant Vásquez Velasco noted that the high command gets all the benefits in exchange for loyalty (Vásquez Velasco). This is logical, as the president relies heavily on sectors within the military to retain political power (Ferrero 33).
A more complex criterion measures military prerogatives. Stepan classifies them as low, moderate, and high, which are determined by the extent to which the military participate in eleven (11) state areas. The following table represents Stepan´s model applied to Venezuela in order to measure the country's military performance in each one of the eleven areas:
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