The Jakarta Post, March 12, 2003
Military return to power would open old wound
Ardimas Sasdi, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, ardimas@thejakartapost.com
After laying low and being in a defensive mood for almost five years the military has
made it surprisingly clear that it aims to return to power by shooting three salvos
within a matter of days of each other in the last two weeks.
The salvos, tactically and timely planned by the military thinkers, were initiated by the
National Intelligence Agency (BIN), which seeks broader investigative powers,
including the right to detain suspects for questioning as long as it feels necessary to
do so, followed by the Army, which is demanding more say in the handling of internal
security.
The latest salvo came in the form of a controversial military bill. Article No. 19 of the
bill authorizes the military to deploy troops to strife-torn areas of its own discretion, an
act tantamount to insubordination because by law such an action is the prerogative of
the President as supreme commander of the military.
Such requests have strengthened suspicions that the generals have been unhappy
with the process of reform which puts the military under the supremacy of civilians.
Political analysts said Article No. 19 could be twisted by the military to seize power
under the guise of protecting national interests as it had done in 1967 when Soeharto
and several generals launched a bloodless coup against president Sukarno, the father
of President Megawati Soekarnoputri.
Former president Soeharto used the military as a political tool to suppress human
rights activities, outspoken politicians and academics through intimidation, torture and
illegal arrests. These bitter memories are still fresh in the minds of the victims.
The military's reputation was blemished by human rights violations in incidents in
Tanjung Priok, Lampung and East Timor and excesses in military operations in Aceh
and Papua. Their image was no longer one of a guardian of the nation, but as those
who operated protection rackets and worked for the elite.
The military along with political ally Golkar, which represented civilians in the
bureaucracy and major organizations, also served as Soeharto's government political
machinery which determined the course of politics, the economy and security.
The role of the military in Indonesian politics diminished with the fall of its patron
Soeharto in May 1998.
But it has gotten over wrestling with the image problems.
Now the military is still the most solid organization in the country compared with other
state institutions, even though its role is now limited to purely a defense force with the
police taking over the duty of handling internal security.
The military has also seen its dominant role curtailed with the separation of the police
force from the military, the suspension of its dual function of security and politics and
the abolition of its territorial function.
Many critics have noted that military reform should have targeted key aspects such
as the dismantling of the Army's territorial command structures whose scope of duties
overlap with the police force, extending its control from Jakarta to the villages.
However, this key area has been left untouched in the military reform with the Army's
command structures like Kodim (the military district), Koramil (the sub-district military
office) and Babinsa at village levels still in existence.
In a half-hearted response to demands from reformists and pressure from international
powers, the military carried out internal reform in 1999 popularly as "restructuring and
repositioning" the military's role by, among other means, abolishing the territorial
command posts.
The drastic cut in its power has heightened anxiety and frustration among active
officers who lost their privileges to occupy key positions in the governments and
retired servicemen, who are now being tried over past human rights violations in the
civilian courts.
Now it is also harder for military officers to become governors, regents and mayors as
they are no longer appointed, but elected by the people through elections.
Under the government of President Megawati, who came to power with the backing of
a coalition of big political parties and the military, the fate of military reform is going no
where.
Last year's landmark decree of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which
ended military representation in the assembly in 2004 instead of the initial target of
2009, was the result of a maneuver by Megawati's rival Amien Rais, who is speaker of
the assembly.
Megawati, contrary to her predecessor Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid who purged
the military of its role in politics without mercy, even tried to coax generals to side
with her through various policies which benefited the military. The rapport included a
controversial Rp 39 billion (US$4.4million) contribution to the military, which later
broke out into the Asrama Gate (Barrack Gate) scandal.
But Megawati, who has little political experience, had no other choice but to rely on
military support to bolster her weak presidency.
Internal factors such as the government's dismal performance in handling economic
and political crises, which was aggravated by disintegration threats like secessionist
movements in Aceh and Papua, made it difficult for Megawati to be firm with the
military.
External factors were also not in the President's favor with the dramatic changes in
the political constellation of the world after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attack in
America. The U.S. and Australia have tilted toward better ties with the military, which
is considered an effective power to contain the threat of hard-line Muslim groups in
Indonesia.
The aim of the military to return to power, which clouded the process of reform, did not
emerge all of a sudden.
Military observer Lt. Gen.(ret) Hasnan Habib said in February last year that the current
Indonesian Military (TNI) Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, who had entered retirement
when he was promoted to the post, lacked the progressive outlook needed to continue
military reform.
Antireform officers were still very strong in the Army and the reform camps, which
should be a major force to keep military reform on track, had parted ways not long
after they toppled Soeharto.
Though conditions may be conducive for the military to return to power, the generals
must note that a military-backed government or military junta is no longer popular and
that it would kill the newborn democracy. More importantly, it would open old wounds
among the victims of military repression in the past.
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