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IT was a cloudy day and gusts of cold rain blanketed over the Leyte Gulf as the American ships moved in closer. At the entrance of the gulf on the tiny island of Suluan, a platoon of Japanese soldiers served as lookouts for signs of unwanted ships in the horizon. Over the past months, nothing had stirred. But that morning, the lookouts finally saw some movement and hastily scrambled a report that "two battleships, two converted aircraft carriers and six destroyers (were) approaching".
The report was less than accurate. What they actually saw were three minesweepers leading eight destroyer transports and half a dozen light cruisers and destroyers. At 7:45 after the minesweepers were through, the cruiser Denver started bombarding Suluan's beaches. Later, soldiers of Company D of the 6th Ranger Battalion scrambled down into the landing craft and dashed toward the beach. The Japanese in the meantime had retreated inland and positioned themselves for a last stand, but not before they had sent a second radio message: "Enemy elements have began landing on this island." The rangers found buildings which they burnt down and a radio transmitter. In the subsequent search for the island's previous occupants, they ran into an ambush which killed two of them and wounded another. But 32 Japanese would die here in the first battle for Leyte. Other rangers had made a similar landing on Dinagat island at 9:30 that same morning. But no Japanese were reported here. In nearby Homonhon, rangers made another landing but found no opposition. By the 18th, they were able to set up navigation lights in the two islands to guide the Leyte invasion convoy. In the meantime at the Japanese headquarters in Manila, officials of the Japanese high command were still largely skeptical about the radio message. But General Tominaga reasoned out that the attack on Suluan island even under bad weather conditions was indicative of something unusual going on. |
By the evening of the 17th, he had made up his mind and ordered an all-out air strike against American shipping around Suluan. He also directed additional units of the Fourth Air Army to shift to the Visayas.
Terauchi on the other hand wanted more evidence. This Tominaga could not produce. His planes were grounded due to the ill weather. Moreover, there was no word from Gen. Makino's 16th Division in Leyte. The fierce winds had knocked down buildings and installations, including radio equipment. "The communications network was like a broken spider web", recalled a Japanese officer. It was only on the 18th that Makino was able to reach his superiors Gen. Suzuki in Cebu and Gen. Yamashita in Manila. But he was still under the impression that the fleet he was seeing were remnants of the American shipping from the battle in Formosa. But to Terauchi, Makino's report was enough confirmation. Sho-1 had to be activated at once. By 2:00 in the afternoon of the 18th, there was no longer any doubt about the Americans' intentions. At this time, the battleship Pennsylvania along with two cruisers and several destroyers already started shelling Dulag's beaches. Still a decision to shift their major forces to wherever the Americans landed rested on the Emperor himself. While the American forces were already positioned to land on Leyte's beaches, the Japanese high command had yet to relay the urgency to the Emperor, after which the Sho-1 could be safely launched. Only a few minutes past five that afternoon of the 18th were the two separate Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters able to issue orders activating the Sho-1. These were not however immediately relayed to Terauchi and Yamashita in the Philippines. |
