[July, 2001]
‘But do you want independence?’
‘Well, no,’ she replied, ‘But until they ask me about it I’m going to act as if I did.’ [1]
The elections held on 13 May this year were to elect the parliament of the CAV (Comunidad Autonómica Vasca—Basque Autonomous Community).
Not exactly. Or rather, not always. The CAV was established in 1979 during the process of transición that followed the death of the dictator Franco as a part of a ‘federal’ Spanish state structure: the CAV is in fact one autonomous community amongst many, although in reality the autonomous state structure was drawn up only because without some concession to self-government to those areas in which a non-Spanish national identity was strong—Galicia, Cataluña and (especially) Euskadi—a smooth transition from fascism to a safe bourgeois democracy would have been impossible. However, although the new Spanish constitution drawn up after Franco’s death won wide acceptance throughout the rest of the Spanish State, the majority of the Basques symbolically rejected it in the 1978 referendum: even though it was approved by a majority of three to one, the turnout was only amounted to around 45 per cent of the electorate. [2]
Having effectively rejected the constitution in this way, a narrow majority of Basques accepted the Estatuto de Gernika (the Basque Statute of Autonomy), passed a year later (94.6 per cent for, 5.4 per cent against, 43.8 per cent total abstention). The Statute provided for the transfer of a wide range of powers to the soon to be established CAV, which was to encompass the three Basque provinces of Álava (Araba in the Basque language Euskera), Vizcaya (Bizkaia) and Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa). Remaining outside of the CAV, however, were the Province of Navarra (Nafarroa), traditionally held by modern-day Basque nationalism to be an integral part of the Basque Country, which negotiated its own autonomy statute, and, of course, the French Basque territories of Soule (Zuberoa), Labourd (Lapurdi) and Basse Navarre (Nafarroa Behera). [3] One of the long-standing demands of the radical wing of the nationalist movement has been the creation of a unified and sovereign Basque territory which would encompass the CAV, Navarra and Iparralde (the collective name for the French territories, which translates into English as ‘the north’). It is this ‘global’ Basque territory that is referred to by radical nationalists as Euskal Herria, while the CAV is what is frequently—even by non-nationalists—referred to as Euskadi (although the castellano term País Vasco—Basque Country—is often used).
The main Basque nationalist party (and by far the largest party in the CAV) is the Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV—Basque Nationalist Party [4]), launched in 1895 by the ‘founding father’ of modern Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana (who also, incidentally, coined the phrase ‘Euskadi’, and who designed the Basque flag, the Ikurriña, modelled on the British Union Jack). Today, the PNV is a moderate bourgeois-nationalist party of Christian-Democratic stamp; it is, in fact, a member of the Christian Democratic International. It is not openly independentist: its statutes define it as ‘an instrument of the realisation of the nationalist political project’, which ‘seeks to win the greatest social, economic, political and cultural development of the citizens of Euskadi’. Indeed, one of the reasons for the varying and often apparently mutually contradictory political deals made by PNV with other political parties in both Euskadi and Spain is precisely an ambiguity at the heart of the PNV’s shifting conceptions of ‘independence’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘autonomy’, etc.
In 1996, for example, when the minority government of the Partido Popular was in need of parliamentary support in Madrid to enable it to form a stable administration, an agreement was signed between PP and PNV (along with agreements between PP and other non-Spanish nationalist formations) to widen—although not greatly—the powers of the Basque parliament: the PP agreed to compensate the PNV for property seized and destroyed by Franco, and to give the regional governments in the CAV some extra tax advantages, more authority over their ports, a little more money for training schemes and a vague commitment to ‘consider’ more moves toward devolution in the future. But PNV’s tenure as the governing party in the Basque parliament was, from 1986 to 1998, with the support of the Spanish Socialist Party, while after 1998 PNV has governed with the support of a broader nationalist bloc.
The other bourgeois nationalist Basque party is Eusko Alkatasuna (EA), which emerged as a split from the PNV in 1986 as a result of disagreements over political collaboration with the Spanish Socialists. EA thus can appear more ‘radical’ in its stance—its programme defines it as ‘a nationalist political party which concentrates its organised political action on achieving Euskadi’s national liberation’, proclaiming ‘the right of the Basque people to exercise their free determination to constitute a reunified and independent Basque State’—but in reality not only is EA cut from the same political cloth as the PNV but it has stood alongside them as part of a joint electoral ticket in a number of Basque elections, including the most recent ones.
The other Basque nationalist formation is EH (Euskal Herritarrok—Popular Unity), set up in the summer of 1998 by Herri Batasuna, the political party commonly referred to by the Spanish State bourgeois press as the ‘political wing’ of ETA. In fact, EH is not much more than HB by another name, set up principally for fear that the Spanish State government was on the point of declaring HB an illegal organisation. HB itself was established in 1978 with a political program comprised of the following five points: amnesty for the political prisoners and refugees; establishment of democratic and civil liberties; withdrawal of the Spanish State security forces; improvement of workers’ living conditions; and a national statute of autonomy for the Spanish Basque provinces (including Navarra) that would recognise the right to self-determination and independence Euskera as the national language with priority over Spanish. Interestingly, HB is the principal Basque political force in Navarra, where the PNV has scant representation.
The political programme supported by HB is the same as that formally supported by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna—Basque Homeland and Freedom): to make the common analogy with Ireland (although, as we shall see, the analogy cannot be pushed too far) ETA is the IRA to HB’s Sinn Fein. ETA was founded in 1959 by supporters of a group within PNV called Egin, who were unhappy with the former’s moderate approach. ETA has throughout most of its history tried to combine a policy of radical nationalism with a socialism of a more or less revolutionary type. This contradiction of ideologies has meant that the history of ETA has been a history of splits away from radical nationalism as this marriage of socialism and nationalism has time and again come undone: the split between ETA-Bai and ETA-Berri in the 1960s produced the Spanish State-wide Maoist-inspired Movemiento Comunista; the split between ETA (Quinta Asemblea) and ETA (Sexta Asemblea) in the early 1970s resulted in a large part of the latter joining the ranks of the LCR, the then Spanish State section of the Fourth International; the split between ETA-Militar and ETA-Político-Militar in the mid-70s saw itself reflected in the appearance of two opposed radical nationalist parties during the transición: Euskadiko Eskerra, aligned with the polimilis, led by Mario Onaindia, one of the 1970 Burgos trialists, which finally ended up as a part of the PSE, the Basque section of the Spanish Socialist Party, and Herri Batasuna, aligned with ETA-M. What is now ETA today can trace a tradition of a direct continuity to the more militarist side of each successive split: to ETA-Militar, ETA-V and ETA-Bai.
Alongside these nationalist formations also operate the Spanish State political parties. The Partido Popular (PP—Popular Party), which has been the governing party in Madrid since 1996, traces is roots back, through the Alianza Popular, directly to leading figures of the Franco dictatorship (for example, the present-day President of the Xunta de Galicia—another of the Spanish State’s autonomous communities—is none other than the founder of AP, and a long-standing Franco minister, Manuel Fraga). In Álava the PP maintains an electoral pact with Unidad Alavesa (UA), a right wing, ‘foralist’, pro-Spanish State party.
The PSE-EE (Partido Socialista de Euskadi—Euskadiko Ezkerra) is the Basque section of the Spanish State Socialist Party, PSOE; PSE-EE had supported the PNV in the government of the CAV from 1986 up to 1998. Despite this, however, PSOE, the governing party in Madrid from 1982 to 1996, has always been a virulent opponent of Basque nationalism, even up to the point of organising a secret anti-ETA state-funded terrorist organisation of its own while it was in government, the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación—Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups). In December of last year PSOE and the PP signed an Anti-Terrorist Agreement in Madrid which committed them to an explicitly police conception of the Basque problem and its resolution. The name of the Spanish Socialists’ Basque party derives from the fact that the above mentioned Euskadiko Ezkerra fused with the then PSE in 1993.
Izquierda Unida-Ezker Batua (IU-EB—United Left) is the Basque section of the Spanish State coalition Izquierda Unida, set up by the Spanish Communist Party in 1986. Even though nowadays in the rest of the Spanish State IU is reduced almost in its entirety to Communist Party members (estimates put the percentage of members of IU who are also members of the PCE-Partido Comunista de España—at around eighty per cent) in Euskadi the majority of the membership of IU-EB is independent of the Basque section of PCE, the EPK (Euskadiko Partidu Komunista—Communist Party of Euskadi). IU-EB has traditionally held a much more sympathetic position with regard to Basque nationalism that the other Spanish State parties, and—as we shall see—has played, for this reason, a significant role in recent Basque politics.
In order to answer this we need to go back and look at what happened before the last CAV elections. From its formation in 1981 until 1998 the government of the CAV had been in the hands of PNV, from 1986 with the support of PSE-EE. The political framework for the collaboration between PSE-EE and PNV was essentially based on the defence of the existing constitutional settlement in Euskadi. PNV has been nothing if not opportunist: its most important political principle has been preserving its control over the governmental apparatus in Vitoria. For this reason, PNV has agreed pacts with both the PP and PSOE in various circumstances when necessary. Nevertheless, it remains tied to its nationalist credentials, and, via this, to the broader nationalist movement, including the abertzale (radical nationalist) component. In this respect, the key to understand the shifting relationship between PNV (and, to a lesser extent, EA) and the abertzale left is the desire on the part of each to keep the other—to use J. Edgar Hoover’s celebrated phrase—inside the tent pissing out rather than outside the tent pissing in. A break by PNV from the rest of the nationalist movement would deprive the former of its essential role in Basque politics: a defence of the constitutional settlement in Euskadi without a Basque nationalist gloss would only require the collaboration of the Spanish State parties, PP and PSOE; on the other hand, to have the abertzale left in general and ETA in particular running out of control would have a negative knock-on effect on PNV.
In this respect, the wave of anti-Basque-nationalist outrage that swept Spain, including Euskadi, following ETA’s kidnapping and murder of the PP councillor Miguel Angel Blanco in 1997 set the alarm bells ringing for the ‘constitutional nationalists’ of PNV and EA: the danger of popular revulsion against ETA turning itself on PNV and EA was perceived as very real—from 1993 the gap between the combined votes of the Spanish State parties and the Basque nationalists had been narrowing, and from 1996 the PP and PSE-EE combined had been winning a greater share of the vote in Spanish State elections in Euskadi than Basque nationalism. While this was not a new situation, in the 1980s there had existed such a degree of trust between PNV and PSE, that, for example, in the 1986 CAV elections, even though PSE-EE obtained two more seats than PNV, weakened by the split with EA, the socialists decided to support the investiture of a solely Basque nationalist government with a Basque nationalist lehendakari (the CAV first minister). It was clear that such a scenario could no longer be taken for granted by the end of the 1990s.
On the part of ETA too there were real signs of a danger of isolationism, arising from the same source. Both wings of the Basque nationalist movement were disposed to forge a working agreement of some sort between themselves.
The impetus, not for the first time, came from Ireland (it has been a constant within the Basque nationalist movement to look for analogies and inspiration to Ireland). Over the summer of 1998, a series of more or less secret meetings took place between representatives of PNV and EA and ETA, with a view to forging a working pact of political co-operation, and in the final result the experience of the Irish Peace Process was to feature prominently. The result of this process was the signing of the Pact of Lizarra (named after the town in Navarra in which it was signed [5]) on 12 September 1998 by PNV, EA, HB, IU-EB and a host of other, smaller political parties, trade unions and community organisations. The signing of the pact was followed four days later by ETA’s announcement of an indefinite cease-fire. The Pact of Lizarra in turn directly paved the way for a Basque nationalist government in Vitoria when the elections for the Basque parliament were held in October of that year; on 30 June, PSOE had withdrawn from its 12-year-old coalition with the PNV, accusing the PNV (hardly unfairly) of having made a secret pact with HB. As expected, the PNV won the October elections with 21 of the parliament’s seats; the PP jumped from 11 to 16, followed by EH, which increased its seats to 14 from 11; and the Socialists, who won a total of 14. The 10 remaining seats were divided among Eusko Alkartasuna, IU-EB and UA.
With the combined votes of PNV, EA and HB (who, for the first time, took their seats in the Basque parliament—up to that point they had held that, as the parliament had been established under the auspices of a constitution that they did not accept they would not bestow on it the approval implied by their participation), a government composed of PNV and EA was invested, with the PNV’s Juan José Ibarretxe, installed as lehendakari. This was not the first exclusively nationalist government of the CAV (PNV had been able to govern alone from 1980 to 1984, and had managed to limp along as a minority from 1984 to 1986), but it was the first exclusively nationalist government to incorporate the abertzale left.
But this situation did not last. Unhappy with the performance of the mainstream nationalist parties, ETA called off its cease-fire at the end of November 1999, and in January 2000 EH withdrew from the Basque parliament, paralysing it—since the PNV government was unable to function without its votes, and the government could not be removed since the combined votes of the non-nationalist parties would have been insufficient. This is the reason that the recent elections were held a year early.
The Pact of Lizarra (see below) was an attempt to bring the lessons of the Irish Peace Process as interpreted by Basque nationalism to bear on the problems of Euskadi. The Pact was in two parts: the first a summary analysis of the Irish process, the second an outline sketch of the necessary parameters for a process of dialogue in Euskadi based on the conclusions of the first part. The estimation of the Irish process it contained was wildly over-optimistic, suggesting, for example, that the peace process had brought with it ‘the recognition of the right of self-determination for the Irish people as a whole [...]’, missing the point that the Irish process in fact took decisive steps towards the institutionalisation of the partition of Ireland. In the summer preceding the signing of the pact, during which sustained negotiations were taking place between the Basque nationalist formations and ETA, HB had made a number of statements regarding the Irish peace process along similar lines. For example, in April 1998 HB issued a statement entitled ‘Ireland: A Firm Step Towards Freedom’, in which they declared that ‘The Stormont Agreement is based on the right to self-determination for the whole island. That is, in the future, it will be the people of Ireland alone who will decide to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, and the British and Irish Governments will recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people [...].’ From this analysis HB argued that a similar process in Euskadi was not only possible, but urgent. Whether this interpretation of the Irish process was opportunistically disingenuous, or simply mistaken, is not clear.
Accordingly, in the second part of the Pact of Lizarra, referring directly to the necessary steps for Euskadi, it was recognised that ‘[...] a definitive resolution [...] would respect the plurality of Basque society, would regard each viewpoint with equality, and would deepen democracy in the sense that the people of Euskal Herria would be given the last word regarding the shaping of their future, with the states involved respecting that decision’ (my emphasis). While this is absolutely not what had been happening in Ireland, it is this section, the most contentious within the Spanish State setting, that was the key to the Pact’s significance. The text is hardly unambiguous, yet this section can be read as a statement for self-determination, and—since the term Euskal Herria is used—self-determination for the Basque Country understood in the global sense, that is, as comprising the CAV, Navarra, and the French Basque territories. Yet the process of dialogue envisaged by the Pact, which would have clarified the exact meaning of the process underway, never took place. ETA circumvented the process that they had in good measure helped to bring about, and engineered a return to the status quo ante.
This is the big question: while the cease-fire had been expected to happen over the course of 1998, and really took nobody by surprise, its ending was quite the reverse, catching by surprise, it is said, even a good part of the mesa nacional (the leading body) of HB. So why did ETA do it?
In their communiqué announcing the end of the cease-fire (below), ETA noted that the process in Euskadi had been ‘facing an impasse, but [that] no effective political proposal was made. PNV and EA gave importance to the current framework, sticking to the Moncloa statute [i.e. the Gernika Statute of Autonomy], and not to the initiatives for a new politico-juridical framework.’ What ETA was referring to concretely here was the content of the agreements reached, not in the Pact of Lizarra, but in the discussions between itself, PNV and EA in the summer preceding the Pact of Lizarra , in which ETA, PNV and EA had committed themselves to take ‘decisive steps’ towards ‘the creation of a sovereign and unique institution to encompass Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Lapurdi, Nafarroa and Zuberoa’, that is, the whole of Euskal Herria. This agreement was not made public until ETA called off the cease-fire.
The idea of a ‘sovereign and unique institution’ referred to in the agreement of the summer of 1998 was evidently the thinking behind the launch, under the auspices of Lizarra, of Udalbiltza—an assembly composed of locally elected Basque nationalist representatives from all the Basque territories within the CAV, Navarra and France—on 6 February 1999. In the light of the summer 1998 agreement it appears that Udalbiltza was intended to be a ‘parliament in waiting’ for Euskal Herria and that the conception of ETA amounted to the establishment, with the assistance of the nationalist parties, of a kind of ‘parliamentary dual power’. That up until its suspension at the behest of the PNV following the end of the cease-fire the limit of Udalbiltza’s activity was to call for the annual celebration of the Aberri Eguna, the Basque homeland day, evidently fell short of abertzale expectations; and this is the reason that ETA has blamed above everyone else the Basque nationalists of PNV and EA for the breakdown.
In April 2000 ETA released further documents relating to the negotiations held in the summer of 1998. Explaining their interpretation of events, they made explicit reference to the assessment of the cease-fire made by the then Interior Minister in Madrid, Jaime Mayor Oreja, who had dubbed ETA’s cease-fire from the outset a ‘treaty-trap’ (‘tregua-trampa’): ‘Of course it was a trap!’ declared ETA, ‘It was an instrument directed against the Spanish and French governments!’, and added that it was, at the same time, ‘a trap for the strategy of surrender to Spain’ which PNV and EA had been carrying out. [6] Had ETA then simply been engaging in an operation to expose PNV and EA; or had they a genuine, if misguided, expectation that PNV and EA would follow them and the abertzale left on the road to what was being called ‘national construction’? The second of these conjectures appears the more likely, yet, given the enormous political expectations opened up by Lizarra, it has of course been necessary for ETA to appear wise after the event. Of course, it has to remembered as well that in good part what had pushed ETA towards a ‘political’ strategy at this point was the danger of isolation, both with regard to the wider population of Euskadi, and in relation to the danger of a too close relationship between PNV and PSE. From both these perspectives the pressure was off ETA from the end of 1998: Lizarra had opened up an almost impassable rift between Basque nationalism and Spanish socialism, while the elections to the Basque parliament at the end of 1998 had given the abertzale left its biggest ever vote in the CAV.
For the Spanish State parties PP and PSOE the lesson of these events was that they should never happen again: both parties regarded what PNV and EA had done as nothing short of outright treachery.
The Spanish President, José María Aznar, met with Xabier Arzallus, leader of PNV, in October 1998, where the latter was informed of the government’s disgust at not being informed of the development of the events leading to Lizarra. Aznar’s Interior Minister, Mayor Oreja, subsequently commented (on the Día de la Constitución 1999) that ‘at that moment we understood that that the problems of the Basque Country, such as terrorism, were not now going to be resolved on the surface but that it was necessary to take power and root out [desalojar] [Basque] nationalism.’ [7] From this moment, the chauvinist propaganda directed at Basque nationalism by the PP reached new levels: Euskadi was compared to Serbia and Arzallus to Milosevic. ETA were fascists. PNV were fascists too since, while they did not agree with ETA as to methods what mattered was that they shared the same goals.
On 12 March 2000 the Spanish State general election was held, and, when the votes had been counted, it was clear that the PP had achieved the largest vote in Euskadi in its history. A quick calculation at PP headquarters showed that the combined votes of PP and PSOE, if repeated in the forthcoming CAV elections, would translate into enough seats in the Basque parliament to unseat the Basque nationalists. That night, carried away by the euphoria of his absolute majority in the Spanish parliament, Aznar suggested the real possibility of unseating the ‘historic nationalisms’, beginning with the PNV, in the forthcoming round of autonomous elections. Mayor Oreja (a Basque by birth himself, further proving the rule that the most extreme chauvinists often come from areas where minority nationalism is strong) was informed that now was the time to risk himself as PP candidate for lehendakari.
The final break between PSE and PNV did not come until February 2000 (although the bridges had been burning since June 1998, when PSE walked out on the Basque government on hearing about PNV’s backroom negotiations with HB), following ETA’s assassination of the leading Álaves socialist, and former vice-lehendakari, Fernando Buesa. PSE demanded that PNV definitively renounce the strategy of Lizarra. From that point on, the doors to collaboration were open between PP and PSE. In September of that year, PP and PSE jointly presented motions of censure against the PNV government in the Basque parliament. In December, PP and PSOE signed an ‘Agreement in favour of Freedom and Against Terrorism’ in Madrid, in which both parties called on the PNV to break definitively all links with the framework of Lizarra, a demand which was presented as a precondition to any future pact or agreement with Basque nationalism. The agreement declared: ‘PP and PSOE want to make explicit, before the Spanish people, our firm resolution to defeat the terrorists’ strategy, using all the measures that the Estado de Derecho [i.e. the legal framework of the Spanish State] puts at our disposition.’ [8] The clear signal offered by the agreement was that the close collaboration envisaged could be, and would be, extended to the point of governmental collaboration in the Basque parliament following the next CAV elections. While the leaderships of PP and PSOE did not openly admit this, they went out of their way not to deny it, right up to the date of polling. Nicolás Redondo, for example, general secretary of PSE, writing in the Spanish daily El País two months before the election, dealt with the question like this:
The question which is insistently put to me by the journalists is who is PSE is going to pact with after the elections in Euskadi, as if I already knew the results beforehand. It is certainly an interesting question, but we will have to wait and see. The important thing is that [...] the future government of Euskadi be constitutional and statutory.
And, just in case anyone was of the view that chauvinistic propaganda was the sole preserve of the PP, Redondo went on:
We are not novices in our antifascist behaviour, we were not before the uprising of 1936 and today we oppose with the same conscience and commitment the Basque fascism of new vintage.
Leaving no doubt where PNV was to be found in this situation, Redondo continued:
Fascism is not the exclusive result of a radicalised and minority group [...]; fascism spreads itself like an oil slick, when fear and the shutting away of liberty engulfs the whole of society through social, religious and political groups, and even through those in power. Those who seek dialogue without exclusions or limits, those who find and, on the way, justify the causes of terrorism with too much ease [...] are the necessary platform for fascism. The formula has been that of old: a nationalism with a strong traditionalist character which opens the doors and is confronted with another, radical, violent and with a leftist veneer.
Echoing this message, the writer and leader of the anti-Basque nationalist platform ¡Basta Ya!, speaking at the rally which launched Redondo’s campaign for lehendakari, declared:
The fascism with which we have to contend with is that which we are suffering now, that of radical nationalism, and not that of [19]36.
For the Basque nationalists of PNV and EA, mindful of the combined assault of the PP and PSOE bloc, what was necessary was a restatement of their nationalist credentials. Having agreed to run a joint electoral campaign (which they had done in the past in some municipal elections), they came out, in their joint election manifesto, for ‘self-determination’, although in the vaguest and most contradictory manner possible. While defending the present constitutional order in Euskadi (the Statute of Autonomy and the constitution), they demanded that ‘Basque society [...] be consulted to freely, peacefully and democratically decide its own political future’, that the French Basque territories be guaranteed ‘the freedom to establish whatever mode of association and co-operation’ they choose, ‘without limits other than the will of the people and of the institutions that democratically represent them’, and that Euskadi be given a formal voice in the European Community.
Effectively, this platform amounted to self-determination and the existing constitutional order (albeit with ameliorations) at the same time; yet the PNV/EA platform was more radical on the question of self-determination than it had previously been before. The issues at stake in the election were clear.
As for EH, their response to the situation and their platform for the election amounted to nothing more than triumphalist tubthumping. ETA’s return to the armed struggle, an enormous disappointment for a wide swathe of the abertzale left, had paradoxically had the effect of driving the abertzales further into the political bunker. Typical of their stance was the nonsensical declaration in their election manifesto that ‘the Spanish State is unmasking itself from the false democracy of 1978 and is showing its true imperialist and fascist face.’ EH’s election campaign, the plank of which was the proposal for the creation of a Basque National Constituent Assembly, was accompanied by a bizarre poster campaign which featured a (almost pornographic) picture of a naked pregnant women, accompanied by the slogan ‘A Free Nation is about to be Born’. Of ETA’s return to armed actions, and of the breakdown in the Lizarra process, not a word of criticism or balance sheet was issued.
Nevertheless, the battle lines for the election had been drawn. On the one side was a concerted joint effort on the part of PP and PSOE to finish off Basque nationalism once and for all. On the other, the Basque nationalists of PNV and EA (and in another sense EH) standing by, at least in words, the right of self-determination and a defence of the traditional Basque nationalist project more clearly than ever.
Not exactly. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) does have a formal position in favour of ‘self-determination’—not only for the Basques but for all peoples of Spain—but this is situated in a context of what it calls a ‘Federal Spain’. What exactly this latter means is not clear, but it seems to amount to a greater degree of devolution of powers to the autonomous communities and a measure of constitutional reform to facilitate this (including a reform of the Senado—the upper house of the Spanish parliament—into a kind of committee of the autonomous regions). This is a position shared by the Basque Communist Party (EPK), and by Izquierda Unida. So The PCE’s commitment to self-determination is paper only, and not concrete. However, in Euskadi the situation is a little more complicated. Unlike in the rest of the Spanish State, where PCE and IU are practically synonymous, IU-EB—the Basque section of IU—is not dominated by the Communist Party. The leader of IU-EB, Javier Madrazo, who was also its candidate for lehendakari in the elections, won the support of around 57 per cent of the membership of the formation in its last congress in December 1999 against the candidate of the EPK, Amaia Martínez. The difference between the independent majority of IU-EB and the EPK minority is not over formal programme, however, but over what to do practically in the political situation in the Euskadi. The line of the EPK is that of ‘equidistance’, that it is necessary to be equally critical of all wings of the political spectrum (harsher minds than mine might use the word ‘sectarianism’), and their principal criticism of the Madrazo current is that it has placed IU-EB within the orbit of Basque nationalism: specifically, that IU-EB should not have signed Lizarra, and, after having signed it, they should have withdrawn from it sooner than they did (IU-EB did not break from Lizarra when ETA ended its cease-fire but only after the first assassination). The differences are so strong within IU-EB that the sector critical of Madrazo refused to let themselves be considered as candidates in the IU-EB lists for the elections. IU-EB’s line has also created tensions between it and the IU/PCE leadership in Madrid. The Madrid leadership of PCE are among those who routinely use the word ‘fascist’ to talk about ETA; the last leader of IU, general secretary of the PCE Francisco Frutos, has been harshly critical of the IU-EB leadership in Euskadi. The present incumbent in Madrid, the Asturian Communist Party leader Gaspar Llamazares, is softer on the question; but this does not signify a change of line: Llamazares won the leadership of IU as an ‘unofficial’ candidate against that of PCE, Frutos; Llamazares was thus dependent on the support of all the IU ‘malcontents’, including, of course, IU-EB. As a consequence of this, Llamazares defends the ‘autonomy’ of the constituent parts of IU, and, in addition to this, since the leadership contest within IU was so close, he is still dependent on the support of IU-EB. What will happen when Llamazares’ bloc falls apart—as it undoubtedly will with time, for it is based on nothing more then hostility to the old IU leadership and sectarianism towards PSOE—only time will tell.
Fundamentally, there are three features to take note of (see the table of results below). First, the turnout was very high: at seventy-eight per cent, significantly higher than in any other Basque election since the dictatorship (generally, the turnout in Basque elections is lower than in the rest of the Spanish State, especially in Spanish State elections). Clearly, the people of Euskadi recognised the importance of these elections.
Second, there was a very big nationalist vote. This is enormously encouraging for all those who favour genuine progress and a really democratic solution to the problems of Euskadi and Euskal Herria. The clear intention of PP/PSOE was to finish Basque nationalism off once and for all; the attempt failed in the most spectacular manner: On election night itself the leaders of PP and PSE in Euskadi looked visibly shaken by the huge increase in the nationalist vote.
Third, and very important, the EH vote fell significantly compared to the elections of 1998; in fact this was the lowest abertzale vote in any election for the Basque parliament. It seems clear that EH was being punished for the breakdown of Lizarra and ETA’s return to the armed struggle.
That is not so clear. What people voted for, if it can be expressed so precisely at all, is self-determination.
There is a big danger in posing Basque politics as a dilemma between independence and remaining in Spain (this is often, for example, how IU-EB’s position comes across: ‘yes’ to a federal Spain, ‘no’ to independence). But look again at the quotation at the beginning of this report. How many Basques are in favour of independence (a question repeated frequently in political debates)? We simply don’t know, because no one has ever asked them. And there is no realistic mechanism of asking them possible within the present constitutional set up: in order to have, for example, a legal independence referendum in Euskadi, the Spanish constitution would have first to be altered in such a fundamental way that it would first be necessary beforehand to hold a referendum in the Spanish State—and that, whatever else it may be called, is not self-determination.
In a very interesting opinion poll carried out in Euskadi in January of this year the following picture was painted. [9] In answer to the question ‘¿Es Usted partidario de la autodeterminación para Euskadi?’ (‘Are you a supporter of self-determination for Euskadi?’), 45 per cent of the respondents said ‘yes’ compared with 40 per cent who said ‘no’; but when asked ‘¿Quién cree que debería decidir respecto al derecho de autodeterminación o idependencia de Euskadi?’ (‘Who do you believe should decide on Euskadi’s right to self-determination or independence?’), 71 per cent said ‘only Basques’ against 24 percent who said ‘all Spanish people’. This is either a direct contradiction, or precisely a reflection of the confused terms in which the debate on self-determination is routinely carried out.
Writing in the 1930s on the Catalan national question, Trotsky explained his views like this:
We are not concerned [...] with calling upon the Catalans and the Basques to separate from Spain; but it is our duty to insist on their right to do this should they themselves want it. But how is it to be determined whether or not they want it? Very simply: through universal, equal, direct, and secret, vote of the districts concerned. There is no other method at present. In the future, national questions, as well as others, will be decided by soviets as the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But we can only lead the workers towards soviets. We cannot force soviets on the workers at any desired moment; still less can we force upon the people the soviets that the proletariat will create only in the future. In the meantime, it is necessary to answer today’s question. [...] Without the slogans of political democracy to supplement and concretise it, the slogan of national self-determination is a senseless formula, or still worse, it is dust thrown in the eyes. [10]
These remarks retain their relevance today. For PSE, self-determination already exists, in that the powers enjoyed by the Basque parliament are extensive. But these powers are devolved powers, devolved from Madrid: the degree of competences enjoyed in Vitoria are irrelevant from the point of view of self-determination if it is Madrid that decides the question. For IU-EB, although formally in favour of self-determination (but without ‘without the slogans of political democracy to supplement and concretise it’ [11]), the emphasis is on the question of a federal Spain. Yet in Euskadi, the question must surely be first the nature of the Euskadi of the future, not the nature of the Spain of the future. For the abertzale position, independentist insofar as it stresses ‘national construction’ and the ‘Basque ambit of decision-making’, the political mechanism for achieving these goals is today reduced to an assassination campaign directed at Spanish generals and PSOE politicians. No political current in Euskadi seems at the moment capable of addressing concretely the question of self-determination.
In terms of the government itself, what seems most likely is a minority PNV-EA administration (there is a possibility that IU-EB will decide to enter it). The government won’t be able to function, since it is unlikely that it will be able to win a majority in the parliament for any significant measures; but, there again, that is how the government has been functioning anyway since EH decided to walk out of the parliament. So the scene is set for political stalemate: yet, of course, stalemate is preferable to a defeat of Basque nationalism at the hands of the Spanish State nationalists.
In terms of the political parties, we can make the following observations. The last three years have produced such a profound political polarisation that it seems unlikely a future collaboration between PNV/EA and PSOE/PSE. How long IU-EB can survive without a split between the independents and the Communist Party forces is not clear, but tensions remain high, and will be higher still should (when?) the leadership bloc in Madrid break down. In terms of the abertzales, what we should expect is splits to the left away from an armed struggle conception. Up to the point of writing, the only current to emerge from HB/EH is a group called Aralar, led by Patxi Zabaleta, Iñaki Aldekoa and Julen Madariaga (the latter a founder member of ETA and in the 1960s an outstanding theorist of its strategy of armed struggle), all long-time abertzale leaders from Navarra. In the elections, Aralar called for a vote not for EH but for the parties that signed Lizarra: effectively, a ‘vote for self-determination’. Aralar takes the view that Basque politics requires a political solution rather then armed struggle, and takes the view that the abertzale left should work through the existing political structures. Whether Aralar will be followed by more remains to be seen; but it should be noted that HB has been undergoing a process of ‘refoundation’, begun in the summer of 1999. The fruit of the refoundation, an extensive internal debate, a relaunch conference (held in June of this year) and a change of name to ‘Batasuna’, are not clear, but first impressions seem to indicate that there has been a shift within the abertzale left towards the ‘hard-line’ wing, an indication of the tendency of the abertzales to retrench in the face of political difficulties. Further splits are possible.
From the point of view of what is necessary, it seems unavoidable to point out that none of the existing political formations in Euskadi are in any way adequate. PSE, tied as it is to the constitution and the autonomy statute is effectively on the wrong side of the barricades, subsumed completely (and without visible dissent) within the most disgusting greater Spanish State chauvinism. IU-EB, without a break from the Spanish and Basque Communist Parties, will be unable to act as a pole of attraction for either those breaking from Spanish social democracy or those from the abertzale left. EH/HB, while it subordinates its politics to the exigencies of the obviously useless and increasingly desperate ‘armed struggle’ is equally incapable of playing a role in the construction of the kind of political movement necessary in Euskadi.
The inescapable conclusion is that a new political force is necessary in Euskadi. What would be the fundamental political characteristics of such a formation? First, a crystal-clear understanding of the incompatibility between the existing Spanish State constitutional settlement and the right of self-determination. You can be in favour of self-determination, or you can be in favour of the constitution and the autonomy statute. But both, no. For a wide swathe of the Spanish State left, educated in the school of popular frontism and its derivatives, of both social democratic and Stalinist vintages, the constitution is the inviolable holy grail, the untouchable ‘given’ which permeates politics at every level. This particular Spanish version of ‘parliamentary cretinism’ is an ever present, and a dangerous ideological obstacle, opposition to which needs to be the touchstone of all attempts to move forward.
Where would our hypothetical new political formation stand in relation to independence and self-determination? In the first place, following Trotsky’s observations, it would have to make the question concrete. In the elections recently held, the correct position would have been more or less that put forward by Aralar: vote for the parties that signed Lizarra; vote for self-determination. But how would self-determination be achieved? As Trotsky advises us, in the future the soviets will deal with this, as with all, questions. But what do we say in the here and now? Within the framework of Basque politics, what we should not concern ourselves with, to the exclusion of everything else, is the future shape of a ‘socialist Spain’. Were the Spanish constitution to be changed in a way that would allow the real expression of Basque (Catalan, Gallego ...) self-determination, then we should welcome it. But this cannot be a precondition to political change in Euskadi. If Madrid cannot recognise the right to self-determination then it will have to be realised by the Basques themselves. Fundamentally, the Basque question reduces itself to a question of government. What needs to be fought for is a government in Euskadi, and in Navarra, and in the provinces of Iparralde, which will assert—politically, not through guerillarist foolishness, the right to national self-determination of the people of the areas concerned.
The struggle to win such a government could be be summarised in a slogan along the lines of ‘Self-government for the Basque People’: but such a slogan would need to be made concrete in a way it has not been up till now. But the party necessary to wage such a campaign is still waiting to be built.
[1] Overheard conversation between a woman and her partner during the election campaign. El País, 27.4.01.
[2] The vote for the constitution was 479,205 with 163,191 votes against out of a total electorate of 1,552,737, giving a turnout of 44.7 per cent. However, if account is taken of the 11,097 nulo (spoiled) ballots and the 39,817 blanco (blank) ballots, the turnout drops to 41.4 per cent. (All electoral data, unless otherwise stated, is taken from <http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/datuak/indice_c.apl>.)
[3] The French government has always refused to treat these territories as a separate administrative unit: currently they are included along with other non-Basque territories within the Lower Pyrenees Department. Public opinion polls do indicate however that the majority of Basques living under French rule would support an initiative to create a Department encompassing only the Basque territories.
[4] The name Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea gives an interesting indication of PNV’s Carlist origins: it translates as ‘Partriotic Basque Followers of the doctrine of JEL’ (this latter—Jaungoikua eta Lega-Zarra—standing for ‘God and the Ancient Laws’).
[5] Lizarra has a symbolic resonance for Basque nationalism: it was the site of the approval of a joint statute of autonomy for the Basque territories and Navarra drawn up by the locally elected nationalist politicians of these areas in 1931: the statute aimed to unify the four Basque provinces but was rejected by the then Spanish Republican government. The Statute of Autonomy that was finally established (in October 1936) did not have to deal with the Navarra question since the territory had already fallen to the fascists.
[6] El País, 1.5.00.
[7] El País, 3.5.01.
[8] El País, 9.12.00
[9] El Diario de León 3.1.2001.
[10] Leon Trotsky, ‘The Spanish Revolution and the Dangers Threatening it’ (May 1931), The Spanish Revolution (1931-39) (New York, 1973), 117-18.
[11] The incredibly abstract way in which IU-EB poses the question is clear from their 2001 election manifesto: ‘We defend, from the capacity of Basque society to decide its own future, a model of a federal relationship with the rest of the Spanish peoples. This proposal [...] is based on two pillars: the right of self-determination and federal solidarity. [...] Peoples, among them the Basque, have the right to freely set out their political condition and their economic, social and cultural development in the way that they decide fit (as defined by the United Nations International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights signed in 1966).’
(Spanish state vote shaded grey)
| Vizcaya | Guipúzcoa | Álava | País Vasco | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| votes | % | seats | votes | % | seats | votes | % | seats | votes | % | seats | ||
| Basque Nationalist | PNV/EA | 330,386 | 43.7 | 12 | 201,734 | 44.7 | 12 | 64,519 | 33.8 | 9 | 596,152 | 42.6 | 33 |
| EH | 61,044 | 8.0 | 2 | 69,286 | 69,286 | 4 | 11,793 | 6.1 | 1 | 141,723 | 10.1 | 7 | |
| Spanish State | PP/UA | 178,823 | 23.6 | 6 | 81,804 | 18.1 | 4 | 62,351 | 32.7 | 9 | 322,831 | 23.1 | 19 |
| PSE-EE | 137,803 | 18.2 | 4 | 73,085 | 16.2 | 4 | 39,324 | 20.6 | 5 | 250,096 | 17.9 | 13 | |
| IU-EB | 43,305 | 5.6 | 1 | 23,558 | 5.2 | 1 | 11,361 | 5.9 | 1 | 78,175 | 5.6 | 3 | |
| Turnout | 80.1 | 79.7 | 79.5 | 79.9 | |||||||||
| Total Basque Nationalist | 391,430 | 51.7 | 14 | 271,020 | 60.0 | 16 | 76,312 | 39.9 | 10 | 737,875 | 52.7 | 40 | |
| Total Spanish State | 222,166 | 47.4 | 11 | 178,447 | 39.5 | 9 | 113,036 | 59.2 | 15 | 651,102 | 46.6 | 35 | |
Source: El País, 14.5.01.
(Spanish state general elections shaded grey)
| PNV+EA | HB/EH | EE | UCD/CDS | PP+UA | PSE-EE | EKP/IU-EB | Turnout | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1977s | 29.3 | 6.1 | 12.8 | 4.4 | 26.5 | 4.6 | 75.0 | |
| 1979s | 27.6 | 15.2 | 8.0 | 16.9 | 19.1 | 4.6 | 64.4 | |
| 1979j | 38.0 | 20.5 | 7.7 | 8.1 | 15.3 | 4.7 | 60.2 | |
| 1979m | 37.8 | 15.6 | 6.2 | 8.1 | 15.2 | 4.7 | 60.7 | |
| 1980a | 38.1 | 16.6 | 9.8 | 8.5 | 4.8 | 14.2 | 4.0 | 58.9 |
| 1982s | 31.9 | 14.8 | 7.7 | 1.8 | 11.7 | 29.3 | 1.8 | 77.4 |
| 1983j | 39.8 | 14.3 | 8.0 | 0.3 | 8.9 | 26.5 | 2.0 | 63.4 |
| 1983m | 39.4 | 13.7 | 7.3 | 0.5 | 7.8 | 25.9 | 2.1 | 63.4 |
| 1984a | 42.0 | 14.7 | 8.0 | 9.4 | 23.1 | 1.4 | 67.8 | |
| 1986s | 28.0 | 17.8 | 9.1 | 5.2 | 10.6 | 26.4 | 1.3 | 66.1 |
| 1986a | 39.5 | 17.5 | 10.9 | 3.5 | 4.9 | 22.1 | 0.6 | 68.9 |
| 1987e | 35.8 | 19.8 | 9.8 | 3.9 | 7.2 | 19.2 | 1.0 | 65.8 |
| 1987j | 39.8 | 19.4 | 10.0 | 3.4 | 6.2 | 19.1 | 0.8 | 66.1 |
| 1987m | 40.6 | 19.3 | 9.5 | 3.0 | 5.4 | 18.9 | 0.8 | 66.2 |
| 1989e | 34.3 | 19.4 | 9.9 | 2.8 | 7.7 | 18.5 | 1.8 | 57.3 |
| 1989s | 34.1 | 17.0 | 8.9 | 3.5 | 9.4 | 21.3 | 3.0 | 65.9 |
| 1990a | 39.9 | 18.3 | 7.8 | 9.6 | 19.9 | 1.4 | 60.2 | |
| 1991j | 42.4 | 17.6 | 6.9 | 10.4 | 19.9 | 1.8 | 58.0 | |
| 1991m | 42.1 | 17.5 | 6.9 | 9.9 | 19.6 | 1.8 | 58.2 | |
| 1993s | 34.4 | 14.8 | 16.3 | 24.9 | 6.4 | 68.1 | ||
| 1994e | 35.3 | 15.9 | 17.8 | 18.6 | 9.8 | 50.9 | ||
| 1994a | 40.1 | 16.3 | 17.1 | 17.1 | 9.2 | 58.3 | ||
| 1995j | 40.0 | 14.7 | 18.0 | 17.0 | 8.3 | 62.2 | ||
| 1995m | 39.2 | 14.6 | 16.7 | 17.2 | 7.3 | 62.3 | ||
| 1996s | 33.8 | 12.5 | 18.6 | 24.0 | 9.4 | 69.9 | ||
| 1998a | 36.7 | 17.9 | 21.4 | 17.6 | 5.7 | 68.7 | ||
| 1999e | 34.5 | 19.9 | 20.1 | 19.9 | 4.0 | 62.9 | ||
| 1999j | 35.2 | 20.0 | 20.2 | 18.6 | 4.7 | 63.2 | ||
| 1999m | 34.8 | 19.9 | 18.5 | 19.2 | 4.4 | 63.3 | ||
| 2000s | 39.1 | 29.1 | 24.0 | 5.6 | 61.3 | |||
| 2001a | 42.7 | 10.1 | 23.1 | 17.9 | 5.6 | 78.0 |
PNV+EA PSE-EE PP+UA HB/EH KPE/IU-EB
1977s = Spanish State parliamentary general elections held in 1977
1979j = CAV (Comunidad Autonómica Vasca - Basque Autonomous Community) Juntas Generales elections held in 1979
1979m = CAV municipal elections held in 1979
1980a = CAV general elections held in 1980, etc.
PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco)
EA (Eusko Alkartasuna)
HB (Herri Batasuna)
EH (Euskal Herritarrok)
PSE-EE (Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra)
UCD (Unión de Centro Demócratico)
CDS (Centro Demócratico y Social)
AP (Alianza Popular)
PP (Partido Popular)
UA (Unidad Alavesa)
EKP (Euskadiko Partidu Komunista)
IU-EB (Izquierda Unida-Ezker Batua)
PNV+EA: PNV only from 1977, PNV and EA votes aggregated from 1986a. In 1987e PNV stood as a part of a coalition with other non Spanish State nationalist parties called Coalición Unión Europeista and in 1989e and 1994e as part of a coalition called Coalición Nacionalista. In 1987e, 1989e and 1994e EA stood as part of a coalition called Coalición por la Europa de los Pueblos. In 1999e PNV and EA stood as part of a joint coalition between Coalición Nacionalista and Por la Europa de los Pueblos.
HB/EH: Did not exist in 1977, HB from 1979, EH from 1998a (did not stand in 2000).
EKP/IU-EB: EKP from 1977-1984, IU-EB from 1986a.
EE: Figures for 1977-1991 (in 1993 EE fused with the PSE). In 1987e stood as a part of a broader Spanish State coalition called Coalición Izquierda de los Pueblos.
UCD/CDS: UCD in 1977 and 1979, CDS from 1982s, did not stand in 1984a, disregarded for size of vote from 1990a.
AP/PP/UA: AP in 1977, did not stand in 1979. 1982: AP-PDP-PDl-UCD coalition. 1983m, 1983j, 1984 and 1986s: Coalición Popular (AP-PDP-UL). 1986a: Coalición Popular (AP-UL). 1987e: AP. 1987: Federación Alianza Popular. From 1987: PP. From 1990: PP and UA votes aggregated (but UA did not stand in 1994e, 1996s and 1999e).
PSE-EE: PSE from 1979, PSE-EE from 1993.
Turnout: Calculated by subtracting spoiled (votos nulos) and blank (votos en blanco) ballots from the total figure of votes cast
Source: <http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/datuak/indice_c.apl>
[Translation based on that by Euskal Herria Journal: the original text in Euskera was published in the Basque newspaper Gara on 28 November 1999.]
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Eusko Alkartasuna and the Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Basque Nationalist Party, taking into account the situation in Euskal Herria, and with the intention of making possible a new chapter in the confrontation with Spain, adopt the following agreement:
1. The signatories of the agreement adopt the commitment to take, starting today, the decisive steps for the creation of a sovereign and unique institution to encompass Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Lapurdi, Nafarroa and Zuberoa. In agreement with the political and social forces with the same goal, on the road to the creation of that institutional structure, [the signatories of the accord] take on the compromise to make agreements, support and promote all the initiatives whose goal is to overcome the current institutional division and between the [two] states.
2. The signatories of the agreement adopt the commitment to promote movement and to achieve agreements, in both the short and long terms, on the basic necessities with those forces which support the construction of Euskal Herria and of its democratic rights.
3.EA and the EAJ-PNV agree to break off relations with the political parties (PP and PSOE), whose goal is the construction of Spain and the destruction of Euskal Herria.
4. On the other hand, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna agrees to declare an indefinite cease-fire(*). Even if the cease-fire is total and indefinite, ETA retains the right to maintain its infrastructure and to retaliate against any aggression.
(*) Although the cease-fire will be announced as indefinite there will be a four-month deadline to implement what was agreed to by EA and the EAJ-PNV; making the cease-fire permanent will depend on that compromise.
[My translation.]
Bearing in mind the features of the Irish peace agreement, our estimation is that the conflict in Euskal Herria can find its resolution if the following guidelines are followed:
The Basque problem is a historical conflict of political origin and nature in which the Spanish and French states find themselves involved. Its resolution has to be political.
Given the existence of different conceptions as to the conflict’s roots and longevity, at the heart of the fundamental questions to be resolved are: territory, who decides, and political sovereignty.
A political resolution can only be achieved through an open process of dialogue and negotiation involving all the parties involved and with the participation of the Basque people as a whole.
Preliminary phase: The process of dialogue and negotiation can be brought about by multilateral talks without insurmountable preconditions being placed on the parties, so that dialogue can take place.
Decision phase: The process of negotiation and resolution properly so called, which requires a willingness and commitment to deal with the conflict’s causes, will be realised under conditions of a permanent absence of any manifestation of violence.
The negotiations have to be global in the sense of dealing with and responding to all the issues which constitute the conflict, along with all those that arise as a consequence. There are no predetermined agendas. In this sense, negotiation has to be conceived not as a process of vested interests but as one to resolve the conflict.
Accordingly, a definitive resolution would not entail specific impositions, would respect the plurality of Basque society, would regard each viewpoint with equality, and would deepen democracy in the sense that the people of Euskal Herria would be given the last word regarding the shaping of their future, with the states involved respecting that decision. It is Euskal Herria that has to have its say and make the decisions.
The final agreement to resolve the conflict will not have a final or fixed character, but will realise open structures which will accommodate new formulae to meet the needs of the traditions and wishes of the people of Euskal Herria.
[Translation based on that by Euskal Herria Journal.]
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna wants to tell the Basque people its opinion and decision. Given the seriousness of this decision we will attempt to explain as briefly and clearly as possible the reasons which made beginning the political process possible.
In September last year, the mechanisms used by Spain and France to place obstacles to our freedom failed, and Euskal Herria was on the eve of a new situation:
That is, we thought that the option to replace the old politico-juridical framework designed during the reform of the dictatorship and in existence for the last 20 very long years, and the decision to take steps in favour of a new politico-juridical framework based on a democratic option for Euskal Herria, were ripe.
This context made it possible for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna to propose an agreement to the PNV and EA in the summer of 1998.
According to this agreement, the signatories [PNV, EA, ETA] agreed to take steps that would bear fruit in support of a sovereign and unique institution comprising the entire Euskal Herria. In this sense, they agreed to seek some minimum points that would support the rights and interests of Euskal Herria and the basic needs and interests of the Basque people.
On the other hand, PNV and EA agreed to break off relations with Spanish political forces standing against Euskal Herria; and Euskadi Ta Askatasunak that it would announce an indefinite interruption of its actions. This was a secret accord that set a trial period of four months.
PNV and EA accepted and signed the accord. Taking their signatures as the starting point, ETA put the initiative into effect during this year.
The maximum qualities of the Initiative were:
That is, a manifestation of the political nature of the conflict and a design for its solution through activating the different forces in Basque society.
During the first months of the Initiative, a basic change in the political situation took place. But after four months, things started to change, and the Initiative was facing an impasse. In our opinion, the reasons for this change are as follows:
Spain’s pressure on PNV and EA attempted to change the nature of the Initiative.
They tried to turn a process of nation-building into a peace process without content, and to drown the abertzale left in political ‘normality’, with the obstinate and evil intention of turning the ‘provisional’ interruption of ETA’s actions into ‘permanent’ and ‘irreversible’ ones.
During last summer it was noted that the process was blocked and poisoned.
ETA had, and still has, the firm intention of taking this process to the end it had when it started out on the Initiative last year. Therefore, we proceeded to identify the difficulties and problems of the Initiative:
In ETA’s opinion, this attempt was manifested in the lack of will by those participating in the process to bring the critical mass in Euskal Herria to a democratic situation and to activate all the forces.
We made an analysis of the process and saw that the agreement signed in the summer of 1998 has not been implemented (in respect of the concrete steps to be taken, and of breaking off relations with the Spanish political forces), and deliberated over the interruption of actions that we proposed in September 1998; and we told this to the PNV and EA in the summer of 1999, now four months ago.
It was made clear that the process was facing an impasse, but no effective political proposal was made. PNV and EA gave importance to the current framework, sticking to the Moncloa statute, and not to the initiatives for a new politico-juridical framework.
Seeing that there was no political proposal or concrete strategy at a time in which the future of Euskal Herria was on the table, ETA highlighted the need for political proposals, and came up with one.
Briefly, this was ETA’s political proposal: that the people of Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Lapurdi, Nafarroa and Zuberoa choose freely and democratically a sovereign constitutional parliament in one single constituency encompassing the whole of Euskal Herria. That is, that the vote cast by each Basque citizen ought to have the same value in all of Euskal Herria.
In this context, and considering the strength and stability of the various institutions that would emerge from this constitutional process, ETA would make the decision to end its armed struggle used in the defence of the rights of Euskal Herria.
Many of the political, social, and trade union forces in Euskal Herria are already aware of this proposal. Moreover, the police have had the texts of ETA’s debates, which were given to the media and the leadership of the political parties. Thus, ETA proposed to the PNV and EA that they reach a new agreement based on this democratic proposal. PNV and EA have not yet given a concrete response.
Euskal Herria has made some progress walking the road to freedom. As always, the key to that progress has been the struggle, the quiet work, and the facing up to oppression with all the means we have.
However, during this last year, the abertzales have again been talking and working together and while we must continue to do this, in the meantime, Spain and France continue with their occupation, attacks, and repressive dominance; and the forces in Euskal Herria have not been sufficiently activated to face this attack and to continue walking the road to nation-building.
Therefore, the process that started last year is blocked and poisoned, and, in this context, given its commitment to the defence of Euskal Herria, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna has made the decision to reactivate its armed struggle.
More concrete initiatives are needed, as well as more strength, to end the process initiated last year; and we call on the Basque people to continue their work of nation-building, facing up the enemy and re-enforcing the basic pillars of our nation.
The cease-fire that was in effect since 18 September 1998, is over.
Beginning 3 December 1999, it will be up to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna to inform its operational commandos when to start to carry out actions.
Long Live Euskal Herria!
Long Live a Socialist Euskal Herria!
Day to day reporting of the nitty gritty of Basque politics is, not unsurprisingly, not extensive in English. However, one invaluable source is the online Euskal Herria Journal (<http://www.ehj-navarre.org/index.html>). This site is a source not only for the details of the events of Basque politics, but also contains excellent historical background material and translations-although, as can be seen above, not always very good translations-of the most important documentation relating to Euskadi. For the transición, a fundamental period in Basque politics, the best overview is Paul Preston’s recently republished The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London and New York, 2001), which also contains a good deal of material on Euskadi. For a general overview of Basque nationalism, and the place of ETA within it, excellent is John Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986 (London and New York, 1988).
For an account of the events outlined above two books stand out. Carmen Gurruchaga and Isabel San Sebastián, El arbol y las nueces: la relación secreta entre PNV y ETA (Madrid, 2000), although written by two Spanish chauvinists of the worst order, is detailed and very good from the ‘what happened and when’ point of view. Mario Onaindia, one of the condemned Burgos trialists of 1970 and subsequent leader of Euskadiko Ezkerra, has written a book called Guía para orientarse en el laberinto vasco (Madrid, 2000) which covers much the same ground, although from a social-democratic point of view. For an absolutely indispensable overview of modern Basque nationalism in general, Juan Pablo Fusi’s El País Vasco: pluralismo y nacionalidad (Madrid, 1984) is, in my view, quite the best work on nationalism in general written in castellano; but curiously, despite Fusi’s reputation in British historiography—he has worked a great deal with the doyen of Anglo-Saxon Spanish historiography, Raymond Carr—this work has not been translated into English.