Short Range UAV "Hunter"

    The Joint Project Office's first UAV acquisition effort was the Short Range UAV, subsequently named the Hunter. The
 program was started in 1988. It was originally estimated to cost about $1.2 billion for development and procurement of
50 systems with 400 Hunter air vehicles and other associated equipment. However, by the end of the program in 1995,
the cost was expected to be $2.1 billion for development and procurement of 52 systems.

The mission of the Hunter was to be day and night reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition for Corps
Commanders. It was to be deployed to Army divisions and corps, as well as naval task forces, and operate at a range of 200
kilometers. Because of line-of-sight limits, the system's range and ability to see over terrain were dependent on the use of a
second Hunter air vehicle operating at a closer range to relay imagery from the first air vehicle to the task force or ground
commander.

During Limited User Testing in 1992, Hunter's demonstrated problems included the inability to reliably transmit video imagery
during relay operations, meet Army time standards for artillery adjustments, and meet standards for reliability. Hunter
successfully completed only 4 of 11 relay flights. Test results revealed (1) the system's ability to transmit video imagery during
relay operations was unacceptable for a fielded system, (2) the system may never meet Army time standards for artillery
adjustments, and (3) the system was unreliable. The Hunter system, with all its associated parts and support vehicles, was also
far too large to fit in the number of airlift aircraft specified for moving one system.

Nevertheless, the DAB approved a low-rate production decision for Hunter and a contract a $171 million low-rate
initial production (LRIP) contract for seven Hunter systems was awarded to Israel Aircraft Industries/TRW in January
1993. Navy requirements were validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in May 1993. Subsequent logistics
demonstrations in 1993 revealed that the system could not be supported in the field.

The Hunter contractor began delivering the seven LRIP systems in May 1994. Government acceptance testing of these systems
revealed new deficiencies with the system's software, data link and engines. Observations on reasons for problems: DOD did
not allow enough time to perform (1) system integration necessary to integrate non-developmental components of the system or
(2) analyses necessary to develop a logistic support system. Several crashes occurring in short order led to the system being
grounded for months. A Navy Program Decision Memorandum in November 1994 authorized proceeding with the
Hunter/Shipboard program. The Navy Program Decision Memorandum directed that 18 of the Hunter full-rate production
systems be adapted for deployment on amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers (LHA/LHD/CV/CVN class ships).

The first Hunter LRIP system was accepted April 14, 1995, almost one year after the originally scheduled date. Five systems
were accepted by September 1995. In October 1995, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council strongly recommended
termination of the Hunter Program. On January 31, 1996, the Defense Acquisition Executive announced his decision not to
procure additional Hunter systems beyond the low-rate production and to allow the current contract to expire.