The 2Q Test
The 2Q Test is a quick-and-dirty mental tool I use to evaluate whether a historical - or scientific - claim is plausible or not. Professional philosophers of science may wince at the simplicity of it, but it is a useful aid in identifying root issues of disagreement and foundational assumptions the underlie alternate paradigms. In a sense, the 2Q test includes many more specific tests grouped together under two main headings.
The "2 Q's" are Quality and Quantity. The goal of the 2Q Test is to identify whether a claimed cause-effect relationship is qualitatively and quantitatively plausible. The fact that a cause-effect relationship may be plausible does not prove it is correct. However, if a cause-effect relationship is not qualitatively AND quantitatively plausible then the hypothesis should be discarded.
For example, suppose we place a cookie in an empty room and then allow two children to enter the room. Upon exiting, we notice Child #1 has cookie crumbs on one hand, and Child #2 does not. This fact is consistent with a hypothesis that Child #1 ate the cookie, but other possibilities exist which can also explain the data. For example, they may have shared the cookie, or Child #2 may have grabbed the cookie out of Child #1's hand. Child #2 could have licked or brushed his hands after eating. In fact, a near infinite variety of subtly different scenarios could be constructed that explain the limited set of data. This is a problem with historical investigation because one can merely establish plausibility, never certainty. An idea can be ruled out, but virtually never proven as the only possible solution.
The 2Q test is merely tests plausibility. Since historical science can in many respects be described as a search to identify cause-effect relationships the 2Q test examines those claimed relationships. It asks:
1. Is the hypothesized Cause QUANTITATIVELY sufficient to explain the observed Effect?
2. Is the hypothesized Cause QUALITATIVELY of the correct nature to produce the observed Effect?
The first question is fairly straightforward, the second is more intuitive but still simple enough to understand. For an example, consider a simple wheeled vehicle with a gasoline engine observed to be at the bottom of a hill. Later, the vehicle is observed to be at the top of the hill. In terms of physics and mechanics, how did the vehicle reach the top of the hill?
Referring to question #1, we realize a need to quantify the amount of energy required to lift the vehicle against gravitation from the bottom to the top of the hill. Taking into account the mass of the vehicle, the change in altitude and the gravitational force we could calculate that "X" Newtons of force, at a minimum, are required to have moved the vehicle. Any explanation that does not produce "X" Newtons of force, or more, does not have a sufficient cause for the observed effect. For example, proposals that a gentle breeze or a falling pebble striking the vehicle cause the movement would have to be rejected on this basis. However, sufficiently large quantities of TNT, glucose, gasoline, or electricity could produce sufficient force. A lightning strike, for exactly, might survive this first hurdle because it holds sufficient energy to generate the observed amount of force required.
Now the second question. Is the proposed cause the right type? I mentioned the engine is a gasoline engine. That means that striking it with lightning, or attaching an electrical cord for that matter, will not work. They are qualitatively wrong. So would proposals that the engine was powered by blood, crude oil, orange juice or dynamite. Quantitatively they may be sufficient causes, but qualitatively they flunk. Only explanations that pass both tests would remain for further investigation. For example, gasoline in the engine, or a team of horses pulling the vehicle, could both remain as possibilities that would require additional information to allow a choice between them. The observation that horses are rare in the area and hardly ever used to pull motor vehicles could be used to reduce, though perhaps not eliminate, the probability that horses pulled the vehicle to the top of the hill.
This sounds simple enough but it is worthwhile to keep the 2Q test in mind in evaluating models of earth history and origins. Frequently you will discover that one side or the other rejects an explanation not because it fails the 2Q test, but because it violates a foundational assumption of their worldview.
To offer just one broad example, let me ask this question:
Are there any scientific objections to the proposal that the universe, earth, and all life were directly created by an omnipotent God as described in the Bible?
I'm not referring here to any disputes about anything that happened after the proposed creation event, in terms of disputes about earth history, etc. I'm only concerned here with whether the concept can be scientifically dismissed. Based on the 2Q test, I would suggest the answer is no. Omnipotence is defined as the ability to do anything that is possible. In terms of the 2Q test I suggest this means an omnipotent being is a potential and sufficient cause for any possible effect. Additional attributes - for example, moral goodness - could eliminate God as the cause for effects involving qualititative violations of those attributes. But quantitatively an omnipotent being is always sufficient.
This is recognized among philosophers as a limitation on the study of science since it eliminates the criterion of risk; one can never disprove a claim that "God did it" scientifically. But it should also be candidly recognized by anti-creationists that for the same reason it is impossible to claim that divine creation is scientifically impossible or implausible. In fact, strictly speaking, there has never been a scientific objection to the proposal that God created; only theological objections. Not "God couldn't do that," but rather "if I was God, I wouldn't have done it like that." These objections get into issues concerning the attributes of God (moral goodness, for example); this is the arena of theologians as much or more so than scientists.
In other words, anti-creationists reject the fact that God created the world not because it is scientifically impossible but for other reasons involving their worldview, beliefs and starting assumptions. An assumption that God does not exist, for example, eliminates Him as a proposed cause for the universe. This elimination process is totally separate from issues of plausibility as outlined in the 2Q Test. The 2Q Test is never applied in the first place, in such cases. By the same token, a proposal that the Grand Canyon formed over several million years from slow erosion is not accepted by creationists because it violates the foundational assumption of a short time scale.
Notice that in each case subsequent reasons for a belief could be offered (the anti-creationist raises theological objections, the creationist points to evidence incompatible with slow canyon formation; and so on). Nonetheless, the fact that a person disbelieves a proposed cause-effect relationship in these cases will not depend on a failed 2Q test. One of these days I'll discuss this more fully in an essay on the importance of using assumptions accepted by your opponent to sway their own views.
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