Melberg, Hans O., The Russians

_{[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Should historians make
ethical judgements?, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960509.htm]

Should historians make ethical judgements?

by Hans O. Melberg

Introduction

In this short article I want to discuss two different approaches to history. The first is
Richard Pipes' view that history should be written with passion. The second view can be
exemplified by E. H. Carr who argues that historians should avoid making moral judgements
(Sources).

To discuss these views I will first try to examine the two positions a bit more closely in
order to see where they conflict (if they conflict at all). In the second part I try to
present some arguments as to which approach is the best. However, I should make it clear
at the outset that I am no neutral observer in the debate. For reasons explained below my
sympathies are with those who argue that history should be approached with passion and
judgement.

Clarifying the positions

What exactly is the conflict between the two views? First of all it is not a conflict
about how to collect facts. Both Pipes and Carr agree that this phase of a historian's
work should be done in a dispassionate manner. Where they disagree, is on how facts should
be presented and selected. Pipes does not deny that his presentation is marked by his own
enthusiasm and anger. Carr on the other hand wants to refrain from using normative
concepts.

To fix our attention we may use Stalin as an example. On Pipes' approach it is not wrong
for historians to pass judgement on his actions. Hence, we may argue that he was a
"horrible" man and that he committed "terrible crimes." Carr's
approach seems to be more detached and descriptive. He would avoid normative terms like
"horrible", "terrible" and "crimes" in favour of
dispassionate statement. For example, he might just state that in a certain incident 10
000 people were killed. He wound then refrain from making a judgement on the morality of
the incident or using normative concepts to describe it.

In my opinion the difference between the two approaches is more fundamental than the
differences in presentation described above. To see why it is necessary to make a
distinction between describing a state of affairs as opposed to describing the causal
factors behind an event. To the question "What caused World War I?" it seems
possible for both approaches to discuss this question and even reach an agreement (even if
they use different styles). We may disagree on the moral judgement of a cause, but we may
agree that it was a cause. However, to the question "What kind of society is
this?" it seems more difficult to reach an agreement since it is inherently a
normative question. To characterize a state of affairs as "oppressive" or
"totalitarian" is to convey your own feelings on the nature of the system.

The difference between the two approaches is thus not only one of tone, but also one of
focus: They disagree on what topics are important. The revisionist rejection of the
concept of totalitarianism can be viewed in this light. The classic criticism was that
totalitarianism is a static concept which could not explain developments in Soviet
society. In my opinion this criticism misses its target because the totalitarian model was
not so much a model to explain the dynamics of the system, as to describe its outstanding
static features. (Note: Admittedly there were those who criticised the totalitarian
concept on this ground too i.e. that it was no longer a good description of the state of
affairs in the Soviet Union). The example illustrates the point that Carr's approach tends
to focus on explaining the dynamics of the system and not on characterising the static
nature of a system.

I have to admit that I am not sure whether the above "more fundamental
difference" is correct. Maybe the difference between Carr and Pipes is simply one of
style and that my search for a more fundamental difference is mistaken. Maybe the question
of causation is no less (or more) normative than the question of describing a state of
affairs. For example, it seems perfectly possible to simply describe a state of affairs in
neutral terms. Instead of saying that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian system, we may
simply describe all the static features of the system: There was only one party, certain
positions were reserved for members of this party (the nomenklatura), the gross national
product was so and so much in a certain year, and so one could continue. Would not such a
description be perfectly neutral?

First of all the number of facts are so great that one is forced to make a selection. This
selection is inherently normative when it comes to describing a state of affairs. It may
be less normative when it comes to describing the causes of an event, because we have a
criteria (causal importance) which aids the selection of facts. When we are describing
state of affairs there are no generally agreed criteria for selecting facts. True, we tend
to focus on facts that describe "the quality of life" for people under the
system, but we disagree on the components of this quality of life. Some would put a lot of
emphasis on personal freedom, other on material well being. Within these categories one
might also disagree, for example on the relative importance of positive and negative
freedom (see I. Berlin's famous essay: Two concepts of liberty) . The weighting of these
factors is inherently and unavoidably normative which in turns means that our presentation
of a state of affairs becomes a normative description through our selection of facts.

Second, simply piling facts on top of each other is not a very good way to describe a
state of affairs. Practical necessity forces us to summarise the facts in more general
concepts (which indicates a whole set of facts). The use of such concepts is a linguistic
necessity. Without it we could not conduct scholarly discussions (if not for other reasons
than the scarcity of time).

What is the right approach?

In order to assess which approach is the best, I first want to discuss some of Pipes'
arguments for the passionate approach.

First, Pipes' claims that there is no need to be dispassionate because the objective of a
historian is not to arrive at a sound decision. An accountant analysing the finances of a
firm needs to be dispassionate because his analysis forms the basis for a decision at a
later stage. The analyses of the accountant is forward-looking. In contrast, Pipes
believes a historian is backward looking. Stalin's actions have been committed and our
analyses of his actions are not going to lead to a decision. Thus, we are not bound by the
same need to be cool and dispassionate.

In my opinion this is a weak argument. One might argue that historical analyses forms the
basis for future decisions in a way similar to the accountant's' analyses. People often
make decisions based on lessons drawn from history. They might do so wrongly (if it is
impossible to draw lessons from history), but the very fact that they do means that the
history is important as the basis for decisions. Yet, this only adds to the importance of
making an ethical judgement of the past instead of pure description. It is important to
say that Stalin committed horrible crimes because our characterisation of his actions is
important for today's political decisions.

Pipes' second argument is more interesting, but also weak. If we recall that his first
argument was that there was no need to be dispassionate, the second can be summarised as
'it is necessary to be passionate in order to understand the events.' Pipes' argument is
that the decisions we are trying to understand, were made with the passions. And, he asks
rhetorically, "how can one comprehend dispassionately events that have been produced
in the heat of passion?" (p. 509). To me this seems more like a play on words than a
real insight. For example, I believe it is perfectly possible for a cynic to comprehend
and exploit the feelings of other people without himself being a passionate person.
Furthermore, it seems to me perfectly possible to describe the actions of a passionate
person in non-passionate language. For example, if I say that you did a certain action
because you were in love, this does seems to me a non-passionate description of a
passionate action.

Maybe I misunderstand Pipes? Maybe his point is simply that to fully or best understand
events we must live ourselves into the situation, using all our senses, not simply our
intellect. If this is what he means I would tend to agree with him. To understand a
decision it is necessary to try to imagine yourself in the shoes of the person making the
decision. This sort of empathy is indeed important in history.

Third, Pipes' quotes some historians and philosophers to make his point that history
should be written with enthusiasm and anger. Such quotes are of limited use as long as
they only assert the same as Pipes' without adding new substantial arguments. The only
quote which does, seems to me to be Aristotle who argued that it would be foolish not to
call events by their "true" name. If something is evil, we should call it evil.
I would agree with this, but add that things are a bit more complicated when we do not
agree on what evil is (or any other moral categories). Though, this in turn should not
prevent us from voicing our views since the attempt to define normative terms may be an
important task of the historian.

Forth, Pipes uses the already mentioned argument that the historian is forced to select
some facts and that this selection is by its nature normative. Thus, passion is
unavoidable and it is better to acknowledge it rather than trying to camouflage it by
pretending to be neutral. In this I can only agree with Pipes.

As the reader may appreciate my choice of the passionate approach is not built entirely on
Pipes' arguments. I believe some of them are weak, but some of their weaknesses only
strengthen my belief in the advantages of the ethical approach. For example, the flaw in
Pipes' first argument that historical analysis do not form the basis for future decisions,
only strengthens my conviction that it is important to make the correct ethical judgements
of a historical event.

Conclusion

Ultimately the disagreement between Carr and Pipes is about the role of historians and why
we study history. I believe a historian cannot be, and should not be, a mere accountant of
factual events. Being human we cannot avoid making ethical judgements of events.
Furthermore, we should not avoid doing so because the very debate is an important and
useful process of discovery in which we continually try to define normative terms. The
definition normative terms should not be left to abstract philosophers. One of the reasons
why I study history is to find examples and counterexamples which aid my construction of
theories of good and wrong. If this is one of the roles of a historian, then he cannot and
should not avoid ethical judgements.

SOURCES

The starting point of this discussion is page 509-510 in Richard Pipes' book Russia
under the Bolshevik Regime (Harvill (HarperCollins), London, 1994). The source of
Edward H. Carr's views is his book What is history? (Random House, London, 1961)

_{[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Should historians make
ethical judgements?, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960509.htm]}}