Hindutva Offensive Social Roots: Characterisation
R.R. Puniyani
Last decade has seen the Hindutva onslaught going from strength to strength to
the detriment of poor and oppressed sections of society. Though Sangh Parivar
(SP), RSS and the paraphernalia of its affiliates, is at the core of Hindutva
movement some other forces have also broadly contributed to the social and
political agenda of Hindutva, the main such associate is Shiv Sena, prior to
consolidation of SP, Hindu Mahasabha propogated Hindutva, while variable
expression of Hindutva has also taken place through congress as well. The
turmoil created by its offensive has disturbed the very fabric of our society,
and this has threatened to change the very rules of social politics.
This movement is based on the premise that Hindus alone constitute the Indian
nation as they are the original inhabitants of this land and have created this
society and its culture. Hinduism, as per their assertion, is a very tolerant
and catholic, which makes it superior to all other faiths, but its tolerance has
often been mistaken for weakness...... The Hindu nation has been repeatedly
conquered by aliens, particularly the Muslims and then the Christian British and
must acquire strength through RSS Sangathan to counter all present and future
threats. The subsequent entry and takeover by foreigners created the illusion
that India was land of many different and equal cultures -- `Pseudo Secular'
nationalists like Nehru, who preferred bondage to an alien system of thought,
perpetuated it by integrating this notion within the `pseudo secular'
constitution. This must be changed and only a `truely secular' Hindu Rashtra
will afford protection to non-Hindus. The threats remain because the present
state is ruled by traitors to the Hindu nation; `pseudo secularists' who
`appeased' Muslims in their pursuit of a politics of `vote banks' (1). Its own
perception of itself is thus of a movement meant to build a Hindu rashtra
(nation) for the Hindus.
TOP |
Today's social common sense believes Hinduism to be the religion of all the
people in India except those who are specifically Muslims, Christians or
Buddhists. It will be interesting to note that contrary to the popular belief
the truth is that "Hindus" and "Hinduism" are orientalist
constructions originating with late eighteenth century British administrators
who believed "the essence of India existed in a number of key Hindu
classical scriptures such as Vedas, the codes of Manu and the shastras that
often prescribe hierarchical ideas" -- a conclusion eagerly "supported
and elaborated by Brahmins". (2) Britishers not only absorbed this
understanding, they put an official seal on it "by applying a legal system
based on Brahminic norms to all non-Muslim castes and outcastes, the British
created an entirely new Brahmin legitimacy. They further validated Brahmin
authority by employing, almost exclusively, Brahmins as their clerks and
assistants. "(3) " -- this fabrication through repetition of India as
unitary Hindu society has -- obscured the reality of a segmented society, with
Brahmins and other upper castes exercising a monopoly of power, fabricated
Hinduism is found everywhere." (4)
The historical process whereby Brahminism gained ascendancy has variously
been formulated by different sociologists. To give one example, Arun Bose (5)
paraphrases Mill's beliefs, "The ideological and a fortiori social,
political and economic development of Indian society was arrested at a primitive
nomadic stage by the sterilizing despotic power of ruthless caste of Brahmin
priests who fabricated more successfully than any other priestly caste ever
known, myths and legends to deceive, oppress and exploit the remaining castes,
particularly the Sudra caste. By draconian punishments, reinforced by legends
about creation and the cycle of rebirths through which strict conformity with
caste taboos was rewarded and infringements penalized, they were able to enforce
total and resigned submission to their omnipotent power."
Initially the term Hindu began with regional tones. The term was coined by
Arabs and others, who pronounced `S' as `H', and to denote the people living on
this side of Sindhu (Indus) they called them Hindu. Its only much later that
this term was bestowed with a religious meaning. Nehru (6) pointed out that
"Hinduism as a faith is vague, amorphous, many sided, all things to all
men. It is hardly possible to define it, or indeed to say definitely whether it
is a religion or not, in the usual sense of the word, in its present form, and
even in the past, it embraces many beliefs and practices, from the highest to
the lowest, often opposed to or contradicting each other."
Formulating it more sharply to bring to focus the caste factor, Hinnells and
Sharp (7) concede that "A Hindu is a Hindu not because he accepts doctrines
and philosophies, but because he is a member of caste', thus implying that
Hinduism is a social order and not a religion.
Romila Thapar (8) in her analysis posits that "The new Hinduism which is
being currently propogated by the Sanghs, Parishads and Samajs is an attempt to
restructure the indigenous religions as a monolithic uniform religion, rather
paralleling some of the features of semitic religions. This seems to be a
fundamental departure from the essentials of what may be called the indigenous
`Hindu' religions. Its form is not only in many ways alien to the earlier
culture of India but equally disturbing is the uniformity which it seeks to
impose on the variety of `Hindu' religions."
Hindu sects are multiple and diverse with many founders, and these sects have
survived over a period of centuries. At times scholars used the word for a group
of different indigenous religions which could vary in their belief system from
animism to atheism, which are looked at with suspicion by todays votaries of
Hinduism. Thapar goes on to say (8) "Hinduism as defined in contemporary
parlance is a collation of beliefs, rites and practices consciously selected
from those of the past, interpreted in contemporary idiom in last couple of
centuries and the selection conditioned by historical circumstances." -- in
a strict sense, a reference to `Hinduism' would require a more precise
definition of the particular variety referred to Brahminism, Brahmo-Samaj, Arya
Samaj, Shaiva Siddhanta, Bhakti, Tantricism or whatever."
The two major religious categories which existed were Brahminism and
Shramanism. Shramans were those who were often in opposition to Brahminism,
these are the groups which had belief structures away from Vedas and
Dharmashastras. Their teachings transcended castes and communities, and in
contrast to Brahminism which categorised religious practice by caste, shramanic
religions opposed this in order to universalise their religious teachings.
Bhakti tradition emphasised selfless action projected as the need to act in
accordance with ones' moral duties. This shift of emphasis, away from
Brahminical rites and sacrificial rituals provided the root, in later time, for
a number of cults like, Shaiva, Vaishnava and many others, it also provided the
rough outline to much that is viewed as traditional `Hinduism'. Lot of
variationsoccurred in this tradition. Much later Kabir and Nanak brought in sufi
ideas in their teachings. Shakta sect and Tantric rituals also gained wide
popularity. These are now played down as being anathema to the current version
of Hinduism, i.e. Brahmical Hinduism.
The religious practices of untouchables and tribals have a lot of rituals
which involve offerings and libations of meat and alcohol. Also these groups
could not afford the costly donations required for Brahmical yagnas. Gradually
dharma (religious duty) became central to religion, regarded as sacred and which
had to be performed in accordance with one's varna, jati and sect and which
differed according to each of these. Thapar (8) goes on to add "`Hindu'
missionary organisations, taking their cue from Christian missionaries are
active among the adivasis, untouchables and economically backward communities,
converting them to `Hinduism' as defined by upper caste movements of the last
two centuries. That this `conversion' does little or nothing to change their
status as adivasis, untouchables and so on and that they continue to be looked
down upon by upper caste `Hindus' is of course of little consequence."
Jainism and Buddhism were the major amongst Shramanic tradition. These
religions were persecuted in many parts of the country. The premodern Hinduism
was not a monolithic religion, as being projected by the SP, but was a
juxtaposition of multiple religious sects.
Thapar calls the Hinduism, currently being propogatead as `Syndicated
Hinduism'. This projection is made by the social base of the SP, a powerful
urban middle class with a reach to rural rich who find it useful to bring into
politics, a uniform, monolithic, Hinduism created to serve its new requirement.
The Hinduism which more or less has won the social space and draws mainly from
Brahminical texts, and also draws from Dharmashastras. The attempt of this
exercise is to present a modern reformed religion. The net result is a
repackaged Brahminism. The Hindu communities settled abroad, look for a parallel
to Christianity, as their religion. This is to overcome the sense of inferiority
and cultural insecurity which they experience in their life. Thapar goes on to
say " Syndicated Hinduism claims to be re-establishing the Hinduism of
pre-modern times; in fact it is only establishing itself and in the process
distorting the historical and cultural dimensions of indigenous religions and
divesting them of the nuances and variety which was a major source of their
enrichment." To put the understanding in a linear way: "The Hindu
religion as it is described today is said to have its roots in the Vedas, -- In
any case, whatever we call the religion of these nomadic clans, it was not the
religion that is today known as Hinduism. This (Hinduism in its current version)
began to be formulated only in the period of Maghadha-Mauryan state, in the
period ranging from Upanishads and the formation of Vedantic thought to the
consolidation of the social order represented by Manusmriti. Buddhism and
Jainism (as well as the materialist Carvak tradition) were equally old -
Hinduism as we know it, was in other words, only one of the many consolidations
within a diverse sub-continental cultural tradition, and attained social and
political hegemony only during the sixth to tenth century A.D., often after
violent confrontations with Buddhism and Jainism (9).
As per Gail Omvedt (9) this Brahmanic Hinduism adopted and identified with
the authority of the Vedas and Brahmans. Material base of this system was the
caste structure of the society. Its cooptive power was qualified to the extent
that dissidents had to accept their place in the caste herarchy. The masses of
people did not have the identity of `Hindu'. Multiple local gods and traditions
existed side by side forming the base of popular culture. Later only during
colonial period this identity of Hindu was constructed for all the inhabitants
of this land except those who were followers of Islam or Christianity.
This construction was thrown up by English scholarship and by Indian elites.
Gail posits that "In the nineteenth century, people like Lokmanya Tilak
adopted the "Aryan theory of Race", claimed a white racial stock for
upper caste Indians and accepted Vedas as their core literature. Tilak was also
the first to try and unite a large section of the masses around brahmanical
leadership with celebration of Ganesh festival - also by the end of 19th
century, Hindu conservatives were mounting a full scale attack on their upper
caste reformist rivals with the charges that latter were
"anti-national." One gets a clear idea that SP has succeeded in
perpetuating a perception amongst Hindus to forge a communalsolidarity through
elective projections of the past, and this does involve a deliberate
reformulation of history. Emergence of nation state does bring in its wake and
imposes a homogenisation. In case of India this evolution of "national
religion and Hinduism has mainly been defined in opposition to the Muslim
"other".
TOP |
Today's social common sense believes Hinduism to be the religion of all the
people in India except those who are specifically Muslims, Christians or
Buddhists. It will be interesting to note that contrary to the popular belief
the truth is that "Hindus" and "Hinduism" are orientalist
constructions originating with late eighteenth century British administrators
who believed "the essence of India existed in a number of key Hindu
classical scriptures such as Vedas, the codes of Manu and the shastras that
often prescribe hierarchical ideas" -- a conclusion eagerly "supported
and elaborated by Brahmins". (2) Britishers not only absorbed this
understanding, they put an official seal on it "by applying a legal system
based on Brahminic norms to all non-Muslim castes and outcastes, the British
created an entirely new Brahmin legitimacy. They further validated Brahmin
authority by employing, almost exclusively, Brahmins as their clerks and
assistants. "(3) " -- this fabrication through repetition of India as
unitary Hindu society has -- obscured the reality of a segmented society, with
Brahmins and other upper castes exercising a monopoly of power, fabricated
Hinduism is found everywhere." (4)
The historical process whereby Brahminism gained ascendancy has variously
been formulated by different sociologists. To give one example, Arun Bose (5)
paraphrases Mill's beliefs, "The ideological and a fortiori social,
political and economic development of Indian society was arrested at a primitive
nomadic stage by the sterilizing despotic power of ruthless caste of Brahmin
priests who fabricated more successfully than any other priestly caste ever
known, myths and legends to deceive, oppress and exploit the remaining castes,
particularly the Sudra caste. By draconian punishments, reinforced by legends
about creation and the cycle of rebirths through which strict conformity with
caste taboos was rewarded and infringements penalized, they were able to enforce
total and resigned submission to their omnipotent power."
Initially the term Hindu began with regional tones. The term was coined by
Arabs and others, who pronounced `S' as `H', and to denote the people living on
this side of Sindhu (Indus) they called them Hindu. Its only much later that
this term was bestowed with a religious meaning. Nehru (6) pointed out that
"Hinduism as a faith is vague, amorphous, many sided, all things to all
men. It is hardly possible to define it, or indeed to say definitely whether it
is a religion or not, in the usual sense of the word, in its present form, and
even in the past, it embraces many beliefs and practices, from the highest to
the lowest, often opposed to or contradicting each other."
Formulating it more sharply to bring to focus the caste factor, Hinnells and
Sharp (7) concede that "A Hindu is a Hindu not because he accepts doctrines
and philosophies, but because he is a member of caste', thus implying that
Hinduism is a social order and not a religion.
Romila Thapar (8) in her analysis posits that "The new Hinduism which is
being currently propogated by the Sanghs, Parishads and Samajs is an attempt to
restructure the indigenous religions as a monolithic uniform religion, rather
paralleling some of the features of semitic religions. This seems to be a
fundamental departure from the essentials of what may be called the indigenous
`Hindu' religions. Its form is not only in many ways alien to the earlier
culture of India but equally disturbing is the uniformity which it seeks to
impose on the variety of `Hindu' religions."
Hindu sects are multiple and diverse with many founders, and these sects have
survived over a period of centuries. At times scholars used the word for a group
of different indigenous religions which could vary in their belief system from
animism to atheism, which are looked at with suspicion by todays votaries of
Hinduism. Thapar goes on to say (8) "Hinduism as defined in contemporary
parlance is a collation of beliefs, rites and practices consciously selected
from those of the past, interpreted in contemporary idiom in last couple of
centuries and the selection conditioned by historical circumstances." -- in
a strict sense, a reference to `Hinduism' would require a more precise
definition of the particular variety referred to Brahminism, Brahmo-Samaj, Arya
Samaj, Shaiva Siddhanta, Bhakti, Tantricism or whatever."
The two major religious categories which existed were Brahminism and
Shramanism. Shramans were those who were often in opposition to Brahminism,
these are the groups which had belief structures away from Vedas and
Dharmashastras. Their teachings transcended castes and communities, and in
contrast to Brahminism which categorised religious practice by caste, shramanic
religions opposed this in order to universalise their religious teachings.
Bhakti tradition emphasised selfless action projected as the need to act in
accordance with ones' moral duties. This shift of emphasis, away from
Brahminical rites and sacrificial rituals provided the root, in later time, for
a number of cults like, Shaiva, Vaishnava and many others, it also provided the
rough outline to much that is viewed as traditional `Hinduism'. Lot of
variationsoccurred in this tradition. Much later Kabir and Nanak brought in sufi
ideas in their teachings. Shakta sect and Tantric rituals also gained wide
popularity. These are now played down as being anathema to the current version
of Hinduism, i.e. Brahmical Hinduism.
The religious practices of untouchables and tribals have a lot of rituals
which involve offerings and libations of meat and alcohol. Also these groups
could not afford the costly donations required for Brahmical yagnas. Gradually
dharma (religious duty) became central to religion, regarded as sacred and which
had to be performed in accordance with one's varna, jati and sect and which
differed according to each of these. Thapar (8) goes on to add "`Hindu'
missionary organisations, taking their cue from Christian missionaries are
active among the adivasis, untouchables and economically backward communities,
converting them to `Hinduism' as defined by upper caste movements of the last
two centuries. That this `conversion' does little or nothing to change their
status as adivasis, untouchables and so on and that they continue to be looked
down upon by upper caste `Hindus' is of course of little consequence."
Jainism and Buddhism were the major amongst Shramanic tradition. These
religions were persecuted in many parts of the country. The premodern Hinduism
was not a monolithic religion, as being projected by the SP, but was a
juxtaposition of multiple religious sects.
Thapar calls the Hinduism, currently being propogatead as `Syndicated
Hinduism'. This projection is made by the social base of the SP, a powerful
urban middle class with a reach to rural rich who find it useful to bring into
politics, a uniform, monolithic, Hinduism created to serve its new requirement.
The Hinduism which more or less has won the social space and draws mainly from
Brahminical texts, and also draws from Dharmashastras. The attempt of this
exercise is to present a modern reformed religion. The net result is a
repackaged Brahminism. The Hindu communities settled abroad, look for a parallel
to Christianity, as their religion. This is to overcome the sense of inferiority
and cultural insecurity which they experience in their life. Thapar goes on to
say " Syndicated Hinduism claims to be re-establishing the Hinduism of
pre-modern times; in fact it is only establishing itself and in the process
distorting the historical and cultural dimensions of indigenous religions and
divesting them of the nuances and variety which was a major source of their
enrichment." To put the understanding in a linear way: "The Hindu
religion as it is described today is said to have its roots in the Vedas, -- In
any case, whatever we call the religion of these nomadic clans, it was not the
religion that is today known as Hinduism. This (Hinduism in its current version)
began to be formulated only in the period of Maghadha-Mauryan state, in the
period ranging from Upanishads and the formation of Vedantic thought to the
consolidation of the social order represented by Manusmriti. Buddhism and
Jainism (as well as the materialist Carvak tradition) were equally old -
Hinduism as we know it, was in other words, only one of the many consolidations
within a diverse sub-continental cultural tradition, and attained social and
political hegemony only during the sixth to tenth century A.D., often after
violent confrontations with Buddhism and Jainism (9).
As per Gail Omvedt (9) this Brahmanic Hinduism adopted and identified with
the authority of the Vedas and Brahmans. Material base of this system was the
caste structure of the society. Its cooptive power was qualified to the extent
that dissidents had to accept their place in the caste herarchy. The masses of
people did not have the identity of `Hindu'. Multiple local gods and traditions
existed side by side forming the base of popular culture. Later only during
colonial period this identity of Hindu was constructed for all the inhabitants
of this land except those who were followers of Islam or Christianity.
This construction was thrown up by English scholarship and by Indian elites.
Gail posits that "In the nineteenth century, people like Lokmanya Tilak
adopted the "Aryan theory of Race", claimed a white racial stock for
upper caste Indians and accepted Vedas as their core literature. Tilak was also
the first to try and unite a large section of the masses around brahmanical
leadership with celebration of Ganesh festival - also by the end of 19th
century, Hindu conservatives were mounting a full scale attack on their upper
caste reformist rivals with the charges that latter were
"anti-national." One gets a clear idea that SP has succeeded in
perpetuating a perception amongst Hindus to forge a communalsolidarity through
elective projections of the past, and this does involve a deliberate
reformulation of history. Emergence of nation state does bring in its wake and
imposes a homogenisation. In case of India this evolution of "national
religion and Hinduism has mainly been defined in opposition to the Muslim
"other".
TOP |
The construction of Hindutva is to be seen in the backdrop of emergence of
Hinduism as a homogenous religion. The concept of Brahminical Hinduism,
projected as Hinduism was at the root of multiple religious revivalist
movements. Its political translation began mainly with Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who
initiated the Ganapati Festival to wean away the popular participation of lower
castes people in Muharram festival. Some sociologists (10) have called such
ideological maneouvers as "manipulative reinterpretation of cultural
material" and "invention of tradition." Later Tilak went on to
organize a festival in honor of Shivaji, who broke the Moghul hold on western
India and opened the way for rampage of Maratha armies through much of India. A
strong anti-muslim slant was brought into the function.This nationalism was
based on hate of Muslims. At the same time Ram, was popularised as a symbol of
moral power, along with Hanuman symbolising the masculine strength. Shivaji's
guru Ramdas had the image of anti-Muslim crusader and this was highlighted by
Tilakites. Guru Ramdas's vision was limited to ending the Moghul rule and
establishing Brahminical hegemony. Guru Ramdas was also given prominence in the
initial phases of RSS activities. Shivaji tradition was and is an important
means for Brahminism to assure themselves of the essential similarities of their
interests and those of current society.
Anti-Muslim sentiments were consistently used by Tilak to project a political
methodology of consolidating the Hindus. Starting from Bankimchandra Chatterji,
various other Hindu national ideologoues had whipped the fear psychosis with
Muslims as the ones' threatening the survival of Hindus. All these fabrications
were manufactured and propogated by the ascendant, nascent, amorphorphous Hindu
nationalist forces. The combination of `syndicated Hinduism' with nationalism
was brewed by Vinayak Savarkar who can be called the first exponent of the
doctrine of Hindutva. The mix of Brahminical Hinduism with nationalism
reflecting the interests of upper castes and part of upper class was defined and
later refined on the exclusionist principles, which are so basic to the
Brahminism. Savarkars initial anti British struggles were very impressive. After
his assuming the role of the proponent of Hindutva his major energies were
channelised in strengthening the politics of hate, the formation of communal
Hindu Mahasabha and helping RSS from distance.
Savarkars politics was a rival to Gandhian politics. Gandhi the
representative of Indian Nationalism was branded as conciliator and appeaser of
Muslims. Savarkar propounded that struggle for supremacy would begin after
British left and that the Christians and Muslims were the real enemies who could
be defeated only by "Hindutva". His key sentence was "Hinduize
all politics and militarize Hindudom". His definition of a Hindu was the
one who regarded this land from Indus to the Seas as Pitrabhumi (Father land)
and Punyabhumi (Holy land). This land belonged to Hindus and so by implications
Muslims with Holy land in Mecca and Christians with Holy land in Jerusalem, can
not have equal status to `Hindus'. This was later to be made more explicit by
Guru Golwalkar, who despite adoring Hitler, was 'generous' and 'kind' enough to
these 'aliens' by granting them the status of second class citizens. Also began
the concept of "Hindu Raj" the precurser of present SP goal the `Hindu
Rashtra'.
The final crystallisation occurred with foundation of Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) which became the `Father' organization for plethora of organisations
which were to take birth after a period of consolidation of the core
swayamsevaks (volunteers).
TOP |
With the transition of leadership of Congress from the Brahminical Tilakites
to Nationalist Gandhi, transition in the anticolonial struggle took a major
leap. Gandhi's Nationalism, though used religious idioms was not a religious
nationalism and unlike the religious nationalism of Tilak, was able to inspire
the large section of Indian masses into anticolonial struggle. With the
leadership of Congress slipping away from the Chittapavan Brahmins, with the
dissatisfaction with Gandhi's conciliatory methods and in the backdrop of the
slipping hegemony of Brahmins over the lower castes, the idea of an organisation
representing the aspirations of these high castes took roots and this is what
gave birth to RSS (in 1925), an explicitly Hindu organisation, working for the
achievement of Hindu Rashtra and calling it a `Nation'. Thus the synthesis of
religious construct, Hinduism and Nationalism got crystallisation through this
organisation, which in due course, was to take the central place in the
political battles of upper castes, displacing the Hindu Maha Sabha.
RSS decided to model itself on `Hindu Joint Family' and on analogy with the
patriarch of Hindu joint family created the post of Sar Sangh Chalak (supreme
dictator). Its emphasis was, one, physical fitness of volunteers and their
training in methods ofstreet battles (Not battles against the British Raj), and
two, it started discussion groups, the Bouddhiks, where the glorified Hindu
history was (and is) shoved down the throats of trainees. This non-dialogic,
authoritarian mode of teaching emphasised the core of RSS doctrine as per which,
during the glorious Hindu past of vedic times, the glorious Hindu Kings ruled
this Bharatvarsha in the most Hindu way. The Hindu society is the most tolerant
society, the chosen race, the society which gave wisdom to the world. However,
this tolerance of Hindus was misconstrued by the Muslims who invaded this holy
land and converted the people on the force of the sword. This rule of Muslims
has created big problem for the Hindu Nation. Later the rulers of this country,
under leadership of Gandhi, have appeased the Muslims and pampered them. After
independence Nehru took over Congress whose pseudosecularism pampered the
Muslims and the Hindus are suffering in their own country. Now the time has come
to rise in the defense of holy Fatherland, to consolidate the Hindu Nation,
Hindu Rashtra through the organisation of the Hindus, the RSS."
After its formation RSS got lot of support from Brahmins/Banias, landed
aristocracy and a small section of petty bourgeisie. It concentrated on so
called `cultural' work of spreading the Hindutva doctrine by molecular
permeation, keeping aloof from the anti British struggles which were being led
by Gandhian Congress. It went to the extent of ridiculing the 1942 Quit India
Movement and supported the British war effort. It also encouraged its followers
to infiltrate in army, bureaucracy, and the police. After independence it helped
in the formation of first, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and later Bharatiya Majdoor
Sangh, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and a plethora
of organisations have sprung up in last few decades. Its social presence had
been inconspicuous till mid eighties. The first time it got broad notice was
when one of the trained cadres of RSS, Nathuram Godse, killed the Father of
Indian Nationalism, Mahatma Gandhi. Later it got noticed for its `anti
communist' noises during India China War in 1962. Despite low social visibility
it strengthened itself by continuing to `train' the cadres who occupied crucial
positions in army, bureaucracy, police and media. The second major social
recognition of this organisation came with JP movement in early seventies, when
riding on the wave of middle class movement, JP launched a mass struggle and
permitted the `committed' RSS to be a part of it. This recognition of RSS by a
figure like JP, helped to wash a bit of the `sin' of the murder of Mahatma
Gandhi.
Following the emergency and elections, Janata Party of which Jan Sangh became
one of the constituents came to power. After the split in Janata Party, the old
Jan Sanghis unwilling to break their RSS connection, split from Janata Party to
form Bharatiya Janata Party on the agenda of Gandhian socialism. This probably
was due to the calculation that socialism was a popular cliche and can be
encashed upon. Despite its prolonged sustained work, RSS did not get its social
visibility till quite late and its political arm did remain a marginal force.
What transformed this marginal force into a major political power?
Indira Gandhi, loosing her popular appeal, did subtly try to win over the
`religious nationalist' social base of upper castes by communalising the Kashmir
and Punjab problems. With Rajiv Gandhis' blunder on Shah Bano, it was necessary
to appease the Hindu communalists by opening the locks of Babri Masjid. This
gave a lot of fillip to the Hindu communalists. Later VP Singh's regime
implemented Mandal Commission recommendations. And this was 'The' point which
transformed the Indian politics. The reaction to Mandal Commission was a wide
spread backlash of the upper castes, especially in Hindi belt. BJP cleverly
encashed upon it by giving an emotive touch to the political events. SP by a
masterstroke projected Hindutva, Mandir issue as the core of social problems. It
was not possible for BJP to directly oppose Mandal Commission, also it had to
express the aspirations of its social constituency, those opposed to the social
justice, those for status quo, those for privileges of upper castes. Advani's
Rath Yatra campaign came at a time, by which the industrialisation process had
thrown up a new layer of petty industrialists, also in north the construction of
Hindu identity was strongest amongst this new layer and the earlier Brahmin/Bania/Rich
peasant, upwardly mobile middle classes (an unavoidable mix of caste/class
categories).
The movement, Hindutva, which existed only as an ideology so far, got the
real flesh and blood with the consolidation of anti-Mandal sentiments. The
social sector which was supporter of Religious nationalism, which was living in
the category `us' in contrast to the category of the `other' the Muslims swung
into a social action to aggressively guard its privileges and status. The
cultural onslaught of VHP (Ramshilapujan and the like) came in to supplement the
political campaign of BJP and the heady mix of religious emotive symbol and
political agenda of protecting the interests of the upper castes, watered the so
far dormant, poisonous seeds of SP movement, culminating in the demolition of
Babri Masjid and accompanying nationwide anti-Muslim progroms, reaching their
crescendo in the Shiv Sena controlled anti-Muslim riots in Bombay and the
ghastly rape of Muslim women in Surat.
The political force which had a semi-notional existence till mid 80's, and
was mainly surviving on the ideological fodder of `ban cow slaughter', `Indianise
Muslims', `abolish article 370' and the like as an ineffective social
distraction, found its moorings and strength in late 80's to create a `social
monster' which after a `acute' beginning of early nineties has crystallised
itself as a social political and ideological force asserting its political
agenda at every opportune moment in the society.
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One will like to add a comment about the relations of Hindutva with Congress
and Shiv Sena. Congress came up mainly as a 'national', anticolonial movement
but Hindutva was constantly associated with it, at times dominant, at times
hidden and at times a marginal accompaniment. Under the leadership of Tilak
Congress was the vehicle of Hindutva in a major way. With Gandhi assuming the
leadership of Congress, Hindutva was subjugated to the main 'anti-British'
project and was side tracked. But it existed within Congress all the came. Lala
Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Sardar Patel and later
Purshottamdas Tandon were the main 'Hindutva' votaries. Also there was a uniform
scatter of these 'strong saffron' to mild saffron leaders at all the rungs of
leadership. With Nehru assuming strong 'socialist, secular' principles as the
state policy, the Hindutva elements kept themselves maintaining their roots.
After Nehru's demise and with change in social dynamics, Indira Gandhi veered to
upper castes as the main support base, the upper caste vote bank, in 84
electrions.
Rajiv's Congress lost out the battle for the 'upper caste' vote bank, to the
blatant puritan and unadulterated upper caste agenda of BJP, which since then
has not looked back and has by now become 'The' vehicle of Hindutva politics,
marginalising the Congress from the upper caste arena. All in all though
Hindutva has played a 'hide and seek' expression in some periods, through
Congress. But it is the BJP which has been the major and preferred vehicle for
Hindutva agenda. Shiv Sena, which thrived on the 'sons of the soil' garbage,
watered from the backyard by some elements of Congress, came up strongly in
Bombay. Supported by the big capital, it unleashed a'physical annhilation' of
communist labor leaders in Bombay.
After exhausting this agenda, it temporarily campaigned against the 'lungiwallahs'
(South Indians), and Gujarathis before latching on to the upswinging Hindutva
movement. In the process it boosted and supplemented the SP, playing the combine
role of a mini Maharashtraian BJP and the storm tropper Bajrang Dal (the lumpen
'son' of R.S.S., specialising in anti-muslim onslaught/pogroms). In early
simmerings of its emergence this movement to begin with was spearheaded mostly
by Brahmins. Its support came from the landed aristocracy and some layers of
middle classes. Most amorphous sections identified with the Gandhian
Nationalism, while the subulterns identified more with the movement of Ambedkar
or the communist parties.
Despite the training of cadres, dedicated, committed, ascetic on so on, the
reach of religious nationalism was confined to Brahmin/Bania/Rich peasant and
petty bourgeoisie in the Hindi belt in Northern India. And the failure of its
campaigns on cow slaughter ban, Indianise the Muslims, was well indicative of
that. Even the communal riots which began from 60s began with a slow pace and
picked up more and more dangerous proportions with passage of time. The
ideological propagation of Hindutva and the rise of its support base went hand
in hand, and by late seventies and early eighties the anti-Muslim riots began to
assume horrendous proportions.
Though BJP and its predecessor the Jan Sangh began with small electoral
support, this support was well designed. It was the urban middle classes,
sections of twice-born castes, and the Banias. Let us have a brief look at the
changes in social composition which have occurred during last 50 years of the
republic. The proportion of urban population has gone up by 20-25 per cent. They
also constitute the ones' having derived maximum benefit of modern education and
the facilities thrown up by the industrialization process. They do have a sort
of dominant presence in the society. The cultural, social and political
aspirations of this sector is the ground on which has risen the edifice of SP.
To understand the social base of the SP we will like to go into the
regrouping of social groups in Gujarat. Nandy et al (11) have described this
process in detail. Along with urbanisation there has been a parallel process in
which the rich peasants of Gujarat have achieved an enhanced social status.
These Patidars', (cash crop farmers) caste has been upgraded by a process of
religious manoeuvering. The polarisation of middle class (Brahmin, Bania) and
Patidar occurred around 1980, around the issue of reservations for the lower
castes. In 1981, Gujarat witnessed an extreme form of caste violence directed
against the lower castes. These antireservation agitations played a key role in
consolidating the base of upper castes and upwardly mobile middle classes. SP
directly or indirectly stood by to support this upper caste onslaught.
By using clever strategies SP was also able to give an upwardly mobile
channel to a section of Dalits, aspiring a better place within Hindu society. In
Gujarat, one can clearly see the social functionality of creating the `other'.
Here earlier the ultimate object of hate was the dalit, by a clever manoeuver,
the Muslim is substituted for that, the dalit is unleashed upon the
"other", a atmosphere of terror is created, which helps to maintain a
`status quo' of social hierarchy. The core of this social base was given a
cohesion by various Yatras and campaigns by VHP.
Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen in their enlightening work `Khakhi Shorts
Saffron Flags' (1), have tried to trace the roots of SP movement. They correlate
it with the rise of new religiosity around worship `Jai Mata Di', `Jai Santoshi
Ma', around functions like `Jagrata' and pilgrimages like `Vaishno Devi'. All
these which emerged in northern states in late 60's and early 70 got co-opted
and colored by the VHP campaigns. Basu et.al. identify a significant social base
of SP in new urban middle class, spreading in small towns as well, which has
come up due to the rapid growth of relatively small enterprises and the
accompanying trade boom. "These small scale units flourish without the
concomitant growth of organized working class, since individual work-places are
far too small to consolidate the labor force and enable effective
unionization." This type of industrial development, based on screw driver
technology has mushroomed all through in 70's and 80's. This newer middle class
tends to be fragmented into smaller more individual units. "They are marked
by intense internal competition and steady pressure of new opportunity
structures, ever expanding horizons for upward mobility and a compulsive
consumerism that keeps transcending its own limits. The very pressure of growth
is disturbingly destabilizing; the brave new world of global opportunities
creates anomie and existential uncertainties." (1) The Green Revolution in
parts of UP has increased rural purchasing power feeding into the boom in urban
enterprises, consumerism and trade.
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Most of the social scientist have characterised this movement as a communal
one. The broad perception amongst the segment of liberal, progressive
intellectuals is that this is a communal movement, spearheaded by the SP, to
strengthen the social and political power of Hindu elites. It's most commonly
perceived activity is to train the cadres in its core doctrine to float the
different organisations (BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal, Swadeshi Jagran Manch, Vanvasi
Kalyan Ashram, etc.) which overtly spread the communal venom against minorities
in general and Muslims in particular. By now the success of SP (Sangh Parivar)
in communalising the social space, infiltrating police, army and bureaucracy is
well recognised. And it is, and is broadly perceived as a communal movement.
`Religious nationalism' is a characterisation by many a sociologists who pick
up the assertions of these movements and give them a decent looking veneer (13).
In Juergansmeyers' understanding the religious nationalists see the failure of
democracy and socialism, both western models, leading them to conclude that
secular nationalism has failed. And so they view religion as a hopeful
alternative, which can provide a basis for criticism and change. As per him the
differences amongst various religious leaders are immense, but they all share
one thing in common - seeing Western secular nationalism as their enemy and
their hope to revive religion in public sphere. Juergansmeyer hesitates to call
these movements fundamentalist as this word tends to suggest "an
intolerant, self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism."
The term is less descriptive and more accusatory. Also it is an imprecise term
for makingcomparisons across cultures. The better term for this phenomenon is
offered by Bruce Lawrence (14) which suggests a global revoltagainst secular
ideology that often accompanies modern society.
The 'modern' according to this are those who are `modern' while opposing the
values of modernism. Also fundamentalism does not carry any political meaning
and conveys the idea of solely being motivated by religious beliefs rather than
broad concerns about the nature of society and the world. The term religious
nationalist conveys the main meaning of religious and political interests and
also holds that there is no clear distinction between religion and politics, as
this distinction is a mask of western thinking.
But this characterisation is not able to totally understand different broad
and deepfacets of its offensives. Also it isnot able to explain the intensity
and sustained nature of this movement. To fill this gap some social scientists
and activists like Ram Bapat, characterise this as being a fundamentalist
movement, akin to the one in countries like Iran (12). As per this formulation
Indian fundamentalism, like the global one which exists everywhere in post
industrial societies, has been generated by the system of advanced capitalism or
late capitalism.
In third world countries it is in a manifest form in contrast to the latent
form in advanced countries. Bapat feels that due to lack of power of public
opinion of the progressive world at the turn of century, the first world is
making every attempt to put fundamentalism on top of the agenda for the world
politics and even for military purposes. After the decades of 60s and 70s, which
constituted the years of triumph of socialism and also of emancipatory
nationalism, the next two decades marked the beginning of revivalism and
fundamentalism. Originally fundamentalism developed in America where capitalism
faced a lot of turmoil from 1870 to 1930. Similarly other countries when faced
with severe economic crisis, came up with the fundamentalist response from some
sectors of society. In America this fundamentalist response came in the form of
a movement which asserted the revivalist trend to identify essential absolute to
enable American citizens to take on the force of darkness. Bapat makes a
pertinent point that since 1818, Maharashtra, amongst all Indian states has
served as a kind of hot house plant for sustaining all kinds of orthodoxy,
revivalism, fundamentalism and communalism, particularly of Hindutva variety. To
begin with Fundamentalist Hindutva is not the Hinduism practised by millions of
people. It (the Hindutva) is an imaginary Hinduism which is essentially
extra-historical, extra-religious and is a political credo for those who want to
make much of the ideology for their political ends. The fundamentalism is
neither based on traditional modes of thought nor traditions as they existed.
They win over people by propogating of `manufactured traditions.'
They adopt the gains of modernity, science, technology, weaponary and
industrial production. It wants a modern apparatus of life without the necessary
relations between human beings which would give them space to struggle for their
rights. In nutshell, it wants to achieve a certain modern culture i.e. the
modern production process sans the accompanying space for improvement of human
relationships. It is a post feudal phenomenon aimed at inventing a new identity
for the ruling classes.
It uses the language of religious discourse. Fundamentalism is possible only
in semitic religions. The semitisation process of Hinduism is going on from last
many decades. This semitic Hinduism which in fact is the Brahminical Hinduism
has discovered the Book in `Gita', the holy deity in `Ram' from amongst hundreds
of contenders for this status. The attempt of this fundamentalist movement is to
read their interests and programmes of the present into the past. Bapat feels
that Sangh Parivar is not fascist as, fascism does not lean upon religion to
give it the cohesive aggressive slant. In contrast Aijaz Ahmed, K.N. Panikar,
Sumeet Sarkar and many other sociologist characterise the SP as being Fascist.
As per Sarkar (15) the SP movement may not look exactly parallel to the German
Fascism, but a closer look at the pattern of affinities and differences helps to
highlight the crucial features, notably as the implications of the offensive of
SP go far beyond the events of 92-93. The drive for Hindu Rashtra has put into
jeopardy the entire secular and democratic foundations of our republic. It is
onlyHindu communalism, and not the Muslim communalism which has the potential of
imposing fascism in India. Sarkar points out that Fascism was introduced in
Italy and Germany through a combination of carefully orchestrated street
violence (with a mass support) and deep infiltration into the police bureaucracy
and the army, with the connivance of 'centrist' political leaders. Hitler, for
example, had repeatedly asserted his party's respect for legality even after
coming to power, but meanwhile his colleague Goering, Nazified the German
police, organised street encounters in which more than 50 anti-Nazis were
murdered and set the scence for Reichstag fire; after which first the communists
and then all opposition political parties and trade unions were quickly
destroyed. The methodology adopted in destruction of mosque is so much
reminiscent of the same method. The mosque is demolished in 51/2 hours in total
violation of supreme court order and repeated assurances given by leading
opposition party, and the central government does not even lift a finger till
the mosque is totally razed to the ground. Countrywide riots follow, police
partiality is painfully obvious, the land grabbing vandals build a temporary
'temple', illegally, and this structure is protected, while the political force
behind this, the BJP alternates between occasional apology and more frequent
aggressive justification, while their brother organisation, the VHP adds Delhi's
Jumma Masjid in the list of Hindu monuments and denounces the Indian
constitution as being anti Hindu. The beating up of journalists on Dec. 6, is no
surprise as the fascists forces, who carefully cultivate the press usually, like
to combine persuasion with an occasional big stick.
Unlike the Fascism in Italy and Germany which came into power within a decade
or less of its emergence as a political movement, Hindutva had a long gestation
period, which has given added strength and stability to the movement and it has
been a long enough time for their ideas to become part of the social common
sense. Sarkar correctly points out that the real base of Sangh Parivar remains
the predominantly upper caste trader professional petit bourgeoisie of cities
and small town mainly in Hindi heartland; with developing connections perhaps
with upwardly mobile landholding groups in countryside. He quotes Daniel
Gurien's definition of fascism as "not only an instrument at the service of
big buisness, but at the same time a mystical upheaval of the petite
bourgeoisie. Specific linkages of big business with fascism remain
controversial. By a sustained propaganda work SP has succeeded in creating a
communalised common sense in which Muslim has become a near equivalent of the
Jew - or the Black in contemporary white racism. As per SP the Muslim in India
is unduly privileged a charge much more absurd than it was in Germany where Jews
had been fairly prominent and well to do. In India Muslims are grossly
underrepresented in business, bureaucracy, army, police, private enterprise etc.
Here the alleged privileges are the appeasement of Muslims by pseudosecularists.
Like Hitler in Germany, the SP arrogates to itself to be representative of
Hindus, who are in majority, and thereby its democratic credentials are above
board. Similarly since SP is 'The' representative of Hindus, any body deviating
from its line is anti Hindu at worst and pseudosecular at best. Unlike Jews who
had to face the gas chambers, Hindutva line is 'kind and generous' and offers a
second class citizenship to the Muslims.
The constant anti Muslim violence, euphemistically called 'communal' riots
has succeeded in ghettoising large chunks of the Muslim population. Also unlike
Nazis, SP grounds the identity on religion.
Aijaz Ahmed (16) calls it Hindutva Fascism and points out that it differs
from the Italian and German ones' on the ground that it speaks relatively rarely
of economic instance and fashions its ideological discourse along categories of
'nation' and community seeking to obtain the identity between these two
categories nation and community - through methodical use of violence as a
political instrumentality. Hindutva has nationalised the violence as a means for
capturing state power. As per Ahmed the whole series of mass spectacles,
mobilizationsand blood baths that began with rath yatra and culminated in the
demolition of masjid on one hand, and terrorization of Bombay on the other has
introduced into Indian politics a qualitatively different dynamics, pushing the
urban culture of diverse regions across the country in a distinctly fascist
direction,and giving to the new phase of Indian communalism a form at once
hysterical and methodical which is similar to that of European anti-semitism.
The true object of SP's desire is not submission of the muslims alone but of
state power as a whole, and remaking of India in its own image. This, it is
achieving by imposing a homogenisation on the lines of Brahminical ethos on the
society. Concieved and executed as at present, the SP fascist project has some
limitation since it does not 'pose' to be radical enough to win over the masses
and India is too diverse a country to buy SP's homogenisation at a quick pace.
The Hindu Right (SP) has been equated with Nazi Germany by Jan Breman (17),
who points out that popular support for Hindutva primarily stems from social
sections which enjoy better life than earlier generations were used to. " -
both (German Fascism and Hindutva) originate within and also appeal to the petty
bourgeoisie, a composite class which is growing in size and political
weight". Despite minor differences Breman posits that there are deeper
similarities. Nazi ideology worked into a pseudo religious dogma, while Hindutva
has packed its gospel in purely religious terms. This religiosity of Hindutva is
a mere facade for a more comprehensive societal reconstruction which is very
materialistic in nature. Breman, who was born and bred during Hitlers reign and
has also seen the Hindutva onslaught from close quarters, gets a distinct
feeling of de ja vu. This is partly because of the fact that similar to the
Hitler regime here also one community is singled out as arch enemy of the people
(the nation), the Hindu majority. The persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany was
planned and controlled by the party machinary. Though in the maze of propaganda
which gives advanced legitimization to the pogroms which are to follow, the
Hindutva offensive tries to cleverly masquerade its role in the pogroms on
Muslims. This is possible because of a clever division of labor between 'father'
(RSS) and different 'sons' and 'daughter' of this 'parivar'. RSS trains the
cadre in ideology, BJP plays this game on political chessboard, VHP gives an
emotive touch to the communal project by roping in the Sants, Mahants and the
NRI's, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti backs up the RSS ideology by taking it in the
sphere of home, and the Bajrang Dal translates it in to the street violence,
which can take off only because of the ground work done by other members of the
'parivar'. This was painfully obvious on Bombay and Surat in 1993. In addition
the Hindutva forces encouraged hunt against the deviant forces, with those
upholding the secular ethos, being next on the firing line.
But unlike the Jews in Germany, Muslims are no capitalist sharks, so their
'privileged' 'appeasement' is projected and they are shown to be a pampered lot.
Also part of this aggression is justified by their political domination and
harassment of Hindus in the medieval times. Bremen sharply perceives the project
of Hindu right-"marginalised as Mohammadi Hindus they may be allowed to
hide in their own ghettos, cordoned off like the judenvierter"were in the
Nazified Europe. In their defiled habitat they will live beyond the pale, as new
untouchables in a modern India which is thoroughly Hinduised".
Trying to take a broad and critical look at the Fascist analogy of Sangh
Parivar Achin Vanaik (8) theorises the phenomenon of fascism and uses it for
analysing Hindu Nationalism. Vanaik feels that fascist paradigm is inappropriate
and of very limited value for situating not just Hindu nationalism but a whole
host of political phenomena, particularly in the third world. There are
important similarities and dissimilarities between Hindutva and Fascism. To take
up dissimilarities first: lack of charismatic leader in SP, absence of an
explicitly anti-liberal/anti-democratic and anti working class themes, absence
of any verbal anticapitalist demagogy, absence of any orientation to the theme
of a 'generalisational revolt' etc. Vanaik states that though Fascist formations
can draw their support from all classes, they are not multiclass political
formations or movements. They are not a form of authoritarian populism.
"Fascist formations win ideological and political hegemony because their
decisive victories are achieved on non-ideological terrain. Their momentum is
convulsive. They grow rapidly but they also fade out fast if they do not achieve
power. In postcolonial societies the political vehicles of religious
fundamentalism or religion based nationalism are not so much the fascist
formations as, at most, potential fascist formations, where that potential may
or may not be realised. While fascist state in India would necessarily be Hindu
nationalist, the Hindu nationalist state would not ecessarily be fascist."
Vanaik in his presentation is totally silent on the class base of fascism.
This forces him to turn to ideological realms to characterise the nature of
Hindu nationalism. In a subtle shift from class analysis, to analysing 'nation'
Vanaik dumps the materialist understanding in the bin and walks on the crutches
of idealism "In last 15 years ..... there has been the dramatic rise of
politics of cultural exclusivisms and xenophobia.... we are witness to four
forms of which the politics of exclusivity have taken .... rise of religious
fundamentalism.... HIndu nationalism .... spreading and swelling of carbuncles
of racist and anti immigrant xenophobia in the first world. Vanaik does relate
all these phenomenon to global changes in correlation and feels that politics of
identity has by and large overshadowed the politics of class. He sees this
movement, the political vehicle of religious fundamentalism not as fascist but
only potentially so, it is an Indian variant of a generic phenomenon but does
not belong to the genus of fascism.
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Different scattered views, not necessarily mutually exclusive are prevelant
in the sociological domain. The communal nature of SP is very obvious at the
very first level of approximation. Its fundamentalist character is easily
discernible from its clinging to religious expressions. The proper
characterisation can come by constantly relating the social roots with the
political manifestations of the SP.
To begin with since Fascism has been a very major category which came into
being and has serious implications, it is necessary to understand the 'core' of
Fascism. Narratives and analysis on Fascism can go on and on at different
levels. Martin Kitchen (19) has tried to give a succint summary of this
phenomenon. It is a ultraconservative movement rejecting liberal values,
projects soverignty of nation as absolute supreme, glorifies martial spirit,
dictatorship of supreme dictator, calls for subordination of rights of
individuals to the 'states' soverignty'. It tends to identify the 'enemy' 'the
culprit' for social ills, terrorising the social psyche and suspending the human
rights.
The social backdrop of this ideology and social movement is 'fright' of the
properties classes by the unrest of the poor. Extreme poverty, inflation,
malnutrition, unemployment are the ground on which unrest of the poor is
founded. Along with section of the propertied classed it is the response of
middle classes to the unrest of poor, unemployed and different social movement
(organized working class in case of classical fascism). The major thrust of
attack of fascist movement is on 'human rights' movements (trade union movement
in case of German Fascism).
The core of Fascist movement is a threatened middle class, threatened by the
struggles of the oppressed in the backdrop of general scarcity of resources. The
European Fascism came up as a cataclysm which gripped the society in a brief
span of time for a brief span of time. SP movements theoretical underpinnings
began decades ago. The ideological exercises and consolidation has been going on
since then. Despite a vast network of Shakha's and their followers in the state
apparatus they were not a social force till 80's. 80's saw the turmoil of lower
castes, asserting itself. The response was anti-dalit riots spread all over the
country. The Gujarat anti dalit riots of 1980 are a clear example of this. The
twin processes: formation of cash crop rich peasants, the small industrialists
and urbanised middle class acquired a substantial presence by 80's. The
precipitation of this amorphous mass into SP movement was brought in by many
factors: the main of these was the 'Mandalisation', which brought together the
'core supporters of fascism (Rich peasants, small industrialists and sections of
middle classes), threatened by assertion of the low castes, poor etc.,
immediately rallied around the SP.
It was not possible for SP to keep openly attacking the lower castes and
other oppressed sections of society. A clever manoeuver has taken place here.
The real project of this 'core fascist supporters' is to keep the dalits, poor
workers and women in their place. (Also this can not be done openly due to the
seeping in of liberal values in society). The upper castes have a morbid fear of
protecting their privileges and social status. Last few decades have seen a
systematic, subtle campaign to degrade 'reservations' and to look down upon
those who avail of these reservations. Also they hate the movements supporting
the rights of poor peasants and workers. The latter especially are the 'hate
objects' for the upcoming 'petty industrialists'. One is not sure about what the
extent of impact the 'women's rights' movement has been on the upper caste Hindu
males in particular, but one can broadly say that the upcoming movement of self
assertion of rights of women added up to the insecurity which this group faced
in the society. Thus broadly in the complex class/caste/gender scenario the
petty bourgeoisie, in this context, the upper caste Hindu male was looking for
an ideology, support system and a political movement which can suppress the
aspirations of these groups, as they were threatening his social and political
power.
With the development of liberal ethos worldwide it is not possible, not to
pay lip service to casteless society, gender equality and human rights in
general. One (upper class/caste) hates these human rights but one has to either
(a) distract attention from the situations which gives space for struggle to
these or (b) propogates alternative set of value system which without directly
opposing these 'threats' to their status, obfuscates these sharp formulations to
propogate the ideology which neutralises the sharpness of these assertions.
'Hindutva' fits in the bill excellently. One one hand it creates an external
enemy image in the hapless 'muslim' on whose head are dumped all the historical
ignomities, the causation of present evils, and in this direction creates an
'enemy' who is to be hated, fought against, repeatedly subjected to street
violence to 'ghettoise' him and this process is done with 'hysterical intensity,
the pitch of which subsumes all the other genuine voices of struggling oppressed
groups. The enemy's projection through 'manufacturing history', 'doctoring mass
consciousness' is taken to a level whereby the 'anti-enemy' pogrom can be
initiated at will, while the communalised social consciousness and communalised
state appraratus aids and abetts it. The 'enemy' in this case is an extension of
the low caste shudra, all attempts are made to engineer the hatred between the
two, with the purpose that the latter can be used against the former. This whole
process is so much full of 'social passion' that a terrorising atmosphere is
created which is the best way to suppress the liberalism and the accompanying
social space for the struggles of the oppressed groups.
'Hindutva' also has the 'merit' at another level. After 'excluding the
other', all the remaining ones are Hindus. They are projected to be a homogenous
Hindu mass, in which each has and 'assigned' 'dharma' to which each has to stick
for the harmonious society to flower. The concept of homogenous and harmonious
is propogated by the upholders of the status quo, by those who are beneficiaries
in the present power equations. It is proclaimed, ours is a casteless society,
the caste politics is divisive, we should (the lower castes) overcome the caste
psychology, even at a time when caste exploitation is going on at full speed.
The women is given the 'respectable' place of 'mother' and a 'sister' 'wife' and
'daughter' these relations which the patriarchs exploit to the hilt. The workers
are supposed to be doing the productive activity for the 'nation' and so should
conform to the present exploitative, unjust laws, lest the 'nation' will suffer.
In this 'national' project the unrestricted right of employer to exploit is
conspicious by its silent presence.
Thus nothing can fit into the political project of 'upper caste male', than
the political construct of Hindutva. Unlike the fascisms of Europe whose
occurrence was cataclysmic, Indian Fascism, is chronic and sub-acute. It comes
in paroxysms and every occurrence of its exacerbation leaves a broader
consolidation for itself. Every occurrence of its offense, leaves the 'other'
more helpless and ghettoised. This ghettoisation is a necessary accompaniment of
Brahminical domination, hegemony of Hindutva. Brahminical exclusivity needs a
ghetto, be it of a untouchable centuries ago, or of a muslim in 20th century
(nay probably even in 21st century for that matter).
Hindutva in essence is fascism, as to use Vanaik's 'Fascist minimum'
criterion, its the 'core' and class character which should determine the nature
of a movement, either in opposition or in power. Fascism's core, the minimum, is
the middle class base. Hindutva's core, the social base is the cash crop farmer,
the petty industrialist and multiple segments of middle classes (bureaucracy,
professionals, traders etc) latched on to the big capital. The peripheral
manifestations apart, which can change in place and time, Fascism and Hindutva
share the commonality, the same social base. Hindutva is a sub-acute, chronic
Fascism of a caste-ridden, post colonial society.
Where does Hindutva differ from the Fascisms of European variety. To begin
with the ideological base and cadre of Hindutva were prepared for decades by the
brahminism, before the change in social dynamics resulted in threat to the power
of its social constituency fell back and on a ready-made formation. In between
period there were many individuals, from these segments who had veered around to
its politics. Secondly Hindutva, as a fascist variant, has invaded the social
image in a much more consistent and planned way. Unlike cataclysmic Fascisms,
its dedicated soldiers infiltrated army, bureaucracy, police, media and
education for decades to prepare a conducive ground for smooth walk-in of the
Hindutva in the social space.
Thirdly probably because of the above, Hindutva does not need a 'radical'
rhetoric of 'socialism' or some such, which was used by European Fascisms. The
absence of radical rhetoric is a strength of Hindutva as it eliminates the need
to undertake radical social reforms whenever it succeeds in capturing the power
in small sectors, states, of the country. In a way Hindutva is a organically
stronger variety of Fascism as it does not need the radical rhetoric to propel
its engine. Their is another subtle problem in native Fascism. The unspoken
north-south divide. The imageries of Hindutva are mainly around north Indian
upper caste male. This hegemony is yet to succeed in its goal in subjugating the
non-Hindi speaking regions. With the rise of cash crop farmers and other social
bases of Hindutva, in non-Hindi speaking regions also, there is a marginal
possibility of this movement getting some foothold in these regions as well. But
probably the extent of this will be too small.
The chronicity, i.e. slow speed of this movement has its inherent problems.
Where as on one hand it can capture the social space, on the other it can also
elicit a reaction to itself. This reaction to it from dalits, workers, women,
section of middle class which is secular, is a big obstacle to the march of
Hindutva. Big capital, the major industrial houses have a unique relation with
SP. Whenever faced with crisis to their own existences the socially terrorising
atmosphere created by SP helps the bourgeiosic to wriggle out of the compulsions
of liberalism. The conservative movement of SP helps the needs of capital to
keep thriving in an uninterrupted way. The noises of 'swadeshi' and the
multispeak' adopted by different 'sons' of the RSS are an indication enough that
overall the Hindutva project does not go against the global nature, 'computer
chips', 'potato chips', 'Dump Enron in the Arabian Sea' (and bring it back
through the roads of Konkan)', while the Indian capital continues its logical
trajectory of more and more firmly becoming the part of global capital with
uneven playing field, on which it has to play while the unfair immigration laws
and hegemony of richer countries increasing the miseries of the poor people of
the poor countries.
Thus this, chronic, resilient, thriving fascism, expressed through the
idomitable vehicle of SP continues to throw up different shades of its
existence, sometimes terrorising (to the poor and minorities) sometimes
aggressive (to the neighboring 'enemy' countries), sometimes appearing to
collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. But the march, at the
moment is on. The social roots of Hindutva are all for the support and
continuation of the repressive capitalist regime; sustaining the bourgeisic
aspirations, while continuing to pursue its own project.
At present the situation is fairly in balance. The onslaught has achieved
mammoth proportions in the north, but south and east is comparatively unaffected
by its paranoid aggression. The reaction of dalits, though fragmented is
definitely going to retard the march of the 'Rath' of Hindutva.
The target of SP, the muslims are in a bind. On one hand they have been
battered so much by Hindutva, that they cannot afford to lie quiet about it.
Secondly unlike the dalits they lie in a subcritical zone of backwardness where
they find it difficult to come out of the grip of their own 'religious leaders',
'the muslim obscurantists' posing to be speaking on behalf of 'their community.
Thus they face a double attack from both Hindu Fascism and Muslim
fundamentalism. Probably the suffering of the 'poor muslims' is so great they
will be forced to come out and resist the 'bears hug' of SP and sidetracking
their 'leaders' will pose definite obstacle to the march of Trishuls of Hindutva.
How SP overcomes this problem, which new 'velvet gloves' it discovers to remove
this obstacle remains to be seen.
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The core of fascist movement is to suppress and suspend the rights of the
oppressed. It is a social agenda of shaken, threatened middle class in the
service of big bourgeisic. It is a mass movement, Hindutva is the political
agenda of petty industrialists, sections of middle classes and rich peasantry
blessed by capital. Hindutva aims to create the new ghettoised untouchables, the
poor muslims, a la the shudra of the olden times and keeping this goal in mind
it wants to suppress/sidetrack the social andpolitical aspirations of dalits,
workers and women.
With growth of autonomous movements each struggling sector is asserting
itself through small attempts to work for, to wrest its rights. This is a
non-hegemonic way of struggle of the oppressed. Unfortunately this has a
potential of advancement in liberal atmosphere only, where these fragmented,
isolated struggles and movements can stand on their own feet to march towards
their goals.
Hindutva is succeeding in creating a social atmosphere, where it will be
difficult for these struggles to be carried on properly. Already lot of hurdles
are cropping up in the march of these movements. These movements share an
anti-authoritarianism which can be the basis of there coming together, to combat
Hindutva, despite their seemingly diverse social agendas. The common platform
which coordinates, without suppressing the aspirations of individual
constitutents, can aim against the Fascistic Hindutva and strengthen the
secular, democratic rights of large sections of society. That alone can form the
basis of secular, democratic ethos, which can stand upto the onslaught of
Hindutva and in the long term show it, its place in the history, the dustbin.
Acknowledgement
(I am thankful to Irfan Engineer, Jairus Banaji and Vrijendra for the
discussions which helped me formulate my ideas. However responsibility and
weaknesses of these formulations are entirely mine.)
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1. Tapan Basu, P. Datta, S. Sarkar, T. Sarkar & S. Sen 'Khakhi Shorts
Saffron Flags', (Tracts for the Times - 1), Orient Longman, 1993, p.37.
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and Everyday Facial Relations in South Asia: Delhi, OUP, p.6.
3. Arthur Bonner, 'Democracy in India: a hollow shell', The American
University Press, Washington, 1994, p.40.4. ibid, p.41.
5. Arun Bose, 'India's Social Crisis', Delhi: OUP, p.56.
6. Jawaharlal Nehru, 'The Discovery of India', John Day, 1946, p.66.
7. Hinndls, John and Eric Sharpe, eds. Hinduism, New Caste upon Tyne, Oriel
Press, 1972, p.128.
8. Romila Thapar, 'Syneticated Moksha?' Seminar, 1987, pp.14-22.
9. Gail Omvedt, 'Dalit Visions' (Tract for the times - 8), Orient Longman,
1995, pp.7-12.
10. Jafferlot Christopher, 1993, Hindu Nationalism: Strategic syneretic in
ideology building, EPW, March 20, 93, 517-24.
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Hindutva as Savarna Purana: OUP, Delhi, 1995.
12. Ram Bapat 'Religious Fundamentalism as a factor in Today's National and
International Politics', Paper presented at the Seminar "The Nation, State
and Indian Identity: A PostAyodhya Perspective", MAJLIS, Bombay, Feb. 7-10,
1994.
13. Mark Juergensmeyer 'Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State',
OUP, Delhi, 1994.14. Bruce Lawrence, 'Defenders of God', quoted in 3, p.5.
15. Sumeet Sarkar 'The Fascism of Sangh Parivar', Economic and Political
Weekly, pp.163-168, Jan. 30, 1993.
16. Aijaz Ahmad: Radicalism of the Right and Logics of Secularism, in
Religion, Religiosity and Communalism (Eds. Bidwai, Mukhia & Vanaik),
Manohar: 96, pp.36-55.
17. Jan Breman 'The Hindu Right', Times of India, March 15, 1993.
18. Achin Vanaik 'Situating Threat of Hindu Nationalism', EPW, July 9, 1994,
1729-1748.
19. Martin Kitchen 'Fascism', The Macmillan Press Ltd. London,1976.
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