À̰÷Àº Á×Àº °æÁ¦ÇÐÀÚÀÇ »çȸ-the Dead Economists Society-ÀÇ ÀÚ·á½Ç ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.ÀڷḦ ¿­¶÷ÇϽ÷Á¸é ȸ¿ø ·Î±×ÀÎÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇϸç, À̰÷ÀÇ ÀÚ·á´Â ´Ù¸¥ °÷¿¡ ÀÓÀÇ·Î ¸µÅ©, ÀüÀç(ï®î°)ÇÏ½Ç ¼ö ¾ø½À´Ï´Ù. (http://ECONOMISTS.wo.to)


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-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer
-A Case for Quantity Regulation(48KB)
-Abstract
Contrary to the standard economic advice, many regulations of financial intermediaries, as well as other regulations such as blue laws, fishing rules, zoning restrictions, or pollution controls, take the form of quantity controls rather than taxes. We argue that costs of enforcement are crucial to understanding these choices.... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A,George-Marios Angeletos and Laurent E. Calvet
-Incomplete Markets, Growth, and the Business Cycle(496KB)
-Abstract
We introduce a Ramsey growth model with incomplete markets, decentralized production, and idiosyncratic technological risk. The combination of uninsurable shocks with the precautionary motive can slow down capital accumulation or give rise to persistent fluctuations even when agents are very patient and technology is strictly convex. The model generates closed-form expressions for the equilibrium dynamics under a finite or infinite horizon...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Dale W. Jorgenson
-Information Technology and the U.S. Economy (171KB)
-Abstract
No Abstract Available...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Edward L. Glaeser and Matthew E. Kahn
-Decentralized Employment and the Transformation of the American City (469KB)
-Abstract
This paper examines the decentralization of employment using zip code data on employment by industry. Most American cities are decentralized--on average less than 16 percent of employment in metropolitan areas is within a three mile radius of the city center. In decentralized cities, the classic stylized facts of urban economics (i.e.prices fall with distance to the city center, commute time rise with distance and poverty falls with distance)no longer hold...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Edward L. Glaeser and Jose A. Scheinkman
-Non-Market Interactions (KB)
-Abstract
A large body of recent research argues that social, or non-market, interactions can explain a wide range of puzzling phenomena from fashion cycles to stock market crashes. This paper attempts to connect the range of these papers with a general model and a broad empirical overview. We establish conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in social interactions models. The existence of multiple equilibria requires sufficient non-linearity in social interactions and only moderate heterogeneity across agents--strategic complementarities are neither necessary nor sufficient for multiple equilibria...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A,Edward L. Glaeser, David Laibson and Bruce Sacerdote
-The Economic Approach to Social Capital (1417KB)
-Abstract
To identify the determinants of social capital formation, it is necessary to understand the social capital investment decision of individuals. Individual social capital should then be aggregated to measure the social capital of a community. This paper assembles the evidence that supports the individual-based model of social capital formation, including seven facts: (l) the relationship between social capital and age is first increasing and then decreasing, (2) social capital declines with expected mobility, (3)...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Michael Schwarz and Konstantin Sonin
-The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions (475KB)
-Abstract
This paper introduces and formally models the variable value environment and proposes an auction mechanism appropriate for it. In the variable value environment, bidders? private values may change over time as a result of both private actions and exogenous shocks. Examples of private actions and exogenous shocks are complementary investments and exogenous changes in bidder's business, respectively...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer
-Who Owns the Media? (242KB)
-Abstract
We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media. Government ownership of the media is generally associated with less press freedom, fewer political and economic rights, and, most conspicuously, inferior social outcomes in the areas of education and health...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Laurence Ball and N. Gregory Mankiw
-Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design(810KB)
-Abstract
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, N. Gregory Mankiw and Ricardo Reis
-Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve(842KB)
-Abstract
This paper examines a model of dynamic price adjustment based on the assumption that information disseminates slowly throughout the population. Compared to the commonly used sticky-price model, this sticky-information model displays three, related properties that are more consistent with accepted views about the effects of monetary policy...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Oliver Hart
-Norms and the Theory of the Firm(120KB)
-Abstract
This paper discusses some of the attempts economists have made in the last ten years or so to integrate norms into the theory of the firm. The paper argues that (a) although norms are undoubtedly very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the theory has been very difficult and is likely to continue to be so in the near future; (b) so far norms have not added a great deal to our understanding of such issues as the determinants of firm boundaries (the "make-or-buy" decision)--that is, at this point a norm-free theory of the firm and a norm-rich theory of the firm don't seem to have very different predictions...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Oliver Hart
-Financial Contracting(265KB)
-Abstract
This paper discusses how economists?views of firms?financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms?profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Edwarad L. Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro
-Is There a New Urbanism? The Growth of U.S. Cities in the 1990s (173KB)
-Abstract
The 1990s were an unusually good decade for the largest American cities and, in particular, for the cities of the Midwest. However, fundamentally urban growth in the 1990s looked extremely similar to urban growth during the prior post-war decades. The growth of cities was determined by three large trends: (1) cities with strong human capital bases grew faster than cities without skills, (2) people moved to warmer, drier places, and (3) cities built around the automobile replaced cities that rely on public transportation..... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A,Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine
-Learning to Play Bayesian Games (202KB)
-Abstract
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, N. Gregory Mankiw
-U.S. Monetary Policy During the 1990s (117KB)
-Abstract
This paper discusses the conduct and performance of U.S. monetary policy during the 1990s, comparing it to policy during the previous several decades. It reaches four broad conclusions. First, the macroeconomic performance of the 1990s was exceptional, especially if judged by the volatility of growth, unemployment, and inflation. Second, much of the good performance was due to good luck arising from the supply-side of the economy: Food and energy prices were well behaved, and productivity growth experienced an unexpected acceleration. Third, monetary policymakers deserve some of the credit by making interest rates more responsive to inflation than was the case in previous periods. Fourth...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Gene D'Avolio, Efi Gildor, and Andrei Shleifer
-Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency (277KB)
-Abstract
A well functioning securities market relies on the availability of accurate information, a broad base of investors who can process this information, legal protection of these investors?rights, and a liquid secondary market unencumbered by excessive transaction costs or constraints. When these conditions are satisfied, securities markets are likely to be broader and more efficient, with felicitous consequences for investment and resource allocation. This paper explores the effect of technological advances on these features of the market, emphasizing the incentives facing the producers of financial information...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote
-Why Doesn't The US Have a European-Style Welfare State? (376KB)
-Abstract
European countries are much more generous to the poor relative to the US level of generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and skewness of the pre-tax income distribution, the volatility of income (perhaps because of trade shocks), the social costs of taxation and the expected income mobility of the median voter. None of these factors appear to explain the differences between the US and Europe. Instead...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer
-The Rise of the Regulatory State (281KB)
-Abstract
During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this happened, we present a model of choice of law enforcement strategy between litigation and regulation based on the idea that justice can be subverted with sufficient expenditure of resources. The model suggests that courts are more vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially in an environment of significant inequality of wealth and political power...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and Ludger Schuknecht
-What Does the European Union Do? (242KB)
-Abstract
We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains. Our goal is to examine the division of prerogatives between European institutions and national ones, in light of the implications of normative models and in relation to the preferences of European citizens. Our data con?m that the extent and the intensity of policy-making by the EU have increased sharply over the last 30 years...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara
-Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities (492KB)
-Abstract
The poor favor redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social mobility may make some of today뭩 poor into tomorrow뭩 rich and since redistributive policies do not change often, individual preferences for redistribution should depend on the extent and the nature of social mobility. We estimate the determinants of preferences for redistribution using individual level data from the US, and we find that individual support for redistribution is negatively affected by social mobility...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
-Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different? (171KB)
-Abstract
The answer to the question posed in the title is 뱘es.?Using a total of 128,106 answers to a survey question about 밾appiness,?we find that there is a large, negative and significant effect of inequality on happiness in Europe but not in the US. There are two potential explanations. First, Europeans prefer more equal societies (inequality belongs in the utility function for Europeans but not for Americans). Second, social mobility is (or is perceived to be) higher in the US so being poor is not seen as affecting future income. We test these hypotheses by partitioning the sample across income and ideological lines. ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and Federico Etro
-The Political Economy of International Unions (433KB)
-Abstract
We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and policies because of spillovers. The countries are heterogeneous either in preferences and/or in economic fundamentals. The trade off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines the size, the composition and the scope of unions. Our model implies that the equilibrium size of the union is inversely related to the degree of heterogeneity between countries and to the spectrum of common policies..... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and Federico Etro
-Institutional Rules for Federations (356KB)
-Abstract
We study the organization of federations ?or international unions ?which decide together the provision of certain public goods. The benefit of centralization depends on the internalization of the spillovers, that of decentralization on the adaptability to local differences. We individuate as an optimal institutional design a form of fiscal federalism based on decentralization of expenditures and a system of subsidies and transfers between countries...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

-ÀÚ·á ºÐ·ù ¹× ÀúÀÚ: A, N. Gregory Mankiw and Ricardo Reis
-Sticky Information: A Model of Monetary Nonneutrality and Structural Slumps (139KB)
-Abstract
This paper explores a model of wage adjustment based on the assumption that information disseminates slowly throughout the population of wage setters. This informational frictional yields interesting and plausible dynamics for employment and inflation in response to exogenous movements in monetary policy and productivity. In this model, disinflations and productivity slowdowns have a parallel effect: They both cause the path of employment to fall below the level that would prevail under full information...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

±âÃâ¹®Á¦ (Final or Mid-term Exams)

Microeconomic theory(Econ1010a, Fall 1999)-Wolcomitz, Jeffrey...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Microeconomic theory(Econ1010a, Fall 1998)-Wolcomitz, Jeffrey...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
International monetary economics(Econ1530a, Fall 1998)-Cooper, R.N....... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Applied econometrics(Econ1123a, Fall 1999)-Murray, Michael...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Economic theory(Econ2010a, Fall 1998)-Hart, Oliver; Green, Jerry...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Macroeconomic Theory(Econ1010b, Spring 2000)-Caselli, Francesco)...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Economic theory(Econ2020a, Fall 1999)-Hart, Oliver...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Microeconomic theory(Econ1011a, Fall 1999)-Schwarz, Michael...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Econometric development of east Asia(Econ1315a, Fall 1998)-Perkins, Dwight H....... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
International trade and investment(Econ1535a, Fall 1998)-Tornell, Aaron...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Microeconomic theory(Econ1010a, Fall 1999)-Wolcowitz, Jeffrey...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Macroeconomics and politics(Econ1430a, Fall 1999)-Alesina, Alberto...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Economic theory(Econ2010c, Fall 1999)-Barrow, Robert J.; Mankiw, N. Gregory...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Macroeconomic Theory(Econ1010b, Spring 2000)-Foote, Christopher...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Macroeconomic Theory(Econ1011b, Spring 2000)-Caselli, Francesco...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Quantitative Methods in Economics(Econ1126, Spring 2000)-Chamberlain, Gary...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Economic Development in East Asia(Econ1315, Spring 2000)-Perkins, Dwight...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ

°­ÀÇ ³ëÆ®

Course:(°ÔÀÓÀÌ·Ð)EC 1052 - Introduction to Game Theory (Spring 2001) ...... ¹ø¿ªÀÇ·ÚÇϱâ
Professor:Markus M. Mobius
-Lectures 1 and 2 Decision Theory
-Lecture3. Strategic Form Games, Rationality, Iterated Deletion of Dominated Strategies
-Lecture4. Knowledge
-Lecture5. Nash Equilibrium
-Lecture6. Mixed Strategies
-Lecture7. Nash's Existence Theorem
-Lecture8. Learning, Fictitious Play
-Lecture9. Replicator Dynamics, ESS, Stochastic Stability
-Lecture10. Extensive Form Games, Nash Equilibrium
-Lecture11. SPE, Backward Induction
-Lecture12. Commitment Devices in Extensive Form Games (general theory)
-Lecture13. SPE in Infinite Games, Single Period Deviation Principle, Rubinstein Bargaining
-Lecture14. Repeated Games, Folk Theorem
-Lecture15. Axelrod's Tournaments, Evolutionary Game Theory with Repeated Games
-Lecture16. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Auctions
-Lecture17. Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Spence's job signalling model
-Lecture18. reputation games; second price auctions; Winner's curse

L.S.E
Oxford
Cambridge
Stanford
etc.