The Reform Movement has done some research on the why the
Coalition government decided to take Ireland out of the British
Commonwealth in 1948. This research was carried out following a casual
remark made by the ex-Irish Ambassador to the USA, Mr Noel Dorr, who said
to some Reform members that Ireland did not leave the British
Commonwealth, but was asked to leave by the British government. This
extraordinary interpretation is not supported by the facts, even though
perhaps it is the received wisdom in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The research is based on John B O'Brien's article "Ireland's Departure
from the British Commonwealth" in the Round Table 1988 and a chapter from
by MacDermott in a study of Clann na Poblachta.
The facts seem to be as follows:
Basically, the Coalition government (Fine Gael and Clann
na Poblachta) wanted to leave the Commonwealth FOR GOOD and made this
quite clear to the British government in 1948 (Attlee). In fact, Dublin
insisted when talking to London at that time, that they had left the
Commonwealth in 1936 and they did not attend any meetings between 1936 and
1948. However, they badly bungled the repeal of the External Relations Act
(ERA) as they did not think through the implications for Ireland north and
south, particularly the enormous legal consequences. The British
representative in Dublin, Lord Rugby, had a very low opinion of Costello
and thought he handled the repeal of the ERA in "a slapdash and amateur
fashion".
When they announced they were going to repeal the ERA,
they were told by the British government that there was no alternative but
to treat them like any other foreign country, which meant that movement of
citizens would be restricted and irreparable damage would be done to Irish
trade and business. Incredibly, none of the implications of becoming a
republic and leaving the Commonwealth were thought through by Costello,
MacBride and the cabinet. They were, in effect, shooting their own country
in the heart. And why? In MacDermott's rich metaphorical words:
"This was a two pronged robbery, aimed as much at
deValera as at MacBride, for in donning the natty nationalist rain-gear of
deValera, and in stealing the republican raiment of the bathing MacBride,
Costello did not merely appropriate their garments, but also enabled Fine
Gael to reclaim their nationalist ancestry and heritage, and to lay claim
to a portion - their portion - of the national iconography and the symbols
of national identity, thereby shedding their unfortunate démodé allegiance
to the Commonwealth".
All hell broke out. The initial stance of Attlee and Lord
Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor, was not to be conciliatory but Dr Evatt, the
Australian Deputy PM, intervened (for obscure reasons, see below) and
eventually prevailed on Attlee and the Canadian PM, MacKenzie King and the
Canadian Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Lester Pearson (the
Canadian cabinet was not supportive of the Irish stand) and on the
Australian PM, Chifley (puzzled by what Ireland was up to) plus New
Zealand PM Peter Fraser, not to treat the Free State like a foreign
country once it became a Republic. Attlee and Jowitt gave way so the new
ROI emerged with the same status in effect as a Commonwealth country,
despite the fact that Costello and McBride were adamant that Ireland left
the Commonwealth (in this Noel Dorr is misinformed, the Free State was
certainly not asked to leave the British Commonwealth and in fact great
efforts were made to keep it in the Commonwealth by the big hitter
members, and by the Queen Mother, to no avail). In fact, Costello, under
pressure, promised he would look at re-joining later on but quickly forget
about it when he got back to Dublin.
As far as Northern Ireland was concerned, the result was
ironical and very telling. The British Ireland Bill was introduced which
copper fastened the Ulster Unionists to Great Britain. This Bill would not
have been introduced had the Coalition decided to keep the ERA so was
brought on because of what Costello did. "If there was any doubt before
the repeal of the ERA about the survival of Northern Ireland as a separate
entity, there were none afterwards. It was the tactics used rather than
the repeal itself which brought that about", as O'Brien puts it.
MacBride's vision of a united Ireland had been "severely dented". He was
very fortunate to retain Ireland's previous advantages. Again the Brits
being accommodating to the Irish as Ireland would have suffered
irreparable damage to its trade and restrictions on the movement of
citizens..." a policy decision had been made without regard to its
consequences", as O'Brien put it.
Some extracts from John O'Brien's paper on Ireland's
departure from the British Commonwealth:
Dr HV Evatt, the Australian Deputy PM's "motives are as
obscure as Costello's. He had no previous involvement in Irish internal
affairs; he was not of Irish extraction and he had no instructions from
Canberra, but he was destined to play a pivotal part in the crisis"
according to O'Brien. Chifley, the Australian PM. "was not unduly
concerned about the Irish vote in Victoria and Evatt himself, being an MP
for a Sydney constituency, had little to fear personally from the Irish in
Victoria, whose numbers anyway were declining. Of possibly greater
importance for Evatt was his concern for world peace-keeping bodies - he
had been largely instrumental in designing the Charter for the United
Nations, and in 1948 he was President of that body. He was equally
committed to the British Commonwealth as a vehicle for the preservation of
peace and the democratic way of life in the world and was loath to see it
being undermined or fragmented, especially as ...(wait for it!)... in his
view Ireland was as much a mother country as Britain". How would Adams and
MM like that? He acted entirely on his own initiative. His effectiveness
"was enhanced by the fact that he was in Europe and not in Canberra
because it is extremely doubtful if he would have received the backing of
the cabinet for his actions". Dr Evatt was "extremely indignant" at
Costello's announcement. It therefore came as a great shock to the British
when Dr Evatt decided to champion the Irish cause". Again it is doubtful
if the Canadian Sec of State for Foreign Affairs, Lester Pearson, and the
New Zealand PM Peter Fraser would have secured the support of their
cabinets. They were in Paris so could act more freely. The Canadian
cabinet was "very cold towards Eire" and the New Zealand cabinet was "also
quite tepid in its response". Without Evatt, Fraser and Pearson "it is
doubtful if the Irish would have made any headway with the British". "The
Irish could not have anticipated Dr Evatt's intervention without which
Ireland would surely have suffered irreparable damage to its trade and
restrictions on the movement of its citizens".
At a meeting at Chequers on 17th Oct 1948 the Irish
"weakly hinted that they might consider rejoining the Commonwealth at a
later stage. On returning to Dublin they promptly dropped the idea and
never raised it again. They refused to match like for like on reciprocal
privileges for the Irish and Commonwealth citizens in the other person's
country." Sounds familiar re the Belfast Agreement and the southern
minority also British passports. The British government "placed
Commonwealth solidarity before the inevitable hostile reaction to the Eire
settlement". Irish votes in England were not discussed nor were a factor
of any major consideration by the British government, according to
O'Brien. Ireland was obdurate "in refusing to make any concession
whatsoever". Sound familiar? Adams. "Britain was determined to have Irish
citizens treated as aliens and to withdraw all preferences for Eire under
the most favoured nation clauses of trade treaties", but Evatt would not
endorse this policy partly because "Eire was covered by Sections 2 and 3
of the British nationality Act so that the UK would have to repeal these
two sections".
"MacBride and MacGilligan, Ireland's Minister of Finance,
representing Costello, held to their position and insisted that Ireland
had not been a member of the Commonwealth since 1936 and had no intention
of becoming one now".
"The Irish citizens enjoyed the franchise in the UK and
other Commonwealth countries, the same was not true for UK and
Commonwealth citizens in Ireland". At the end of the negotiations,
"Ireland was now in the Commonwealth without being in it. The Sydney
Sunday Sun described it as "so typically Irish that perhaps a solution
should best be left to the Irish. No other people could hope to understand
it". "it achieved the immediate objective of breaking the link with the
Crown" which "suited the Irish". Later on, "subsequent special ad hoc
arrangements for Eire's attendance as observers were not ruled out" but in
fact did not happen. Reform Movement 2004 | Print This Page  |
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