The material in this chapter is the key to the entire work. Although an understanding and appreciation for the material preceding this chapter will be helpful, it is not absolutely necessary in the sense that the arguments presented here are not dependent on the preceding ones. Rather, it is the other way around. Everything that has been presented -- indeed, all possible knowledge -- is dependent on the thinking process which is the foundation of any theory, especially a theory of learning. Though references shall be made to the earlier work, such references are made to help us appreciate the necessary consequences and extensions of the relationships we shall discuss here. Though at times it might appear superficialy that we are basing our arguments in this chapter on the results obtained in the preceding discussions, it will be found upon closer scrutiny that a part of the material of this chapter was simply included intrinsically in those discussions.
For example: We developed a notion of spirit from considerations of the nature of thoughts, which required our considering "something" other than the physical -- unless thoughts could be considered "physical". From such considerations, we developed the further logical consequences of the "dual", or "triune", nature of man. In this chapter, we might utilize such results ( the "dual" or "triune" nature of man in particular) as basic assumptions, or as settled issues. We might also re-develop such notions from another point of view. Yet, if we accepted them as assumptions, the only assumption that we are actually making is that our thought and the physical world are different in nature.
Since it is apparent to (almost) everyone that thought and physical entities are different in nature, we must accept that they are -- unless it can be shown to be otherwise. We can validly make this assumption without "proving" it is justified, while the assumption to the contrary is not valid, or justified. A great deal of time could be spent in showing why this is so, but let's simply look at the essentials of the answer.
We must use language (in our particular case, English) to communicate. Our understanding of language and the meaning of words is dependent upon how we learned those words, which in turn is dependent upon "common usage". Furthermore, our ability to communicate is dependent upon the acceptance of certain assumptions: e.g., mutual acceptance and understanding of the language used. It is the purpose of dictionaries, among other things, to help produce mutual understanding and acceptance of the definition of words. Now, if a word has a generally accepted meaning, or group of meanings, we cannot change its meaning unless we justify the change. To justify the change, it is not sufficient to merely re-define the term. The purpose for the change, and the effects of that change will have to be explained and discussed. (Consider, for example, the care taken to remove the connotation of "unreal" from the term "imaginary"). To change a meaning without justifying the change leads to problems because assumptions can be masked by the connotations on the word used. Therefore, it is possible to have a "proof" denying some basic assumption which seems plausible because the connotations on the words carry with them, intrinsically, the very assumption that is being denied: e.g., "purely" physical theory, or material theory -- which by the nature of a theory cannot be physical.N1
It is not desired, nor desirable, to imply (as the foregoing argument might seem to do) that all arguments in which an equation or re-definition of terms is made is invalid. Far from it! It is absolutely necessary for us to re-define and equate terms if we are to learn and associate. (Rather obvious). Generalizations cannot be obtained without equating terms with the obliteration of some distinctions to get at a more fundamental similarity. Thus, an equation of terms (or the concepts they represent) leads to a more general term, a more general concept, and a more general argument. To go in the other direction, i.e., from the general to the specific, requires that a term or concept be differentiated as being composed of more than one entity or idea represented or defined as two or more specific terms or concepts. In this case the problem is somewhat different. The degree of specificity is dependent upon the degree of differentiation. To develop more specific terms or concepts it might be necessary to go back to the general concept by equating the terms so as to destroy the previous differentiation and then to re-differentiate the terms in another way, or from another point of view.
Since we have a natural aptitude for equating and differentiating terms and concepts, we often do it intuitively. The consideration of the precautions against equating or re-defining terms erroneously is obviously necessary and of particular importance in going from the specific to the general. But care must be taken to find the frame of reference and the point of view from which they can validly be equated or re-defined, because our natural tendency and ability to do so validly is tainted by personal bias. The precaution of explaining and discussing the purposes and effects of any change in definitions, or equation of terms, is therefore of paramount importance as a check against personal bias. Our theory of contradiction should be very helpful in formalizing the procedure. Some pertinent corollaries of that earlier development that could be applied here are: Given any word, it can be re-defined only if it can be done in such a way that the essential meaning is not obliterated. Given any two words that make a distinction -- and they must if they are definable -- they can be equated only if it can be done in such a way that their primary distinction or essential meanings are not obliterated. But they can never be equated to identity without losing one of the distinctions or essential meanings.
For example:
We could obliterate a distinction if --
1 - the distinction made is completely unnecessary as shown before hand; or,
2 - the distinction made is a poor one, in which case, we would have to re-establish a better distinction; or,
3 - we remove ourselves to a more general frame of reference in which the distinction does not hold; or,
4 - we remove ourselves to a highly specialized frame of reference whose limits are well defined and in which the particular distinction or difference between the terms is constant, or unobservable, or trivial, etc.
The preceding comments are important here because we will soon be involved in minimizing distinctions almost to the point of obliterating them for the mere purpose of simplification. Our main purpose in this chapter is to try to gain insight into how we learn and know, and we must take into account various contradictory theories. As was pointed out at the beginning of the first chapter with respect to psychological theories in particular, there are many contradictory theories of learning. Add the theories of philosophers and educators, for example, and the need for simplification becomes apparent. The interesting thing is that almost everyone who has given serious thought to the question has concluded:
1 - We learn through our senses; or,
2 - Our knowledge is derived from our sense impressions.
It is possible, of course, that we could learn in some other way. It is possible that knowledge, though derived from sense impressions, is not necessarily or wholly dependent on them. However, since our main concern is to gain insight into how we learn and know despite the foregoing possibility, we might begin by exploring the simpler question of how we learn and know things through our senses. Accepted psychological theories also attempt to do this, but they approach the problem from the standpoint of learning without adequately considering the aspects of knowing; i.e., the concern is how we learn and know, but not what learning and knowledge is. The philosophical approaches on the other hand are primarily concerned with the nature of learning and knowledge without adequately considering the mechanisms of learning and knowing.
From various of these studies, despite their limitations, we are given the information that our senses operate through stimulus-response mechanisms, and that the senses, and the knowledge derived therefrom, are dependent on conditioning of such stimulus-response mechanisms for their development. We will begin by approaching the problem from the standpoint of knowing, and by trying to gain insight into how we learned the things we know by considering the nature as well as the mechanisms of the senses through which our knowledge is gained.
It is important to make as few assumptions as possible. We have to assume, recognize, and utilize our own senses, including perhaps a "sixth sense" of the mental faculty. But that's all that we will assume in order to better appreciate on what grounds, if any, we attribute senses or intelligence to some things while denying them to others. Within our mental faculties we have knowledge about our senses, and a good beginning would be to analyze our knowledge of the senses in an attempt to simplify the problem by trying to eliminate some unnecessary assumptions we are all prone to make.
We are told, and most of us believe, there are five senses - at least that's the usually accepted number. The five senses are usually understand in terms of stimulus-response mechanisms (e.g., eyes, nose, etc.) and, viewed from an evolutionary point of view, there may be less depending upon how far back along the evolutionary scale we go. An interesting thing to note is that the concept of the "senses" is usually restricted to animals. Even though members of the plant kingdom respond to stimuli of the same nature with essentially the same kind of responses, they are denied the ability to "sense". However, there is one "sense" which we all have in common, at least from a stimulus-response point of view, with most, if not all, biological specimens -- the sense of touch; i.e., all biological specimens are capable of responding to stimuli which come in direct contact with it. Since it is customary to apply the term "sense" to the responses of biological organisms to stimuli, and since we are interested in understanding our five senses (touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight), the observations made on any organism in the biological world anywhere along the evolutionary scale are relevant observations to consider. Not only are such observations relevant, but they are also necessary, if we would consider the evolution of the sense organs, or the relation, if any, between the stage of development of the mechanism of response with the "sense" or sensation attached to it.
Besides having properties in common with all biological organisms (i.e. with plants and with animals), we, and our senses, have properties in common with physical things (i.e., machines, photocells, etc.) by virtue of the fact that we are composed of the same materials -- molecules, atoms, and the forces existing between them. What's more, they are also an integral part of the stimulus-response mechanisms, so that making observations of the phenomena associated with physical things should also be relevant. In fact, since our sense organs respond through the same kind of mechanisms (i.e., chemical, electrical, physical, etc.), we really must take them into account because we want to understand how our senses and awareness are derived from the operation of these sense organs.
The absence of one or more of the senses should not cause any difficulty to our theoretical development since, even in a restricted study of humans alone, we would find a number of individuals with one or more of these senses either impaired, absent, or capable of responding in a peculiar manner. But regardless of the individual differences, we can still make valid general observations. The individual differences can account for the differences in interpretation, the inaccuracies of our knowledge, etc. Since we are seeking a general theory, we shall emphasize the similarities and minimize the differences. We must, however, take the differences into account so that we will not fall into the error of obliterating any important distinctions.
To simplify the task of keeping track of all the senses, and to enable us to talk about all of them at the same time, let us simply re-define them in terms of an essential characteristic common to all of them. Since we again find ourselves seeking a "common basis", we might start with the most general common basis of "values" already at our disposal and seek a point of view from which we can establish a set of values to place on the senses so that we can equate them to a single value incorporating the essential quality of all the others. Without becoming too involved in a general discussion of how best to go about establishing such a common basis to suit our purposes, we might observe some general associations:
1 - A common basis is an essential characteristic.
2 - An essential characteristic is a fundamental quality.
3 - A fundamental quality must be incorporated in the most primitive entity of a given set.
4 - A primitive quality is part of some development.
5 - Development of the "senses" occured during evolution.
From an evolutionary standpoint we could certainly value the senses differently. If we accept "touch" as being the most primative of them (not only because it requires direct contact to function, but also because it is shared by all biological organisms) we can accept our usual notion of that sense with no difficulty and we can define the others to conform to the "sense" of touch with relatively minor changes in our usual understanding of them. The sense of "taste" has the most obvious similarity: it, too, requires direct contact to function. Superficially, there appear to be differences, but basically, the differences are only of the nature of refinements: the stimuli (food) must still come in contact with (touch) the sense receptor (the taste buds) where a response is generated (in this case, the response is more "chemical" than "physical", if one would want to differentiate between them).
The same thing could be said for the other three senses. Though they can be considered to be further advanced along the evolutionary scale on the basis of survival value (since they allow responses to dangers that are distant) the differences between them and the sense of touch are superficial; i.e., of the nature of refinements of the sense of "touch". Regardless of how subtle the stimuli, how specialized the receptor, or how complex the response, the stimuli must come in contact with (touch) the sense receptor for it to respond.
In the case of hearing, a vibrating body causes the molecules of air to vibrate, which in turn, impinge upon (touch) the eardrum causing it to vibrate. In the case of smell, a body gives off molecules to the air in the form of a gas which is carried through the air to the sense receptor where the response is very similar to that of the sense of taste. Even in the sense of sight, the subtle stimuli of light (considered as waves or particles) must actually come in contact with the sense receptor.
It should be obvious from the foregoing that -- from a stimulus-response point of view -- there are no essential differences between the senses, and that all the senses operate in the same manner as the sense of touch. It should also be obvious that whatever we say about the sense of touch, we also say of the other senses since we have in effect compressed our notions of all of them into our notion of the sense of touch. The most interesting thing to notice, however, is that "direct contact", which is fundamental to our notion of "touch" is not only common to all the other senses, and therefore, common to the response of all biological organisms, but it is also common to all the responses of physical systems. If we now recall that we began this discussion by assuming a consensus that we learn through our senses, and further, that various studies give us the information that our senses operate through stimulus-response -- or conditioned-response -- mechanisms (every test of learning merely measures some ability to respond, or to develop a response), we have posed for us the interesting problem of trying to determine what rational criteria is, or can be, used to infer that some responses imply learning (or even feeling) while others do not.
We can set up a controlled experiment if we wish, and we'll do just that in our thoughts. In our "experiment" we will consider individuals other than ourselves and discuss their response to stimuli. For the time being, we will further limit our discussion by considering only subjects that are not human, e.g., animals and machines. To begin with, we will consider the subjects to be in complete isolation with no prior knowledge or experience at all so that we can contrast the behavior of the biological subjects against the behavior of mechanical models. Contrasting the behavior of biological subjects with mechanical models is important because we are trying to understand what criteria, if any, we can use to conclude that some subject other than ourselves (humans) is capable of learning and knowig through their senses, or, to go a step further, to determine whether or not we can establish any rational criteria for asserting that they are capable of "sense" at all.
Beginning with some organic subject (e.g., a dog, a tree, or a venus fly trap) that does not know anything and can only respond to "touch" stimuli, it is fairly obvious to conclude that such a subject certainly could not learn anything unless we touch it with something. But if we touch, or hit, it, all that we could observe is a response. This is not sufficient to postulate that our subject has any knowledge of the phenomena involved in the response, nor knowledge of the stimuli, or of the response itself. To show that this is so we an cmpare our hitting particular inanimate objects, (e.g., nitroglycerine, or, perhaps the starter on a car) and also observing a response. In all cases all that we can have is the observation of a stimulus and a response, though the response to ths same stimuli might be different.
The only difference (between organic and inorganic subjects) that we could observe in a single stimulus-response reaction is one of degree. The biological response is usually more complex, involving contributions of many physical phenomena (e.g., chemical, electrical, mechanical, etc.) but certainly it should be explainable in such terms. In effect, all that we could reasonably conclude at this point is that the biological response is complicated because it is a combination of physical, inanimate mechanisms. (The jump from the specific to the general here might be a little too rapid. An interesting article that might be helpful here appears in a magazine within the reach of the layman's understanding of science, Scientific American, (Aug., 1960), entitled "Biological Transducers").
But, if we could observe that our biological speciman can respond in a manner different from a pure physical or mechanical response, then we might postulate something else, some other phenomena other than a simple stimulus-response mechanism that does not require any sensation at all. Let's try to observe some differences. Suppose that our biological specimen responds to the stimuli and then returns more or less to its original state. Would that prove anything? Not really, because elastic bodies, and various systems in equilibrium do just that. Even if our biological specimen responded in such a manner as to re-enforce, or negate,the stimulus, we could discern no essential difference because various buffer systems are designed to accomplish that same feat of maintaining some particular equilibrium or direction.
Not only would we be unable to find any essential difference between a biological and mechanical system by merely observing singular stimulus-response phenomena, but, with a little careful consideration, we would also realize that the observation of any number of responses of a biological specimen or a physical mechanism can never give us any criteria by which we can conclude that the one has knowledge of the event, whereas the other does not; or, that the one has responded because of "feelings" while the other has responded without their benefit.
The fact that we can find no essential difference -- no difference of nature -- between a biological system and a mechanical one (except for the obvious differences of degrees of complexity which can be found in both types of systems separately) implies that we have no rational basis to assert that one has feelings, whereas the other does not. Or to state the same implication in another way, we are led to consider the hypothesis:
Animals and plants have no feelings, or, they have as much of an ability to feel and to think as do mechanical systems!
A shocking statement , isn't it? Most people are willing to believe that plants and mechanical systems cannot feel or think; they will probably go so far as to as to believe that animals cannot think; but it is hard for them to believe that animals feel no pain. Yet, try as we may to prove that animals are capable of feeling, we constantly find ourselves in a dilemma of presenting arguments which depend upon stimulus-response data -- arguments which are equally valid when applied (as they can be) to physical systems. Yet the inclination to attribute feelings to one and not the other remains. Part of the difficulty may reside in mistaken notions of the nature of feelings, or to be more specific, in the general notion of what pain is. A helpful article on this aspect appeared in Scientific American.
But now, it might be postulated, that if we apply a series of stimuli and observe a series of responses with the same subject, we could observe a phenomenon of conditioning -- that is -- the same stimulus gradually producing a different response. Furthermore, since this ability to develop a conditioned response and thereby find or develop, if possible, a compatible relationship with the environment which has usually been ascribed to an entity "life", we could at least distinguish between "living" things and machines. This may not be completely justified because all that is really indicated is a high degree of "buffering". But we seem to have evidence that there is a difference between physical and biological systems, and our intuition seems to demand that there is a difference. Yet, up until now, we have not been able to define that difference. If we analyze further, we will find that the distinction between biological and inorganic specimens -- the distinction that is ascribed to "life" -- is based more on the ability of a biological specimen to reproduce than to merely preserve itself by finding or developing a compatible relationship with its environment. Still, from our development, making as few assumptions as possible, we have found the only difference between the subjects we have considered so far (non-human) to be essentially one of degree, of complexity, or of organization. If this is so, if the only difference is one of degree, then the conclusion that is clearly indicated is that "life" itself (as defined biologically) might possibly be "created" if we could develop the high degree of organization necessary. In fact, this development of a high degree of organization might have been the origin of "life", and is so considered from an evolutionary point of view.
Before we continue, I would like to digress for a paragraph or two to make some observations on the "origin of life" and the possibility of man "creating" "life". The concept of the origin of "life" is the same as that which is usually accepted -- usually accepted at least in most scientific circles. Not only that, but the possibility of "creating life" in the manner we have conceived has not only been explored, but is presently being explored. I shall refer those interested to one of many articles which appear in current literature involving similar considerations. An article entitled "Self-Reproducing Machines" is a particularly good one for our pureposes. It appears in the June, 1959 issue of Scientific American.
The question of whether or not man can "create life" is a question that is "wide open" scientifically. There seems to be evidence that he can. But he has not yet done so. Yet, from our conceptual development we could postulate no difference between physical systems (or machines) and biological systems, except the degree of organization. If this is the only difference, as it appears to be, man should be able to "create" such "life". Let's assume that he can, and make a quick check to see whether man's creating "life" would necessarily lead to philosophical, moral, or religious difficulties.
So far our discussion with respect to "creating life" has been limited to "animal and plant life" which does not require the creation of a soul or mind. From a religious point of view, man would be co-creating rather than creating in the sense that God created. From this observation alone it should be seen that from a moral or religious point of view there coud be no Real problems to man's co-creating "life" as defined biologically. In fact, man has not only been co-creating "life" (as defined biologically) in producing offspring. He has also been co-creating human life, which from a religious point of view could be considered True life. Since the religious views can cope with the co-creation of true life (as was indicated in the first chapter), they certainly can cope with the co-creation of biological "life". Actually such considerations should help the "religious" to foster a better understanding of the beauty and power of God, enhancing rather than detracting from His infinite attributes.
From a philosophical point of view we can take the position that until man can (co-)create "life", we can accept it as a different entity. Until we can develop this high degree of organization in a physical system, and thereby develop an organism which can reproduce, we can accept the differences we have described, and ascribed, to "life". In doing so, we are simply accepting the present biological definition of "life". But why should we?
If the only difference between the "living" and the non-living in a biological sense is, as we have shown, the degree of organization, "life" as presently defined is not a distinct entity. It is, in fact, very anbiguous. To consider it as a distinct entity, we would have to accept one of two alternatives:
1 - That even those things that we now consider to be non-living, are "living" in the same way that we, animals, and plants, "live", but to a lesser degree.
2 - That our concept of life must be restricted to apply only to human life.
The second alternative is by far the better one since it removes ambiguity that leads to the "paradoxes of life". Our restriction of the term "life" to human life, would be valid since we have only been considering non-human subjects, and since we have already found (or at least postulated) a distinction between man and animals that involves a difference in nature and not simply a difference of degree. Both of the alternatives have very intrigueing philosophical and theological consequences which would have interesting influences on our development of psychology (as indicated that they would in previous chapters). For this reason, we shall review briefly some terminology to avoid confusion now and later -- just enough to enable us to make the necessary distinctions for our present discussion.
Since the meaning of "life" applied to organic systems (animals and plants) is not essentially different from the meaning "life" would have applied to an inorganic self-reproducing system, we find ourselves in a position reminiscent of the position chemists found themselves when "organic" material was synthesized from inorganic material. If we simply carry over this terminology and restrict the term "life" to human life, we obtain the desired results. There is some justification for this other than the possible ability of man to create self-reproducing machines. Even in nature we find the virus which exists in crystalline, inorganic, non-living form and also in viable, organic, "living" form depending on its environment. It should be noted here that the ambiguity of the present biological definition of life requires us to accept not only differing degrees of life, but also that a single subject like a virus can be both living and non-living.
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