[One would think that the text of a case as important as Chisholm v. Georgia (the second major case decision by the supreme court of the United States) would be readily available on the Internet, but I was unable to find it in 1999.
[I guess this webpage is obsolete as of 2001, because a full-text version is now available from Findlaw at:

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=2&invol=419
.

[I admit that the decision is no longer binding because of supersession by Article 11 of the United States Constitution, but the principles discussed in the dicta are still valid.
[I transcribed verbatim what I considered to be important portions of the case as a study of the early history of our country because of the endnote appended to the case:

[Endnote (1 Led 440, 466): "The authority of this case was abrogated by an amendment, Article 11 of the Constitution U.S., which provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."
"This amendment was proposed Dec. 2, 1793, declared adopted Jan. 8, 1798."]
[According to SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS, VOL. 2.1., CASE EDITION (1994), p. 28, and its SUPPLEMENTS, Chisholm is still being cited fairly regularly.
[These folks had different ideas about proper punctuation than we do currently.
[Imbedded page numbers follow those of Dallas, not of L.Ed.]


Chisholm v. Georgia
(February Term, 1793)

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed 440.

As excerpted and transcribed verbatim from
1 United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition 440 et seq.


[from page 419] This action was instituted in August term, 1792. On the 11th of July, 1792, the marshal for the district of Georgia, made the following return: "Executed as within commanded, that is to say, served a copy thereof on his excellency Edward Telfair, Esq. Governor of the state of Georgia, and one other copy on Thomas P. Carnes, Esq. the attorney general of said state."
"Robert Forsyth, Marshal."

Upon which Mr. Randolph, the attorney general of the United States, as counsel for the plaintiff, made the following motion on the 11th of August, 1792. "That unless the state of Georgia, shall after reasonable previous notice of this motion, cause an appearance to be entered, in behalf of the said state, on the fourth day of the next term, or shall then show cause to the contrary, judgment shall be entered against the said state, and a writ of inquiry of damages shall be awarded." But to avoid every appearance of precipitancy, and to give the state time to deliberate on the measures she ought to adopt, on motion of Mr. Randolph, it was ordered by the court, that the consideration of this motion should be postponed to the present term. And now Ingersoll, and Dallas, presented to the court a written remonstrance and protestation on behalf of the state, against the exercise of jurisdiction in the cause; but, in consequence of positive instructions, they declined taking any part in arguing the question. The attorney general therefore, proceeded as follows:

[Attorney general's argument omitted.]

[from page 429] The court held the case under advisement, from the 5th to the 18th of February, when they delivered their opinion seriatim.

(Opinion of (James)) Iredell, Justice: [omitted.]

[from page 450] (Opinion of (John)) Blair, Justice: [omitted.]

[from page 453] (Opinion of (James)) Wilson, Justice:--This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it is a state; certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined, is whether this state, so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the United States? This question, important in itself, will depend on others, more important still; and, may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less radical than this--"do the people of the United States form a nation?"
A cause so conspicuous and interesting should be carefully and accurately viewed from every possible point of sight. I shall examine it, 1st. By the principles of general jurisprudence. 2d. By the laws and practice of particular states and kingdoms. From the law of nations little or no illustration of this subject can be expected. By that law the several states and governments spread over our globe, are considered as forming a society, not a nation. It has only been by very few comprehensive minds, such as those of Elizabeth [I] and the fourth Henry, that this last great idea has been even contemplated. 3dly. and chiefly, I shall examine the important question before us, by the Constitution of the United States, and the legitimate result of that valuable instrument.
. . .
Having thus disavowed my disapprobation of the purposes, for which the terms, state and sovereign, are frequently used, and of the object to which the application of the last of them is almost universally made; it is now proper that I should disclose the meaning that I assign to both, and the application, [455] which I make of the latter. In doing this, I shall have occasion incidently to evince, how true it is, that states and governments were made for man; and at the same time how true it is, that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and at last oppressed their master and maker.
... A state, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance. ...
Let a state be considered as subordinate to the people: But let everything else be subordinate to the state. The latter part of this position is equally necessary with the former
. For in the practice, and even at length, in the science of politics there has very frequently been a strong current against the natural order of things, and an inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. As the state has claimed precedence of the people; so, in the same inverted course of things, the government has often claimed precedence of the state; and to this perversion in the second degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning sovereignty owe their existence. The ministers, dignified very properly by the appellation of the magistrates, have wished, and have succeeded in their wish, to be considered as the sovereigns of the state. This second degree of perversion is confined to the old world, and begins to diminish even there: but the first degree is still too prevalent even in the several states, of which our union is composed. By a state I mean, a complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests: It has its rules: It has its rights: and it has its obligations. It may acquire property distinct from that of its members. It may incur debts to be discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts; and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this [456] feigned and artificial person, we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act, are men.
Is the foregoing description of a state a true description? It will not be questioned, but it is. . . .
[from page 457] ...As a citizen, I know the government of that state to be republican; and my short definition of such a government is,--one constructed on this principle, that the supreme power resides in the body of the people. As a judge of this court, I know, and can decide upon this knowledge, that the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the union, as a part of the "People of the United States," did not surrender the supreme or sovereign power to that state; but, as to the purposes of the union, retained it to themselves. As to the purposes of the union, therefore, Georgia is not a sovereign state. If the judicial decision of this case forms one of those purposes; the allegation, that Georgia is a sovereign state, is unsupported by the fact. Whether the judicial decision of this cause is, or is not, one of the purposes is a question which will be examined particularly in a subsequent part of my argument. . . .
[from page 461] III. I am thirdly, and chiefly, to examine the important question now before us, by the Constitution of the United States, and the legitimate result of that valuable instrument. Under this view, the question is naturally subdivided into two others. 1. Could the Constitution of the United States vest a jurisdiction over the state of Georgia? 2. Has that constitution vested such jurisdiction in this court? I have already remarked, that in the practice, and even in the science of politics, there has been frequently a strong current against the natural order of things; and an inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. This remark deserves a more particular illustration. Even in almost every nation, which has been denominated free, the state has assumed a supercillious pre-eminence above the people who have formed it: Hence the haughty notions of state independence, state sovereignty, and state supremacy. In despotic governments, the Government has usurped, in a similar manner, both upon the state and the people: Hence all arbitrary doctrines and pretensions concerning the supreme, absolute, and incontrolable, power of government. In each, man is degraded from his prime rank, which he ought to hold in human affairs: In the latter, the state as well as the man is degraded. Of both degradations, striking instances occur in history, in politics, and in common life. ...
...Another instance, equally strong, but still more astonishing, is drawn from the British government as described by Sir Willima Blackstone and his followers. As described by him and them, the British is a despotic government. It is a government without a people. In that government, as so described, the sovereignty is possessed by the parliament: In that parliament therefore, the supreme and absolute authority is vested: [fnt 7. 1 Bl. Com. 46-52, 147, 160-162.] In the parliament resides that incontrolable and despotic power, which, in all governments, must reside somewhere. The constituent parts of the parliament are the king's majesty, the lord's spiritual, the lord's temporal, and the commons. The king and these three estates together form the great corporation or body politic of the kingdom. All these sentiments are found verbatim [fnt 1. 1 Bl. Com. 153.] in the commentaries upon the laws of england. [fnt 2. 1 Bl. Com. 153.] The parliament form the great body politic of England! What then, or where, are the people? Nothing! No where! They are not so much as even the "baseless fabric of a vision!" From legal contemplation they totally disappear! Am I not warranted in saying, that, if this is a just description: a government, so, and justly so described, is a despotic government? Whether this description is or is not a just one, is a question of a very different import.
In the United States, and in the several states which compose the union, we go not so far: but still we go one step farther than we ought to go in this unnatural and inverted order of things. The states, rather than the people, for whose sakes the states exist, are frequently the objects which attract and arrest our principal attention. This, I believe, has produced much of the confusion and perplexity, which have appeared in several proceedings and several publications on state politics, and on the politics too, of the United States. Sentiments and expressions of this inaccurate kind prevail in our common, even in our convivial, language. ...

[from page 466] (Opinion of (William)) Cushing, Justice:--
. . .
[from page 468] ...The rights of individuals and the justice due to them, are as dear and precious as those of states. Indeed the latter are founded upon the former; and the great end and object of them must be to secure and support the rights of individuals, or else vain is government.
But still it may be insisted, that this will reduce the states to mere corporations, and take away all sovereignty. As to corporations, all states whatever, are corporations or bodies politic. The only question is, what are their powers? As to individual states and the United States the constitution marks the boundary of powers. Whatever power is deposited with the union by the people for their own necessary security, is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of states. This is, as it were, a self-evident proposition, at least it cannot be contested. Thus the power of declaring war, making peace, raising and supporting armies for public defence, levvying duties, excises, and taxes, if necessary, with many other powers, are lodged in Congress; and are a most necessary abridgement of state sovereignty. Again: the restrictions upon states; "No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation, coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold or silver a tender in payment of debts, pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts;" these with a number of others, are important restrictions on the power of state, and were thought necessary to maintain the union; and to establish some fundamental uniform principles of public justice, throughout the whole union. So that I think, no argument of force can be taken from the sovereignty of states. Where it has been abridged, it was thought necessary for the greater indispensable good of the whole. If the constitution is found inconvenient in practice in this or any other particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed out for amendment. But, while it remains, all offices legislative, executive, and judicial, both of the states and of the union, are bound by oath to support it.

[from page 469] (Opinion of (John)) Jay, Chief Justice:--The question we are now to decide has been accurately stated, viz., Is a state suable by individual citizens of another state?
It is said, that Georgia refuses to appear and answer to the plaintiff in this action, because she is a sovereign state, and therefore not liable to such actions. In order to ascertain the [470] merits of this objection, let us enquire, 1st. In what sense Georgia is a sovereign state. 2d. Whether suability is incompatible with such soveriegnty. 3d. Whether the constitution (to which Georgia is a party) authorizes such an action against her.
Suability and suable are words not in common use, but they concisely, correctly convey the ideas annexed to them.
1st. In determining the sense in which Georgia is a sovereign state, it may be useful to turn our attention to the political rights which emerged from the revolution: All the country now possessed by the United States was then a part of the dominions appertaining to the crown of Great Britian. Every acre of land in this country was then held mediately or immediately by grants from that crown. All the people of this country were then, subjects of the king of Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him: and all the civil authority then existing or exercised here, flowed from the head of the British Empire. They were in strict sense, fellow subjects, and in a variety of respects, one people. When the revolution commenced, the patriots did not assert that only the same affinity and social connection subsisted between the people, of the colonies, which subsisted between the people of Gaul, Britain and Spain, while Roman provinces, viz., only that affinity and social connection which result from the mere circumstances of being governed by the same prince; different ideas prevailed, and gave occasion to the congress of 1774 and 1775.
The revolution or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their more domestic concerns by state conventions, and other temporary arrangements. From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it, and it was then not an uncommon opinion, that the unappropriated lands, which [had] belonged to that crown, passed not to the people of the colony or states within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people; on whatever principles this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the revolution, combined with local convenience and considerations; the people nevertheless continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accordingly; afterwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of mutual confidence, they made a confederation of the states of the states, the basis of a general government. Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it; and then the people, in their collective and national capacity, established the present constitution. It is [471] remarkable that in establishing it, the people exercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and conscious of the plentitude of it, they declared with becoming dignity, "We, the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution." Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of sovereignty, establishing a constitution by which it was their will, that the state governments should be bound, and to which the state constitutions should be made to conform. Every state constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of the state to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the constitution of the united States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects, in a ceratain manner. By this great compact however, many perogatives were transferred to the national government, such as those of making war and peace, contracting alliances, coining money, etc. etc.
If then it be true, that the sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of each state, in the people of each state, it may be useful to compare these sovereignties, with those in Europe, that we may thence be enabled to judge, whether all the prerogatives which are allowed to the latter, are so essential to the former. There is reason to suspect that some of the difficulties which embarrass the present question, arise from inattention to differences which subsist between them.
It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a court of justice or elsewhere. That system contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant derives all franchise, immunities and privileges; it is easy to perceive that such a sovereign could not be amenable to a court of justice, or subjected to judicial control and actual constraint. It was of necessity, therefore, that suability, became incompatible with such sovereignty. Besides, the prince having all the executive powers, the judgment of the courts would, in fact, be only monitory, not mandatory to him, and a capacity to be advised, is a distinct thing from a capacity to be sued. The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here: at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless the African [472] slaves among us may be so called) and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.
From the differences existing between feudal sovereignties and governments founded on compacts, it necessarily follows that their respective prerogatives must differ. Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or state-sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually administers the government; here, never in a single instance; our governors are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same relation to their sovereigns, in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns. Their princes have personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but offical; not do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.

2d. The second object of enquiry now presents itself, viz., whether suability is compatible with state sovereignty:
Suability, by whom? Not a subject, for in this country there are none; not an inferior, for all the citizens being as to civil rights perfectly equal, there is not, in that respect, one citizen inferior to another. It is agreed, that one free citizen may sue another; the obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes of society demand it. ...
[from page 473] The only remnant of objection therefore that remains is, that the state is not bound to appear and answer as a defendant at the suit of an individual: but why it is unreasonable that she should be so bound, is hard to conjecture: That rule is said to be a bad one, which does not work both ways; the citizens of Georgia are content with a right of suing citizens of other states; but are not content that citizens of other states should have a right to sue them.
Let us now proceed to enquire whether Georgia has not, by being a party to the national compact, consented to be suable by individual citizens of another state. This enquiry naturally [474] leads our attention. 1st. To the design of the constitution. 2d. To the letter and express declaration in it.
Prior to the date of the constitution, the people had not any national tribunal to which they could resort for justice; ...
Prior also to that period, the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations; and it was their interest as well as their duty to provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed; in their national character and capacity, the United States were responsible to the foreign nations for the conduct of each state, relative to the laws of nations, and the performance of treaties: and there the inexpediency of referring all such questions to state courts, and particularly to the courts of delinquent states became apparent. While all the states were bound to protect each, and the citizens of each, it was highly proper and reasonable, that they should be in a capacity, not only to cause justice to be done to each, and the citizens of each; and that, not by violence and force, but in a stable, sedate, and regular course of judicial procedure.
[from page 475] It may be asked, what is the precise sense and latitude in which the words "to establish justice," as here used, are to be understood? The answer to this question will result from the provisions made in the constitution on this head. They are specified in the 2d. section of the 3d article, where is ordained, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to ten descriptions of case, viz., 1st. To all cases arising under this constitution; because the meaning, construction, and operation of a compact ought always to be ascertained by all the parties, or by authority derived from only one of them. 2d.

[More to come.]

[480] The following order was made:--By the Court. It is ordered, that the plaintiff in this cause do file his declaration on or before the first day of March next.
Ordered, that unless the said state shall either in due form appear, or show cause to the contrary in this court, by the first day of next term, judgment by default shall be entered against the said state. [fnt 1. In February Term, 1974, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and a writ of enquiry awarded. The writ, however, was not sued out and executed; so that this cause, and all the other suits against states, were swept at once from the records of the court, by the amendment to the Federal Constitution, agreeably to the unanimous determination of the judges, in Hollingsworth et al. v. Virginia, argued at February term, 1798.]


END

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