THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

(a CALIFORNIA corporation)

currently d.b.a.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF NEVADA

(a fictitious business)

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA	)	Supplemental Notice of
	)	Denial of Access
	)	to Court Records
versus	)
	)	Case number M96-1292
THOMAS M. THORNHILL, III	)
(a legal fiction)	)	Place: 201 Church Street
	)	Nevada City, California
	)	Date:
	)	ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUIRED
	)

Declarant, ___________________________________________ a natural born, white Man of sound mind and body, a National of the united States of America, and currently a Citizen of California; is here by Special Visitation only and without the benefit of the Assistance of Counsel; for the purpose of further advising this "court" that one of its employees has now repeatedly denied me the Right to inspect the public record of Case number M96-1292.

Declarant, with all due Respect and in full Good Faith, Declares, Swears, and Affirms:

Mssrs. Dover and Edwards, et al., have previously successfully destroyed Declarant's reasonable expectation of a fair, objective, and honest hearing within this particular "forum". Declarant is currently quite deficient in willing-suspension-of-disbelief and knows of no statute requiring him to make endless excuses or justifications for his employees. Under the current "politically correct" practice of "Zero Tolerance", if strict enforcement of every conceivable imputed violation is good for us Citizens, and great for our children, it must be totally excellent when applied to our employees.

1. On November 8, 1999, I came to the COUNTY OF NEVADA courthouse to continue my pursuit of documents (specifically the warrant for my arrest which was or should-have-been Returned [physically produced and delivered into the "court" along with my body] to the then-NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT on or about []) contained in the case file of M96-1292. Said case file is now maintained [at least] on film strip (microfilm to me) in the offices of the former NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT CLERK'S OFFICE [whatever it is now called] and is supposed to be available to the public during normal business hours.
I advised the same "clerk" who had assisted me on October 27, 1999, self-identified as Gay [? - last name still unknown to me] of some of the provisions of the case Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998), 63 Cal.App.4th 367 and presented her with pages 373-374 photocopied (copies attached and incorporated herein) from that case and advised her that, according to that case, it appeared that she bore the burden of proving that the documents I had lawfully requested were supposed to be unavailable to me.
I implicitly requested the copies I needed and was told by Gay [?] that the film strip reader/microfilm printer was currently "broken." I also advised Gay [?] that it appeared to me that if I should have to "go to court" on this matter, that she would probably be the Defendant. I very reluctantly scheduled a place on the "8:30 calendar" in "DEPARTMENT 1" of the now-"SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF NEVADA" for November 9, 1999.

2. On November 9, 1999, I came to the COUNTY OF NEVADA courthouse about 8:15 A.M., delivered two copies of the document "Notice of Denial of Access to Court Records" to the former NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT CLERK'S OFFICE; they were marked "Received"; and I retained one copy for my records. I was directed to go to "DEPARTMENT 1" of the now-"SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF NEVADA," so I did. The room was locked.

3. About 8:35 A.M., the room was unlocked and those having business with the "court" entered. In "DEPARTMENT 1" of the now-"SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF NEVADA," my matter finally arrived on calendar at about 10:20 A.M. With no court reporter actually creating a Record as I had requested in writing; Gay [?] (now identified by Mr. Holmer as "Madam Clerk") told Mr. Holmer in open court, very informally and not under oath that the Record of Case M96-1292 (the film strip/microfilm) was "not available" for his inspection because it had been "sent out". The matter was "continued".

4. I do not believe in coincidences. "Madam Clerk" appears to be one of the senior employees of the former NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT CLERK'S OFFICE. If the film strip/microfilm was, in fact, "unavailable" for whatever reason, I believe "Madam Clerk" is probably one of the few persons who would be in a position to make or "help" it to become "unavailable".

5. I have this psychological quirk such that when I am prevented from accessing information that I know I have a Right to, I have to assume that there is something that I NEED to know about that information, and I believe I have a duty and an obligation to investigate the matter.
I WILL, in the fulness of time, possess the Documents I lawfully seek.

6. If, hypothetically, this series of events were in fact an attempt to conceal from me documents which concern me and my private affairs, the next logical step would be for the potential concealer to "massage" or "correct" the Record. That, unfortunately, would become a crime rather than just a mistake.

7. The CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS requires of judges:
"CANON 1. A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
"An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensible to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. ..."

"CANON 2. A JUDGE SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL OF THE JUDGE'S ACTIVITIES
"A. Promoting Public Confidence. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
"B. Use of the Prestige of Judicial Office
"(1) A judge shall not allow family, political, or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that any individual is in a special position to influence the judge.
"(2) A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the pecuniary or personal interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge testify voluntarily as a character witness. ..."

8. Declarant suggests that the "court" may wish to counsel its employee, Gay [?] /"Madam Clerk" as to the proper lawful duties of her position as articulated by the California Legislature and the California courts. For the "court's" convenience, Declarant is providing what appear to be appropriate statutes and decisions of the higher courts of this state on this matter.

A. "In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
"The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created." THE GOVERNMENT CODE (1999), section 54950.

B. "It is an emphatic postulate of both civil and penal law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof. Of course it is based on a fiction, because no man can know all the law, but is a maxim which the law itself does not permit any one to gainsay. ... The rule rests on public necessity; the welfare of society and the safety of the state depend upon its enforcement. If a person accused of a crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of the law which he violated, immunity from punishment would in most cases result. No system of criminal justice could be sustained with such an element in it to obstruct the course of its administration. The plea would be universally made, and would lead to interminable questions incapable of solution. Was the defendant in fact ignorant of the law? Was his ignorance of the law excusable? The denser the ignorance the greater would be the exemption from liability. ..." People v. O'Brien (1892), 96 Cal. 171, 176.

C. "[page 490] The foregoing cases support the obvious rule that plaintiffs, as public servants, have the implied duty to support the form of government lawfully chosen by the people whom they are employed to represent, to act as representatives of the people and not to advocate destruction of the government by force or violence. By accepting public employment they forego any privilege they may have had as private citizens to advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence. It is inconceivable that they should be permitted to represent the people, be supported by the people, and at the same time have the privilege of advocating the overthrow of the very government by which they are employed and obtain their livelihood. ...
"...If they desire to advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States, the State of California, or the county of Los Angeles, they may do so by any and all lawful means after first resigning from their public employment. ... A servant employed by the people is held to an even higher standard, and his employer, the people, not only may, but it is their duty through their authorized representatives to make proper inquiry as to his fitness for the position which he occupies and as to his intentions and acts relative to his loyalty to the people." Steiner v. Darby (1948), 88 Cal.App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429; appeal dismissed (1949), 338 U.S. 327, 94 L.Ed. 144, 70 S.Ct. 161.

D. "The right of a citizen to inspect public writings has its origin in the common law. In State v. McGrath, 104 Mont. [67 P.2d 838, 841], the common law rule is stated thusly: "At common law every person was entitled to the inspection, either personally or by his agent, of public records, including legislative, executive, and judicial records, provided he had an interest therin such as to enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the documents or records sought could furnish evidence or necessary information." (See also North v. Foley, 238 App. Div. 731 [265 N.Y.S. 780]; Palacios v. Corbett (Tex. Civ. App.) 172 S.W. 777, 781; 76 C.J.S., Records, sec. 35, p. 133; 45 Am.Jur., pp. 426-427.)" Craemer v. Superior Court (1968), 265 Cal.App.2d 216, 220, fnt. 3.

E. "(2) Although the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, secs. 6250ff.) does not apply to court records (see sec. 6252, subd. (a)), there can be no doubt that court records are public records, [fn. 2. ...Public status of court records was established by former sections of the Code of Civil Procedure 1892, 1894, and 1888, and by present section 1904. California courts have consistently classified judicial records as public writings. (Hibernia Savings and Loan Society v. Boyd, 155 Cal. 193 [100 P. 239].) ... Public status of court records can also be inferred from the language of Government Code section 69503, which, in authorizing the destruction of superior court records, requires that "(c) the county clerk shall maintain for the use of the public a microphotographic film print of copy of each will, document, record, instrument, book, deposition, transcript, or other paper so destroyed..." (Italics added.) Judicial record is defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 1904 as the record or official entry of the proceedings in a court of justice or the official act of a judicial officer.] available to the public in general, including news reporters, unless a specific exception makes specific records nonpublic. (See Craemer v. Superior Court (1968) 256 Cal.App.2d 216, 220-222 [71 Cal.Rptr. 193].) To prevent secrecy in public affairs public policy makes public records and documents available for public inspection by newsmen and members of the general public alike. (Craemer, supra, at p. 222; ...
"(5) What is more, the public has a legitimate interest in access to public records, such as court documents, which establish and perpetuate long-term testamentary trusts. If public court business is conducted in private, it becomes impossible to expose corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism. For this reason traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence distrusts secrecy in judicial proceedings and favors a policy of maximum public access to proceedings and records of judicial tribunals..." Estate of Hearst (1977), 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 782, 784, 136 Cal.Rptr. 821.

F. "The fundamental notion of public access to court proceedings is grounded in the common law of England and the United States. (Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) 448 U.S. 555, 569 [100 S.Ct. 2814, 2823, 65 L.Ed.2d 973] ["at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open"].) Based on this history of openness, the public's right of access to such court proceedings is now recognized under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at pp. 575-581 [100 S.Ct. at pp. 2826-2829].) Similarly, the California Constitution, article I, section 2, subdivision (a), and section 15 provide for a right of access to judicial proceedings. (See also Pen. Code, sec. 686.)
"Records from judicial proceedings, including evidence introduced at such proceedings, are also subject to a public right of access. However, this right exists not by virtue of the First Amendment (Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-610 [98 S.Ct. 1306, 1317-1318, 55 L.Ed.2d 570]; cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469, 495 [95 S.Ct. 1029, 1046, 43 L.Ed.2d 328]), but rather as a continuation of the common law right to inspect and copy judical records. (See In re Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc (D.C. Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 609, 612 [209 App.D.C. 354].) (1) The right of access "serves the important functions of ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings in particular and of the law enforcement process more generally." (United States v. Hubbard (D.C. Cir. 1980) 650 F.2d 293, 315 [208 App.D.C. 399], fn omitted.)
"However, the fundamental nature of the right gives rise to a "presumption" in favor of public access. (Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 569 [100 S.Ct. at p. 2823].)[fnt. 2]
"California also recognizes the presumption of accessibility of judicial records in criminal cases and allows a trial court limited authority to preclude such access. "[W]here there is no contrary statute or countervailing public policy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed. In this regard the term 'public policy' means anything which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel has a tendency to be injurious to the public or the public good." (Craemer v. Superior Court (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 216, 222 [71 Cal.Rptr. 193]; cf. Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 785 [136 Cal.Rptr. 821]..." KNSD Channels 7/39 v. Superior Court (1998), 63 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1202-1204, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 595.

9. Since Declarant is not a "licensed" Attorney, nor any other "legal" representative, Declarant makes NO Motion and is seeking NO Relief from the "court".
Declarant is merely performing his duty as a Private Citizen to advise this "court" that it appears to have a performance problem with one of its personnel. Once the "court's" internal problem is corrected, I will again apply to the former NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT CLERK'S OFFICE and undoubtedly receive the copies I lawfully requested. If the "court" cannot correct its own internal problem, I suppose I will have to help it, through the appropriate processes of THE COUNTY OF NEVADA.
Should this "court" wish to direct Declarant to a lawful court of the State of California, Declarant is willing to remove this matter to that forum.

I Declare and Affirm, under the penalties provided for the crime of Perjury in the Law of the United States of America and in the Law of the State of California, that the foregoing is True, Accurate, and Complete, to the best of my knowledge, belief, and understanding at this time.

Verified by my hand, this Day, the ______________ day of___________________ in the year of Our Lord, one thousand, nine hundred and ninty-nine, in ____________________________city,
_________________________county,
____________________________state, United States of America.

Signature: _______________________________________
Thomas Murrell Thornhill III