Thomas Murrell Thornhill III
c/o Box 1755, U.S.P.S.
Nevada City, California, united states of America
In my own person, without the assistance of counsel
No telephone service maintained
[Date]

Notice of Applicable California law concerning the standing of a district attorney.

OFFICIAL NOTICE REQUESTED (West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code (2001), § 11515)
JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUIRED (West's Ann.Cal.Evid.Code (2001), §§ 451, 453, 459).

Declarant, ___________________________________________, is a competent witness and does Solemnly state that:

1.a. I am a natural born, adult white Man, one of the people of the united states of America and one of the people of California.

1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney; so, of necessity, I am acting at all times within my right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in The California Constitution (2001), Art. 1, Sec. 1 (from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov./.const/.article_1 [as of May 9, 2001]):

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
2. I had reason to research the California law concerning the standing of persons purporting to occupy the office of district attorney. I present some results of my research here.

3.a. A California appellate court has held:

...it is now well-settled law that a prosecuting officer is a quasi-judicial officer who is called upon to determine upon evidence submitted to him whether or not a criminal offense has been committed. It is equally well settled upon principles of public policy that such officer is immune from civil liability for his official acts when he determines that an offense has been committed by a defendant and when he prosecutes such defendant therefore. (Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 277 [44 Pac. (2d) 592], and authorities therein cited.) Downey v. Allen (1939), 36 Cal.App.2d 269, 273.
3.b. A California appellate court subsequently defined "quasi" thus:
The term "quasi" used as prefix means "analogous to" (Black's Law Dict. (4th ed.); or as "having some resemblance (as to function, effect or status) to a given thing." (Webster's Third New Internat. Dict.) Webster's defines the term "quasi-legislative" as "having a partly legislative character by possession of the right to make rules and regulations having the force of law" and as "essentially legislative in character but not within the legislative power or function or belonging to the legislative branch of government as constitutionally defined." (Webster's Third New Internat. Dict.) Hubbs v. People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. (1974), 36 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1008; 112 Cal.Rptr. 172.
3.c. It is an undisputed fact that the entry for "quasi" in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev. (13th reprint (1975)), p. 1410, reads in full:
QUASI. Lat. As if; almost as it were; analogous to. This term is used in legal phraseology to indicate that one subject resembles another, with which it is compared, in certain characteristics. but that there are intrinsic and material differences between them. Bicknell v. Garrett, 1 Wash.2d 564, 96 P.2d 592, 595, 126 A.L.R. 258: Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wash.2d 227, 155 P2d 500, 503, 507, 157 A.L.R. 530. Marker v. State, 25 Ala.App. 91, 142 So. 105, 106. It is often prefixed to English words, implying mere appearance or want of reality. State v. Jeffery, 188 Minn. 476, 247 N.W. 692, 693.
It is exclusively a term of classification. Prefixed to a term of Roman law, it implies that the conception to which it serves as a index is connected with the conception with which the comparison is instituted by a strong superficial analogy or resemblance. It negatives the notion of identity, but points out that the conceptions are sufficiently similar for one to be classed as the sequel to the other. Maine, Anc. Law, 332. Civilians use the expressions "quasi contractus," "quasi delictum," "quasi possessio," "quasi traditio," etc.
As to quasi "Affinity," "Contract," "Corporation," "Crime," "Delict," "Deposit," "Derelict," "Easement," "Entail," "Fee," "In Rem," "Municipal Corporation," "Offense," "Partners," "Personalty," "Possession," "Posthumous Child," "Purchase," "Realty," "Tenant," "Tort," "Traditio," "Trustee," and "Usufruct," see those titles.
3.d. It is an undisputed fact that the entry for "quasi-legislative" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1968), p. 1861, reads in full:
quasi-legislative \"+\ adj 1 : having a partly legislative character by possession of the right to make rules and regulations having the force of law < the Interstate Commerce Commission is a quasi-legislative agency > 2 : essentially legislative in character but not within the legislative power or function or belonging to the legislative branch of government as constitutionally defined < quasi-legislative powers >< quasi-legislative authority >
4.a. It is an undisputed fact that the entry for "Public policy" in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (13th Reprint, 1998), p. 1231, reads in full:
Public policy. Community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare, and the like; it is the general and well-settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having due regard to all circumstances of each particular relation and situation. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas, & Sur. Co. D.C.Ohio, 243 F.Supp. 793, 796.
4.b. It is an undisputed fact that there is no entry for "Public policy" in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (12th Reprint (1988), pp. 1104-1109.

4.c. It is an undisputed fact that there is no entry for "Public policy" in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev. (13th reprint (1975)), pp. 1393-1396.

4.d. Judicial glossing of the term "public policy" in California includes:

1. "All things which are opposed to moral precepts may be said to be against public policy, and thus we have a great and uncertain field opened before us." People v. Munroe (1893), 100 Cal. 664, 668.

2. As to whether an agreement is or is not contrary to public policy, we quote from 14 C. J. 424, section 360: "If an agreement binds the parties or either of them to do, or if the consideration is to do, something opposed to the public policy of the state or nation it is illegal and absolutely void, however solemnly made. It is not easy to give a precise definition of public policy. It is perhaps correct to say that public policy is that principle of law which holds that no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good, which may be designated, as it sometimes has been, the policy of the law or public policy in relation to the administration of the law. Where a contract belongs to this class it will be declared void, although in the particular instance no injury to the public may have resulted. In other words, its validity is determined by its general tendency at the time it is made, and if this is opposed to the interest of the public it will be invalid, even though the intent of the parties was good and no injury to the public would result in the particular case." Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy (1926), 78 Cal.App.362, 373-374.

3. The declaration of public policy is essentially a legislative function and although the courts occasionally intrude that field, a declaration by the legislature has made such a declaration with respect to that public policy concerning garnishments by a judgment creditor which is contrary to that established by the courts. (emphasis added.) Wilson v. Walters (1941), 19 Cal.2d 111, 115, 119 P.2d 340.

4. Also in Noble v. Palo Alto, 89 Cal.App. 47, the court said at pp. 50-51 [264 P. 529]: "Public policy is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which its application may not be disputed. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts (§ 546), says: 'It has never been defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of definition in the same manner as fraud.' By 'public policy' is intended that principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. ... Public Policy means . . . anything which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel is against public policy. . . ." Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks etc. Assn. (1953), 41 Cal.2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721.

5. In this regard the term "public policy" means anything which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel has a tendency to be injurious to the public or the public good. (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks etc. Assn., 41 Cal.2d 567, 575 [261 P.2d. 721]; Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 188 [344 P.2d 25].) The public policy of a state is found in its constitution, acts of the legislature, and decisions of its courts. [same cites.] By the same token, where the federal Constitution and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are made applicable to the states, the public policy there embodied becomes that of the states. [cites omitted.] Craemer v. Superior Court (1968), 265 Cal.App.2d 216, 222.

5.a. West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code (2001), § 24000 plainly lists a district attorney as a county officer.
The officers of a county are:
(a) A district attorney.
5.b. A line of California cases has glossed the plain language of West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code (2001), § 24000(a).
1. It may first be conceded that a district attorney is a county officer in at least a geographic sense--that is to say, that the exercise of his powers as such is limited territorially to the county for which he has been elected. But, considering the nature and purposes of county governments, he is also in a sense a state officer, or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, a part of a political organization which is itself an agent of the state.... But this discussion, in view of the conclusion at which we have arrived upon points the decision of which is decisive of this case, may well be regarded as unnecessary or academic. Singh v. Superior Court (1919), 44 Cal.App. 64, 65-67, 185 P. 985.

2. A prosecutor ... is a quasi-judicial officer and he is also an executive officer. It was decided in Singh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App. 64 [185 Pac. 985], that a district attorney is an executive, as distinguished from a judicial officer within the meaning of section 67 of the Penal Code.... It is the nature of the duty performed that determines whether it is a judicial act--not the name or classification of the officer who performs it, and many who are properly classified as executive officers are invested with limited judicial powers. Pearson v. Reed (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 277, 286-287.

3. The district attorney is a county officer. Section 24000(a) of the Government Code so provides. For some purposes he is a state officer. (Singh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 64 [185 P. 985].) Galli v. Brown (1952), 110 Cal.App.2d 764, 776, 243 P.2d 920.

4. Counties are political subdivisions of the state for purposes of government (Los Angeles County v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal.App.2d 160 [28 Cal.Rptr. 32]), but they are also classified as quasi corporations and exercise corporate powers (Whelan v. Bailey, 1 Cal.App.2d 334 [36 p.2d 709].) ... The officers of the county include "A district attorney" (§ 24000, subd. (a))...
It appears that the district attorney of a county wears two hats. He acts as both a county officer and a state officer in the exercise of the powers for which he has been elected (Galli v. Brown, 110 Cal.App.2d 764 [243 p.2d 920]; Singh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App. 64 [185 P. 985].) The dual functions of the district attorney were discussed in Sloane v. Hammond, 81 Cal.App. 590, 599 [254 P. 648] wherein the court stated: "It may be conceded that for some purposes a district attorney is a county officer and as such exercises some of the 'powers' of a county. When, however, he conducts prosecutions for the punishment of crimes denounced by act of the legislature, he certainly discharges functions which pertain to the state and not to the county, whether or not, technically he is to be deemed a state officer when he is engaged in the discharge of such function." (emphasis added.) Pritchess v. Superior Court (1969), 2 Cal.App.3d 653, 656-657, 83 Cal.Rptr. 41.

5. With regard to the fact that district attorneys in California can be removed from office in the same fashion as other county officers, this does not mean they are within the control of the county. ... We conclude that a California district attorney is a state officer when deciding whether to prosecute an individual. ...
Although a California district attorney is a state officer when deciding to prosecute an individual, this is not to say that district attorneys in California are state officers for all purposes. (emphasis added.) Weiner v. San Diego County (9th Cir. 2000), 210 F.3d 1025, 1030-1031.

5.c. Declarant makes the reasonable inference from the foregoing information that the courts in California are unable to clearly determine what status or standing a district attorney lawfully has.

6. A district attorney and each attorney employed by him/her is required, pursuant to West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code (2001), § 6125, to be active members of The State Bar of California:

No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar.
7.a. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code (2001), § 6001 reads:
The State Bar of California is a public corporation. It is hereinafter designated as the State Bar.
The State Bar has perpetual succession and a seal and it may sue and be sued. It may, for the purpose of carrying into effect and promoting its objectives [whatever those may be]:
(a) Make contracts.
(b) Borrow money, contract debts, issue bonds, notes and debentures and secure the payment or performance of its obligations.
(c) Own, hold, use, manage and deal in and with real and personal property.
(d) Construct, alter, maintain and repair buildings and other improvements to real property.
(e) Purchase, lease, obtain options upon, acquire by gift, bequest, devise or otherwise, any real or personal property or any interest therein.
(f) Sell, lease, exchange, convey, transfer, assign, encumber, pledge, dispose of any of its real or personal property or any interest therein, including without limitation all or any portion of its income or revenue from membership fees paid or payable by members.
(g) Do all other acts incidental to the foregoing or necessary or expedient for the administration of its affairs and the attainment of its purposes.
Pursuant to those powers enumerated in subdivisions (a) to (g), inclusive, it is recognized that the State Bar has authority to raise revenue in addition to that provided for in Section 6140 and other statutory provisions. The State Bar is empowered to raise that additional revenue by any lawful means, including, but not limited to, the creation of foundations or not-for-profit corporations.
No law of this state restricting, or prescribing a mode of procedure for the exercise of powers of state public bodies or state agencies, or classes thereof, including, but not by way of limitation, the provisions contained in Division 3 (commencing with Section 11000), Division 4 (commencing with Section 16100), and Part 1 (commencing with Section 18000) and Part 2 (commencing with Section 18500) of Division 5, of Title 2 of the Government Code, shall be applicable to the State Bar, unless the Legislature expressly so declares.
7.b. Declarant's research into the final paragraph of West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code (2001), § 6001(g) in West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code (2001) reveals:
(1) Division 3 of West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 11000 et seq. relates to The State of California, Executive Department.
(2) Division 4 of West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 16100 et seq. relates to The State of California, Fiscal Matters.
(3) Division 5, Part 1 of West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 18000 et seq. relates to The State of California, Personnel.
(4) Division 5, Part 2 of West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 18500 et seq. relates to The State of California, Civil Service.

7.c. The California Supreme Court has held:

We recognize certain similarities between the bar and a labor union which would support imposing upon the bar those restrictions which limit union expenditures. The bar is an association composed of members of a particular profession. [p. 1162]
In Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 548 [7 Cal.Rptr. 109, 354 P.2d 637] we said that this last provision demonstrates "[t]hat the Legislature considered the State Bar as at least akin to a state public body or agency" (p. 565),... [p. 1164]
In light of the structure of the California State Bar, as imposed in the state Constitution, statutes, and court decisions, we conclude that the activities of the bar should be governed by the standards applicable to governmental agencies. (information in brackets and emphasis added.) Keller v. State Bar (1989), 47 Cal.3d 1152, 1162-1173, 255 Cal.Rptr. 542, 767 P.2d 1020; rev. (1990) 496 U.S. 1, 110 L.Ed.2d 1, 110 S.Ct. 2228.
7.d. The United States Supreme Court held, in reversing Keller v. State Bar:
There is, by contrast, a substantial analogy between the relationship of the State Bar and its members, on the one hand, and the relationship of employee unions and their members, on the other. ...
But the very specialized characteristics of the State Bar of California discussed above served to distinguish it from the role of the typical government official or agency....
The State Bar of California was created, not to participate in the general government of the State, but to provide specialized professional advice to those with the ultimate responsibility of governing the legal profession. Its members and officers are such not because they are citizens or voters, but because they are lawyers. (emphasis added.) Keller v. State Bar (1990), 496 U.S. 1,13, 110 L.Ed.2d 1, 110 S.Ct. 2228.
7.e. In reliance on the foregoing, Declarant makes the reasonable inference that The State Bar of California is not lawfully nor legally a part of the government of The State of California.

8.a. West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 53051 reads:

(a) Within seventy (70) days after the date of commencement of its legal existence, the governing body of each public agency shall file with the Secretary of State on a form prescribed by the Secretary of State and also with the county clerk of each county in which the public agency maintains an office, a statement of the following facts:
1. The full, legal name of the public agency.
2. The official mailing address of the governing body of the public agency.
3. The name and residence or business address of each member of the governing body of the public agency.
4. The name, title, and residence or business address of the chairman, president, or other presiding officer, and clerk or secretary of the governing body of such public agency.
(b) Within 10 days after any change in the facts required to be stated pursuant to subdivision (a), an amended statement containing the information required by subdivision (a) shall be filed as provided therein. The information submitted to the Secretary of State shall be on a form prescribed by the Secretary of State.
(c) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State and of the county clerk of each county to establish and maintain an indexed "Roster of Public Agencies," to be so designated, which shall contain all information filed as required in subdivisions (a) and (b), which roster is hereby declared to be a public record.
8.b. West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 53050 reads:
The term "public agency," as used in this article, means a district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state, but does not include the state or a county, city and county, or city.
8.c. Declarant makes the reasonable inference that The State Bar of California plainly falls within the definition of "public agency" in West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 53050 and, hence, the requirement to register stated in West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code, § 53051.

9.a. The United States Supreme Court has held:

Under the ancient English system, criminal prosecutions were instituted at the suit of private prosecutors, to which the King lent his mname in the interest of the public peace and good order of society. In such cases the usual practice was to prepare the proposed indictment and lay it before the grand jury for their consideration. There was much propriety in this, as the most valuable function of the grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will. Hale v. Henkel (1906), 201 U.S. 43, 50 L.Ed 652, 659, 26 S.Ct. 370.
9.b. Declarant makes the reasonable inference from the foregoing information that The State Bar of California is functioning in a similar, if not identical, manner to the referenced "ancient English ... private prosecutors".

10.a. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code (2001), §§ 17900, 17910, 17915, 17917, and 17918 read:
(1) § 17900:

(a) As used in this chapter, "fictitious business name" means:
(1) In the case of an individual, a name that does not include the surname of the individual or a name that suggests the existence of additional owners.
(2) In the case of a partnership or other association of persons, other than a limited partnership that has filed a certificate of limited partnership with the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 15621 of the Corporations Code, a foreign limited partnership that has filed an application for registration with the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 15692 of the Corporations Code, a registered limited liability partnership that has filed a registration pursuant to Section 15049 or 16953 of the Corporations Code, or a foreign limited liability partnership that has filed an application for registration pursuant to Section 15055 or 16959 of the Corporations Code, a name that does not include the surname of each general partner or a name that suggests the existence of additional owners.
(3) In the case of a corporation, any name other than the corporate name stated in its articles of incorporation.
(4) In the case of a limited partnership that has filed a certificate of limited partnership with the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 15621 of the Corporations Code and in the case of a foreign limited partnership that has filed an application for registration with the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 15692 of the Corporations Code, any name other than the name of the limited partnership as on file with the Secretary of State.
(5) In the case of a limited liability company, any name other than the name stated in its articles of organization and in the case of a foreign limited liability company that has filed an application for registration with the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 17451 of the Corporations Code, any name other than the name of the limited liability company as on file with the Secretary of State.
(b) A name that suggests the existence of additional owners within the meaning of subdivision (a) is one which includes such words as "Company," "& Company," "& Son," "& Sons," "& Associates," "Brothers," and the like, but not words that merely describe the business being conducted.
(2) § 17910:
Every person who regularly transacts business in this state for profit under a fictitious business name shall:
(a) File a fictitious business name statement in accordance with this chapter not later than 40 days from the time he commences to transact such business; and
(b) File a new statement in accordance with this chapter on or before the date of expiration of the statement on file.
(3) § 17915:
The fictitious business name statement shall be filed with the clerk of the county in which the registrant has his principal place of business in this state or, if he has no place of business in this state, with the Clerk of Sacramento County.
(4) § 17917:
(a) Within 30 days after a fictitious business name statement has been filed pursuant to this chapter, the registrant shall cause a statement in the form prescribed by subdivision (a) of Section 17913 to be published pursuant to Government Code Section 6064 in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the principal place of business of the registrant is located or, if there is no such newspaper in that county, then in a newspaper of general circulation in an adjoining county. If the registrant does not have a place of business in this state, the notice shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in Sacramento County.
(b) Subject to the requirements of subdivision (a), the newspaper selected for the publication of the statement should be one that circulates in the area where the business is to be conducted.
c) Where a new statement is required because the prior statement has expired under subdivision (a) of Section 17920, the new statement need not be published unless there has been a change in the information required in the expired statement.
(d) An affidavit showing the publication of the statement shall be filed with the county clerk within 30 days after the completion of the publication.
(5) § 17918:
No person transacting business under a fictitious business name contrary to the provisions of this chapter, or his assignee, may maintain any action upon or on account of any contract made, or transaction had, in the fictitious business name in any court of this state until the fictitious business name statement has been executed, filed, and published as required by this chapter. For the purposes of this section, the failure to comply with subdivision (b) of Section 17917 does not constitute transacting business contrary to the provisions of this chapter.
10.b. Declarant makes the reasonable inference that the foregoing sections of the Business & Professions Code apply to a district attorney engaged in a business or profession as a member of The State Bar of California.

10.c. Declarant makes the reasonable inference that West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code (2001), § 17918 bars said district attorney from doing business in the fictitious name of THE OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

I certify under the laws of the state of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Sworn and Subscribed this Day, the ______________ day of___________________ in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and one, at ____________________________ city, ________________________ county, ____________________________ state, the united states of America.

_______________________________________

END


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